Public actors associated with the tradition of American antislavery constitutionalism in the nineteenth-century insisted that the Constitution of 1787 contained certain inbuilt purposes or animating principles, which ought to have aided constitutional interpreters in construing specific provisions of the constitutional text that related, directly or indirectly, to the law and politics of slavery in the United States. The Constitution of 1787 recognized the existence of slavery in the several states, yet antislavery constitutionalists interpreted even the slavery-related clauses as aspiring toward a certain liberal constitutional vision that was not yet a reality. In this dissertation, I argue, first, that these nineteenth-century interpretations of the Constitution in antislavery terms were intricately bound up with theories of natural law, and, second, I suggest that this aspect of the antislavery constitutional tradition offers a strong interpretive challenge (both descriptive and normative) to various aspects of the current scholarly literature on constitutional development and constitutional theory. / text

This thesis explores the tensions between constitutional forms of democracy and the practice-based understanding of democracy found among ancient Greek and recent post-structural theorists. In drawing from Plato’s discussion of the constitutions of varying political regimes, this thesis hones in on his assertion that the democratic city does not have a single constitution due to the freedom of its citizens. Contemporary understandings of democracy, such as deliberative democratic theory, have largely overlooked the kind of power embodied in democracy by focusing attention on deepening the forms of participation in existing practices of government. By drawing from a practice-based understanding of democracy, this thesis responds to the problems of exclusion produced by statist accounts of democracy. Taking the example of First Nations in Canada, the thesis asks whether new forms of protest, such as Idle No More, embody the spirit of democratic practice outlined by the ancient Greeks. / Graduate

Constitutional change is relentless. Today, states jockey with regional associations, international organizations, transnational networks and sub-state authorities to define the scope of legitimate political conduct and establish rival bases for political affiliation. Constitutional theorists must be resolute but they should not be rigid. Especially in such uncertain conditions, theories are best understood not as plans to be implemented but as hypotheses to be tested. Charles Sabel and David Dyzenhaus write separately but share this pragmatic orientation, in which doubt is indispensable and truth is the end of public inquiry. They also share a distinctive belief that constitutionalism serves a moral end: it is the project of cultivating citizens who conceive their political community in terms of the commitments revealed by its practices. Their position, which is well suited for contemporary challenges, warrants elaboration and examination. British Columbia offers an ideal constitutional laboratory for that test. During the 1970s and 1980s, doubts mounted about the legitimacy of the constitutional settlement imposed by the Crown in the westernmost province of Canada. Legal, political and constitutional decisions raised the possibility that aboriginal rights and title survived colonization and Confederation. Since 1990, their existence has been confirmed in a cascade of constitutional experiments. Those initiatives can be distilled into four procedures: litigation, negotiation, consultation and collaboration. Although they have delivered practical benefits to some indigenous peoples, these procedures have not transformed provincial politics into a moral endeavour. The constraints on constitutionalism in British Columbia are both conceptual and institutional. Despite marginal improvements, those constraints endure and constitutionalism remains for now the sporadic pursuit of a small elite. To conceive constitutionalism as a project is to set a sound but exacting standard. Although British Columbia falls short, its failure is informative: the theory is useful.

Formation of the Constitution of the Czech Republic Abstract The thesis deals with the issue of formation of the Constitution of the Czech Republic. This process has not been sufficiently described yet, as the sources are limited and fragmented. Therefore, the aim of this work is to map the whole process of the formation of the Constitution following the interviews with important personalities of that time. The intention is to provide readers with an insight into this issue and to deal with some partial questions arising in connection with this process. One such issue is, for example, the question of the legality and legitimacy of the formation of the Constitution which raises the debate even with a considerable lag from its adoption, as well as some constitutional institutes which were discussed extensively during the process of formation of the Constitution and which were often results of compromises of the subjects involved in the process. It is precisely a compromise solution of a number of sub-questions that is typical for the formation of the Constitution, as well as the randomness and specificity that lined its formation. These include, for example, the entities involved in the process of the formation of the Constitution which included not only two official commissions but also some notable...

