Sporting success is defined by athletic prowess, mental stamina and the ability to win. The balance between winning by fair, or foul, means is an area of fierce debate. This thesis seeks to illuminate the workings of the former German Democratic Republic Doping Scam: (Theme 14.25); to shed light on the human tragedy of steroid engineering, and to explore, within a fictitious world, new ground in areas that have offered little in research. Dark Mermaids, a novel, presents a narrative through contemporaneous documentation of the experiences of a fictitious former Olympic GDR swimmer and a tenacious young girl. In parallel, the novel considers the idea of selective memory, the paranoia of life under a dictatorship, and the notion of 'home' in a divided country. The accompanying essay further explores, through example, the themes of amnesia and exile, and the theory that the common exilic pathology of strain and estrangement of flight is never, in practice, over. Synopsis of Novel 1990. The Berlin Wall has fallen. Police officer Sophia Kunstler slips through the backstreets of Berlin looking for sex in the arms of a cruel faced blue eyed stranger; the same boy she has found in clubs and dance halls over many years. Outside her apartment a cold and frightened girl waits with a letter. Dagmar, Sophia's mother, is dying. Sophia and her father must return to the former GDR, a place from which they had escaped. As part of her job, Sophia is required to investigate claims of Stasi collaboration in her former home town's local police force. Suppressed memories gradually surface, and these impel her to revisit the GDR elite sports training ground, where death, or a new life, await.

In an article, “Corruption and Governance Challenges: The South African Experience”,1 the Public Protector commented that corruption and good governance sit at the opposite ends of the spectrum. While good governance represents the ideal for governments, corporations and nations globally, corruption is a scourge that decent people, organisations and governments seek to eradicate. In the simplest of terms, corruption involves the abuse of power for private gain.The Public Protector further stated that it should be a concern to everybody that in post-independence Africa, certainly in South Africa, the accumulation of riches (in most cases, very sudden) is venerated even in the absence of visible means of accumulating the riches. South Africa has battled with corruption since the days of apartheid. Post-apartheid South Africa is a more open society and more opportunities have been created for detecting, exposing and prosecuting corruption. South Africa‟s approach to corruption is multipronged. The main pillars according to the Public Protector are the law, anti-corruption agencies, and public mobilisation.This studyhas attempted to attend to the challenges of managing misconduct relating to fraud and corruption that appear to weaken our democracy. Fraud and corruption is a complex phenomenon that requires managers and supervisors to possess a specialist technical knowledge in order to be effective in punishing those that are involved in this type of misconduct. The tendency currently is for the managers and supervisors to place suspected corrupt employees on a prolonged pre-cautionary suspension for a period that is not supported by law. This of course weakens the employer‟s case as they tend to rely on the outcomes of the proceedings in the criminal procedure before they institute disciplinary action against such culprits. Workers could be criminally prosecuted for this type of misconduct in terms of the provisions of the Prevention and Combating of the Corrupt Activities Act. Employers always enjoy the right to criminally prosecute workers who have committed acts of fraud or corruption but that must go concurrently with the institution of the disciplinary proceedings in terms of the collective agreement, if there is any. This study will show that the act of misconduct relating to fraud and corruption is a complex phenomenon that poses a threat to the global security. This study also takes a closer view of the provisions of international instruments and institutions such as the United Nations and International Labour Organisation. It further, does a detailed analysis of the provisions in other foreign jurisdiction like Canada. This is consistent with the provisions of the Bill of Rights as enshrined in the Constitution:Section 39(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa demands that when interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum: a. Must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom; b. Must consider international law; and c. May consider foreign law. Section 1 of the Labour Relations Act, states that the primary objects of the Act are: (a) To give effect and regulate the fundamental rights conferred by section 23 of the Constitution; (b) To give effect to obligations incurred by the Republic as a member state of the International Labour Organisation. Section 3 of the LRA further stipulates that any person applying this Act must interpret its provisions:(a) To give effect to its primary objects; (b) in compliance with the Constitution; (c) in compliance with the public international law obligations of the Republic.This treatise further shows the importance of the Constitutional values and principles that govern the Public Administration in terms of Chapter 10, section 195.Of importance the elements of fraud and corruption are discussed in this study.This study also gives a detailed analysis of the case laws that give guidance on how best to deal with and successfully punish employees involved in misconduct relating to fraud and corruption.

