i Abstract Recent financial crisis resulting in global financial instability pointed at the importance of growing shadow banking. Shadow banking activities are gen- erally defined as banking-like activities outside of regulated banking. In this thesis, we study theoretical background of shadow banking, its regulation and supervision. Despite the data availability problem, a qualitative analysis is performed to estimate the volume of the European and the U.S. shadow bank- ing sectors from 2006 until 2013 Q2. European shadow banking system hit its bottom of EUR 8.3 trillion (19% of total European bank assets) in 2008 Q4. Nowadays, it equals to EUR 9.3 trillion (21% of total European bank assets). U.S. shadow banking sector attained its maximum of USD 20.7 trillion (163% of total U.S. bank assets) in 2008 Q1. Nowadays, it equals to USD 15.6 tril- lion which also equals to total U.S. bank assets. Moreover, we concentrate on Chinese money market funds and French and UK repo markets, since these represent an important part of shadow banking. Quantitative analysis studies relationships among traditional banking, shadow banking and economy itself in France and UK. Results show that if repo transactions, GDP and government debt increase, total bank assets increase. Furthermore, if money market fund assets decrease and...

The central bank, its activities and position Abstract Central banks are in today's global banking system an indispensable part of a stable functioning market economies. I was always interested in these issues. I studied these issues in another master's degree course. The subject of this thesis is the central banking system in the Czech Republic and in the European Union. In the first chapter I focus on definition of banking and on the characteristics of three models of the banking system (single-stage, two-and three-stage banking system). The second chapter is the largest of all chapters. In this chapter I deal with the formation of Monetary Union, the creation of the European central banking system and the foundation of the European Central Bank. I analyze the legal base of European Central Bank, its organizational structure, issuing of legal acts, the capital. I deal with the introduction of the euro in member and non-member countries too. Special attention is paid the independence of the European Central Bank. I analyze its institutional, personal, financial, material and budgetary independence. The conclusion of this chapter deals with the preparations for the introduction of the euro in the Czech Republic. In the third chapter I describe the historical development of European central banking and the...

This thesis aims to analyze and evaluate changes in bank regulation prepared in the European Union. It focuses primarily on the imperfections of the existing regulatory system, which occurred in relation to the financial crisis, and on efforts of EU leaders to eliminate such imperfections. The first section defines the general reasons for bank regulation and supervision, describes the specifics of the banking sector and summarizes the pre-crisis situation in the EU. The second part analyzes the most important reasons for the financial crisis and the causes of its rapid expansion from U.S. to European markets. The third block deals with the final response in the form proposed by the EU and the concrete measures taken with regard to banking regulation and supervision on the territory of all EU Member States.