This diploma thesis address the problem of Islam in Egypt's constitutional arrangements after the change of government caused by the Arab Spring. The main research question is whether Islam was used by political forces affect the new constitutional arrangement of Egypt and if so in what way. The task is to confront the idea that the influence of religion in Islamic society is disappearing . In addressing the research question was the method of analysis of the available literature and information. By performing analysis of the literature , we found that Islam has clearly still a significant impact on Egyptian society, it is used as a tool of political mobilization and mainly Islamic- oriented political parties push Islam into the state structures. The main finding of this work is that secularism as seen in the European sense, is applicable in Egypt only on condition separating Islam from politics and performing only the basic thought form within the state is built

En France, l’apparition de la justice constitutionnelle et la création d’un juge spécialisé questionnent la montée en puissance du pouvoir juridictionnel. La relative jeunesse du Conseil constitutionnel, le perfectionnement des techniques de contrôle et l’essor de nouvelles voies de recours en droit constitutionnel offrent à la doctrine des champs de recherche importants. Pourtant, à l’issue de l’observation des études consacrées à ces thèmes, on découvre une terre inexplorée du contentieux constitutionnel : celle de la rhétorique du juge constitutionnel, et plus particulièrement, du recours à l’argument de la nature des choses. Si d’aucuns se sont interrogés sur cette référence en philosophie du droit, la jurisprudence y faisant référence n’a jamais fait l’objet d’une analyse détaillée. Pourtant, les décisions du Conseil constitutionnel offrent bel et bien des exemples d’utilisation discutable de cette locution. On peut vraisemblablement attribuer cette absence au fait que la nature, l’essence, la force des choses se sont imposées dans le langage courant et dans le langage juridique comme une formule topique, un outil langagier bien utile permettant de combler les points aveugles de la pensée. Cette réponse ne fait que confirmer l’intérêt de notre étude. Car qu’est-ce qu’un droit qui fait appel à la nature des choses pour pallier les failles de la logique ? / In France, questions about the part of judicial power are renewed by the recent introduction of constitutional justice administrated by a judge ad hoc created on purpose. The relative youth of Constitutional Council, the improvement of control techniques and the establishment of a new right of appeal open the field of research. Nevertheless, it must be observed that these studies fail to analyze one particular aspect of constitutional justice: the rhetoric arguing and, more specifically, the naturalistic justification. Now, as far as we know, it seems that no consequent works have been produced on this issue. The contentious aspect of this naturalistic topic had not been precisely analyzed contrary to the philosophical aspect of it in jurisprudence. And yet, we must observe the presence of this particular argument – under different forms – in Constitutional Council decisions. Beside, the undifferentiated uses of terms like “nature”, “essence”, “substance”, “in itself” etc. in both legal and common language can explain the lack of recent study on this subject in so far as this arguing is most likely appearing as a discursive tool, devoid of any scientific interest. In this regard, this assertion confirms and strengthens our interest for this topic which can be resumed in this terms: “how to define a legal system that fills in its own legal loophole by referring to nature of things ?”

The waves of democratisation in Africa gave hope to the continent. Democracy was becoming a reality and legal instruments were being put in place at the domestic level through constitutional clauses which were imposed to strengthen a democratic culture. However, regional trends in Africa proved that even constitutional clauses were not enough to regulate democracy. Presidents from African countries were still as autocratic as they previously were. Linked to its history and poor governance, political dynasty was entrenched in the political system in many African countries. Currently, many African countries still experience one-party rule in the form of political dynasty. Mauritius, though considered as a model of democracy, is a good example to show how political dynasty has undermined its democratic values. A way of consolidating its democracy can be to impose term limits on the Prime Minister's mandates, which are currently unlimited. This study analyses the effectiveness of imposing term limits in the Mauritian political system to control political dynasties to some extent. It however acknowledges that term limits alone cannot be an effective solution. It therefore proposes other recommendations such as having a youth quota, involving the civil society organisations and reviewing electoral procedures, which can help to consolidate democracy in Mauritius. / Mini Dissertation (MPhil (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa))--University of Pretoria, 2021. / European Union / Government of Flanders / Centre for Human Rights / MPhil (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa) / Unrestricted

