No description available.

Conventional accounts of classical Athenian democracy represent the assembly as the primary democratic institution in the Athenian political system. This looks reasonable in the light of modern democracy, which has typically developed through the democratization of legislative assemblies. Yet it conflicts with the evidence at our disposal. Our ancient sources suggest that the most significant and distinctively democratic institution in Athens was the courts, where decisions were made by large panels of randomly selected ordinary citizens with no possibility of appeal. This dissertation reinterprets Athenian democracy as “dikastic democracy” (from the Greek dikastēs, “judge”), defined as a mode of government in which ordinary citizens rule principally through their control of the administration of justice. It begins by casting doubt on two major planks in the modern interpretation of Athenian democracy: first, that it rested on a conception of the “wisdom of the multitude” akin to that advanced by epistemic democrats today, and second that it was “deliberative,” meaning that mass discussion of political matters played a defining role. The first plank rests largely on an argument made by Aristotle in support of mass political participation, which I show has been comprehensively misunderstood. The second rests on the interpretation of the verb “bouleuomai” as indicating speech, but I suggest that it meant internal reflection in both the courts and the assembly. The third chapter begins the constructive part of the project by comparing the assembly and courts as instruments of democracy in Athens, and the fourth shows how a focus on the courts reveals the deep political dimensions of Plato’s work, which in turn suggests one reason why modern democratic ideology and practice have moved so far from the Athenians’ on this score. Throughout, the dissertation combines textual, philological and conceptual analysis with attention to institutional detail and the wider historical context. The resulting account makes a strong case for the relevance of classical Athens today, both as a source of potentially useful procedural mechanisms and as the point of origin of some of the philosophical presuppositions on which the modern conception of democracy and its limits depends. / Government

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine under what political conditions public policy issues are likely to become judicialized in Argentina. This study shows that the most widespread theoretical explanation, the loser argument, is too general and does not provide much analytical insight about the relationship between the political context and the judicialization of policy. Meanwhile, other explanations developed by the literature, mainly the politically disadvantaged group and the fragmented legislative power, although theoretically valid, have a limited empirical coverage and cannot fully explain the phenomenon of policy judicialization in Argentina. Taking into account the limitations and contributions of the existing theories, the theoretical argument of this dissertation is predicated upon the idea that there are various, alternative political scenarios under which judicialization is likely to occur. In other words, there is not just one, but several, different political conditions or combinations of conditions that might trigger the involvement of courts in public policy. Within this conceptual framework, the dissertation argues that policy disputes are likely to become judicialized under two political scenarios which have not been considered by the existing literature: first, when the state apparatus is unable to implement or enforce policy goals and mandates already approved by the political branches of government, and second, when the political elites in charge of the executive do not fully support existing policy mandates, and the legislature is too passive or deferential to the government regarding that policy issue. In these types of political contexts, social actors are likely to judicialize their policy claims. To assess these arguments, the dissertation develops a qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) of 13 major policy conflicts that occurred in Argentina during the last two decades, complemented by case studies. As a result of my analysis, I identify three combinations of political conditions that are sufficient to trigger the judicialization of policy in Argentina. Two of these combinations clearly fit with my theoretical argument and expectations about what political scenarios are likely to lead to policy judicialization, while the third combination closely reflects the political disadvantage argument. / text

published_or_final_version / Sociology / Master / Master of Social Sciences

published_or_final_version / Sociology / Master / Master of Philosophy

No description available.

No description available.

