This essay examines the behavior of tax evasion and bribery and the result of interaction among taxpayers, tax auditors and juridical officials. This study is based on the established theory of Jean Hindriks, Michael Keen and Abhinay Muthoo(1999), and focuses on the opposing relationship between taxpayers and tax auditors. If taxpayers report their income untruthfully and are discovered by tax auditors, they might offer bribe to cover the illegal conduct. It¡¦s also a temptation to tax auditors. Then it leads to a cycle of bribery. The analysis is based on a finite dynamic game. It explores further the situation where auditors abuse the administrative authority to extort bribe from unlawful taxpayers. It discusses the strategic and colluding relationship between auditors and taxpayers. The main discovery of the analysis is as follows. Tax evasion is not only an illegal but also criminal act. Besides, tax evasion and corruption coexist. If taxpayers are found bribery for tax evasion and that means tax auditors have committed corruption. The best effective way to prevent corruption is to increase penalty for tax evasion. Taxpayers should be educated if they commit tax evasion, they will be imposed both taxation and penalty. If there is no bribe, the corruption of tax auditors will decrease. On the other hand, it is also necessary to make severer punishment for corruption so that auditors will dare not to receive the bribe. During the process of taxation, auditors are delegated sufficient administrative authority. After declaring income tax, the actual amount of personal taxation depends on the check report auditors hand in. Therefore, in order to prevent tax evasion and corruption, we should make more severe punishment for unlawful auditors and taxpayers. In conclusion, the main reason for tax evasion is that auditors abuse the authority and cover up the illegality. Therefore, the most direct and effective method of decreasing corruption is to increase penalty for the act of tax evasion.

This thesis investigates the impact of corruption by government officials on firm level and macroeconomic growth in the context of Bangladesh. I revisit and extend the existing body of work on cross-country analysis of the impact of aggregate level of corruption on macroeconomic growth. However, the macroeconomic impacts are not necessarily mirrored at the micro level. As Nguyen and Van Dijk (2012 p.2935) observe, ‘country-level research does not help us to understand the determinants of the level of corruption that individual firms face and why and how the level of corruption varies across firms within a country’. To see how firm growth is affected by the corrupt behaviour of government officials in Bangladesh, I conduct a detailed study of the firm level bribing practices using both primary and existing survey data. The cross-country study has been carried out using two data sets; first, a cross-section of 119 countries using averages over 2000-2011 and second, a panel data set for a subsample of these countries over 1985-2013. I use both CPI (constructed by Transparency International) and ICRG index (constructed by the PRS group) as measures of corruption for this impact study. In several instances, the panel data model provides more efficient estimations and also works as a robustness check of the results obtained from the cross-section analysis. Corruption is found to have a positive but small impact on economic growth. This positive impact of corruption on macroeconomic growth supports the so-called East Asian paradox, a term coined to highlight the co-existence of high corruption and high growth in East Asia. This study adds to the existing body of work by examining the effects of corruption on growth by interacting it with freedom status and executive recruitment quality . I analyse the average marginal effect of explanatory variables on the estimated growth with respect to corruption, freedom status, executive recruitment quality and their interactions. It is found that the effect of corruption varies when the freedom status changes from below average to above average and when executive recruitment quality changes from below average to above average, which is in line with the hypothesis. Unlike the cross-country studies, there is very little work on firm level impacts, barring the notable exception of the work by Fisman and Svensson (2007) on industrial sector firms in Uganda. I use two different sets of data for this analysis. For the first exercise, I carried out a survey of 250 firms in Bangladesh and for the second study I use Bangladesh Enterprise Survey data collected by the World Bank. The analyses in these two studies are done using the same methods, and the problems, for example, the problems of heterogeneity and endogeneity are solved in the both in a similar fashion. The first firm level analysis presented in chapter 5 is suspected to suffer from small sample bias and endogeneity, and the instrument used in the Instrumental Variable method is weak. The second firm level analysis overcomes this small sample bias and endogeneity problems. I find that the impact of corruption of government officials on firm growth is negative but small. The important finding that comes out from these two pieces of empirical work on the effect of corruption is that a particular segment of the industrial sector may be benefiting from bribery but it does not necessarily mean that other segments or sectors or the industrial sector as a whole benefits from bribery. Corruption does not have an enormous effect on firm’s growth and perhaps the emphasis that is sometimes put on corruption is misplaced. The analysis is based on the existing firms, firms which survive under the current climate of governance. It may well be that if corruption was to decline, then a different set of firms would emerge. A comprehensive and analytic discussion on the growth trajectory and corruption scenario of Bangladesh has also been presented in the thesis, for which in-depth interviews have been taken from firm owners and managers, and people who have expert knowledge in the concerned areas.

Public sector corruption is endemic in many economies and is frequently cited as a cause of poor economic performance. Corruption hinders the completion of beneficial transactions and distorts the outcomes of economic policies. It can also affect the policy choices of governments as they attempt to counteract the consequences of corruption. Excessive inflation may be a negative side effect of corruption if the government compensates for lost revenue by increasing the rate of monetary expansion to exploit seigniorage. There is convincing empirical evidence from cross-section studies that inflation and corruption are positively correlated. It has been suggested that this is a consequence of governments in corrupt economies turning to the use of seigniorage as a method of raising revenue (Al-Marhubi, 2000). This seems a likely route through which the correlation can arise, but the mechanism at work has not received any theoretical attention. In particular, there has been no demonstration that an optimizing government will rationally exploit seigniorage as a response to corruption. The contribution of this study is an analysis of this issue in theoretical models in which the growth rate of money supply is chosen by an optimizing government. Although an empirical analysis is undertaken to explore the relationship between corruption and inflation in chapter one, the main focus of the study is on chapters three, four, and five where theoretical analysis plays the principal role in the research.

