No description available.

The purpose of this study was to elucidate the indifferent passive behavior described in persons with right cerebral hemisphere dysfunction (Bear & Fedio, 1977; Critchley, 1966; Denny-Brown, Meyer & Horenstein, 1952). The process of caring for another person encompasses an interpersonal relationship with that person. Passive behavior may interfere with that relationship (Fried, 1970), and therefore jeopardize care. This correlational descriptive study was based on an explanatory model which included hemispheric side of lesion, attention, neglect of extrapersonal hemispace, passive behavior, and mood/emotion. The following indicators of outcome variables were used: attention--bilateral skin conductance level and skin conductance response; neglect--line bisection and cancellation tasks; passive behavior--a modification of Mays' (1973) Activity Passivity Scale; mood/emotion--the anxiety and depression subscales of Kellner and Sheffield's (1973) Symptom Rating Test. The sample comprised 10 persons with a single right hemisphere stroke and 10 persons with a left hemisphere stroke. The strength of the relationships among the variables was assessed only for persons with right hemisphere stroke. The data from this sample support some of the theorized links in the conceptual model, but not others. The predicted positive relationship between right hemisphere stroke and neglect, and the negative relationship between right hemisphere stroke and anxiety were demonstrated (r = .3177 and r = -.4353, respectively). The predicted negative relationship between right hemisphere stroke and attention was not demonstrated. Unexpected significant positive correlations existed between right hemisphere stroke and estimates of attention from the left hand (r = .3111 to r = .4472). No demonstrable relationship existed between right hemisphere stroke and passive behavior. Another unexpected finding was that the scale to scale and part to whole correlations for the concepts mood/emotion and passive behavior were strikingly different for the two groups. The fact that the two groups of subjects did not interpret the contents of the two scales similarly indicated that persons with right hemisphere dysfunction view the world quite differently from those with left hemisphere dysfunction. Appreciation of these differences may allow formulation and implementation of effective care plans which will reduce frustration in both client and caregiver.

Individuals with Asperger’s Disorder (AD) have difficulty with social interactions and understanding sarcasm. One source of these deficits is the deficient use of pragmatic language. Right hemispheric (RH) dysfunction has been linked to trouble understanding sarcasm and using pragmatic language. This study attempted to determine the role of the RH in sarcasm comprehension by using a computerized dichotic listening task. Participants with AD were matched with typically developing participants and completed a dichotic listening task, brief intelligence assessment and a perceived accuracy questionnaire. The results showed participants from both groups performed similarly on the dichotic listening task. Interestingly, those with AD did not appear to have insight into their ability to identify sarcastic or sincere tones while the typically developing group did. / Department of Psychological Science

This masters thesis examines the hemispheric activation pattern of the cognitive processes involved in a complex mental rotations test (MRT) (Vandenberg and Kuse, 1978) using Steady-State Probe Topography (SSPT) (Silberstein et al, 1990) as a method to index brain activity. The Steady State Visually Evoked Potential (SSVEP) was recorded from 64 electrode sites using a multichannel electrode helmet, and elicited by a 13 Hz sinusoidal visual flicker, whilst the subjects were performing a visual vigilance Baseline task and the MRT. Forty-one right handed subjects (twenty male and twenty-one female) were used. In the MRT the subjects were required to choose the two figures which correctly matched the criterion figure in the centre. The figures were three-dimensional objects represented in two-dimensions on a computer screen. A significant finding of this study was that when all the subjects were considered as one group, no noticeable lateralization in cerebral activation associated with mental rotation was evident. When analyzing the results for the subjects, partitioned into two groups according to gender, evidence was found suggesting that the cortical processing associated with mental rotation may be more localized bilaterally in the males than the females. However, no noticeable lateralization effects for mental rotation were found in the males or females, and hence no gender differences in hemispheric lateralization was evident. An important finding was the emergence of gender differences in hemispheric lateralization in subsets of subjects performing with higher spatial ability. A left hemisphere lateralization for mental rotation was associated with the Best Performance Male group. The Best Performance Female group showed the opposite effect, where a right hemisphere lateralization was associated with better performance on the task. The lateralization effect appeared to be stronger in the Best Performance Males than the Best Performance Females. An important conclusion from this study is that when examining for hemispheric lateralization effects in mental rotation, and possibly other visual-spatial tasks, not only gender effects need to be considered, but the level of spatial ability in the comparison groups needs also to be taken into account.

A large body of human brain-behavior research has focused upon sensorimotor processes and their relation to higher mental functioning. Semmes et al. (1960) have presented evidence to suggest that sensorimotor functions of the two cerebral hemispheres are not mirror images of each other. These

No description available.

