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Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Toronto, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 189-202).

This research aims to dispel the myth that export cartels should be prohibited because they restrain competition and, thus, holds back economic development. It also proposes the conditions under which export cartels promote economic development. In contrast to the myth, this research argues that, when it comes to economic development, competition is not always desirable and, therefore, that export cartels should be formed under certain conditions. In other words, the doctrine that maximum competition is optimal competition is not applicable when the objective is economic development. Moreover, as export cartels from developing countries do not possess market power in the global market, if they facilitate their firms, which are mainly SMEs, to be able to export, competition in the global market is increased, rather than decreased. We then propose the concept of competition relocation, which argues that cartelisation does not eliminate competition but relocate competition from the activity being cartelised into other activities. The concept rejects the conventional interpretation of competition as a unidimensional action, in which cartels always decrease competition. On the contrary, competition is multidimensional, i.e., firms compete across different activities. Therefore, cartelisation may not eliminate or decrease competition but simply relocates it across different activities and the overall degree of competition might even increase. Export cartels is simply a tool to relocate competition. Based on the concept of competition relocation, we argue further that, in order to promote economic development, we must make sure that whenever cartelisation promotes the long-term productive capabilities more than competition does, cartelisation should be promoted. To derive the conditions under which export cartels should be promoted, we used both history and game theory. We study the historical lessons of now-developed countries, including Germany, the US, and Japan and draw a game-theoretical model to derive the conditions under which export cartels promote economic development. In terms of game theory, we propose that the situation in which export cartels should be promoted resembles the stag-hunt game, where both cartelisation and competition are Nash equilibria. Even though it is more productive to hunt a stag together, each hunter has an incentive to deviate and catch a hare. The model shows that, whenever the benefit of sharing resources between firms is sufficiently large (in comparison with other parameters), export cartels are more productive than competition. Therefore, most export cartels have been promoted among SMEs. Moreover, it also shows that, even though each firm may be able to export (due to abundant exclusive resources), the environment, which supports the use of resources across firms, could still make export cartels more productive.

The Competition Act 89 of 1998 prohibits abuse of its dominance by a firm that is dominant within a specific market. The abuse of dominance prohibitions are set out in section 8 of the Act. This dissertation focuses on section 8(b) which prohibits a dominant firm from refusing to give access to an essential facility that belongs to the dominant firm or to which the dominant firm has access, in circumstances where it is economically feasible for the dominant firm to provide such access. The concept of an “essential facility” is problematic in South African competition law and this dissertation probes into the characteristics of such a facility and the requirements of proving a contravention of section 8(b). A comparative study of the US and EU is undertaken and it is eventually concluded that the South African Competition Authorities should lean more towards the US approach to the essential facilities prohibition. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / gm2014 / Mercantile Law / unrestricted

The diploma thesis is focused on creating a competitive strategy that is active in sales of jewelry and watches. The thesis analyzes the current situation of the company, examines the environmental factors acting on the company or individual processes within the enterprise. Through the goals and results of competitive advantage is leading the work to design a competitive strategy and its implementation over time.

One of the recognised ways through which a firm may increase its market share or reorganise its presence in a market is through a merger. A merger occurs when independent firms combine their businesses. Section 12A of the Competition Act, 1998, provides two grounds in terms of which mergers must be evaluated by competition authorities. These are competition and public interest considerations. The Act is reticent on which, between the two considerations, should take precedence in the event that the two conflict. The anterior purpose of this study is therefore to provide an in-depth analysis on which consideration must take precedence in the event of conflict. On analysis, the majority of case law suggests that the competition considerations must take precedence. This observation is also buttressed by a significant amount of literature, which holds that in merger analysis, the public interests only play a secondary role to the competition inquiry. / Mercantile Law / LL.M. (Mercantile Law)

by Cheung Wai-yin Ronald, Chong Wing-kong. / Thesis (M.B.A.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1991. / Bibliography: leaf 95. / ABSTRACT --- p.i / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.ii / LIST OF FIGURES --- p.iv / LIST OF TABLES --- p.v / CHAPTER / INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Chapter I. --- METHODOLOGY --- p.5 / Chapter II. --- COMPUTER SOFTWARE AND SERVICES ENVIRONMENT --- p.7 / Hong Kong --- p.11 / Infrastructure --- p.11 / IT Manpower --- p.12 / Technical Capacity --- p.16 / Research and Development --- p.18 / Market Information --- p.19 / Supporting Hardware Industry --- p.22 / Role of Government --- p.25 / People's Republic of China --- p.28 / Infrastructure --- p.28 / IT Manpower --- p.30 / Technical Capacity --- p.32 / Research and Development --- p.34 / Market Information --- p.34 / Supporting Hardware Industry --- p.39 / Role of Government --- p.39 / Singapore --- p.44 / Infrastructure --- p.44 / IT Manpower --- p.45 / Technical Capacity --- p.48 / Research and Development --- p.50 / Market Information --- p.50 / Supporting Hardware Industry --- p.54 / Role of Government --- p.56 / Taiwan --- p.59 / Infrastructure --- p.59 / IT Manpower --- p.60 / Technical Capacity --- p.63 / Research and Development --- p.64 / Market Information --- p.65 / Supporting Hardware Industry --- p.68 / Role of Government --- p.71 / Chapter III. --- COMPARISON OF COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGES AND WEAKNESSES --- p.74 / Comparison of Infrastructure --- p.74 / Comparison of IT Manpower --- p.75 / Comparison of Technical Capacity --- p.85 / Comparison of Market Information --- p.85 / Comparison of Supporting Hardware Industry --- p.86 / Comparison of Role of Government --- p.86 / Chapter IV. --- CONCLUSIONS --- p.90 / Collaborative Model --- p.90 / Role of the Four Chinese Communities --- p.92 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.95

