本研究主要針對影響董監酬勞與會計(市場)績效關聯性之因素進行探討。在現代公司之經營管理架構中，係由股東在股東大會選出代表進入董事會，由董事會成員選出主要執行業務經營之人，並代理所有投資人監督及管理經營層。換言之，相對於經理人，董事會成員為股東最為直接之代理人。因此，本研究認為董事會成員為外部股東最直接之代理人，故以董監酬勞為分析對象，從公司治理之角度，以股權結構(如是屬於家族控制企業、董監持股、外部大股東持股等)及董事會特性(獨立董監席次比率、董事是否兼任經理人、董事長是否兼任總經理)等相關變數，探討其對於董監酬勞與會計、市場績效間關聯性之影響。 實證結果顯示，家族企業與公司經理人兼任董事會職位時，會提升董監酬勞與績效間之關聯性；董監持股比例愈高、外部大股東持股比例愈高、獨立董監席次比例越高及董事長兼任總經理時，會降低董監酬勞與績效間之關聯性。 / This study argues that members of corporate boards are the most direct delegate of external shareholders. Agency problem may exist between board members and external shareholders. Using a sample of firms listed in Taiwan Securities Exchange Corporation and Gre Tai Securities Market over 1996-2005, this study empirically examines the effect of ownership and board structures on the compensation of board members. This study expects that the pay-performance sensitivity of board compensation is weakened when a strong monitoring mechanism is in place. Using return on assets as the measures for performance, the primary empirical results show that family-controlled firms and firms with representation of executive directors illustrate higher pay-performance sensitivity. On the contrary, firms with higher shareholdings by board members and by outside block holders, and firms with representation of independent board members demonstrate lower pay-performance sensitivity.

本研究主要針對目前企業績效不佳，董事會成員坐領高額董監酬勞之情況進行研究。本研究首先從權力與監督兩構面分析目前影響董監酬勞水準之因素，並進一步從權力與監督構面探討執行業務董監領取員工分紅產生之激勵或稀釋效果對公司價值與股東權益之影響。 實證結果顯示，董事會成員之權力擴張會導致較高水準之董監酬勞，尤其是執行業務董監之員工分紅部分，且執行業務董監領取員工分紅對於公司股東權益及公司未來價值具有負向之影響。家族企業之董監酬勞並不會隨著權力擴張而有較高的水準。在內部監督機制方面，獨立董監之監督效果較不明顯；在外部監督機制方面，主動機構投資人相較於被動機構投資人，具有抑制董監酬勞自利行為之效果。 / Based on a sample of Taiwanese companies listed in Taiwan Securities Exchange over the period of 1996-2004, this thesis examines the determinans of compensation of board directors from the power and monitoring perspectives. In addition, this thesis investigates the effect of equity-based compensation of executive directors on firm value and return on equity. The empirical result indicates that the entrenchment of managerial power determines the level of directors’ pay, especially on equity-based compensation. The more powerful the board of directors, higher the level of compensation, lower the company value and the return on stockholders` equity. However, as compared to non-family-controlled firms, the directors of family-controlled firms tend to have lower level of compensation. Moreover, we find that active institutional investors have greater monitoring effect on the compensation level of board of directors.