There is a growing literature in political science that focuses on the impact that policies, or mechanisms, of transitional justice (e.g. tribunals, truth commissions, and amnesty laws) have on future human rights abuses and democratization processes. However, this literature fails to differentiate between having a policy on the books and having a policy which is actually implemented. My project attempts for the first time to measure and assess how well two distinct types of transitional justice policies, truth commissions and ad-hoc tribunals, are designed and how well they are implemented. Variation in terms of policy structure (or institutional design) and implementation are currently unknown; knowing what the level of this variation is will enable us to understand the impact these transitional justice policies have on state-level human rights behavior. To conduct this analysis, I first offer a derivation of principal-agent theory and then assemble a new dataset of measures culled from primary and secondary data sources on over 40 different courts and truth commissions. For the data on the institutional design of these transitional justice policies, I collected and translated the legal mandates which create courts or commissions. I then coded the power, authority, and resource allocations which are designated in these mandates. For the data on implementation, I collected primary commission and court reports as well as secondary analyses and tracked the various activities and forms of engagement which were utilized in the process of carrying out each policy. These data were then compiled with a full set of economic, political, and social context measures and analyzed to determine whether policies with (1) more allocated authority/power or resources or (2) better implementation produced greater improvements in respect for human rights or reduced the likelihood of having additional instances of rights violations. Overall, I find that design and implementation measures are not strongly related to greater rights improvements or the reduced likelihood of violations, indicating that whatever positive changes may exist are not likely due to transitional justice practices. However, the use of transitional justice policies following human rights abuses is correlated with more positive outcomes. The ultimate goal of this project was to determine whether these policies can deliver justice and to initiate a dialogue on whether domestic populations are well served by high-cost policies (such as courts or commissions) or whether these priorities should be tabled in favor of addressing more immediate needs of these groups. The results of this dissertation appear to support the latter claim although these findings remain preliminary.

The judicial system of seventeenth-century France is often qualified as vitiated and inefficient. Actually, truth and equity are virtually absent from the court. In these conditions, why would one appeal to institutional justice? Montpellier notables use the judicial system to exert pressure on a debtor, to redress the internal familial order, to sidestep customary practices, to take revenge, to cause harm. Indeed, the question of law is rarely something other than a pretext, and it is precisely because it is vitiated that the judicial system can be used in that way. The analysis of the procedural practices and of the judicial system as they are---instead of as they should be---allows us to penetrate the fascinating universe of social, familial and financial practices. Furthermore, the emphasis on the civil procedures reveals an original perspective which goes beyond the points of view of notarial and criminal archives usually preferred by historiography. The petty Montpellier notables studied here are steering a delicate course between customs, laws and procedures. Far from suffering the imperfections of the judicial system, they are adopting them, appropriating and using them as means of meeting their own objectives. The recourse to justice is similar to a game of chess: the judicial system is the chessboard, its defects are the chess pieces and the jousts, always fought inside the same frameworks and with the same weapons, are opposing various opponents displaying different strategies.

This thesis examines the tension between the evolving demand for the protection and promotion of human rights and the dissatisfaction with the legal institutions charged with these responsibilities. This problematique is examined and reconstructed with the objective of determining how Canadian legal institutions could be structured so as to more effectively contribute to the achievement of social justice. A critical theory approach is undertaken in this thesis. This method involves the development of a transformative ideal against which current practices are examined. This juxtaposition illuminates both the problems with, and the possibilities of, the courts and human rights commissions in interpreting and applying human rights norms. The transformative ideal comprises two elements. The first element postulates that the legal institutional role should be conceived as contributing to a broad and evolving discourse on human rights and responsibilities within the public sphere. The second element holds that this role should be enhanced through the development of transformative human rights practices and their integration into legal processes. The transformative ideal is constructed through a series of six discussions comprising: (1) the development of an analytical framework based on the concepts of social transformation, social justice, human rights and the right to equality; (2) an examination of the critique of the role and functions of courts and human rights commissions; (3) an elaboration of a normative account of the public sphere and discourse together with a discussion of the role of human rights norms therein; (4) a discussion of current mediation practices in the human rights context leading to the development of a normative model of transformative mediation; (5) an examination of the transformative ideal in human rights commission practices; and (6) an exploration of the transformative ideal in court practices. The thesis concludes that the transformative ideal and particularly the concept of transformative human rights practices, will assist in reform of Canadian legal institutions so as to enhance social justice.