Thesis (M.A.)--Florida State University, 2005. / Advisor: Peter Garretson, Florida State University, College of Social Sciences, Dept. of International Affairs. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Feb. 1, 2006). Document formatted into pages; contains viii, 99 pages. Includes bibliographical references.

En l’absence d’autorité nationale, la majorité du peuple kurde a vécu selon un mode d’organisation social tribal régi par des coutumes. C’est donc en prenant les coutumes des sociétés tribales des Barzani comme exemple que nous allons montrer en quoi la coutume est le fondement de toute société tribale kurde. La confédération tribale Barzani regroupe sous son nom sept tribus (les Chérwâni, les Baroji, les Mazouri, les Dolamari, les Nazâri, les Harki-Bénagi et les Gardi) et est gérée par les cheikhs du village de Barzan, tout au nord du Kurdistan Irakien. La coutume des Barzani comprend l’ensemble des normes à la fois à l’origine des coutumes des Kurdes tribaux en général mais également les règles coutumières qui se sont développées selon l’évolution des conditions socio- économiques sous l’impact religieux des cheikhs de Barzan.Le mode de fonctionnement du pouvoir des cheikhs qui se donne pour objectif de garantir l’autonomie et la survie de la société tribale en s’appuyant sur la coutume et des principes de justice et de fraternité nous permet d’affirmer que la société tribale des Barzani peut être éventuellement comparée à un État.Parmi les Barzani le lien de parenté fondé sur la filiation patrilinéaire joue un rôle principal dans la vie sociale. La lignée avec à sa tête un chef est le segment le plus important dans un village et correspond à une unité du groupe agnatique composé de plusieurs familles. Au sein d’une lignée, les Barbes blanches, de par leur sagesse et leur grande connaissance des règles coutumières, sont respectées. Au sein de la famille de nature patriarcale, le père avait un pouvoir absolu sur les membres et les biens de sa famille. Une femme devait obéir à son mari, en respecter le prestige et la renommée notamment en faisant de l’hospitalité une valeur de la famille. De plus, la fidélité d’une femme envers son mari et la pureté des filles représentaient l’honneur de la famille. / In the absence of national authority, the majority of the Kurdish people live according to a familiar pattern of a social organisation governed by customs. Therefore, by taking the traditions of the Barzani tribal communities as an example; we will show how custom is the foundation of Kurdish tribal society.The tribal confederation of Barzani is made up of seven tribes (the Sherwani, the Baroji, the Mazouri, the Dolamari, the Nazari, the Harki-Benagi and the Gardi) which is managed by the sheikhs of the village of Barzan, in the far north of Iraqi Kurdistan.The custom of the Barzanis includes all tribal and societal norms which derive from the customs of tribes in general; and in particular, the customary rules developed according to the evolution of the socio-economic conditions under the religious impact of Barzani sheikhs.The functioning mode of sheikh’s powers aims to guarantee the autonomy and survival of tribal society, based on custom and the principles of justice and fraternity. Hence, it allows us to argue that the tribal society of Barzani can be compared to a state.Barzani kinship based on patrilineal descent plays a significant role in social life. The lineage headed by a chief is the most important segment in a village and corresponds to a unit of the agnatic group composed of several families. In a lineage, White Beards are considered to have the vast knowledge of customary rules and wisdom; henceforth, they are highly respected. The family was patriarchal, and the father had absolute power over the members and property of his family. A woman had to obey her husband and respect prestige and fame, primarily by making hospitality a family value. Besides, the fidelity of a woman to her husband and the purity of girls being the family's honour.