This article discusses the corrupt official and entrepreneurs. When entrepreneurs want to operate in the market, they have to purchase license from the official. In two-stage model, the official can take different prices of different types of entrepreneurs, and commits to his demand. We get the optimal demands of the official and critical types of entrepreneurs. In the framework with the shadow economy, the official is forced to decrease his demands. By examining the optimal demands and critical types, we found that the official¡¦s benefits decrease in the shadow economy.

<p>This paper is a comparative analysis of Russian and Chinese markets in terms of businesscorruption. This study is based on quantitative and qualitative case analysis and small surveysaccording to different criteria.The aim of this work is to find out the general feature of corruption and show main differencesand similarities on corruption practices in Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China. Along with the comparative study this paper also presents general overview on corruption fromhistorical point of view. The results of the analysis show the main characteristics of the corruption phenomenon in China and Russia according to popularity of corruptive behavior, typology of bribes, reasons forcorruptive acts, impact from different local cultures, such as “Guanxi” and “Blat”, and also thestructure of enterprises. We believe that our work may be proved useful for further researches on this subject, and alsohelp business managers to avoid disadvantages caused by lack of knowledge on corruptionphenomenon when doing business in Russia and China.</p>

This paper is a comparative analysis of Russian and Chinese markets in terms of businesscorruption. This study is based on quantitative and qualitative case analysis and small surveysaccording to different criteria.The aim of this work is to find out the general feature of corruption and show main differencesand similarities on corruption practices in Russian Federation and People’s Republic of China. Along with the comparative study this paper also presents general overview on corruption fromhistorical point of view. The results of the analysis show the main characteristics of the corruption phenomenon in China and Russia according to popularity of corruptive behavior, typology of bribes, reasons forcorruptive acts, impact from different local cultures, such as “Guanxi” and “Blat”, and also thestructure of enterprises. We believe that our work may be proved useful for further researches on this subject, and alsohelp business managers to avoid disadvantages caused by lack of knowledge on corruptionphenomenon when doing business in Russia and China.

Bribery is a concept which has appeared quite frequently in the media recently, but what constitutes a bribe and what factors can be used in determining if an individual case is actually a bribe? The purpose of this essay is to try and answer these questions through a study in which respondents were presented with different scenarios and were asked to determine whether a bribe had occurred and explain their reasoning. In the study, it was evident that the amount of money involved in a given case had a large impact on respondents’ determination of whether a bribe had occurred or not. The grey area that seems to exist between what is appropriate and inappropriate most likely stems from ambiguousness in Swedish law.

<p>Bribery is a concept which has appeared quite frequently in the media recently, but what constitutes a bribe and what factors can be used in determining if an individual case is actually a bribe? The purpose of this essay is to try and answer these questions through a study in which respondents were presented with different scenarios and were asked to determine whether a bribe had occurred and explain their reasoning. In the study, it was evident that the amount of money involved in a given case had a large impact on respondents’ determination of whether a bribe had occurred or not. The grey area that seems to exist between what is appropriate and inappropriate most likely stems from ambiguousness in Swedish law.</p>

Yes / One of the main challenges developing nations face is curbing bribery. While there are many efforts to curb bribery, most focused at macro level, such as law, while little has been examined at the micro level, e.g., individual behavior and intention. Those who did investigate at the micro level tend to focus on the recipients rather than the ones giving the bribe. We explored eight factors that influence Malaysian young adults’ bribe giving intention based on the Reasoned Action Approach (RAA). A total of 345 respondents (M age = 20.68, SD = 2.01, 189 are females) completed questionnaires about all RAA variables. Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modelling (PLS-SEM) was carried out using smartPLS3.0 to analyze the result. The result revealed that out of the eight variables, four variables—Instrumental attitudes, Experiential Attitudes, Parents’ descriptive norms and Capacity—explain 74% of the variance in bribe giving intention. An important take-away is that young adult’s perception of whether their parents gave or did not give bribes in a given situation is important in influencing their bribe giving intention. Bribe giving prevention messages must be targeted explicitly toward parents, where they play a crucial role in curbing this dishonesty.

Title: Protection against corruption and bribery and their prevention Abstract This thesis deals with corruption and ways of its prevention. Initial chapter describes phenomenon of corruption in society, defines it and its Subchapter contains kinds of corruption. I try to explain the cause of origin of the corruption and its development phases in Chapter Two. Following Chapter Three is focused on measurement of corruption level and on existing corruption measurement methods also. This chapter concerns with description of Corruption Perception Index (CPI) published by Transparency International. The most important part of this diploma thesis is Chapter Four. This chapter is trying to find the suitable preventive measures that could reduce occurrences of corruption. Because this topic is very voluminous, Subchapter One is focused on preventive anti-corruption measures in subsequent three areas: legislative process (I describe much discussed topic of lobbing today in this part), conflict of interests and corruption in public administration. I try to describe particular measures that can reduce creating of corruption opportunities. Subchapter Two contains legislation of the corruption with put emphasis on anti-corruption tools of criminal law. It describes bribery crimes especially. Chapter Five explores ways...