The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between the Affective Facial Recognition Test (AFRT) and Facial Recognition Test (FRT) with a group of right and left hemisphere CVA patients and controls. In addition, the differences in abilities of right and left hemisphere CVA patients and controls to perform on these two tests was explored. The four null hypotheses were: (a) There will be no significant differences between right and left hemisphere damaged patients and controls on the AFRT, (b) There will be no significant differences between right and left hemisphere damaged patients and controls on the FRT, (c) There will be no significant relationship between the AFRT and FRT with right hemisphere damaged patients, and (d) There will be no significant relationship between the AFRT and FRT with left hemisphere damaged patients. Hypotheses one and two were statistically analyzed by using a One-Way Analysis of Variance and three and four by a Pearson Product Moment Correlation.Experimental group subjects were 16 right and 16 left hemisphere CVA volunteer patients obtained from Community Hospital, Indianapolis, Indiana. The control group was composed of 16 non-neurologically impaired subjects from the Muncie, Indiana area. All subjects were equated with respects to age, education, and post-injury. The subjects were randomly administered the AFRT, FRT, and Comprehension subtest of the WAIS-R. The Comprehension subtest was used as a screening device to insure that the patients understood what was expected of them during the testing. The testing, data analysis, and interpretation was completed between May, 1982 and February, 1984.All four hypotheses were rejected. Right and left hemisphere CVA patients and controls significantly differed in performance on the AFRT and FRT (r<.01). In short, right and left hemisphere CVA's were significantly impaired on the AFRT and FRT when compared with the controls. However, both experimental groups exhibited equal impairment on the two tests. This suggests that neither affective facial recognition nor facial recognition is hemispherically lateralized. Also, a higher relationship (r=.79) was found between the AFRT and FRT with right hemisphere patients as opposed to left (r=.65). This appears to indicate that both tests are measuring similar neurological functions and that the inability to match unfamiliar faces and affective faces may not be two separate disorders.

There is no abstract available for this dissertation.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Psychology, June 2002. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

This thesis discusses the philosophical positions that have arisen out of the research with cerebral commissurotomy patients. Following this discussion we develop and defend a position of our own. The first chapter discusses the operation and the postoperative tests that were conducted. Evidence is set out that makes it prima facie plausible that these patients have two minds. This evidence is basically evidence that the two hemispheres are not capable of pooling their informational content in special situations. Evidence for this non integration is found in all the senses except taste. This chapter also discusses hemispheric specialization, language in the minor hemisphere and the cuing mechanisms of the split hemispheres. The second chapter is devoted to Puccetti and Bogen who argue that normal humans have two minds. Their evidence for this comes from the evidence for two minds in the cerebral commissurotomy patients. Puccetti argues that if two minds were not present to start with, a simple operation would not elicit two minds from one. Puccetti also discusses tests on normal humans that are to support his position. These arguments are discussed and rejected. The third chapter discusses additional evidence for only one mind in normal humans. Puccetti's arguments are not only inadequate in that they do not prove their point but they ignore a great deal of evidence that there is only one mind in normal humans. This evidence comes from interference that two different tasks cause for each other. There is also evidence that the two hemispheres work together on one task and that their specialization is complimentary, resulting in functional dependence, rather than being duplicative. The fourth chapter is devoted to Eccles' attempt to reduce the minor hemisphere to an unconscious, computer like entity. He argues from what he calls, 'the unity of consciousness' and on epistomological grounds concerning evidence for a mind other than one's own. The argument from the unity of consciousness, however, begs the question and his epistomological considerations leave him in grave danger of solipsism. Chapter five discusses Dewitt's attempt to mediate between Eccles and Puccetti. Dewitt believes that Puccetti is right in asserting that these patients have two minds. On the other hand he is impressed with Eccles theory that the lack of language in the minor hemisphere causes a great disparity between the minor hemisphere and the major hemisphere. He therefore concludes that the patients have two minds, one of which does not qualify for personhood. Dewitt, however, has gravely underestimated the ability of the minor hemisphere. It has more language capacity than he believes and gives every evidence of being a person. It is also questionable whether or not language is a necessary condition for the self-awareness that goes with personhood. Chapter six looks at Robinson's attempts to undermine the two mind interpretation of the evidence. He does this mainly by trying to find tiimilar counter examples that resist a two mind interpretation. His program fails due to the dissimilarity of the counter examples and the cerebral commissurotomy results. Chapter seven considers Nagel's contention that the patients have an uncountable number of minds. Nagel does not believe that there is a strange uncountable number of minds that these patients actually have. Instead he believes that it is impossible to say how many minds they do have because we do not know how to count them. Nagel reasons that we have good evidence to believe that the patients have one mine and good evidence that they have two. Since both cannot be true we do not know what to say about these patients. Nagel believes that the above considerations make it difficult for us to understand these patients' mental lives. We agree with Nagel that there are times when it is difficult if not impossible to say how many minds the commissurotomy patient has. We disagree that this is always the case. Our problem with counting is not, however, a failure to understand something about the patients' mental lives, but is due to a counting problem when two hemispheres are only partially integrated. We agree with a suggestion from Nagel that an unusual connection between the hemispheres does not settle the question of how many minds the patient might be said to have. The hemispheres do seem to be able to integrate or pool their information using sophisticated muing mechanisms. Our position is that the patients usually have one mind that integrates the two hemispheres of the brain by cuing. The testing situations, however, interfere with this cuing and thereby cause a temporary, partial nonintegration between the hemispheres. During this time we, therefore do not know how many minds the patient can be said to have. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate