Cette recherche porte sur la question de l'existence de lacunes constitutionnelles. Elle vise à évaluer les représentations fondées sur l'hypothèse de telles inexistences normatives. La diversité des propriétés attachées à l'idée de lacune normative dans le champ du droit constitutionnel invite à proposer une cartographie des différents concepts qui peuvent lui être attachés. Les lacunes constitutionnelles sont à la fois des phénomènes et des instruments. Phénomènes, elles sont difficiles à connaître et impossibles à nier. Elles sont difficiles à connaître : leur appréhension est affectée à la fois par les variations dont peuvent faire l'objet les dogmes qui structurent la représentation systématique des normes juridiques et par diverses formes d'indétermination linguistique. Elles sont impossibles à nier: une évaluation des différents arguments formulés au soutien de la thèse de la nécessaire complétude des systèmes normatifs permet d'établir leurs limites. Instruments, les lacunes constitutionnelles ont une fonction critique et une fonction subversive. Utilisées par la doctrine, elles ont une fonction critique: elles semblent une unité de mesure, perfectible, sur le fondement de laquelle elle évalue les dispositions constitutionnelles. Utilisées par les interprètes authentiques, elles ont une fonction subversive: elles constituent une ressource argumentative propre à justifier le contournement de certaines dispositions constitutionnelles. / This research relates to the question of the existence of gaps in the constitution. It aims to assess the representations based on the hypothesis of these normative non-existences. The range of properties linked to the idea of normative gaps in the field of constitutional law necessitates the mapping of its various connected concepts. Constitutional gaps are both phenomena and instruments. As phenomena, they are difficult to recognise yet impossible to deny. They are difficult to recognise as their understanding is affected both by the variations in the dogma that structure the systematic re-presentation of the legal norms, and by various forms of linguistic indecision. They are impossible to deny insomuch that an assessment of the various arguments in favour of the theory of the necessary completeness of the system of norms makes it possible to establish their limits. As instruments, constitutional gaps have a critical and a subversive function. Used for doctrinal analysis, their function is critical : they appear as a unit of measure, perfectible, serving as a basis to evaluate constitutional provisions. Used by authoritative interpreters, they have a subversive function: they constitute an argumentative resource that can justify the circumvention of specific constitutional provisions.

In Sidumo v Rustenburg Platinum Ltd ((2007) 12 BLLR 1097 (CC); (2007) 28 ILJ 2405 (CC); 2008 (2) SA 24 (CC)) the Constitutional Court made two findings of immense significance for dismissed employees: firstly, the court rejected the use of the so-called “reasonable employer” test in our law, a test which traditionally required arbitrators and courts evaluating the fairness of a dismissal for proven misconduct to treat the employer’s decision on sanction with a measure of deference; and secondly, on scrutiny of the more controversial issue before the court, to wit, the basis, if any, upon which arbitrators are obliged to make reasonable decisions, the court (in confirming that arbitrators are so obliged) held that the obligation to do so suffuses section 145 of the LRA, and that the extended review grounds legislated under PAJA do not apply. In the present article these judicial conclusions are critically analysed and evaluated, and a number of submissions are made, inter alia: it is submitted that the Constitutional Court’s rejection of the “reasonable employer” test was premised on a fundamental misinterpretation of the test; that while the court’s attempt to locate the reasonableness standard within the LRA was perhaps justifiable, the court failed to consider properly, or at all, the wording of section 145 and its history, with the consequence that the court failed to appreciate that section 145 of the LRA (save on an unduly strained interpretation) could not conceivably be construed to cater, in itself and without more, for the constitutional right to lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair administrative action; and further, that the labour landscape post-Sidumo is, to an extent, unquestionably one bathed in greater uncertainty. In conclusion, the author poses the question whether, on a review of Sidumo, the Constitutional Court should not be considered to have fallen short of fulfilling its constitutional obligations under the rule of law.

The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution of 1993. The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, which are in conflict with it The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights are suggested in the thesis. / Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

The Zuma case - important as the first decision of the Constitutional Court - is primarily concerned with the constitutionality of section 217(l)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In trying to fmd an answer to this question, the Constitutional Court also addressed other important issues. In this dissertation the Constitutional Court's decision on the constitutionality of section 217(1)(b)(ii) is examined, as well as important general principles laid down by the Court regarding incompetent referrals by the Supreme Court; constitutional interpretation; reverse onus provisions and the right to a fair trial; as well as the application of the general limitation clause. A closer look is taken at adherence to these principles in subsequent Constitutional Court decisions, and finally a conclusion is reached on the value of the Zuma case. / Law / LL.M. (Law)

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-05T17:40:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 17 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A presente tese de doutorado estampa como fio condutor problemático o conceito, a abrangência e as peculiaridades inegavelmente próprias da interpretação constitucionalmente adequada. A aplicação do direito consiste num procedimento hermenêutico e normativo de especificidade concretizadora cuja finalidade aponta para resolver os conflitos opostos em juízo através de um pronunciamento decisório materialmente legítimo. As decisões prolatadas pelo poder judiciário devem, no seu conteúdo expresso mediante fundamentação, guardar conformidade ao ordenamento constitucional, seja aplicando os atos normativos em consonância à Constituição, seja atendendo de maneira adequada e eficaz o direito material sacrificado ou ameaçado injustamente. Desta forma, o juízo de constitucionalidade adquire autonomia jurídica de natureza concreta ou jurisdicionalmente decisória em face daquilo que se convencionou denominar de controle de constitucionalidade das leis. A inconstitucionalidade das leis, assim, não se pode equiparar à / This PhD thesis highlights as the very problematic/debatable binding element the concept, the reach and the peculiarities undeniably inherent in the constitutionally appropriate interpretation. The application of the law consists of a hermeneutic and normative procedure of fulfilling specificity which aims at solving the opposing conflicts in court through a materially legitimate decision-making statement. The decisions analyzed by the justice system must, in their substantiated content, be in conformity with the constitutional provisions, either applying the normative acts in agreement with the Constitution, either addressing adequately and effectively the material law that has been unfairly sacrificed or threatened. This way, the constitutional judgement acquires judicial autonomy of concrete nature or jurisdictionally decisory in face of what has been denominated constitutional control of the laws. The unconstitutionality of the laws, thus, can not be put on the same level of the unconstitutionality as t

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Bruna Capelari.pdf: 1708370 bytes, checksum: 411091ff7c544a49a443c2e76b17ba0a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-09-16 / This work aims the analysis of eventual political influence exercised in the deliberations of constitutional Courts in common and civil law systems due to the form of investiture of its members and especially the majority share of political bodies in this procedure which is assigned the function of raising to power the members who compose it, justifying such research due to the own e. Supremo Tribunal Federal - STF , the highest Court of the Brazilian Judiciary, be the subject of reflections on the theme, especially given the form of investiture of its members, in addition to treating the subject of relevant theme from an academic point of view. For the development of work towards your outcome readings were performed, research and reflections on the relevant legal provisions inserted in the Brazilian Federal Constitution and the Fundamental Laws of sovereign States here invoked and linked to the common and civil law systems, having being also performed research in the national and foreign doctrine in order to enrich the work and give a personal touch to each of the analyzed States by evocation of scholars that they are linked by bonds of nationality / O presente trabalho tem por objetivo a análise de eventual influência política exercida em as deliberações das Cortes constitucionais em sistemas do common e civil law decorrente da forma de investidura de seus membros e, principalmente, da participação majoritária de órgãos políticos em tal procedimento aos quais é atribuída a função de alçar ao poder os membros que as integram, justificando-se a referida investigação em razão de o próprio Supremo Tribunal Federal STF, a mais alta Corte do Judiciário brasileiro, estar sendo alvo de reflexões em torno do tema especialmente em razão da forma de investidura de seus membros, além de tratar-se de tema relevante do ponto de vista acadêmico. Para o desenvolvimento do trabalho em direção ao seu desfecho, foram realizadas leituras, pesquisas e reflexões em torno das pertinentes disposições normativas inseridas em a Constituição Federal brasileira e em as Leis Fundamentais dos soberanos Estados aqui invocados e vinculados aos sistemas do common e civil law, tendo sido também realizadas pesquisas em a doutrina nacional e estrangeira, a fim de enriquecer o trabalho e dar um toque pessoal a cada um dos analisados Estados mediante evocação de doutrinadores que se lhes encontram ligados por vínculos de nacionalidade