Suite à la crise financière et économique de 2008, il a été constaté sur le portefeuille de négociation des banques un montant de capital réglementaire significativement inférieur aux pertes réelles. Pour comprendre les causes de cette insuffisance de capital réglementaire, il nous a paru important d'évaluer la fiabilité des modèles de mesure de risque de marché et de proposer des méthodologies de stress test pour la gestion des risques extrêmes. L'objectif est de mesurer le capital réglementaire sur un portefeuille de négociation composé d'actions et de matières premières par la mesure de la Value at Risk (VaR) et l'Expected Shortfall. Pour réaliser cet objectif, nous avons utilisé le modèle Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD) et deux modèles internes utilisés par les banques : méthode de simulation historique et modèle de la loi normale. Une première évaluation de la fiabilité effectuée sur les trois modèles de risque sous l'hypothèse de volatilité constante, montre que les modèles internes des banques et le modèle GPD ne mesurent pas correctement le risque du portefeuille d'étude pendant les périodes de crise. Néanmoins, le modèle GPD est fiable en période de faible volatilité mais avec une forte surestimation du risque réel ; cela peut conduire les banques à bloquer plus de fonds propres réglementaires qu'il est nécessaire. Une seconde évaluation de la fiabilité des modèles de risque a été effectuée sous l'hypothèse du changement de la volatilité et par la prise en compte de l'effet asymétrique des rentabilités financières. Le modèle GPD s'est révélé le plus fiable quelles que soient les conditions des marchés. La prise en compte du changement de la volatilité a amélioré la performance des modèles internes des banques. L'intégration des scénarios historiques et hypothétiques dans les modèles de risque a permis d'évaluer le risque extrême tout en diminuant la subjectivité reprochée aux techniques de stress test. Le stress test réalisé avec les modèles internes des banques ne permet pas une mesure correcte du risque extrême. Le modèle GPD est mieux adapté pour le stress test. Nous avons développé un algorithme de stress test qui permettra aux banques d'évaluer le risque extrême de leurs portefeuilles et d'identifier les facteurs de risque responsables de ce risque. Le calcul du capital réglementaire sur la base de la somme de la VaR et du stress VaR n'est pas logique et entraîne un doublement des fonds propres réglementaires des banques. Le doublement de ces fonds propres aura pour conséquence le resserrement du crédit à l'économie. Nous observons que le coefficient multiplicateur et le principe de la racine carrée du temps de l'accord de Bâle conduisent les banques à faire un arbitrage en faveur des modèles de risque non fiables. / During the financial and economic crisis of 2008, it was noticed that the amount of capital required for banks' trading portfolio was significantly less than the real losses. To understand the causes of this low capital requirement, it seemed important to estimate the reliability of the market risk models and to propose stress testing methodologies for the management of extreme risks. The objective is to measure the capital requirement on a trading portfolio, composed of shares and commodities by the measure of the Value at Risk (VaR) and Expected Shortfall. To achieve this goal, we use the Generalized Pareto Distribution (GPD) and two internal models commonly used by banks: historical simulation method and model of the normal law. A first evaluation of the reliability made on the three risk models under the hypothesis of constant volatility, shows that the internal banks' models and the GPD model do not measure correctly the risk of the portfolio during the crisis periods. However, GPD model is reliable in periods of low volatility but with a strong overestimation of the real risk; it can lead banks to block more capital requirement than necessary. A second evaluation of the reliability of the risk models was made under the hypothesis of the change of the volatility and by considering the asymmetric effect of the financial returns. GPD model is the most reliable of all, irrespective of market conditions. The performance of the internal banks' risk models improves when considering the change of the volatility. The integration of the historic and hypothetical scenarios in the risk models, improves the estimation of the extreme risk, while decreasing the subjectivity blamed to the stress testing techniques. The stress testing realized with the internal models of banks does not allow a correct measure of the extreme risk. GPD model is better adapted for the stress testing techniques. We developed an algorithm of stress testing which allow banks to estimate the extreme risk of their portfolios and to identify the risk factors causing this risk. The calculation of the capital requirement based on the sum of the VaR and the stress VaR is not logical and leads to doubling the capital requirement of banks. Consequently, it conducts to a credit crunch in the economy. We observe that the multiplier coefficient and the principle of square root of time of the Basel's agreement lead banks to make arbitration in favor of risk models that are not reliable.

Cette thèse s’articule autour de trois essais liés par la thématique des réformes récentes de séparation des activités bancaires. Le premier essai examine les décisions réglementaires dans le cadre de la réforme française de séparation bancaire. En s’appuyant sur les théories des logiques institutionnelles et de la justification, cette étude de cas montre comment un découplage des logiques institutionnelles se justifie dans une situation de controverse publique.En adoptant la méthodologie d’étude d’évènements, le deuxième essai analyse les réactions des investisseurs liées aux réformes de séparation des activités bancaires en Allemagne, aux Etats-Unis, en France et en Grande Bretagne. En se basant sur les théories du maintien institutionnel et l’endogénéisation de loi, le troisième et dernier essai de cette thèse étudie le processus d’élaboration de la réforme de séparation bancaire au niveau de l’UE, qui n’a pas été mise en oeuvre. / This thesis consists of three essays on recent post-crisis structural banking reforms. The first essay examines regulatory decision-making in the national context, namely regarding the French structural banking reform. Drawing on the theories of institutional logics and orders of worth, this case study shows how decoupling institutional logics is justified in a situation of public controversy. Adopting event study methodology, the second essay analyses stock price reactions to the US Volcker Rule, the UK Vickers Reform as well as the German and French structural banking reforms. Relying on the theories of institutional maintenance work and endogenization of law, the third and final essay of this dissertation investigates the rule-making process of the EU structural banking reform which did not lead to any final regulation.