The public is regularly shocked by revelations of new business scandals. Nearly every sector of society is tainted by incidents of unethical behaviour. In this regard, the South African financial services industry has attracted a lot of attention, as some of the biggest scandals in recent years have occurred in this industry. With the world economy still experiencing the effects of the global recession, the last thing that institutions in the financial arena must do is engage in unethical behaviour. Immoral behaviour could damage a company's repution and lead to further financial losses. The purpose of this study was thus two-fold: firstly, to investigae the factors that influence unethical decision-making and behaviour in the local life insurance sector, and secondly to evaluate how business ethics are institutionalised at a sample of life insurance companies.

Corporate corruption is a widespread phenomenon that persists in the functioning of both public and private companies of differing size, performance, industry, and national origin. As it generates negative effects both within and outside the organization, corporate corruption has been the subject of scholarly research. Yet, despite attempts to understand its antecedents and consequences, companies continue to struggle to eliminate corruption in their business practices. Thus, the overarching research question for this dissertation is "Why do companies continue engaging in corruption?" To answer this research question, I focused on the topic of organizational corruption control, i.e., a set of mechanisms that purposefully target the prevention of corrupt practices within an organization. Specifically, I investigated the trident of organizational corruption control via its effects and implications on three constructs - corporate social performance, opportunity attractiveness of organizational corruption and corporate corruption recidivism. Using distinct methodologies, I examined corporate corruption control in three separate studies to address 1) the effect of corruption control on the opportunity attractiveness of organizational corruption 2) the effect of corruption control on corporate social performance and 3) the implication of ineffective corruption control on organizational corruption recidivism. Based on interdisciplinary theoretical perspectives and several secondary data sources, the hypothesized effects were empirically tested and insights were derived from a multiple case study approach. The three studies used different firm samples. Study 1 was based on the data of the United States enforcement actions for violations of the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA) formally prohibiting foreign bribery; firm-level data from the Bloomberg terminal; and a country-level measure from Worldwide Governance Indicators. In Study 1 (N=71 firms involved in foreign bribery), results supported hypotheses that regulatory sanctioning in host countries and bureaucratic controls at a firm level were negatively correlated with corruption opportunity attractiveness. Furthermore, vigilance controls help strengthen negative effect of bureaucratic controls on corruption opportunity attractiveness. Study 2 was based on reports of anti-corruption programs of the world's largest companies from Transparency International, corporate social performance scores from CSRHub, and firm-level financial indicators from the Bloomberg terminal. The findings of Study 2 (N=102 firms) supported hypothesis that corporate corruption controls positively affect Sustainable Resource Management, a sub-dimension of CSP. Importantly, the use of a cross-lagged design helped to specify that the relationship between Corruption Controls and CSP dimensions is not reciprocal (2-way) as was previously discussed in the literature. Study 3, was based on 6 cases of corruption recidivists identified via FCPA enforcements' database, and utilized data from court proceedings, annual reports, and news articles. Data were coded following prescribed steps to arrive at categories and themes. An inductive qualitative analysis performed in Study 3 resulted in a descriptive framework of ingenious deviance that underpins the profile of corporate corruption recidivists. The analysis revealed that a) a combination of underlying contextual and situational factors provided fertile ground for corruption, b) the phenomenon of recidivism occurred in the presence of multiple competing logics, and c) internal controls were subverted through ingenious deviance to facilitate bribery.

