In 1998, Florida voters approved Article V, Revision 7, which changed the funding mechanism of the state circuit court system from a county/state mix to state responsibility. The change was implemented as planned in the 2004/05 fiscal year. Although increased efficiency was a key goal of Revision 7, to date no published studies exist on the impacts of Revision 7 on circuit or system efficiency and/or productivity. This work analyzes Revision 7, integrating the larger debate of increasing judgeships or improving efficiency. The study is a full performance analysis of the Florida circuit courts from 1993 through 2008 that can benchmark the system‟s future efficiency and productivity. In that respect, top performers are identified. The study follows the evolution of court studies from their rational origins to the more recent orientation of open-natural systems. Resource dependency and institutional theory, two open-natural system frameworks, are utilized to predict that Florida‟s circuit courts have become more efficient over the period since the implementation of Revision 7. The efficiency outcomes are expected to be unequal across circuit sizes. Integrating a Florida debate to a larger one that transcends time and culture, productivity changes are expected to be a function of the number of judges that a circuit adds within a given year, controlling for other factors. The results of the study methodologies—data envelopment analysis, Malmquist Productivity Index, hierarchal regression analysis and analysis of covariance—reveal that only 3 of 300 DMU‟s in Florida are technically efficient; the mean IOTA score is .76. The Florida circuits did not improve efficiency and productivity as expected, in fact becoming significantly less efficient over time as a function of Revision 7. Small and medium-sized circuits lost iii efficiency, large circuits showed no change and there was a significant interaction between circuit size and Revision 7 period. Within the system overall, productivity fell by 2.7%, most noticeably in the small and medium-sized circuits. The number of judges a circuit added explained 32.2% of the variance in total factor productivity change. The largest system productivity losses followed both Revision 7 intervention years and the addition of the most judges in a single year. Analysis of covariance revealed that productivity increased only when no judges were added to a circuit, regardless of circuit size or time period (+2.6%). The addition of a single judge reduced average productivity by 8.6%; adding two judges reduced productivity by 10.5% and adding 3 or more judges reduced productivity by 16.2%. As judges were added, productivity declined in circuits of all sizes, but the drop was more pronounced in the small and medium-sized circuits. None of the circuits showed an increase in productivity from 1993 to 2008. Revision 7 has not increased circuit court efficiency or productivity in Florida. It is recommended that efficiency and productivity analyses be included in resource allocation decisions such as adding judgeships. More data on court structures and process are needed. Efficiency and productivity measures show that the current level of circuit court judgeships is sufficient.

Although federal circuit and district court judges are placed within a federal hierarchy, and receive legal and judicial training that emphasizes the importance of the judicial framework and its structure, such judges are also subjected to other pressures such as the types of litigants within the courtrooms as well as their local political environment. Furthermore, such judges are apt to form their own views about politics and legal policy and are often appointed by presidents who approve of their ideological leanings. Thus, federal courts are caught between competing goals such as their willingness to maximize their preferred legal policy, and their place within the judicial hierarchy. This dissertation applies hierarchy and impact theory to assess the importance of the judicial framework and its socialization, by analyzing both the judicial opinions and votes of federal circuit and district court judges in obscenity cases during a four-decade period (1957-1998). The research presented here finds the influence of higher court precedent to correspond in part with the conception of a judicial hierarchy. An analysis of citations of Supreme Court precedent (Roth v. United States (1957) and Miller v. California (1973)) in lower court majority opinions suggests low levels of compliance: lower courts at the circuit and district court level do not signal to the Supreme Court their acceptance of High Court doctrine; thus, except for 'factual' cases, most circuit and district court decisions do not comply formally with higher court precedent. An analysis of judicial votes, however, suggests that a Supreme Court doctrinal shift (to Miller v. California) influences lower court decisions only at the circuit court level. Further investigation suggests that Supreme Court precedent has a greater influence in circuit courts than in district courts: not only is the magnitude greater for circuit (versus district) court decisions, such results occur when controlling for such factors as the appointing president, regional variations, various constitutional claims and types of litigants. Thus, it appears that the influence of Supreme Court doctrine is much stronger in the circuit courts (only one step removed from the Supreme Court) than in district courts yet the hierarchy is influential nonetheless.