The core focus of this thesis is the principal-agent problem and its role in the outbreak of the 2007 financial crisis. Analysis of key elements of the problem like moral hazard and adverse selection lays foundations for identifying situations, in which conflict of interests led to negative impacts on the economic performance before and during the financial crisis. This work also studies the influence of factors that are often overlooked by theoretical economists but are still tightly connected to the principal-agent problem, like exogenous incentives based on the mechanism of trust. The author also evaluates mechanisms that have been put into place after the financial crisis and which could help lower agency costs. He also sketches out possible venues of future research in this area.

[pt] Este trabalho analisa a construção dos padrões regulatórios bancários internacionais a partir de uma perspectiva de Relações Internacionais. Tem como objeto a transformação regulatória observada em Basileia III no pós-crise 2007/2008, como forma de acessar a problemática mais ampla do Poder Estrutural no Sistema Monetário Internacional. A hipótese que guia o estudo é a de que apesar da regulação bancária internacional ser concernente ao poder estrutural do dólar há espaço de atuação política aos países emergentes/periféricos, na dimensão institucional internacional e ideacional. Analisa-se o sistema monetário internacional a partir de seus elementos constitutivos e os processos políticos, econômicos e ideacionais que conformam a história da regulação bancária internacional. Este tema representa, desde a perspectiva dos países periféricos, um pouco problematizado espaço de política internacional. Parte-se de análise epistemológica sobre o campo para realizar análise teórica sobre o Poder Estrutural e sua aplicação à análise do SMI. Considera-se o surgimento da regulação bancária internacional em meados dos anos 1970 e procura-se explorar como os marcos regulatórios acordados no BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) foram atingidos em relação aos eventos de crise que marcaram o sistema monetário internacional a partir dos anos 1980. Exploram-se, nesse sentido, os condicionantes estruturais e locais que levaram ao surgimento dos acordos de Basileia I, II e III. As conclusões consolidadas pelo estudo revelam a importância dos elos ideacionais e da atuação institucional advocatícia para a definição dos padrões de regulação bancária internacional e demonstram a possibilidade de um espaço político para atuação dos países mal posicionados em relação à hierarquia monetária internacional. / [en] This dissertation aims to analyze the construction of international banking regulatory standards from an International Relations perspective. Its object is the regulatory transformation observed in Basel III in the post-2007/2008 crisis as a way of accessing the broader problem of Structural Power in the International Monetary System and the political space available to peripheral countries in this context. The hypothesis that guide the study is that even though international banking regulation is aligned to US structural power, there are political spaces for action for emerging/peripheral countries in the international institutional and ideational dimensions. Therefore, it analyzes the international monetary system from its constituent elements and the political, economic and ideational processes that have shaped international banking regulation. This topic represents an under problematized space of international relations. The work departs from an epistemological analysis and follows through a theoretical analysis of Structural Power and its application towards the International Monetary System. It then considers the emergence of international banking regulation in the mid-1970s and seeks to explore how regulatory frameworks agreed upon the BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) were achieved in relation to crisis events that have characterized the international monetary system since the 1980s. In this sense, the structural and local constraints that led to the emergence of the Basel I, II and III agreements are explored. The conclusions consolidated by the study reveal the importance of ideational links and institutional action for standards definition in international banking regulation and suggest a political space for action by countries poorly positioned in the international monetary hierarchy.

Relations of Central bank to Commercial banks The purpose of my thesis is to analyse relations among central bank and commercial banks in current view with emphasising on situation in the Czech Republic. This analysis is a critical appraisal of issues in relation to current legislation, and last but not least also the planned changes, which are currently under discussion. The thesis is divided into five chapters with introduction and abstract. Chapter One is introductory and defines basic terminology used in the thesis like banking system, central bank and commercial banks. This chapter is subdivided into four parts. Part One describes central bank and banking system. Part Two describes central bank, its position, activity and tools. Part Third is focused on commercial banks. Final part deals with trends in the development of the banking sector. Chapter Two characterises subjects of banking system in the Czech Republic and is divided into two parts. Part One outlines organizational structure of the CNB and its main functions. Part Two outlines organizational structure of commercials banks in the Czech Republic. Chapter Three concentrates on banking regulation and supervision and its division. Part One analyzes arguments for and against bank regulation. Part Two is focused on banking regulation and...