Information leakage before full acquisitions has been widely documented. The information leakage, and the resulting pre-bid runup in the target's stock, generally increases the total cost of the acquisition. That is, information leakage and the ensuing pre-bid runup is a gain to the target and loss to the acquirer. Herein, I first ascertain the characteristics of full acquisitions that affect the amount of information leakage. I find that if the acquirer borrows to finance the acquisition then information leakage is greater. Further if the acquirer is foreign, if the target is a high-tech firm, and if the target has options on its stock all increase information leakage. I find hostile deals are effective in reducing information leakage. Lastly, information leakage increases in the percentage of managerial ownership. I next hypothesize that the identity and intent of partial acquirers is known to market participants before the announcement of a partial acquisition. I find that the market can anticipate whether a partial acquirer intends to fully-acquire or take an active role in the management of the target. Also, the market anticipates whether the acquirer is a private investment find or a non-financial corporation. Further, the acquirer's identity or intent is fully reflected in the target's stock price before the announcement of the partial acquisition. These results help explain why there are few partial acquisitions as precursors to full acquisitions. / I next hypothesize that macroeconomic factors affect information leakage, and may serve as a signal of when to speculate on acquisitions. I find that information leakage is positively related to shocks in both expected economic conditions and financing costs, the latter signaling to speculators that acquisitions are imminent. I also find information about an imminent full acquisition is leaked earlier when there are positive shocks to economic conditions and financing costs. / by Matthew David Brigida. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2009. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2009. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

I examine the impact of real earnings management (REM) and corporate governance on cash holdings. Extant research documents an increase in both cash holdings and REM activity in recent years and shows that agency conflicts influence both the levels and valuations of cash holdings. Motivated by agency problems of REM and Jensen's (1986) arguments concerning the free cash flow problem, I investigate whether opportunistic asset sales and reductions in discretionary expenditures are associated with levels and valuations of cash holdings. Prior research also shows that strong corporate governance mitigates opportunistic earnings management behavior and enhances the valuation of cash holdings. Using empirical models from prior research, I document that REM is positively associated with cash holdings, investors discount cash holdings of high REM firms, and, among high REM firms, valuations of cash holdings of weak corporate governance firms are discounted significantly lower relative to those of strong corporate governance firms. My study unites two lines of research by incorporating agency problems concerning REM with levels and valuations of cash holdings. / by Adam J. Greiner. / Vita. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2013. / Includes bibliography. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / System requirements: Adobe Reader.

李林艷. / 論文(哲學博士)--香港中文大學, 2006. / 參考文獻(p. 251-269). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in Chinese and English. / Lun wen (zhe xue bo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2006. / Can kao wen xian (p. 251-269). / Li Linyan.

The other study distinguishes the effects of political connection and governmental intervention on firm value. The event study of 371 scandals from 1997 to 2004 confirms the hypothesis that governmental intervention is the de facto reason. Scandal firms controlled by the state sustain less negative cumulative abnormal returns than non-state controlled firms, because the market expects that those state controlled scandal firms will surely receive governmental bailout or support while those non-state controlled ones not. For state controlled samples, the degree of political connection does not produce any significant effect on the market reactions. For non-state controlled scandal firms, however, closely politically connected firms have more negative CAR than loosely politically connected ones. This is because the governments get away from the scandal firms in trouble, and those non-state controlled firms that once gained the governmental intervention via political connection suffer more as the support withdraws. The results highlight the effect of governmental intervention on the firm valuation, and address a misconception that political connection is the source of firm value. / The thesis includes two empirical studies concerning corporate scandals in China. One investigates the intra-industry effect of 356 scandals from 1997 to 2004. The empirical results show that contagion effect and competitive effect are conditioned by degree of industry competition and ownership type of scandal firms. Because state controlled firms dominate in most industries and share common characteristics as the legacy of planned economy, their scandals can typically reveal the industry wide information on poor corporate governance problem. In highly competitive industries, the negative information of state controlled scandal firms spills over to state controlled peers, creating net contagion (negative) effect. In low competitive industries, contagion effect is offset by competitive effect that mainly stems from non-state controlled rivals. Comparatively, non-state controlled scandal firms, because of their marginal status in the market, do not produce evident externality in the industry. This study supports the hypothesis of informational contagion effect, and contrasts with the traditional view that scandals are idiosyncratic. The conclusions in previous studies are biased because they fail to consider the role of ownership on intra-industry effects. / Zhang, Peng. / "August 2007." / Adviser: Larry H. P. Lang. / Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 69-08, Section: A, page: 3259. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 109-113). / Electronic reproduction. Hong Kong : Chinese University of Hong Kong, [2012] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Electronic reproduction. [Ann Arbor, MI] : ProQuest Information and Learning, [200-] System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Available via World Wide Web. / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / School code: 1307.