<p>The Swedish food retail market contains of three major actors, ICA, KF and Axfood, all in all dominating 75 percent of the total market shares. The scant number of retailing actors indicates that the Swedish food retail market is a highly concentrated oligopoly, which as a fact has given rise to definite discussions and argumentations concerning the market situation. But is the food retail market imperfect and how do we reach a workable competition? Economic theory does not provide any clear answer on these questions, but is rather divided into two fundamentally different approaches to define competition: the static and the dynamic perspective on competition. </p><p>In an attempt to examine the competition on local Swedish retail markets, the purpose of this study is to carry out an econometric model estimating the situation. The model serves to explain the variation of ICA’s achievements measured in terms of turnovers obtained in the company. The explanatory variables composing the model are divided into three separate groupings: degreeof market concentration, storespecific factors and region-specific factors. Furthermore, in order to find out which one of the competitive explanations best fits the reality, the regression results are interpreted from a static and a dynamic perspective of competition. In part, we also aim to compare the results with the outline of the Swedish competition law. </p><p>We found that the level of concentration obtained in our material is high and is steadily increasing. We also found that stores do not, in any great extent, use price, service and quality as competitive methods. Thus, to gain competitive advantage, market actors must find other ways to carry out strategic market activities. The region-specific variables had either none or very little influence on ICA’s turnover. According to these findings, neither the static nor the dynamic perspective of competition is solely able to produce an accurate method for reaching a state of a workable competition. Instead, a combination of the static and the dynamic ideas may be regarded as the most advantageous way to generate suitable conditions for competition to be efficient. Therefore, in order to promote workable competition, the Swedish competition law must consist of a balance between the static and the dynamic view of competition.</p>

The Swedish food retail market contains of three major actors, ICA, KF and Axfood, all in all dominating 75 percent of the total market shares. The scant number of retailing actors indicates that the Swedish food retail market is a highly concentrated oligopoly, which as a fact has given rise to definite discussions and argumentations concerning the market situation. But is the food retail market imperfect and how do we reach a workable competition? Economic theory does not provide any clear answer on these questions, but is rather divided into two fundamentally different approaches to define competition: the static and the dynamic perspective on competition. In an attempt to examine the competition on local Swedish retail markets, the purpose of this study is to carry out an econometric model estimating the situation. The model serves to explain the variation of ICA’s achievements measured in terms of turnovers obtained in the company. The explanatory variables composing the model are divided into three separate groupings: degreeof market concentration, storespecific factors and region-specific factors. Furthermore, in order to find out which one of the competitive explanations best fits the reality, the regression results are interpreted from a static and a dynamic perspective of competition. In part, we also aim to compare the results with the outline of the Swedish competition law. We found that the level of concentration obtained in our material is high and is steadily increasing. We also found that stores do not, in any great extent, use price, service and quality as competitive methods. Thus, to gain competitive advantage, market actors must find other ways to carry out strategic market activities. The region-specific variables had either none or very little influence on ICA’s turnover. According to these findings, neither the static nor the dynamic perspective of competition is solely able to produce an accurate method for reaching a state of a workable competition. Instead, a combination of the static and the dynamic ideas may be regarded as the most advantageous way to generate suitable conditions for competition to be efficient. Therefore, in order to promote workable competition, the Swedish competition law must consist of a balance between the static and the dynamic view of competition.

This collection of studies was designed to understand the mechanisms and consequences of competition among early life stages of red drum (Sciaenops ocellatus), with a special attention to asymmetric competition and multiple-breeding strategy of parents. The overall hypotheses were that (1) red drum larvae show behavioral interactions, and the magnitude of these interactions is explained by the sizes of the competing individuals, (2) red drum larvae compete for food and habitat use, and the competition is asymmetric as determined by size and behavioral interactions, and (3) the parents can reduce negative effects of competition among larvae and increase larval survival by altering their multiple-spawning traits. The laboratory experiments showed the existence of sociality in red drum larvae. The magnitudes of aggressive behavior, vigilant behavior and shoaling behavior were explained by a combination of absolute and relative phenotypes of competing individuals, such as body lengths and body condition. A new method of combining the laboratory experiments and the foraging theory disentangled interference competition for food from exploitative competition, revealing that both absolute and relative body lengths of competing individuals influence feeding efficiencies. In addition, vigilant behavior decreased feeding efficiency regardless of body sizes. The competitor size and behavioral interactions between individuals had different effects on competition for habitat use: the existence of larger individuals prevented the newly settled larvae from entering preferred habitats, whereas the aggressive behavior from the occupants of preferred habitats moved newly settled larvae to the unpreferred habitats. Finally, computer simulations using an individual-based model revealed that as interference competition among larvae increased, the number of spawning events and the spawning interval of the parents increased to lessen competition and maximize total survival of offspring. / text