Les banques sont des institutions à part, car elles sont au coeur du fonctionnement des économies et de la dynamique de croissance des pays. Leurs services représentent de ce fait un bien public, et il est donc primordial de les maintenir éloignées autant que possible du risque de faillite. Toutefois, des crises bancaires surviennent régulièrement et affectent les sociétés, souvent de manière durable et profonde, à l’image de la crise financière des subprimes qui a éclaté en 2007, et dont nous ne connaissons pas encore toutes les conséquences désastreuses. Pour prévenir le risque de faillite et de crises bancaires, les autorités de régulation nationales ont développé des filets de sécurité qui, en partie, suivent les standards internationaux de réglementation et de supervision bancaire développés par le Comité de Bâle sur le contrôle bancaire, sous l’égide de la Banque des Règlements Internationaux. Cependant, les crises récurrentes se produisent et nous montrent les limites de la régulation bancaire et, surtout, nous indiquent que celle-ci doit être en permanence revue et adaptée, de façon dynamique, à l’évolution des systèmes bancaires et de l’innovation financière. L’un des principaux objectifs est de s’assurer que les banques soient suffisamment et solidement capitalisées pour faire face à des pertes exceptionnelles inattendues. Par ailleurs, il est primordial, afin d’assurer une stabilité financière durable, que les superviseurs bancaires soient à même de contrôler efficacement les banques et d’entreprendre les actions nécessaires pour que ces dernières demeurent à des niveaux de risques engagés raisonnables et qui ne menacent ni leur solvabilité, ni celle de l’ensemble du système bancaire. Enfin, les banques sont censées être régulées par le marché (discipline de marché), sur la base des informations qu’elles sont tenues de divulguer publiquement, sur leur santé financière. Dans ces politiques de régulation bancaire et de prévention du risque de crise, il ne faut pas oublier le rôle de l’assureur dépôt, à qui certains économistes et instances internationales veulent prêter de plus en plus de pouvoir sur les banques. Nous montrons dans notre travail de thèse, à travers des analyses empiriques menées sur des données contemporaines, les insuffisances des politiques de régulation et de supervision bancaire, les erreurs commises dans l’approche de la régulation bancaire, et nous présentons les aspects qu’il serait souhaitable de prendre en compte, pour approcher une politique de réglementation et de supervision bancaire plus efficace, et dynamique, dans l’objectif de maintien de la stabilité bancaire. Nous avançons notamment qu’il est nécessaire de mieux prendre en compte la nature de l’activité des différents types d’institutions financières qui composent les systèmes bancaires, et dont la nature et le degré d’exposition aux risques ne sont pas les mêmes. Il est également important de considérer les caractéristiques de l’environnement institutionnel dans lequel évoluent les banques, de manière à développer une structure de supervision adaptée et efficace. En définitive, nous étudions dans cette thèse un large ensemble de déterminants économiques et institutionnels, susceptibles d’impacter la stabilité bancaire, de manière à identifier celles des politiques de régulation qu’il s’agirait de mettre en oeuvre, afin d’assurer dans l’avenir un meilleur maintien de la stabilité financière des banques. / Banks are special institutions because they are central to the functioning of economies and to economic growth. Their services represent a public good. Therefore, it is essential to keep them as far as possible from risk of bankruptcy. However, banking crises occur regularly and affect societies, often dramatically and over a long period, like the current subprime financial crisis which burst into 2007, and which consequences are still not very well perceived. To prevent the risk of bankruptcy and banking crisis, the national authorities of regulation have developed safety nets. These follow partially the international standards of regulation and banking supervision developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision under the aegis of the Bank for International Settlements. However, recurrent crises occur and show us the limits of the banking regulation and, especially, indicate that the latter should be continually revised and adapted to the evolution of banking systems and financial innovations. One of the main goals is to make sure that banks are enough capitalized to face unexpected large losses. In order to achieve long-lasting financial stability, it is essential that banking supervisors can monitor efficiently banks. By doing so, the risk taken by banks would be sustainable and would not threaten either their own solvency or the whole banking system solvency. Finally, banks are supposed to be regulated by the market (market discipline) on the basis of information about their financial health which should be disclosed publicly. Along the policies of banking regulation and crisis risk prevention, one should not forget the role of the deposit insurers. Indeed, some economists and international authorities want to attribute more power over banks to deposit insurers. In our research, the empirical analysis, based on contemporary data, show the weakness of the actual regulation and banking supervision policies and the mistakes in banking regulation. Different features of the banking system that should be taken into account for an efficient implementation of regulation and banking supervision policies are also discussed in this work. Hence, we suggest that the type of financial institutions' activities should be better taken into account as it changes with the degree of risk exposure. We also find that it is important to consider the characteristics of the institutional environment in which banks evolve in order to develop a suitable and efficient supervision agency. To summarize, we study in this thesis a large range of economic and institutional determinants of the banking system, which are likely to affect the banking stability. By doing so, we are able to identify the regulation policies which would be the most likely to preserve the financial stability of banks.