While scholars have focused on the importance of the landmark decisions of the United States Supreme Court and its Chief Justice, John Marshall, in the rising influence of the federal justice system in the early Republic, the crucial role of the circuit courts in establishing uniformity of federal law and procedure across the nation has largely been ignored. This thesis seeks to remedy this lack of research on circuit courts by revealing the central role of their presiding Supreme Court justices in the successful development of a national court system drawn up from the ‘inferior’ courts rather than down from the Supreme Court to the lower jurisdictions. This thesis argues that, at a time when the Supreme Court had few cases to consider, all of the nation’s law was formulated by the lower courts; with very few decisions appealed, the circuit court opinions were invariably accepted as final, settling the law for each circuit and for the nation if followed by other justices. Therefore, in the early years, it was the circuit experience and not Supreme Court authority which shaped the course of United States law. This thesis contributes to an understanding of this early justice system because of its focus on and the depth of its research into the work of the circuit courts. Through detailed analysis, it reveals the sources used by the justices to influence the direction of the law and, by its reading of almost 2000 cases tried by four prominent Marshall associate justices, presents insights into momentous issues facing the Union. The thesis examines the generality of the circuit work of each justice but pays particular attention to the different ways in which each contributed to the shaping of United States law. Understanding the importance of the role of the circuit courts leads to a more informed reading of early American legal history.

Political scientists have conducted much work examining a court's decision on the merits of a case. We have concluded that ideology has a strong influence on the outcome on the merits of a decision. Furthermore, courts seek to render a decision that is closest to their own policy preferences. However, federal circuit courts within the judicial hierarchy are constrained by other actors according to the strategic model. There is an abundance of evidence showing that superior actors constrain courts' ideological preferences when such courts render decisions on the merits. However, there is a dearth of scholarship regarding judicial decision making on threshold issues. I argue that federal circuit courts set their judicial agendas by transforming their mandatory appellate jurisdiction into one that is discretionary. They achieve this goal by controlling the type of litigants who gain access to the courts by deciding cases on threshold grounds. I also argue that federal circuit courts are responsive to changes in Congress's ideology because Congress has power to control threshold issues through various mechanisms. I seek to establish that the grounds upon which as case is dismissed -- jurisdictional, justiciable, and procedural -- defines the parameters that constrain federal circuit courts.

Master of Arts / History / Lou F. Williams / During the course of Reconstruction both the Supreme Court and the lower level federal courts faced the task of interpreting Reconstruction legislation, including the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the Enforcement Acts. By the end of Reconstruction the Supreme Court had defined these groundbreaking pieces of legislation in a conservative manner that negatively impacted the former slaves. The lower-level courts, however, had embraced earlier opportunities to broaden the nationalistic meaning of these Amendments. One such opportunity was United States v Hall. This trial level court case initially expanded the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the rights of African Americans. The Hall Case was one of the great “might have beens” in U.S. Constitutional history. This study analyzes Ku Klux Klan violence leading up to the Eutaw riot and the subsequent court case, U.S. v Hall. Conflict broke out during a pre-election political rally when Democrats and Republicans met simultaneously at the Greene County, AL, Court House. The riot resulted in the federal government’s attempts to prosecute the rioters under the Enforcement Act of 1870. The Hall case was one of the first in which federal judges interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment. Federal prosecutors challenged the judges to make a broad, nationalistic interpretation, which would have enabled the federal government to protect the rights of the former slaves for the long haul. What—exactly—were the privileges and immunities of national citizenship? Did the Fourteenth Amendment apply the Bill of Rights to the states? Are these rights protected against the state governments? These are the issues Attorney General John P. Southworth and Circuit Court Judge William Woods tackled in the federal trial. Ultimately, the government failed to secure a conviction of the rioters but set a strong precedent in Judge Woods’ opinion for later federal courts to establish the Fourteenth Amendment’s connection to the Bill of Rights. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court failed to follow the precedent. This analysis provides historians a better understanding of the work of the lower level federal courts’ and their contribution to the constitutional issues of Reconstruction.

Unelected bureaucrats make a broad range of important policy decisions raising concerns of accountability in a democratic society. Many classics in the literature highlight the need to understand agency decisions at stages prior to the final vote by agency appointees, but few studies of the bureaucracy do so. To this point, scholars have treated the issue of shirking as one where laziness and inefficiency are the driving forces. However, it is more realistic to expect that shirking comes in the form of ideological resistance by administrators. I develop a theory that the independence afforded to the bureaucracy is functionally comparable to that of the judiciary, allowing for the insertion of individual attitudinal preferences by bureaucrats. Drawing from the attitudinal model of judicial research, I look at whether attitudes affect the decision making of administrative law judges at the National Labor Relations Board, the influence administrative law judge decisions have on reviewing bodies, and whether attitudinal decision making can be controlled by external political and legal actors. Results demonstrate that Democratic judges are more likely than Republican judges to rule for labor in unfair labor practice cases, administrative law judge decisions provide the basis for subsequent decisions of reviewing bodies, and that few political and legal controls exist over this set of bureaucrats. This research provides evidence that lower level bureaucrats make decisions based on their own political preferences and that these preferences have far ranging consequences for policy and law.

