Prior research on conservative accounting and bondholder-shareholder conflict show that firms with higher degree of conservatism experience less austere conflict and lower cost of debt. However, since the implementation of IFRS in 2005, conservatism has been widely reduced in favor of fair value principles. This study sets out to examine if accounting conservatism still mitigates the conflict and reduces cost of debt. We regress two measures of conservatism on three conflict proxies and debt cost, respectively, for firms on the Norwegian market. Our results support the conclusion that conservative accounting mitigates the bondholder-shareholder conflict even after the introduction of IFRS, but we find no significant evidence that bondholders reward high level of conservatism with lower cost of debt.

Prior research on covenants show that they are frequently included in corporate debt agreements as means of mitigating bondholder-stockholder conflicts. As covenants should be more frequently included when there is a higher degree of bondholder-stockholder conflict, what is then the relation between covenants and spread? Our results show that on the Norwegian corporate debt market, bonds that include covenants have a higher spread than those that do not. The results of an OLS-regression using some of the most common covenants, Z’-score and bond spread shows that the 43 % of bond spread can be explained by whether the bond includes dividend restrictions, equity restrictions and poison puts, and the Z’-score of the issuer.

Research concerning covenants has at large not examined what quantifiable relationship covenants have with yield spreads. We shed light on this topic as we evaluate Swedish bond indentures. By examining the relationship between covenants and yield spread, our results indicate whether covenants effectively mitigate the bondholder-stockholder conflict. The results from our OLS-model indicate that the poison put option and covenants restricting dividends and mergers have a positive relationship with the yield spread, and that the negative pledge has a negative relationship with the yield spread. Furthermore, our results indicate that some covenants are too costly for companies issuing investment grade bonds. Those covenants are therefore only included in bonds with higher yield spreads, where a conflict between bondholders and stockholders could be greater. / Ett kvantifierbart förhållande mellan kovenanter och räntebasmarginalen har överlag i tidigare forskning inte undersökts. I denna uppsats åskådliggör vi detta förhållande genom att undersöka svenska företagsobligationer. Genom att studera relationen mellan kovenanter och räntebasmarginalen kan våra resultat visa på huruvida kovenanter motverkar konflikten mellan obligationsinnehavare och aktieägare. Resultaten från vår OLS-modell visar att poison put option och kovenanter som begränsar utdelningar och fusioner har ett positivt samband med räntebasmarginalen, medan negative pledge har ett negativt samband med räntebasmarginalen. Vidare visar våra resultat att vissa kovenanter är för dyra för företag som ger ut investment grade obligationer. Dessa kovenanter finns därför bara med i obligationer med högre räntebasmarginaler, där en konflikt mellan obligationsinnehavare och aktieägare kan vara större.

This paper proposes that managerial incentive compensation affects the firm choice between public and bank debt. To motivate the case I analyze a simple model with complete and perfect information that implies a positive relation between managers’ incentive compensation and preference toward bank debt. Using firm-level data over the period 1992-2005, I empirically examine the relation between managerial incentives and financing decisions. Specifically, I examine whether managers whose compensation is tied to firm performance choose bank over public debt as a commitment mechanism to reduce the cost of debt. Consistent with a monitoring role of banks, I find that the probability of choosing bank over public debt is positively related to the level of incentive compensation. Further, I find that public lenders price the incentive alignment between manager and shareholders by increasing the cost of debt, while the overall cost of bank loan does not depend on the manager’s incentive compensation. Finally, I find that banks are more likely to include a collateral provision in the debt contract if the manager’s compensation is tied to firm performance.

Appelés à s’appliquer concurremment pour traiter les difficultés d’une société, il est classiquement considéré que les relations entre le droit des sociétés et le droit des entreprises en difficulté se résument à des conflits pouvant être résolus en faisant prévaloir le « droit spécial » des procédures collectives sur le « droit commun » des sociétés. Cette analyse a perdu de sa pertinence en raison de la mutation du droit des faillites en droit des entreprises en difficulté dont la finalité, le contenu, et le domaine d’application ont profondément changé, ainsi qu’en raison de la contractualisation des deux matières. Ces évolutions ont induit une appréhension nouvelle de celles-ci. Sont en effet recherchées, tant par les sociétés en difficulté que par leurs créanciers, les potentialités de l’association du droit des sociétés et du droit des entreprises en difficulté pour organiser le rebond d’une société défaillante. Leurs relations en droit positif s’avèrent ainsi plus subtiles et plus complexes. Une synergie existe entre elles lors du règlement à l’amiable des difficultés, tandis qu’une véritable soumission du droit des sociétés au droit des entreprises en difficulté peut être constatée lors du règlement judiciaire des difficultés. Malgré des origines distinctes, des finalités propres, et des fonctions radicalement opposées, une logique anime les relations des deux matières révélant un corpus légal et jurisprudentiel utilisé pour le règlement des difficultés qui témoigne de l’existence d’un droit des sociétés en difficulté. / It is commonly understood that, when considering ailing companies, the conflicts that arise between concurrently applicable corporate law and insolvency law can be solved with “special law” that prevails over “ordinary law”. This understanding has lost some relevance through the transformation of “bankruptcy law” into “distressed business law”. The trend towards the use of explicit contracts in these fields is bringing about a change in their finality, content and scope. This evolution of corporate law and insolvency law is creating new apprehension on the part of both the distressed company and the creditors, with the result that both parties are looking for means to combine these subjects when organising the recovery of an ailing firm. Their coexistence in substantive law turns out to be even more subtle and complex. In the case of an amicable settlement of a dispute, a synergy exists between corporate law and insolvency law whereas when a settlement is imposed under court supervision, the prevalence of insolvency law over corporate law is notable. Despite distinct origins, differing finality and radically opposing functions, a common logic motivates the relation between corporate law and insolvency law revealing a legal corpus and case law as a testament to the existence of an “ailing company law”.