In addition to the lonely battles fought by Bomber Command crews in the night skies over Germany from February 1942 to May 1945 there was an equally intense if much less bloody struggle in the halls of power between the Air Staff and the AOC Bomber Command, concerning the best employment of the strategic bomber forces. The argument of this study is that the Royal Air Force s contribution to the strategic air offensive was badly mismanaged: that Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Bomber Command, from 22 February 1942 to the end of the war, by ignoring, or often over-riding the Air Staff, affected not only the course but also the duration of the Second World War. Most histories of the bomber war provide the result of the disagreements between the Chief of the Air Staff, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal and Harris, but rarely are the problems discussed in detail. This thesis examines the arguments that were raised by the various authorities, together with the refutations presented not only by the major participants, but also by the advisers to those authorities. The significant feature of the disagreements was that while Harris acted unilaterally, the Air Staff reached consensus decisions. Unfortunately, the decisions reached by the Air Staff on major issues were all too frequently either ignored or subverted by the AOC Bomber Command. One significant feature of the refutations presented to Harris was their dependence on the operational experience gained earlier in the bomber war by junior members of the Air Staff. For too long the direction of the war had been left in the hands of senior officers whose previous service had become irrelevant to war requirements in the 1940s. By 1942, comparatively junior officers were thus tendering advice to senior officers who, in the case of AOC Bomber Command, resented the authority which, Harris argued, had apparently been accorded these juniors. Harris was unable to accept that they were advisers and were never in a position to issue orders: orders could only come from Portal. Finally, this thesis provides an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the major participants and argues that, had the war been conducted as the Air Staff required, victory would have been achieved earlier than May 1945.

During World War II the British Royal Air Force undertook a campaign of area bombing of German cities, resulting in hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties. The debate over the ethics of this policy began at the time and has continued to the present. Area bombing clearly violated the traditional Just War norms of discrimination and noncombatant immunity. Apologists for the bombing have argued that such norms are no longer applicable in conditions of modern total war; critics of the bombing disagree. This dissertation defends the continuing relevance and applicability of these norms, and argues that area bombing constituted a violation of the moral laws governing the conduct of warfare. The dissertation also shows that the seeming intractability of the ethical debate on area bombing results from the participants' positions being informed by distinct and often incompatible ethical traditions. To understand and evaluate the different positions in the debate, it is necessary to engage critically with these underlying traditions. The dissertation shows how five ethical traditions touching on the norm of noncombatant immunity conditioned the positions taken by protagonists in the debate. The ethical traditions are Holy War / Crusade; Classical Realism; Christian Realism; Christian Just War / Jus in Bello; and Christian Pacifism. The first part of the dissertation explores the theoretical background and historical development of each of these traditions. The second part examines five protagonists in the British debate during World War II and analyzes how their positions were informed by the ethical traditions considered in the first part. The participants examined are Lord Vansittart (Holy War / Crusade), Captain Basil Liddell Hart (Classical Realism), Archbishop William Temple (Christian Realism), Bishop George Bell (Just War / Jus in Bello), and Vera Brittain (Christian Pacifism). The dissertation evaluates the strengths, weaknesses, and contributions of each of these traditions. By considering the voices raised against the area bombing at the time - especially those of Bishop Bell and Vera Brittain - the dissertation seeks to encourage theologically and ethically informed opposition to potential violations of the jus in bello norms in present and future conflicts.

Dr. Robert A. Pape publicerar 1996 boken Bombing to Win. Kvantitativa studier av 33 konflikter där luftstridskrafter använts har genomförts. Detta för att söka ett samband mellan lyckade respektive misslyckade slutresultat. De teorier som Pape framför har därför en empirisk förankring och de slutsatser som förs fram är att strategisk bombning väldigt sällan fungerar och att luftstridskrafter istället bör användas för att neka fiendes styrkor framgång på slagfältet. Tre år efter att Bombing to Win publiceras inleds Operation Allied Force. En operation ledd av NATO för att förhindra den etniska rensningen av albaner i Kosovo. Syftet med detta arbete är att se om Robert A. Pape:s teorier uppmärksammats. Detta genom att leta efter händelser där NATO använder luftstridskrafterna på ett sätt som överensstämmer med Pape:s teorier. Slutsatsen är att det finns vissa händelser i konflikten där NATO:s agerande överensstämmer med de teorier Pape presenterar i Bombing To Win. Det finns däremot inte en koppling till ett särskilt skede eller del av operationen. Genom uttalanden av militära beslutsfattare går det att påvisa att teorierna har uppfattats av dessa. Politiska viljor har haft stor inverkan, och vissa militära strategiska viljor har fått stå tillbaka.