Thesis (D. Min.)--New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, 2004. / Includes abstract and vita. Includes project proposal. "April 2004." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 129-136, 61-66).

Thesis (D. Min.)--New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, 2004. / Includes abstract and vita. Includes project proposal. "April 2004." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 129-136, 61-66).

Thesis (D. Min.)--New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary, 2004. / Includes abstract and vita. Includes project proposal. "April 2004." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 129-136, 61-66).

This is an analysis of the U.S. Army's personnel decisions in the Second World War. Specifically, it considers the U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall's appointment of generals to combat command, and his reasons for relieving some generals while leaving others in place after underperformance. Many historians and contemporaries of Marshall, including General Omar N. Bradley, have commented on Marshall's ability to select brilliant, capable general officers for combat command in the war. However, in addition to solid performers like J. Lawton Collins, Lucian Truscott, and George S. Patton, Marshall, together with Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lesley J. McNair, often selected sub-par commanders who significantly underperformed on the battlefield. These generals' tactical and operational decisions frequently led to unnecessary casualties, and ultimately prolonged the war. The work considers six case studies: Lloyd Fredendall at Kasserine Pass, Mark Clark during the Italian campaign, John Lucas at Anzio, Omar Bradley at the Falaise Gap, Courtney Hodges at the Hürtgen Forest, and Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. at Okinawa. Personal connections and patronage played strong roles in these generals' command appointments, and often trumped practical considerations like command experience. While their superiors ultimately relieved corps commanders Fredendall and Lucas, field army and army group commanders Clark, Hodges, and Bradley retained command of their units, (Buckner died from combat wounds on Okinawa). Personal connections also strongly influenced the decision to retain the field army and army group commanders in their commands.