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This thesis examines possible philosophies to account for the practice of mathematics, exploring the metaphysical, ontological, and epistemological outcomes of each possible theory. Through a study of the two most probable ideas, mathematical platonism and fictionalism, I focus on the compelling argument for platonism given by an appeal to the sciences. The Indispensability Argument establishes the power of explanation seen in the relationship between mathematics and empirical science. Cases of this explanatory power illustrate how we might have reason to believe in the existence of mathematical entities present within our best scientific theories. The second half of this discussion surveys Newtonian Cosmology and other inconsistent theories as they pose issues that have received insignificant attention within the philosophy of mathematics. The application of these inconsistent theories raises questions about the effectiveness of mathematics to model physical systems.

We compute the partial isomorphism rank, in the sense Scott and Karp, of a pair of ordinal structures using an Ehrenfeucht-Fraisse game. A complete formula is proven by induction given any two arbitrary ordinals written in Cantor normal form.

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The Backward Induction strategy for the Centipede Game leads us to a counterfactual reasoning paradox, The Centipede Game paradox. The counterfactual reasoning proving the backward induction strategy for the game appears to rely on the players in the game not choosing that very same backward induction strategy. The paradox is a general paradox that applies to backward induction reasoning in sequential, perfect information games. Therefore, the paradox is not only problematic for the Centipede Game, but it also affects counterfactual reasoning solutions in games similar to the Centipede Game. The Centipede Game is a prime illustration of this paradox in counterfactual reasoning. As a result, this paper will use a material versus subjunctive/counterfactual conditional analysis to provide a theoretical resolution to the Centipede Game, with the hope that a similar solution can be applied to other areas where this paradox may appear. The solution involves delineating between the epistemic systems of the players and the game theorists.

FARIAS, Pablo Mayckon Silva. Um estudo sobre as origens da Lógica Matemática e os limites da sua aplicabilidade à formalização da Matemática. 2007. 110 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em ciência da computação)- Universidade Federal do Ceará, Fortaleza-CE, 2007. / Submitted by Elineudson Ribeiro (elineudsonr@gmail.com) on 2016-07-12T14:54:53Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2007_dis_pmsfarias.pdf: 859405 bytes, checksum: 9d580356cce3820f228499085b2e3cde (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Rocilda Sales (rocilda@ufc.br) on 2016-07-20T13:48:23Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2007_dis_pmsfarias.pdf: 859405 bytes, checksum: 9d580356cce3820f228499085b2e3cde (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-20T13:48:23Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2007_dis_pmsfarias.pdf: 859405 bytes, checksum: 9d580356cce3820f228499085b2e3cde (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 / This work is a study about the origins of Mathematical Logic and the limits of its applicability to the formal development of Mathematics. Firstly, Dedekind’s arithmetical theory is presented, which was the first theory to provide a precise definition for natural numbers and to demonstrate relying on it all facts commonly known about them. Peano’s axiomatization for Arithmetic is also presented, which in a sense simplified Dedekind’s theory. Then, Frege’s Begriffsschrift is presented, the formal language from which modern Logic originated, and in it are represented Frege’s basic definitions concerning the notion of number. Afterwards, a summary of important topics on the foundations of Mathematics from the first three decades of the twentieth century is presented, beginning with the paradoxes in Set Theory and ending with Hilbert’s formalist doctrine. At last, are presented, in general terms, Gödel’s incompleteness. theorems and Turing’s computability concept, which provided precise answers to the two most important points in Hilbert’s program, to wit, a direct proof of consistency for Arithmetic and the decision problem, respectively. Keywords: 1. Mathematical Logic 2. Foundations of Mathematics 3. Gödel’s incompleteness theorems / Este trabalho é um estudo sobre as origens da Lógica Matemática e os limites da sua aplicabilidade ao desenvolvimento formal da Matemática. Primeiramente, é apresentada a teoria aritmética de Dedekind, a primeira teoria a fornecer uma definição precisa para os números naturais e com base nela demonstrar todos os fatos comumente conhecidos a seu respeito. É também apresentada a axiomatização da Aritmética feita por Peano, que de certa forma simplificou a teoria de Dedekind. Em seguida, é apresentada a ome{german}{Begriffsschrift} de Frege, a linguagem formal que deu origem à Lógica moderna, e nela são representadas as definições básicas de Frege a respeito da noção de número. Posteriormente, é apresentado um resumo de questões importantes em fundamentos da Matemática durante as primeiras três décadas do século XX, iniciando com os paradoxos na Teoria dos Conjuntos e terminando com a doutrina formalista de Hilbert. Por fim, são apresentados, em linhas gerais, os teoremas de incompletude de Gödel e o conceito de computabilidade de Turing, que apresentaram respostas precisas às duas mais importantes questões do programa de Hilbert, a saber, uma prova direta de consistência para a Aritmética e o problema da decisão, respectivamente.

