The main objectives of this dissertation are: (1) To analyse the pre and post privatisation and deregulation performance of two United Kingdom industries from the transport sector. (2) To analyse the earning and employment in these industries prior to deregulation and/or privatisation, and to examine what has happened to them after these changes. (3) To investigate any changes that have occurred in trade union density in these industries compared with what has happened in the rest of the economy. (4) To see if there was any evidence of rent sharing prior to privatisation and deregulation. If it did exist, did it continue after privatisation and deregulation, or was it substantially reduced or eliminated. The methodology of the dissertation is eclectic, so it examined these issues from a number of different perspectives, and its contribution to knowledge is incremental. In regard to the bus and coach industry in the newly competitive period following deregulation and privatisation, the major firms emerged almost solely through external rather than organic growth. This went against one of the main aims of privatisation, which was to create a competitive industry of many small-to-medium sized operations. Privatisation and deregulation also failed to stop the decline in passenger numbers, which was another objective of the programme. In the case of the UK ports, it is extremely difficult to conclude that the changing ownership constituted a significant factor in port performance and efficiency. Instead, factors such as geographical location and labour market deregulation seems to have had a greater influence on efficiency in the ports. That the measure of liberalisation most associated with privatisation, and that offered the most in terms of potential gains in efficiency, were those on which major concessions had to be made by the Government to win management support for the political process of privatisation. If managerial support for privatisation was absent then process was unlikely to occur. The underlying success of deregulation and privatisation in these industries has been in reducing the power of trade unions to obtain rent for their members, which was one of the main, if understated aims of the policy.

In this essay, I discuss the merits of contestability in contrast with consent as a meansof legitimizing the state. Particularly I have been concerned with problematiccontracts: Contracts with undefined obligations and their implications on thelegitimacy of voluntarist consent. Through my argumentation, I have shown thatvoluntarist consent to political mandates has a hard time legitimizing politicalauthority in the presence of problematic contracts – and instead, that legitimationbased on the the ability to contest decisions may provide a better degree of politicallegitimacy. Contestability can seemingly also be combined with elements of voluntaristconsent to further cement the legitimacy of decisions.

Eastern European countries have experienced many political upheavals and economic reforms since their declaration of independence of the U.S.S.R. Our study is intended for a series of estimations concerning the market structure of the banking in the Eastern European countries. Besides, we also attempt to assess the transformation of the competitive conditions of the banking industries in these countries. We employ three different methods for the assessment: The Panzar-Rosse Model, the Lerner index and the structural indicators (Concentration Ratio and HHI). We also use quantile regression to estimate the change of the H statistics corresponding to different deciles of the bank revenues beside the standard regression. The estimation results of the H statistics and the Lerner indice both indicate the banking markets of the Eastern European countries are characterized as monopolistic competition. Profitable banks in some countries face keener competition in the market. Besides, the Lerner index is affected by some variables, and tends to show the consistent estimation results with the H statistic in general. On the other hand, the structural indicators reveal a descending concentration in most Eastern European countries. However, the comparison between structural and non-structural methods does not support the general view that concentration undermines competition.

This thesis investigates what work ought to be like. The answer it presents consists of an outline of a liberaltheory of justice in the employment contract based on theory developed in the area of political philosophy. Thethesis also examines issues of efficiency—How should measures to improve working conditions be evaluated?—and the ethical implications of the economic theory of employment contracts and the neoclassical theory of themarket. Paper I: A theoretical framework is introduced for the evaluation of workplace inspections with respect totheir effects on working conditions. The choice of a concept of efficiency is discussed, and its relation to criteriafor a good working environment is clarified. It is concluded that in order to obtain reliable information onthe effects of different inspection methods, it is necessary to perform controlled comparative studies in whichdifferent methods are used on different workplaces. Paper II: This article outlines the structure of a Rawlsian theory of justice in the employment relationship.The theory answers three questions about justice and the workplace. What is the relationship between socialjustice and justice at work? How should we conceive of the problem of justice within the economic sphere?And, what is justice in the workplace? Reasons for a specific construction of a local original position are givenand arguments are presented in support of a principle of local justice in the form of a choice egalitarian localdifference principle. Paper III: The political philosophy of John Rawls is applied to the moral dilemma of whistleblowing, andit is shown that that the requirement of loyalty, in the sense that is needed to create this dilemma, is inconsistentwith that theory. In a discussion and rejection of Richard De George’s criteria on permissible whistleblowing,it is pointed out that the mere rejection of loyalty will not lead to an extreme position; harms can still be takeninto account. Paper IV: The case is made that if contemporary economics of the employment contract is correct, thenin order to explain the existence of employment contracts, we must make the assumption that the contractingparties are attempting to deal with decisiontheoreticignorance. It follows that the course of action that theemployer chooses to take when acting from authority cannot be justified by consent, since the informednesscriterion of consent cannot be satisfied under ignorance. It is then suggested that in order to achieve justificationof acts of authority, there must be in place a real possibility to contest employers’ decisions. Paper V: According to Ronald Dworkin’s theory of equality of resources, mimicking the ideal market fromequal starting points is fair. According to Dworkin, the ideal market should be understood as described in GérardDebreu’s influential work, which implies that we should conceive of trade as taking place under certainty. Thereare no choices under risk in such a market. Therefore, there is no such thing as option luck in the ideal market.Consequently, when mimicking this market, we cannot hold people responsible for option luck. Mimicking thismarket also implies that we ought to set up a social safety net, since rational individuals with perfect foresightwould see to it that they always have sufficient resources at each point in life. Furthermore, the idea of insuranceis incompatible with the ideal market. / QC 20100728