Dans cette thèse, nous étudions des problèmes de prise de décisions séquentielles dans lesquels, pour chacune de ses décisions, l'apprenant reçoit une information qu'il utilise pour guider ses décisions futures. Pour aller au-delà du retour d’information conventionnel tel qu'il a été bien étudié pour des problèmes de prise de décision séquentielle tels que les bandits multi-bras, nous considérons des formes de retour d’information partielle motivées par des applications pratiques.En premier, nous considérons le problème des bandits duellistes, dans lequel l'apprenant sélectionne deux actions à chaque pas de temps et reçoit en retour une information relative (i.e. de préférence) entre les valeurs instantanées de ces deux actions.En particulier, nous proposons un algorithme optimal qui permet à l'apprenant d'obtenir un regret cumulatif quasi-optimal (le regret est la différence entre la récompense cumulative optimale et la récompense cumulative constatée de l’apprenant). Dans un second temps, nous considérons le problème des bandits corrompus, dans lequel un processus de corruption stochastique perturbe le retour d’information. Pour ce problème aussi, nous concevons des algorithmes pour obtenir un regret cumulatif asymptotiquement optimal. En outre, nous examinons la relation entre ces deux problèmes dans le cadre du monitoring partiel qui est un paradigme générique pour la prise de décision séquentielle avec retour d'information partielle. / The multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem is a mathematical formulation of the exploration-exploitation trade-off inherent to reinforcement learning, in which the learner chooses an action (symbolized by an arm) from a set of available actions in a sequence of trials in order to maximize their reward. In the classical MAB problem, the learner receives absolute bandit feedback i.e. it receives as feedback the reward of the arm it selects. In many practical situations however, different kind of feedback is more readily available. In this thesis, we study two of such kinds of feedbacks, namely, relative feedback and corrupt feedback.The main practical motivation behind relative feedback arises from the task of online ranker evaluation. This task involves choosing the optimal ranker from a finite set of rankers using only pairwise comparisons, while minimizing the comparisons between sub-optimal rankers. This is formalized by the MAB problem with relative feedback, in which the learner selects two arms instead of one and receives the preference feedback. We consider the adversarial formulation of this problem which circumvents the stationarity assumption over the mean rewards for the arms. We provide a lower bound on the performance measure for any algorithm for this problem. We also provide an algorithm called "Relative Exponential-weight algorithm for Exploration and Exploitation" with performance guarantees. We present a thorough empirical study on several information retrieval datasets that confirm the validity of these theoretical results.The motivating theme behind corrupt feedback is that the feedback the learner receives is a corrupted form of the corresponding reward of the selected arm. Practically such a feedback is available in the tasks of online advertising, recommender systems etc. We consider two goals for the MAB problem with corrupt feedback: best arm identification and exploration-exploitation. For both the goals, we provide lower bounds on the performance measures for any algorithm. We also provide various algorithms for these settings. The main contribution of this module is the algorithms "KLUCB-CF" and "Thompson Sampling-CF" which asymptotically attain the best possible performance. We present experimental results to demonstrate the performance of these algorithms. We also show how this problem setting can be used for the practical application of enforcing differential privacy.

Due to the possible adoption in Peru of the criminal responsibility for companies and of the corporate compliance programs, the author analyzes the position that the United States has adopted facing the acts of corruption abroad, which legal basis is the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.In the present article, the author will do an study of this regulation, covering its scope, who are imputable by it and the possible situations that generate criminal responsibility. All of this developed over the position taken by the jurisprudence in notorious corruption scandals.In addition, the development of the effectiveness of the compliance figure will be studied as well as the implementation of incentives for the corporations to adopt prevention policies. / A raíz de la posible adopción en el Perú de la responsabilidad penal para empresas y de los programas de compliance, el autor analiza la postura que ha tomado el ordenamiento de Estados Unidos frente a los actos de corrupción en el extranjero, cuya base normativa es el Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. En el presente artículo, el autor hará un estudio de esta regulación, cubriendo sus alcances, quiénes son imputables y los posibles supuestos de hecho.Todo esto sobre la base de la postura que ha adoptado la jurisprudencia frente a sonados escándalos de corrupción. Además, se estudiará el desarrollo de la eficacia de la figura del compliance y la implementación de incentivos para los empresarios de adoptar políticas de prevención.