This thesis presents a detailed explanation and argumentation of why modern decentralized technologies could be utilized in order to improve scholarly communication on many fronts. The current model of scholarly communication, which is dominated by scientific journals, is analysed together with the current economic models in use. The thesis also briefly investigates peer reviews. It also endeavors to explain how scholarly goods might be perceived from an economic standpoint. Blockchain technology offers functionalities that could potentially solve many problems associated with scholarly communication through decentralization. Both permissioned and permissionless blockchains, their implementations, interesting technical/economic/governance aspects and why they are such a unique match for scholarly needs are thoroughly analyzed and explained. Finally minimal viability criteria suitable for assessment of decentralized scholarly projects are proposed. Existing decentralized applications which try to migrate scholarly communication from a current centralized system to a decentralized one are described and examined through the prism of this framework.

This thesis is an exploration of a modified club goods approach to wetland conservation in southern Ontario as an alternative to the current policy approach. As the regulatory framework for wetland conservation continues to develop, however, so does an emerging resistance to participate in government conservation programs by private rural landowners protesting regulatory erosion of citizen rights in private land ownership. The modified club goods approach was evaluated as a fair and effective conservation method through a multiple-case study that explored six non-governmental organizations applying a modified club goods conservation model. As non-governmental organizations broaden their economic base to increase their scope of operations, they are susceptible to influence from changing sources of revenue. They must remain accountable and transparent to members and donors in order to receive their continued financial support, rather than depending on government funds which leads to an organization’s evolution away from the modified model. / The intention of this thesis is not to suggest that the Ontario government should not take part in wetland conservation. On the contrary, it is there duty to be active stakeholders that ensure the province's wetlands are managed fairly and effectively. This thesis explores a modified club goods approach as an alternative approach which the government should support as mediator, not as leader nor as spectator. That said, provincial wetland policy should be developed as a tool for guiding best management and conservation practices of wetlands, and to enhance the provision of environmental goods and services from wetlands. / Ontario Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs and the University of Guelph Food, Agriculture and Resource Economics Department.

<p dir="ltr">This dissertation investigates strategic decision-making under conditions of environmental inequality. The three chapters explore various forms of inequality across different decision contexts</p><p dir="ltr">The first chapter examines the impact of income inequality on individuals' participation in multiple public goods investments. Specifically, it analyzes how a global club good opportunity influences local public goods provision in indefinitely repeated interactions within a linear public goods game using a voluntary contribution mechanism. The study varies global club entry costs and local community endowment compositions to assess their effects on contributions and welfare. It finds that income inequality does not significantly alter contribution behaviors in single public good settings under indefinitely repeated interactions. With the introduction of a global club good, lower entry costs lead to higher participation rates among subjects, resulting in increased total welfare for both homogeneous and heterogeneous communities. Conversely, higher entry costs reduce participation and overall welfare. Heterogeneous communities discontinue club use sooner than homogeneous ones. Efficiency, measured as realized payoff relative to maximal social benefits, declines across all treatments following the introduction of a global club good. Additionally, counterfactual simulations using an individual evolutionary learning model demonstrate that the welfare benefits of a global club good opportunity hinge on its ability to yield substantial social benefits compared to local public goods.</p><p dir="ltr">The second chapter explores how power inequality influences cooperation in a dynamic game where competition and cooperation evolve over time. This research, conducted as part of a collaborative project with Yaroslav Rosokha, Denis Tverskoi, and Sergey Gavrilets, examines cooperation dynamics in scenarios where cooperation's benefits depend on political power derived from a contest. The study highlights that incumbency advantages in political contests precipitate a rapid breakdown of cooperation within social dilemmas. Furthermore, it investigates behavioral disparities between groups and individuals, leveraging simulations based on the Arifovic and Ledyard (2012) individual evolutionary learning model to shed light on the difference observed in the experiment.</p><p dir="ltr">The third chapter investigates the impact of unequal positions in a directed communication network on individuals' optimal stopping rules and social learning outcomes. The study involves subjects making predictions about uncertain states of the world using private information and social information obtained through a directed network. Theoretical predictions suggest that individuals should wait when the benefit of waiting exceeds the associated cost. Empirical results confirm that subjects indeed wait longer in more connected networks or when waiting costs are low. However, deviations from equilibrium predictions indicate influences of bounded rationality (supported by quantal response equilibrium) and heuristic decision-making, where some subjects consistently wait for a single turn regardless of positional advantage. Importantly, under-waiting at an information aggregator's position has negative externalities on group-wide information acquisition.</p>