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“Thank God It’s Only Maneuvers!:” Tennessee and the Road to War offers the reader a comprehensive explanation of the importance of the Tennessee Maneuvers of June 1941 to American preparation for World War II. Beginning with pre-war changes in the infantry, followed by the inception of the Armored Force, and continuing through the testing of both during the 1941 Maneuvers, the reader will gain an appreciation of the significance of these actions to overall American preparation before and during the Second World War. This work also presents a look at how these extensive combat actions influenced the people of the State of Tennessee throughout their existence.

The United States Army of the Second World War faced a shortage of manpower after two decades of budgetary and organizational neglect following the post-First World. According to the Chief of Staff, George C. Marshall, this period of mobilization, between 1939 and 1941, was the most crucial of the entire war. In this period, the United States Army pursued large-scale peacetime mobilization, breaking from eighty years of traditional policy. As such, the effort to increase allocations for armaments, industrial expansion, tactical reorganization of the ground forces, mobilizing the National Guard, and the implementation of a peacetime draft all faced an uphill political battle to accomplish, reflecting the complicated political factionalism of the late New-Deal United States. Between the outbreak of hostilities in Europe in 1939 and December 1941, the United States Army grew from less than 150,000 men to more than 1 million personnel, incorporating the National Guard and inductees while also adopting many of the weapon systems it would use throughout the conflict. By mobilizing a usable core for a wartime army and vetting its general tactics and doctrine in peacetime, the Army leadership provided a cadre capable of responding to some of the Allied powers' strategic requirements during the critical year of 1942.

Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited / Due to their unique expertise, military officers have always held a special position within Western society. Yet, while individuals who have demonstrated knowledge of warfare and prowess in battle have long been held in high regard by society and the members of their profession, it is those who have also demonstrated the ideals of citizenship and chivalry who serve as the icons for thoughtful military officers. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the evolution of the citizen-officer ideal- through a close study of historical and literary case studies. By establishing a common theme or values among completely separate exemplars of this ideal, a continuum joining Odysseus, Cincinnatus, Beowulf, and Gawain to Washington, Chamberlain, and Marshall might eventually be carried forward to the present and the modern military officer. Specific focus is given to the roles that classical notions of citizenship and the Code of Chivalry have played in shaping the ethos of the American officer. / Lieutenant, United States Navy

This is an analysis of the U.S. Army's personnel decisions in the Second World War. Specifically, it considers the U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall's appointment of generals to combat command, and his reasons for relieving some generals while leaving others in place after underperformance. Many historians and contemporaries of Marshall, including General Omar N. Bradley, have commented on Marshall's ability to select brilliant, capable general officers for combat command in the war. However, in addition to solid performers like J. Lawton Collins, Lucian Truscott, and George S. Patton, Marshall, together with Dwight D. Eisenhower and Lesley J. McNair, often selected sub-par commanders who significantly underperformed on the battlefield. These generals' tactical and operational decisions frequently led to unnecessary casualties, and ultimately prolonged the war. The work considers six case studies: Lloyd Fredendall at Kasserine Pass, Mark Clark during the Italian campaign, John Lucas at Anzio, Omar Bradley at the Falaise Gap, Courtney Hodges at the Hürtgen Forest, and Simon Bolivar Buckner, Jr. at Okinawa. Personal connections and patronage played strong roles in these generals' command appointments, and often trumped practical considerations like command experience. While their superiors ultimately relieved corps commanders Fredendall and Lucas, field army and army group commanders Clark, Hodges, and Bradley retained command of their units, (Buckner died from combat wounds on Okinawa). Personal connections also strongly influenced the decision to retain the field army and army group commanders in their commands.