<p>Den svenska försvarsmakten har genomgått en förändring mot ett insatsförsvar från ett invasionsförsvar. I dagsläget genomför Försvarsmakten insatser internationellt, tillsammans med flera olika nationer, något som ställer krav på interoperabilitet. Försvarsmakten har genomfört insatser i Afghanistan sedan 2002 och har där varit med om utvecklingen av IED-hotet och på så sätt blivit tvungen att genomföra en anpassning. Hur långt har denna anpassning kommit, främst i form av utbildning och direktiv utgivna av Försvarsmakten? Ett tydligt mål är uppsatt men finns underlaget för att nå detta mål? I uppsatsen kommer jag att jämföra de styrningar som finns i målet, NATO 2294 och AJP 3.15, med de direktiv som Försvarsmakten har gett ut och de krav som ställs på utbildning.</p> / <p>The Swedish Armed Forces have transformed from being mainly a national defence force to becoming a mission-based force, capable of being deployed within and outside the Swedish border. Currently, the Swedish Armed Forces are operating internationally, with several other nationalities. It has therefore become important for the Armed Forces to be capable of operating with other nations. Since the beginning of 2002, the Swedish Armed Forces has been operating in Afghanistan and experienced the changes in the level of IED-threat and has been forced to adapt to it. How far has this adaptation come, with focus on training and instructions? There is a goal stated, but do the necessary qualities exist? In this paper I will compare the goal, NATO STANAG 2294 and AJP 3.15, with the instructionsand the demands on training that the Swedish Armed Forces has developed.</p>

Den svenska försvarsmakten har genomgått en förändring mot ett insatsförsvar från ett invasionsförsvar. I dagsläget genomför Försvarsmakten insatser internationellt, tillsammans med flera olika nationer, något som ställer krav på interoperabilitet. Försvarsmakten har genomfört insatser i Afghanistan sedan 2002 och har där varit med om utvecklingen av IED-hotet och på så sätt blivit tvungen att genomföra en anpassning. Hur långt har denna anpassning kommit, främst i form av utbildning och direktiv utgivna av Försvarsmakten? Ett tydligt mål är uppsatt men finns underlaget för att nå detta mål? I uppsatsen kommer jag att jämföra de styrningar som finns i målet, NATO 2294 och AJP 3.15, med de direktiv som Försvarsmakten har gett ut och de krav som ställs på utbildning. / The Swedish Armed Forces have transformed from being mainly a national defence force to becoming a mission-based force, capable of being deployed within and outside the Swedish border. Currently, the Swedish Armed Forces are operating internationally, with several other nationalities. It has therefore become important for the Armed Forces to be capable of operating with other nations. Since the beginning of 2002, the Swedish Armed Forces has been operating in Afghanistan and experienced the changes in the level of IED-threat and has been forced to adapt to it. How far has this adaptation come, with focus on training and instructions? There is a goal stated, but do the necessary qualities exist? In this paper I will compare the goal, NATO STANAG 2294 and AJP 3.15, with the instructionsand the demands on training that the Swedish Armed Forces has developed.

According to the United Nations, improvised explosive devices (ieds) kill thousandsof people every year and disrupt military work. Therefore, it is of interest to in-vestigate how an ied can be neutralized safely. With an autonomous uav, it ispossible to jam a radio controlled ied (rcied) if the uav can land close enough,making the rcied unable to be triggered remotely. If the radio connected to thedevice uses mixers and is poorly shielded, it is possible to detect and localize thercied with unintentional stimulated emission (sue). It is possible to use an uav,with a radio transmitter and radio receiver, to do so as long as the uav can trans-mit a stimulating signal with enough power. Drawing this power from the uav’sonboard battery decreases the uavs maximal flight time. Simulations suggestthat it is possible to localize a radio using a uav with an error of 2.5 meters.

Unknown wireless devices that use receiver architectures with a mixer may be detected and located using stimulated emissions. Transmitting a known stimulation signal and correlating leaked mixer products allows measurement of the TOF and thus range. The FRFT improves the detection of the stimulated emissions by compressing the energy of the stimulated emissions to a single axis value. The stimulation signal has many parameters that may be optimized for maximum detection distance or minimum range error or somewhere in between. The primary limiting factor for the parameters is the processing time, as the algorithm to compute the discrete FRFT is computationally intensive at the time of this report. The tests performed in this investigation achieved 45+meters detection distance with &lt; 3 meters of range error, with potential for farther detection distance.