Notre étude a été inspirée par l’observation que malgré les efforts considérables en matière de la libéralisation financière au Malawi à partir de la fin des années 1980, les résultats apparents étaient plutôt médiocres, notamment en ce qui concerne la persistance de marges d’intermédiation (spreads) élevés. L’objectif central de notre travail est d’essayer d’élucider pourquoi. Notre hypothèse centrale est que si l’on ne tient pas compte du comportement des banques en matière de leurs réactions vis-à-vis de leurs incitations et leurs contraintes dans la mise en place de la politique de la libéralisation financière, on est voué à la déception en matière des résultats. L’étude montre que dans une situation économique caractérisée par une instabilité macroéconomique, les banques ont moins d’incitations à être plus efficientes du point de vue macroéconomique, c’est à dire en agissant dans la direction de l’approfondissement financier et de l’octroi de crédit au secteur privé. Bien au contraire, tout en agissant de manière rationnelle, elles sont tentées de rechercher des rentes faciles et sûres qui viennent du financement des déficits publics. Ceci leur permet d’accomplir deux objectifs : maximiser leur profit et minimiser leur risque-crédit, notamment en repoussant les « contraintes externes » imposées par les conditions économiques -notamment les taux d’escompte élevées- à leur clients à travers la combinaison d’une augmentation de taux d'intérêt sur les prêts et d’une faible augmentation des taux d'intérêt sur les dépôts. / This study was inspired by the observation that despite the considerable efforts in financialliberalization in Malawi from the late 1980s, the apparent results were mediocre, especially with regardto the persistence of high intermediation margins (spreads). The central objective of this study is to tryto investigate why. The key hypothesis is that if one does not take into account of bank behavior interms of how banks react vis-à-vis their incentives and constraints during the process of financialliberalization, the results are likely to be disappointing. The study shows that in an economic situationcharacterized by macroeconomic instability, banks have less incentive to be more efficient from amacroeconomic perspective, i.e., by enhancing financial deepening through higher credit to the privatesector. On the contrary, while acting rationally, they are tempted to look for easy and safe returnscoming from financing government deficits. This allows them to accomplish two objectives: maximizingprofit and minimizing credit risk, notably by pushing the "external constraints" imposed by economicconditions - including high rediscount rates- to their customers through a combination of an increasein interest rates on loans and a smaller increase in interest rates on deposits.Keywords: financial liberalization, bank behavior, intermediation margins, bank

This dissertation investigates the relationship of competition and firms' price responses, by analyzing: i) whether new entry reduces price discrimination, ii) when incumbents reduce price discrimination preemptively in response to the threat of entry, and iii) how competition increases prices. The dissertation consists of three independent essays addressing each of the above questions. The first two essays present an empirical analysis of the airline industry and the third essay presents a theoretical analysis of the credit card industry. In the empirical study of the relationship between competition and firms' pricing in the airline industry, I emphasize the importance of distinguishing the equilibrium behaviors with respect to different market characteristics. Major airlines can price discriminate differently in a market where they compete with low-cost carriers comparing to in another market where they don't, and also they can respond dfferently to the threat of entry depending on whether they are certain about the rival's future entry. The study reveals that competition has a positive effect on price discrimination in the routes where major airlines compete against one anther. In these routes, competition reduces lower-end prices to a greater extent than upper-end prices. In contrast, an entry by low-cost carriers results in a significant negative relationship between competition and price discrimination. Thus, the opposite results in the literature are both evident in the airline industry, and it is very important to identify the different forces of competition on price discrimination. Firms can respond to potential competition as well as actual competition. So, I extend the study to the relationship of potential competition and price discrimination, specially in cases where major airlines compete against one another while facing Southwest's threat of entry. I also attempt to suggest major airlines' motives of reducing price discrimination preemptively. The results of the study suggest that incumbents reduce price dispersion when it is possible to deter the rival's entry and that the potential rival discourages incumbents from deterring entry by announcing before its beginning service. Finally, I examine when competition can increase prices in a market, by analyzing the issuing side of the credit card industry. This industry is characterized by a two-sided market with a platform. Under the no-surcharge rule that restricts merchants to set the same price for cash and card purchases, the equilibrium interchange fee increases with competition. This occurs because issuers can compensate losses from competing on the issuing side by collectively increasing the interchange fee. As a result, limiting competition may improve social welfare when the interchange fee is higher than the social optimal level. In contrast, in the absence of the no-surcharge rule, the analysis shows that competition always improves social welfare by lowering the price of the market.