M.A. / This study focuses on the concept of an open society, a concept that was given currency by the philosopher Karl Popper in his 1945 book, The Open Society and its Enemies. Popper provides five imperatives for an open society: state power must be limited and strictly controlled; the aim of public policy must be the reduction of misery; massive reconstruction must be foresworn in favour of incremental changes, guided by critical feedback from the citizenry; institutions to enable free criticism are essential to an open society; and individualism and diversity must be cherished as the source of a richer and more valuable critique. This study examines the South African Constitution to evaluate the extent to which it, as an institution, contributes to the attainment of a Popperian open society, and concludes that it provides the enabling conditions to attain four out of five of Popper’s imperatives. Where it does not succeed is in providing for incremental social change: on the contrary, it enshrines a vision of a radically reconstructed society. Ironically, that vision seems to have been renounced by the state, which has instead adopted an austere economic policy designed to win global approval. This policy has elicited widespread criticism, as have other government policies. Government response to criticism has been far from the positive acceptance envisaged by Popper, ranging from dismissal to outrage to blatant attempts to silence criticism through regulation or legislation. In the case of criticism from the courts (in the form of judgments against government agencies) response has frequently been non-compliance with court orders, even with Constitutional Court orders. The Constitutional Court represents one of the institutional checks and balances on the state demanded by Popper, having considerable powers of judicial review to guard against the abuse of state power. An evaluation of the Court’s contribution towards the attainment of an open society suggests that initially the Court was somewhat reticent about exerting its powers, to the extent of being taxed by some with undue deference towards government. In recent years, however, the Court has shown signs of increased assertiveness, finding for government on fewer occasions and attaching structural interdicts to its orders. It nonetheless requires something more, if the Constitutional Court is to make the contribution it should towards attaining an open society, and this study concurs with a suggestion that the Court undertake public interest litigation, as other apex courts have done. The open society envisaged by the Constitution (and by Popper) requires that the Constitutional Court be vigilant for abuses of state power, provide an ongoing critique of public policy through its judgments, and even accept its share of responsibility for realising the reconstructive vision portrayed in the Constitution, through actively identifying, investigating and addressing injustices in our society.

Standard explanations of judicial behaviour (i.e. legal, rational-choice, attitudinal, and institutional models) are overly static and exogenous, interested in instances of sudden change in judicial behaviour, as triggered by appointments, legal reforms, or shifts in the political context. While these models are useful in understanding the external incentives affecting judicial behaviour, they are unsuitable for explaining sustained judicial empowerment beyond temporary strategic calculations. In response, recent 'ideational' approaches, especially studying constitutional courts, highlight the importance of judges' ideas about their role - not their ideologies or policy preferences - in instilling a mission, rather than an incentive-oriented view of the judicial function. Yet, despite their more dynamic approaches, those methods have overlooked how ideational change in the 'outside' world translates into change 'inside' this type of courts. Due to those limitations, this study proposes a complementary explanation of judicial empowerment: a theory of informal mandates and endogenous empowerment. Viewed through this lens, change and variation in judicial empowerment within and across cases are explained by the construction, expansion, and endurance - or absence and collapse - of collective internal understandings of the court's role and mission. Such understandings are developed as legal doctrines and articulated under broader informal mandates by 'mission leaders'. Gradually, these informal mandates can expand and gather majority support from strategic partnerships formed between 'mission leaders' and 'supporting leaders' - usually justices with high seniority. The more these informal mandates expand and endure inside the court, the less exogenous factors and strategic incentives over-determine its behaviour in the long-run. Judicial empowerment, thus, is better understood as a process that develops and expands gradually, endogenously, and informally, with a mission-oriented purpose. The theory is applied in the constitutional tribunals of Costa Rica, Chile, and Uruguay from 1990 to 2016. These countries have similar rule-of-law conditions, but their constitutional tribunals differ considerably in the strength and endurance of their informal mandates and, as a result, have attained different levels of judicial empowerment.

