Sudanese Political Movements and the Struggle for the State: 1964-1985 examines Sudanese opposition movements focusing on the early independence period. It begins in the period immediately following the 1964 October Revolution in which a civil uprising led by students, unions, and civil society at large ousted President Ibrahim Abboud. This event defined understandings of citizenship and political opposition for decades to come. Following 1964, a host of political movements led by Communists, Islamists, sectarian parties, and regional rebel groups all acted with the knowledge that change to the political system—even the removal of the President—was possible and could be done again. These movements engaged in different forms of confrontation with an evolving regime, not only altering the policies of the state but defining what forms of politics were seen as reasonable and worthy of recognition. These confrontations functioned as an iterative process that both altered the state as well as the larger political system in which the government was a dominant, yet not all-powerful actor. This is a history of state building told through the state’s relationships to non-state actors. It builds upon historically engaged studies of Africa and the Middle East that delve into the nature of state power both in an imperial and colonial context of the 19th and early 20th century as well as in post-independence settings. By discussing politics beyond the state, it shows how the state changed over time in dialogue with those that opposed it. Discussions of state formation (and reformation) in relation to political opposition in post-independence Africa and Middle East are rare due to the political sensitivity of the subject and consequent challenges in accessing source materials. Sudanese Political Movements and the Struggle for the State draws on state produced documents located in the Sudanese National Records Office and the South Sudan National Archives, as well as British diplomatic reporting to describe these contestations directly, providing an understanding of a type of politics rarely discussed in historical works. Divided into five chapters, Sudanese Political Movements and the Struggle for the State periodizes the relationship between political movements and the state based on which groups controlled the government. It begins with an examination of the parliamentary period of 1964-69, when political elites from northern Sudan determined and policed the realm of what was deemed reasonable politics even as the security apparatus retained control over large swathes of the country. Following chapters delve into President Ja’afar Nimeiri’s regime, delineating between the alliances it maintained with Sudanese political movements—first with the Communist party (1969-71), Southerners and “technocrats” (1972-76), Sectarian movements of the center right (1977-1983) and finally the Islamic Movement (1983-85). These alliances did not always obviate those of the past, at least entirely, nor did they remove all opposition. Yet the alliances guided the state in its pursuit of policy, as well as in how to respond to dissent from different segments of Sudanese society and what forms of dissent and lines of political argumentation were legible and which were threatening to state legitimacy.

No description available.

Ambedkar’s role as an Indian political leader during the late colonial period has attracted increased attention politically and historically. However, there is a startling disconnect between the modern, often mythological, construction of Ambedkar and the near forgotten historical figure. His broader programme for social uplift of the underprivileged is often lost in the record of his conflict with M. K. Gandhi and the Indian National Congress and their role as the dominant nationalist group in India at the time. The deification that has resulted from his use of Buddhism as an emancipatory identity has obscured his interpretation of it as a secular political tool in a political debate shaped and dominated by religious identity. This thesis will argue that the Buddhist conversion was a continuation of his political and social programme, not, as some have suggested, a retreat to religion after failing to secure reforms to Indian law and society. / February 2009

Ambedkar’s role as an Indian political leader during the late colonial period has attracted increased attention politically and historically. However, there is a startling disconnect between the modern, often mythological, construction of Ambedkar and the near forgotten historical figure. His broader programme for social uplift of the underprivileged is often lost in the record of his conflict with M. K. Gandhi and the Indian National Congress and their role as the dominant nationalist group in India at the time. The deification that has resulted from his use of Buddhism as an emancipatory identity has obscured his interpretation of it as a secular political tool in a political debate shaped and dominated by religious identity. This thesis will argue that the Buddhist conversion was a continuation of his political and social programme, not, as some have suggested, a retreat to religion after failing to secure reforms to Indian law and society.

Ambedkar’s role as an Indian political leader during the late colonial period has attracted increased attention politically and historically. However, there is a startling disconnect between the modern, often mythological, construction of Ambedkar and the near forgotten historical figure. His broader programme for social uplift of the underprivileged is often lost in the record of his conflict with M. K. Gandhi and the Indian National Congress and their role as the dominant nationalist group in India at the time. The deification that has resulted from his use of Buddhism as an emancipatory identity has obscured his interpretation of it as a secular political tool in a political debate shaped and dominated by religious identity. This thesis will argue that the Buddhist conversion was a continuation of his political and social programme, not, as some have suggested, a retreat to religion after failing to secure reforms to Indian law and society.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Toronto, 2005.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1974. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 361-383).

