The main research problem in this study was to identify what trust-building strategies can be utilised by organisations to enhance collective bargaining processes. To achieve this objective a theoretical Institutional Arrangements-Based Model of trust-building was conceptualised, developed and presented in Chapter 5. The presentation of this model was the culmination of the research design phases outlined below: -The first phase consisted of a literature survey undertaken to discover the nature and dynamics of the concept "trust". -The second phase consisted of surveying the literature attempting to understand the nature of the collective bargaining process, its elements and types and the environmental factors that tend to impinge on it. -The final phase of the literature survey focused on various trust-building strategies, theories and models that can be utilised by organisations to ii enhance collective bargaining processes. Trust is generally acknowledged as a necessary requirement for effective and successful workplace relationships. Because of this factor it is crucial that South African employer-employee relationships are improved in a conscious and sustainable way in order for our businesses to remain competitive in the face of global competition. With this reality in mind there is still much in the South African labour relations environment that fosters conflict. One of the primary factors that impinge on trust in employer-employee relations in South Africa is the previous government‘s divisive and racist apartheid policies. These policies have resulted in serious structural imbalances in the economy, the skewed distribution of wealth and the general scarcity of resources to address these attendant challenges. Finnemore and van Rensburg (2002, p. 36) surveys the current labour relations scenario and comments about the extent to which it has been severely affected by apartheid. Some of its appalling outcomes are: racial divisions between skilled and unskilled workers, apartheid wage gaps, poorly educated workers, dictatorial management styles and a lack of protection for the most vulnerable workers. As revealed in this research study there are still widely divergent views at the workplace regarding the nature and levels of trust that are prevalent. The overwhelming view, however, is that there is, generally, a lack of trust between managerial and employee collective bargaining teams. This lack of trust which is evident between employer and employee parties will tend to result in collective bargaining processes being embarked upon in a climate imbued with the negative spirit of distrust. The recommended Institutional Arrangements-Based Model of trust-building advocates for a process of trust-building prior to any collective bargaining initiatives. This process, as depicted in the elements of the recommended model, needs to begin with phases which will focus on frame-alignment and the identification of all sources of distrust between the parties. These prescribed sessions seek to culminate in a common understanding, between the contesting parties, of their real divergent issues and concerns as well as their existing commonalities. The next phases of the recommended model entail the parties, jointly, developing proposals and policies that in the short and long term will aim at the resolution of the identified sources of distrust and thereby reduce the psychological distance between them. The final phase of the model entails the implementation of joint problem–solving resolutions and the development of appropriate policies i.e. institutional arrangements, to deal with all conflict-prone areas of the business operations. Simultaneously, there needs to be continuous evaluation and monitoring of organisational trust and the "agreed to" trust-building strategies to ensure that distrust is reduced or eliminated in the long term, allowing the organisation and the individual employees to perform at their optimum in order to achieve their common goals.