Le risque systémique a joué un rôle clé dans la propagation de la dernière crise financière mondiale.Un grand nombre de mesures de ce risque ont été développées pour évaluer la contribution d’une institutionfinancière au risque de l’ensemble du système. Toutefois, de nombreuses questions concernantles capacités de ces mesures à identifier les institutions financières d’importance systémique (SIFIs) ontété soulevées puisque le risque systémique possède de multiples facettes et certaines d’entre elles sontdifficiles identifier, telles que les similitudes entre institutions financières.L’objectif général de cette thèse en finance est donc (i) de proposer une solution empirique pour identifierles SIFIs au niveau nationale, (ii) de comparer théoriquement et empiriquement différentes mesures durisque systémique et (iii) de mesurer les changements d’expositions au risque des banques.Tout d’abord, le chapitre 1 propose un ajustement de trois mesures de risque systémique basées sur desdonnées de marchés et conçues dans un cadre international, afin d’identifier les SIFIs au niveau national.Ensuite, le chapitre 2 introduit un modèle commun dans lequel plusieurs mesures du risque systémiquesont exprimées et comparées. Il y est théoriquement établi que ces mesures de risque systémique peuventêtre exprimées en fonction de mesures traditionnelles de risque. L’application empirique confirme cesrésultats et montre que ces mesures ne sont pas capables de saisir la nature multidimensionnelle durisque systémique. Enfin, le chapitre 3 présente la méthodologie appelée Factor Implied Risk Exposures(FIRE) permettant de décomposer une variation de la mesure de risque d’une banque en deux éléments,le premier représentant la volatilité de marché et le second correspondant à l’exposition au risque de labanque. Ce chapitre illustre empiriquement que les changements d’expositions au risque sont corréléspositivement entre les banques, ce qui est cohérent avec le fait que les banques présentent des similitudesdans leurs prises de positions sur le marché. / Systemic risk has played a key role in the propagation of the last global financial crisis. A large number ofsystemic risk measures have been developed to quantify the contribution of a financial institution to thesystem-wide risk. However, numerous questions about their abilities to identify Systemically ImportantFinancial Institutions (SIFIs) have been raised since systemic risk has multiple facets, and some of themare difficult to gauge, such as the commonalities across financial institutions.The main goal of this dissertation in finance is thus (i) to propose an empirical solution to identifydomestic SIFIs, (ii) to compare theoretically and empirically different systemic risk measures, and (iii)to measure changes in banks’ risk exposures.First, chapter 1 offers an adjustment of three market-based systemic risk measures, designed in a globalframework, to identify domestic SIFIs. Second, chapter 2 introduces a common framework in whichseveral systemic risk measures are expressed and compared. It is theoretically shown that those systemicrisk measures can be expressed as function of traditional risk measures. The empirical application confirmsthese findings and shows that these measures fall short in capturing the multifaceted nature of systemicrisk. Third, chapter 3 proposes the Factor Implied Risk Exposures (FIRE) methodology which breaksdown a change in risk disclosure into a market volatility component and a bank-specific risk exposurecomponent. This chapter empirically illustrates that changes in risk exposures are positively correlatedacross banks, which is consistent with banks exhibiting commonality in trading.