1990 m. kovo 11 d. buvo atkurta nepriklausoma Lietuvos valstybė. Šis įvykis atvėrė naują Lietuvos konstitucinės raidos etapą. 1992 m.spalio 25 d. įvykusiame referendume Lietuvos Respublikos piliečiai pritarė LR Konstitucijai1, kuri įtvirtina Lietuvos nepriklausomybę ir demokratiją bei išreiškia tautos suverenitetą. Atkūrus nepriklausomybę, Lietuva tapo pripažinta dalyve tarptautiniuose santykiuose. Bendradarbiavimas tarp Lietuvos ir Europos Bendrijos prasidėjo 1991 m. 1992 m. gegužės 11 d. Lietuva ir Europos Bendrija pasirašė prekybos ir komercinio bei ekonominio bendradarbiavimo sutartį2, o vėliau priėmė deklaraciją dėl politinio dialogo tarp Bendrijos ir Lietuvos Respublikos. 1993 m. birželio 21-22 d. vykusiame Europos Vadovų Tarybos susitikime Kopenhagoje Bendrija pirmą kartą suformulavo savo poziciją dėl Vidurio ir Rytų Europos valstybių narystės Europos Sąjungoje ir nustatė kriterijus jų dalyvavimui šioje Bendrijoje. 1994 m. liepos 18 d. buvo pasirašyta ES ir Lietuvos laisvosios prekybos sutartis.3 Tų pačių metų pabaigoje prasidėjo derybos dėl Europos sutarties, kurios baigėsi 1995 m. birželio 12 d. Europos Sutarties pasirašymu.4 1995 m. gruodžio 8 d. Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybė įteikė oficialų prašymą priimti Lietuvos Respubliką į Europos Sąjungą (toliau vadinama ES). Prasidėjo itin sudėtingas derybų etapas, kurio metu Lietuvos teisė buvo derinama su Bendrijos teise. Stojimo derybos buvo oficialiai baigtos 2002 m. gruodžio 12-13 d. Kopenhagoje vykusiame Europos... [to full text] / In the process of EU integration Lithuania faced many complicated legal issues. Constitutional amendments were no exception. The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania did not contain any provision for the delegation of state competences. The constitutional jurisprudence of the member states, the case-law of the Court of Justice and academic circles provide different interpretations for the primacy of EU law, the supremacy of the national constitutions, and the concept of sovereignty. The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania has not yet expressed any position concerning the interrelationship of EU law and the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.

Why are national constitutional courts able to affect the actions of national legislatures? The roles and relationships of both constitutional courts and legislatures are defined in the national constitution. Although there is variance across countries, in general constitutional courts are empowered to ensure that laws conform to the principles and values enshrined in the constitution. National legislatures are, at least to some extent, required to conform legislation to the decisions of the constitutional court. Yet both the constitutional court and legislature could alter or avoid these roles. Constitutional courts can expand or contract their duties by applying the constitution in either a broad or restricted manner. Similarly, national legislatures can expand or contract the influence of the constitutional court by complying with or ignoring past and future constitutional court decisions. This dissertation builds on the works of Fish and Kroenig (2009), Schimmelfinning (2006), Maveety and Grosskopf (2004), Finnemore (2003), and Stone (1990) to explain the balance of power between national constitutional courts and national legislatures in the protection and extension of fundamental rights and democracy. By creating a measure of constitutional court autonomy and using both qualitative and quantitative methods, this dissertation will seek to demonstrate that national constitutional court and legislative autonomy must be viewed from both the national and supranational perspective and that a reduction in national legislative autonomy may increase national diffusion of democratic norms and the protection of human rights.

Thesis (M.A. (Human Rights))--Mahidol University, 2004.

Habilitation - Universität, Passau, 2009.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Passau, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references.

Univ., Diss.--Konstanz, 2005. / Literaturverz. S. [499] - 524.

Zugl.: Potsdam, Univ., Diss.

Si l’on comprend le pouvoir des cours constitutionnelles comme l’influence qu’elles exercent sur les autres organes, il faut concevoir leurs compétences comme les ressources et les moyens que les autres organes peuvent mobiliser afin de limiter leur influence comme les contraintes auxquelles leur pouvoir se heurte. En Espagne, en France et en Italie, la configuration institutionnelle alloue aux cours et aux autres organes des ressources et des moyens de pressions différents. L’analyse stratégique du pouvoir de la cour constitutionnelle dans ces trois pays consiste à interpréter leur histoire au regard de l’allocation de ces ressources et moyens de pression. Elle permet d’éclairer les manières singulières dont leur pouvoir s’est établi dans les trois pays étudiés. Elle permet de comprendre la déférence du Tribunal espagnol a l’égard du législateur et son activisme envers les juges ordinaire, les rapports au contraire collaboratifs que le Conseil constitutionnel et la Cour italienne ont noués avec les juges ordinaires et les relations souvent plus conflictuelles qu’ils entretiennent avec le législateur. / If the power of constitutional courts is defined by the influence that they exercise upon other legal bodies, one must consider the review mechanisms at their disposal to exercise that power and the various ways in which other legal bodies can limit constitutional court influence. In Spain, France and Italy, the distribution of judicial review mechanisms and means of legal influence between the courts and the other legal bodies is different. The Power of Constitutional Courts gives an account of constitutional court power based on the distribution of judicial review mechanisms and other means of legal influence. It details specific ways in which constitutional courts have been able to establish their power in the three countries. It explains: the judicial deference of the Spanish Tribunal towards the legislature and its domination of other Spanish courts; the collaborative relationships of the French Conseil constitutionnel and the Italian Court have established with other courts and the more confrontational relationship they have had with the legislature.