This dissertation is motivated by a straightforward question about a drastic change to American politics: why has the process of staffing the circuit courts of appeals, once so agreeable and bipartisan, seemed to have descended into almost complete partisan bitterness? Across the entire time series, these are, after all, the same courts endowed with the same power of judicial review. And when the process of staffing them was harmonious, the courts were nevertheless deciding the fate of major, controversial policies of national importance---such as the New Deal in the 1930s and civil rights in the 1950s---just as they do today. Yes, many other aspects of American politics have changed through the decades. But what could possibly explain such a complete reversal of course? I argue that this change, toward divisiveness and partisan warfare, is actually about the judiciary itself and the substantive manner by which the nominees are thought of---namely, the entry of judicial ideology into the debate through the innovation of circuit judges being evaluated on ideological terms. While taken for granted as central today, any ideological assessment of circuit court nominees, and in particular viewing them as having a comprehensive judicial philosophy as opposed to just a position on singular pressing issue of the day, was almost nonexistent for generations. Its entry into the process was piecemeal and somewhat complicated, but it eventually came to dominate and irrevocably polarize the business of staffing the courts. I argue that this was the key factor that leaves us where we are today. Broadly speaking, I consider the contributions and particular strengths of my dissertation, relative to previous scholarship, to be threefold. First is my argument and accompanying analyses which put the crucial (and severely understudied) role of judicial ideology front and center. Second, I analyze the entire lifespan of the circuit courts, whereas the previous scholarship looks only at (often relatively brief) subsets of their history. As far as I know, this is the first study to systematically look at all circuit court nominations from the establishment of these courts in 1891 through the modern era. Third, I collect and analyze a great deal of new data. In particular I focus on systematically utilizing extensive archival resources and build two original data sets related to the Senate's public and private evaluation of judicial nominees; and while there is certainly a qualitative aspect to much of this research, I also synthesize and make sense of it with quantitative analysis. In chapter 1, I explain the puzzle motivating this research, elaborate my argument, and lay out the theoretical, methodological, and data collection contributions of this dissertation. I also review the literature and describe the three existing schools of thought. In chapter 2, I give an overview of the history of the circuit courts from their founding to the present. In this data-heavy chapter, I examine multiple metrics individually, and using several of these I build a robust composite score of divisiveness for each nominee ever made to the circuit courts, from 1891 through 2020. As far as I know this has never been done before. I find overwhelming evidence that the process has fundamentally changed and become more divisive. In chapter 3, I dig more deeply into the timing of this change, and begin to explore how and why it happened---and begin my attempt at demonstrating how the evaluation of judicial ideology is central to this change. To do this I examine a massive data source that has never been utilized: the Senate Judiciary Committee hearings for all nominees. With both qualitative and quantitative analysis, I show that the evaluation of nominees has varied widely over time. Prior to 1979, nominees were evaluated almost exclusively based on their qualifications, with ideology examined only under special circumstances, which I explore in depth. In this time period, ideological scrutiny predicted a contentious confirmation process, providing evidence for my argument that ideological evaluation drove divisiveness. Also in this chapter, I analyze the post-1979 transition to the routine ideological evaluation that permanently altered the confirmation process. I find that Republicans and comprehensive judicial philosophies both played a key role. In chapter 4, I examine the senators' private evaluation of nominees, in part to serve as a check on the validity of my earlier data analysis and also to see if there is any difference between the senators' public and private goals in relation to the judiciary. To do this, I build an original data set of over 1000 internal letters and memoranda from senators, by searching the archival records of nearly every president since Benjamin Harrison as well as over 150 senators. Studying this material qualitatively and quantitatively, the findings here largely align with the analysis of the public committee hearings: for much of history senators were concerned mainly about qualifications, with ideological concern rare and under special circumstances, but eventually ideology came to be the predominant concern which ended the consensual and placid process. This immense historical record also brings to light additional senatorial goals, such as ensuring residents of their own state as well as personal friends obtain judicial appointments. In chapter 5, I focus in on the post-1979 era and I find that the more ideologically distant a nominee is from the Senate, the more divisive the confirmation process is. This provides evidence that the process is defined by ideology related to the nominees, not garden variety polarization of the system. In chapter 6, I conclude, trying to synthesize all of my findings as well as offer some thoughts on areas of future research.

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