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Late in 2004, King Abdullah of Jordan coined a controversial phrase that still dominates the heart of the geopolitics of the Middle East: The Shia Crescent. “If pro-Iran parties or politicians dominate the new Iraqi government, a new ‘crescent’ of dominant Shia movements or governments stretching from Iran into Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon could emerge to alter the traditional balance of power between the two main Islamic sects and pose new challenges to U.S. interests and allies. What the King of Jordan saw as a threat, Iran saw as the bedrock of its newfound regional power. However, what the King of Jordan and his Arab-Sunni aides downplayed was Iran’s ties with non-Shia groups, ranging from Sunni parties to secular and even non-Muslim groups. More importantly, they neglected Iran’s presence in the Middle East before the 1979 Islamic Revolution. In fact, the seeming omnipresence of Iran’s proxies in the Middle East is not a recent, nuanced phenomenon; rather, it dated back to the Shah’s foreign policy in making connections with both the Iraqi Kurds and Shia Lebanese. While much ink has been spilled on Iran’s foreign policy under the Islamic Republic, there has been a void in the analysis of Iran’s ties with Non-State Actors (NSAs) in the pre-1979 Revolution Era. v From this point of view, the present study is an attempt to set forth a new understanding of the emergence and fluctuation of Iran’s ties with NSAs at the heart of the Middle East during the Shah’s era. I will accomplish this by identifying the Iran-NSA relationships within an examination of the larger historical context of state-NSA relationships in the region. Here, the story of the evolution of Iran’s ties with NSAs can be narrated as the unfolding of constant interaction between states and non-state forces in the Middle East. Analyzed from this perspective, my research examines the actors, processes, and mechanisms that Iran has used to construct ties with NSAs from 1961 until 1979. “What actors and processes at what levels of analysis and through what mechanisms have constructed Iran’s ties with NSAs?” This is the central question that guides the analytical narrative in the present survey. Therefore, the dependent variable for this research is the evolution of Iran’s ties with NSAs, while the intervening variable is a set of actors and processes that have brought about such sub-state ties. In this framework, the proposed work will undertake these main tasks: A) Tracing the history of the ebbs and flows within Iran’s ties with non-state actors through a geopolitical lens. B) Explaining how Iran’s ties with non-state actors unfolded and understanding why Iran’s proxies evolved in the way they did. C) AssessingthebroadcontoursoftheevolutionarytrajectoryofIran’stieswithNSAs and its possible future path(s) for the geopolitics of the Middle East and its regional balance of power.

Since the creation of modern-day Iraq by the British Empire in 1920, the country’s state territorial structuring has been an ever-evolving source of political instability and conflict. Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian groups have been locked in a near constant struggle over questions of self-rule, shared rule, and secession. Consequently, the territorial model of federalism has never been far from political discussions, negotiations, and territorial disputes. Federalism was finally officially adopted in 2005, giving a new definition to Iraq’s territorial model. But while federalism seemed a natural means of managing Iraq’s long-standing ethno-sectarian divisions and was democratically ratified in a process that included most ethnic and sectarian groups, the model has failed to materialize, and territorial structure remains a major point of contention between the groups. The overarching aim of this dissertation is to shed light on two key questions. First, how have the dynamics between the major ethnic and sectarian groups of Iraq shaped the evolution of the country’s territorial structure from 1920 up to and beyond the federal constitution in 2005? Second, what can the trajectory of this evolution teach us about why federalism was adopted but has failed to materialize? I shall argue that Iraq’s territorial structuring over the past century has been systematically influenced by at least one of four “I”s: the groups’ ideas concerning territorial structuring, their conceptualizations of group identities, their definitions of group interests, and the influence of foreign actors. Focussing on the Shiite Arabs, the Sunni Arabs, and the Kurds, I will examine how these four factors have interacted to shape the territorial organization of Iraq over four key time periods: (i) the foundation of Iraq in 1920 to Saddam Hussein’s rise to the presidency in 1979, (ii) Saddam’s rule from 1979 to 2003, (iii) Saddam’s deposition in 2003 to the adoption of the federal constitution in 2005, and (iv) the post-constitutional period from 2005 to the present. I thus hope to explain how evolving inter-group dynamics over the past century have impacted the development of Iraq’s territorial structure, arguing that this sheds light on both the reference to federalism in the 2005 constitution and its subsequent failure to materialize. This dissertation thus demonstrates the powerful ways in which Iraq’s territorial structuring has been shaped by past trends in ethno-sectarian dynamics, putting us in a better position to understand the complexities of the country’s current territorial politics.