Despite being similarly concerned with the legitimacy of law under conditions of diversity, political and legal theorists currently seem to differ significantly in the role they would reserve for religious reasons in public decision-making processes. Religious arguments that would generally be considered inappropriate if not inadmissible in a courtroom are increasingly viewed as acceptable and even desirable contributions to debate in the political public sphere. The author argues that the existence of this disconnect can be explained by the special challenges that religion poses for constitutional adjudication which in turn should inform our understanding of the judicial decision-making function. Constraints inherent to constitutional courts that make them effective institutions for concrete dispute resolution significantly limit their ability to engage seriously with the normative challenges posed by religious diversity. We should thus properly understand the role of constitutional adjudication as peripheral in matters of public policy that intersect with questions of religious difference. / Graduate

This  article  has  as  aim  to  reflect  about  the  protection  of economic, social and cultural rights before the regressive measures adopted by governments in Latin America, as well as of the different levels of jurisdictional tutelage that those receive. The document develops the concept of a regressive measure and the scope of the non-regression principle, furthermore, it shows the experience of the Constitutional Courts from Peru and Colombia and the organs of the Interamerican System of Human Rights regarding the protection of social rights. / El presente artículo tiene por propósito plantear una reflexión sobre la protección jurisdiccional que reciben los derechos sociales frente a la adopción de medidas regresivas en Latinoamérica por parte de los Estados, así como de los diversos grados de tutela jurisdiccional que aquellos reciben. El artículo desarrolla la noción de regresividad y los alcances del principio de prohibición de regresividad, así como la experiencia  de las Cortes Constitucionales de Perú y Colombia y de los órganos el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos en torno a la protección de los derechos sociales.

The legislative supremacy of Parliament, a dominant characteristic of the Westminster system of government, has for a long time been the basic norm of South African constitutional law. In line with the Westminster prototype, the South African judiciary did not have the power to review the substantive validity of legislation. The creation of a new order, based on a supreme Constitution which entrenches fundamental rights and gives the courts the power to review not on! y the procedural validity but also the substantive validity of legislation, has brought about a significant change. This thesis examines the role of the South African judiciary during the transition from a system of legislative supremacy to one of constitutional supremacy and judicial review. The thesis is based on the interim Constitution of 1993. The entrenchment of fundamental human rights in the Constitution implies a greater role for the judiciary. The judiciary has to apply and interpret the human rights provisions vigorously and fearlessly. The human rights provisions have to be applied and interpreted with a keen awareness that a system of constitutional supremacy differs materially from one of legislative supremacy. In a system of legislative supremacy the intention of the legislature is paramount; in a system of constitutional supremacy the Constitution is supreme and overrides all laws, including Acts of Parliament, which are in conflict with it The doctrine of legislative supremacy has in the past led to a literalist and mechanical application of law; this has had a negative impact on the constitutional role of the South African judiciary. The provisions of a Constitution, especially its human rights provisions, are framed in wide and open ended terms; these need to be elaborated before they can be applied; the nature of these provisions, their purpose and the larger objects of the Constitution are important. The interpretation of the provisions of a supreme Constitution is incompatible with a literalistic and mechanical approach. A purposive and liberal or generous approach is called for. A framework and approach to the interpretation and application of South Africa's Bill of Rights are suggested in the thesis. / Constitutional International and Indigenous Law / LL.D.

The Zuma case - important as the first decision of the Constitutional Court - is primarily concerned with the constitutionality of section 217(l)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. In trying to fmd an answer to this question, the Constitutional Court also addressed other important issues. In this dissertation the Constitutional Court's decision on the constitutionality of section 217(1)(b)(ii) is examined, as well as important general principles laid down by the Court regarding incompetent referrals by the Supreme Court; constitutional interpretation; reverse onus provisions and the right to a fair trial; as well as the application of the general limitation clause. A closer look is taken at adherence to these principles in subsequent Constitutional Court decisions, and finally a conclusion is reached on the value of the Zuma case. / Law / LL.M. (Law)