The present study is intended as an alternative to the experimental game approach to the investigation of conflict. It explores a particular real-world conflict situation, the labor-management bargaining relationship, and is viewed as a transitional step between laboratory experimentation and research in natural settings. Subjects were 34 male adults, 19 representing "Management" and 15 representing "Labor", all with formal bargaining experience in labor-management negotiations. A total of ten 3-hour sessions were conducted in which representatives of both parties participated in 3- and 4-person groups. The study was designed to provide information concerning ways in which representatives of each party (1) perceive the labor-management relationship, and (ii) approach negotiations. Perceptual information was obtained by means of an opinion questionnaire which dealt with specific aspects of labor relations, and semantic differential-type scales. In addition to the descriptive information provided by these tools, it was found that: (1) labor representatives perceived more differences of opinion between "Labor" and "Management" than did management representatives; (2) the personal opinions of management representatives differed from the opinions they perceived "Management" in general to hold more frequently than the personal opinions of labor representatives differed from the opinions they perceived "Labor" in general to hold; (3) the personal opinions of labor representatives differed from the opinions they perceived "Management" in general to hold:, more frequently than the personal opinions of management representatives differed from the opinions they perceived "Labor" in general to hold; (4) no differences existed between the labor sample and the management sample in terms of homogeneity of perception or in terms of homogeneity of personal opinion. The first finding is considered to reflect different values placed upon tension and conflict by "Labor" and "Management", while the second and third findings suggest a greater tendency for "Labor" to hold personal opinions which resemble a perceived "party line". An implication of the fourth finding is that if exogeneous "party lines" do exist, the "party line" adopted by "Labor" is no more well defined for labor representatives than any "Management party line" is for management representatives. A potentially important observation involving misperceptions was the tendency for both labor and management representatives to think the other party perceived them in a less favorable manner than it actually did. This is regarded as one consequence of the roles prescribed for two parties in a conflict relationship. Negotiating information was obtained from a formal analysis of the verbal content of simulated bargaining sessions. The bargaining problem employed in this study cast management representatives in the role of business partners and labor representatives as the elected officials representing employees of the business. The two parties were required to negotiate a wage settlement for the coming year on the basis of a projected wage and profit analysis adapted from the model of Sawyer's bargaining board. Findings are outlined in terms of the ways in which Labor and Management presented the position of their party on the wage issue, questioned the position taken by the other party, and dealt with questions and arguments from the other party. Those aspects of verbal behavior reported Include the relative emphasis given particular bargaining positions, the kinds of arguments presented and degree of determination with which supportive statements were expressed, the types of information exchanged, and the nature of threats and attacks made by each party. In addition to categorizing verbal statements made during "negotiations", emphasis was placed upon the relative frequency with which a particular kind of statement was made by Labor and Management. Implications of the findings of this exploratory study and suggestions for future research are discussed. / Arts, Faculty of / Psychology, Department of / Graduate

This thesis examines on a conceptual level whether, in Canada, government induced centralization of the bargaining structure is apt to contribute to a stabilization of industrial relations measured in terms of a reduction in strike/lockout frequency. A micro-model of strike causation, viewing the outbreak of industrial action as the result of a deliberate gamble of the bargaining parties, forms the core of the conceptual framework developed in this paper. According to this model centralization lowers strike/lockout frequency if it (1) raises the relative costs of industrial action (2) induces the bargaining parties to integrate macro-goals into their goal portfolio (3) modifies collectivity internal interest aggregation in favor of its moderate segments and (4) successfully internalizes intra-group conflict. On the basis of theoretical considerations and existing evidence, the paper then seeks to establish whether centralization can be expected to fulfill these conditions. The study suggests that the impact of centralization upon vertical interest aggregation takes the desired direction. Because of the design of the analysis a general prediction of the effect of centralization upon horizontal interest aggregation can not be made. The relative costs of industrial action in the 'average bargaining unit' are diagnosed to remain unaffected by centralization. While centralization of the bargaining structure appears to be a necessary condition for unions and employers to integrate macro-goals into their goal portfolio, the analysis can not show that it is a sufficient condition. Finally, contingent on the readiness of the government to actively back the rule of the majority, centralization is expected to internalize intra-group conflict successfully. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

This thesis reports theory development and explorative field observation of potential effects of conflict occurring within a collective bargaining team. From the theoretical bases of Walton and McKersie's (1965) intraorganizational conflict (IOC) concept and Pondy's (1967) process model of conflict, a model of bargaining team IOC is developed. The model partitions bargaining team IOC into functional and dysfunctional subsets. Seven propositions related to the effects of dysfunctional IOC are developed from conflict and decision making literature. These propositions are concerned with the effects of dysfunctional IOC on participation of team members, rule breaking behavior, time delays, and decision styles. Operational definitions and tests for dysfunctional IOC are developed using Filley's (1975) five item definition of conflict and seven item win-lose, lose-lose, conflict responses. A participant/observer quasi-case analysis of an actual collective bargaining team experience is the basis for data generation. Many of the propositions are supported iii the observed bargaining team environment. While the single case methodology prevents generalized conclusions regarding the effects of dysfunctional IOC, the findings tentatively suggest there may be considerable practical payoffs for extending this research area. The field experience provides some additional research insights regarding the dynamic variable of dysfunctional IOC. In this study, dysfunctional bargaining team IOC is observed as a few recurring issue-related problems flowing throughout the bargaining team interactions. Implications of this study regarding future research on IOC in a bargaining team are suggested. / Business, Sauder School of / Graduate

The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the types of appeals made to employees by employers and labor organizations for the purpose of influencing the employees' decision with respect to accepting or rejecting collective bargaining, and classifying, as near as possible, the types of appeals.

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