<p>Istorijsko razdoblje u Jugoslaviji, u drugoj polovini &scaron;ezdesetih godina 20. veka, nakon otpoĉinjanja privredne reforme i Brionskog plenuma, poznato je po svojim reformskim karakteristikama. Temeljna reforma ekonomskog sistema, ubrzo je pro&scaron;irena i na ostale segmente dru&scaron;tva i uticala je na promenu samog karaktera federalistiĉkog ustrojstva, kao i na decentralizaciju vladajuće partije. U Srbiji su modernizacijske i reformistiĉke tendencije, koje su odnele prevagu u dru&scaron;tvu, najcelovitije bile izraţene u vreme rukovodstva Saveza komunista ove republike, na ĉijem ĉelu se nalazio Marko Nikezić (1968&ndash;1972). U radu su istraţeni spoljnopolitiĉki segmenti jugoslovenskog reformskog usmerenja, analizom kauzalnih odnosa sa istoĉnim i zapadnim hladnoratovskim blokom. Polazeći od strukturne krize u prvoj polovini &scaron;ezdesetih, istraţena je ekonomska i idejna osnova privredne reforme, odgovor na nju sa stanovi&scaron;ta levo radikalne studentske pobune 1968., kao i politiĉki dometi Brionskog plenuma. U radu se istraţuju i reforma i reogranizacija SKJ, su&scaron;tinska decentralizacija jugoslovenskog federalizma, kao i odnosi reformskog rukovodstva Srbije sa drugim jugoslovenskim republikama i jugoslovenskim predsednikom Titom.<br />Posebna paţnja u radu je posvećena partijskom rukovodstvu Marka Nikezića i njegovim temeljnim programskim usmerenjima, promovisanim pod idejom &bdquo;Moderne Srbije&ldquo;. Ideje socijalistiĉke demokratizacije, sa povećanom ulogom autonomnih segmenata dru&scaron;tva, po&scaron;tovanje institucionalnog okvira i insistiranje na kompetentnosti, znaĉajno su umanjili realan pritisak politiĉkih struktura na dru&scaron;tvo, jaĉajući ga na raĉun drţave. TakoĊe, svojim razumevanjem Jugoslavije kao sloţene drţave, odbacivanjem uloge Srbije kao ĉuvara Jugoslavije, odbacivanjem patronata nad Srbima u drugim republikama, povećanim samoupravnim pravima pokrajina &ndash; temeljno i su&scaron;tinski je napravljen diskontinuitet sa svim centralistiĉkim i nacionalistiĉkim pojavama u Srbiji. Ovakva politika odve&scaron;će partijsko rukovodstvo republike u sukob sa predstavnicima nacionalistiĉke kritiĉke inteligencije. U radu su analizirane i<br />ekonomske postavke, kao i spoljnopolitiĉka orijentacija rukovodstva SK Srbije, kao i njihova kulturna politika, koja je imala intenciju da ponudi alternativu postojećim obrascima u ovoj oblasti dru&scaron;tva. Naposletku, istraţen je sukob koncepcija unutar rukovodstva Srbije, njihove meĊusobne razlike, kao i Titova arbitraţa u korist jedne strane, koja će kljuĉne reformske protagoniste modernizacije ukloniti sa politiĉke i javne scene Srbije i Jugoslavije.</p> / <p>History of Yugoslavian in the second half of the 1960s, after the initiation of economic reforms and Brioni Plenary Session, is characterized by the reform attempts. Fundamental reform of the economic system was soon expanded on other parts of society, affected the federalist character of the state and led towards the decentralization of the ruling party. In Serbia, modernizing and reformist tendencies that have prevailed in the society, were in the most comprehensive way expressed at the time of the leadership of the League of Communists of Serbia by Marko Nikezić (1968-1972). In the beginning dissertation deals with foreign policy aspects of Yugoslav reform orientation by analyzing interrelatedness with Cold War policy of Great Powers. Starting from the structural crisis in the first half of the 1960s, economic and ideological basis of economy reform was researched, as well as the response from the radical left with the Students rebellion in 1968 and political achievements of the Brioni Plenary Session. Dissertation also explores reform and reorganization of the LSY, fundamental decentralization of Yugoslav federal system, as well as relations of leaders of Serbian reformist movement with other Yugoslav republics and president Tito.<br />Particular attention is paid to the leaders of Serbian party and to its basic program guidelines, promoted under the idea of &quot;Modern Serbia&quot;. Ideas of socialist democratization, with the increasing role of autonomous parts of society, respect of institutional framework and insisting on competence, have eroded existing pressure of political structure on the society, strengthening it at the expense of the state. Also, their understanding of Yugoslavia as a composite state, rejecting of the role of Serbia as a guardian of Yugoslavia, declining patronage of Serbs in other republics, increased self-&nbsp;government of the provinces &ndash; made fundamental and essential discontinuity with all the centralist and nationalist developments in Serbia. This policy led the Serbian party leadership in conflict with the representatives of the nationalist intellectuals. Dissertation analyzes economic attitudes, foreign policy orientation, as well as cultural policy of the Serbian party leadership, which had the intention to offer an alternative to existing patterns of society development. Finally, we studied the conflict of different concepts within the leadership of Serbia, their differences, and Tito arbitration in favor of one side, with decisive consequences that led towards the removal of key figures of modernization attempt from the political and public scene of Serbia and Yugoslavia.</p>

This thesis explores new ideas for the foundations for state violence in Iraq by looking specifically at the outbreaks of spectacular violence during the Qasim Era (1958-1963). In order to frame the discussion, this study looks first at how the British established a model for state violence during the Monarchy period (1921-1958), which eventually both validated and radicalized the opposition parties. The second chapter examines the violence of the everyday in Iraq, and how the spectacular violence of the Qasim Era finds historical context within everyday violence and ritual. In the final chapter, this thesis discusses how the radicalized violence of the opposition parties melded with the violence of the everyday to create spectacular acts of ritualized violence. After the coup d’état of 8 February 1963, the Ba’ath Party institutionalized this radical new brand of violence, creating a foundation for the state violence to come under Saddam Hussein. This violence was experienced only by the Iraqi Communists at first, but was later experienced by the whole nation. / text

No description available.