The purpose, of this mini dissertation is to understand South Africa as a country in a spatial crisis that leads to the entrapment of the black body in a social, political, economic and legally depressed state. The crisis describes and is as a result of the multiple upheavals and ruptures that have shaped the post-colonial, particularly African, landscape, and experiences of its people. Particular to the post-colonial landscape is that these ruptures are largely defined by the history of extraction, exclusion and violence by the white elite against the black poor. The nature of the crisis is that it continues to support and re-enact the same colonial oppressive outcomes, ensuring the black poor continue to exist in a state of marginalisation. The spaces in the crisis also work to physically push out and keep marginalised black people in informal spaces away from economic activity. But additionally, the intangible elements of space mean that black people carry the consequences and definitions of these spaces with them which define how they are interpellated, ensuring that in and out of the physical space they are viewed as sub-human. In this dissertation I am particularly interested in how transformative constitutionalism can proactively facilitate spatial justice for the historically and presently marginalised in ameliorating the effects of the crisis. Spatial justice, in my understanding would mean the removal of the abyssal line and simultaneity between those interpellated as human and sub-human. / Mini Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2019. / Jurisprudence / LLM / Unrestricted

This thesis studies the Cambodian Constitution from a socio-legal and ethnographic perspective, highlighting some of the multiple ways in which diverse constitutional discourses and practices manifest themselves in the country outside of judicial, or even state, institutions. The thesis starts by recognising that existing literature typically associates constitutionalism exclusively with the work of courts, and with liberal-democracy, before providing a series of case studies that focus on constitutional practices that are typically obscured from view by such a focus. These case studies provide accounts of how, for example: international actors and local civil society groups engaged in Cambodia’s 1993 constitution-making process; Cambodia’s apparently liberal-democratic Constitution has been used publicly by the government to facilitate and justify authoritarianism; court cases are themselves used by local activists to conduct domestic and internationally-focused advocacy; constitutional provisions have helped to shape the way Buddhist monks understand their role in society and politics; and artists are helping to shape constitutional definitions of national identity and culture through their interactions with or avoidance of state censorship. The result is a nuanced, empirically grounded account of a constitutional order that has been largely overlooked by scholars in the country and abroad. However, it is also an exploration of the ways in which constitutionalism can be understood to operate outside of courts or state institutions, and how a liberal-democratic constitution can simultaneously act as a source of legitimacy for and challenge to authoritarianism. / Graduate / 2023-02-06

Constitution as Promise contends that constitutions are sets of promises. As such, it argues that they must be interpreted in a living constitutionalist manner. Chapter One argues that constitutions meet the analytic criteria to be considered promises. It is argued that constitutions are expressions of the intention of a government to bind itself to a set of principles. Absent this expression, citizens lack assurance of the protection of their rights and legal recourse when their rights are violated. Chapter Two considers the use of promise in contract theory and investigates its viability in constitutional theory. Some theories of contract are skeptical of promise as a basis for contract. The chapter argues that while promise may be an inadequate moral underpinning for the law of contract, it is apt for the law of constitutions. Chapter Three notes that constitutions are sets of vague promises. Vague promises ought not be interpreted solely in accordance with the intentions of promisors or promisees. Traditional forms of originalism contend that constitutions should be interpreted according to the intentions of their framers. So, constitution as promise rules out traditional forms of originalism. Chapter Four considers the positive consequences of constitution as promise. It argues that vague promises ought to be interpreted through a negotiation process between promisor and promisee. This negotiation should consider what moral reasoning reveals about the promise’s terms, the context in which the promise was uttered, the capacities and competing obligations of the promisor, and the expectations of the promisee. To properly consider these factors, the chapter maintains that the negotiation must occur on a case-by-case basis, incrementally specifying the promise’s terms. The chapter then notes the similarities between this negotiation process and the interpretive suggestions of living constitutionalism. It concludes that living constitutionalism is entailed by the promissory nature of constitutions. / Thesis / Master of Philosophy (MA) / Constitution as Promise investigates the interpretive consequences of conceptualizing constitutions as promises from governments to citizens. It first argues that constitutions satisfy the criteria to be considered promises. It then maintains that the morality of promising is apt for application to constitutional law. In the third and fourth chapters, it considers how one ought to interpret vague promises. Vague promises, it argues, should be interpreted incrementally, on a case-by-case basis. The promisor and the promisee must come to an agreement about what their vague promise requires, as new cases arise. When they cannot agree, promisor and promisee need an adjudicator. Since constitutions are sets of vague promises, they must also be interpreted incrementally, on a case-by-case basis and require adjudication where agreement is impossible. Constitution as Promise concludes that the only available interpretive theory that is sensitive to constitution’s nature as vague promise is living constitutionalism. As such, constitutions ought to be interpreted in a living constitutionalist manner.