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento CientÃfico e TecnolÃgico / Este trabalho à um estudo sobre as origens da LÃgica MatemÃtica e os limites da sua aplicabilidade ao desenvolvimento formal da MatemÃtica. Primeiramente, à apresentada a teoria aritmÃtica de Dedekind, a primeira teoria a fornecer uma definiÃÃo precisa para os nÃmeros naturais e com base nela demonstrar todos os fatos comumente conhecidos a seu respeito. à tambÃm apresentada a axiomatizaÃÃo da AritmÃtica feita por Peano, que de certa forma simplificou a teoria de Dedekind. Em seguida, à apresentada a ome{german}{Begriffsschrift} de Frege, a linguagem formal que deu origem à LÃgica moderna, e nela sÃo representadas as definiÃÃes bÃsicas de Frege a respeito da noÃÃo de nÃmero. Posteriormente, à apresentado um resumo de questÃes importantes em fundamentos da MatemÃtica durante as primeiras trÃs dÃcadas do sÃculo XX, iniciando com os paradoxos na Teoria dos Conjuntos e terminando com a doutrina formalista de Hilbert. Por fim, sÃo apresentados, em linhas gerais, os teoremas de incompletude de GÃdel e o conceito de computabilidade de Turing, que apresentaram respostas precisas Ãs duas mais importantes questÃes do programa de Hilbert, a saber, uma prova direta de consistÃncia para a AritmÃtica e o problema da decisÃo, respectivamente. / This work is a study about the origins of Mathematical Logic and the limits of its applicability to the formal development of Mathematics. Firstly, Dedekindâs arithmetical theory is presented, which was the first theory to provide a precise definition for natural numbers and to demonstrate relying on it all facts commonly known about them. Peanoâs axiomatization for Arithmetic is also presented, which in a sense simplified Dedekindâs theory. Then, Fregeâs Begriffsschrift is presented, the formal language from which modern Logic originated, and in it are represented Fregeâs basic definitions concerning the notion of number. Afterwards, a summary of important topics on the foundations of Mathematics from the first three decades of the twentieth century is presented, beginning with the paradoxes in Set Theory and ending with Hilbertâs formalist doctrine. At last, are presented, in general terms, GÃdelâs incompleteness. theorems and Turingâs computability concept, which provided precise answers to the two most important points in Hilbertâs program, to wit, a direct proof of consistency for Arithmetic and the decision problem, respectively. Keywords: 1. Mathematical Logic 2. Foundations of Mathematics 3. GÃdelâs incompleteness theorems

In 1942, Paul C. Rosenbloom put out a definition of a Post algebra after Emil L. Post published a collection of systems of many–valued logic. Post algebras became easier to handle following George Epstein’s alternative definition. As conceived by Rosenbloom, Post algebras were meant to capture the algebraic properties of Post’s systems; this fact was not verified by Rosenbloom nor Epstein and has been assumed by others in the field. In this thesis, the long–awaited demonstration of this oft–asserted assertion is given. After an elemental history of many–valued logic and a review of basic Classical Propositional Logic, the systems given by Post are introduced. The definition of a Post algebra according to Rosenbloom together with an examination of the meaning of its notation in the context of Post’s systems are given. Epstein’s definition of a Post algebra follows the necessary concepts from lattice theory, making it possible to prove that Post’s systems of many–valued logic do in fact form a Post algebra.

<p>In what is supposed to have been a radical break with neo-Hegelian idealism, Bertrand Russell, alongside G.E Moore, advocated the analysis of propositions by their decomposition into constituent concepts and relations. Russell regarded this as a breakthrough for the analysis of the propositions of mathematics. However, it would seem that the decompositional-analytic approach is singularly unhelpful as a technique for the clarification of the concepts of mathematics. The aim of this thesis will be to clarify Russell’s early conception of the analysis of mathematical propositions and concepts in the light of the philosophical doctrines to which his conception of analysis answered, and the demands imposed by existing mathematics on Russell’s logicist program. Chapter 1 is concerned with the conception of analysis which emerged, rather gradually, out of Russell’s break with idealism and with the philosophical commitments thereby entrenched. Chapter 2 is concerned with Russell’s considered treatment of the significance of relations for analysis and the overturning of his “doctrine of internal relations” in his work on Leibniz. Chapter 3 is concerned with Russell’s discovery of Peano and the manner in which it informed the conception of analysis underlying Russell’s articulation of logicism for arithmetic and geometry in PoM. Chapter 4 is concerned with the philosophical and logical differences between Russell’s and Frege’s approaches to logical analysis in the logicist definition of number. Chapter 5 is concerned with connecting Russell’s attempt to secure a theory of denoting, crucial to mathematical definition, to his decompositional conception of the analysis of propositions.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

<p>The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a proper treatment for two groups of logical paradoxes: semantic paradoxes and set-theoretic paradoxes. My main thesis is that the two different groups of paradoxes need different kinds of solution. Based on the analysis of the diagonal method and truth-gap theory, I propose a functional-deflationary interpretation for semantic notions such as ‘heterological’, ‘true’, ‘denote’, and ‘define’, and argue that the contradictions in semantic paradoxes are due to a misunderstanding of the non-representational nature of these semantic notions. Thus, they all can be solved by clarifying the relevant confusion: the liar sentence and the heterological sentence do not have truth values, and phrases generating paradoxes of definability (such as that in Berry’s paradox) do not denote an object. I also argue against three other leading approaches to the semantic paradoxes: the Tarskian hierarchy, contextualism, and the paraconsistent approach. I show that they fail to meet one or more criteria for a satisfactory solution to the semantic paradoxes. For the set-theoretic paradoxes, I argue that the criterion for a successful solution in the realm of set theory is mathematical usefulness. Since the standard solution, i.e. the axiomatic solution, meets this requirement, it should be accepted as a successful solution to the set-theoretic paradoxes.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)