Thesis (Ph.D.) - Carleton University, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 120-131). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 111-125). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1966. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 288-294).

Thesis (M.A.)--Carleton University, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 160-173). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

In this dissertation I investigate the intrapsychic make-up of rage-type offenders and explore the psychodynamics of the act of murder itself The dissertation begins with a discussion on the defining features of the act of rage-type murder. I then consider the role of personality characteristics and psychopathology in individuals who have committed such offences. With the basic features of the offender and act itself outlined, the following section reviews key areas of debate regarding the psychodynamics of violence and the intrapsychic make-up of the rage-type murderer. I first explore the nature of aggression as debated in psychoanalysis and conclude that the views expressed are often unn,ecessarily polarized regarding the origins of aggression and suggest that the specifics of particular types of aggression require consideration in order to assess their intrapsychic nature. The specifics of rage and violence are discussed with this in mind. In the second chapter of this section I develop a number of intrapsychic dimensions to be used in understanding how different types of violence are constituted. Psychodynamic contributions towards understanding rage-type murder, as a specific form of violence, are then discussed. Following this review, a number of directive ~uestions are formulated regarding (1) the intrapsychic dimension of rage-type murder; (2) the pJ;esence of the borderline personality in such offender~ and its intrapsychic nature; and (3) the_ specific psychodynamics that lie behind what is argued to be a defensive act of murder. A multiple case study approach, using nine imprisoned rage-type offenders, is used to further explore the above issues. Court summary reports, the Thematic Apperception Test and the Psychoanalytic Research Interview comprised the research material, with particular emphasis placed on the interview material. The interview is approached from a psychoanalytic perspective and I develop some theoretical, technical and analytical guidelines to try to broaden Jhe use of psychoanalysis in the research domain. Findings of the research reveal a specific kind of defensive organization that is characterized by a constellation of object relations that I term the 'narcissistic exoskeleton'. I suggest that these findings best fit the description of a particular kind of borderline personality organization typified by apparent 'normality'. Other prominent aspects of the dimensions of violence observed in these cases include: (1) a poor representational capacity; (2) an interactional style characterized by uncontainable projective exchanges between victim and offender; (3) a collusive primary object relationship combined with the absence of an internalized 'third object'; (4) a 'two-faced' superego structure; (5) the internalization of traumatic experience that has become associated with a bad object system; (6) phantasies of restoring ideal good in external objects alongside conscious fantasies of annihilation. Within the context of these factors the intrapsychic events that lead to the act itself are discussed. It is found that a collapse of the 'narcissistic exoskeleton', the intrusion of the bad object system and the unbearable shame that this evokes in the offender are prominent features of what culminates in an act of explosive rage and projective identification. Some of the implications of my research are briefly discussed in the concluding chapter.

The purpose of this study was to evaluate the reliability and validity of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) for use with a female population. Seventy-five women who were either incarcerated or on probation were assessed using interview and file information. In addition, all subjects completed a battery of self-report inventories that were theoretically relevant to the PCL-R. The results strongly supported the appropriateness of the PCL-R for use with female offenders. The psychometric properties were excellent indicating a homogeneous and unidimensional scale. The factor analysis confirmed a two factor structure representing two distinct aspects of psychopathy; the personological and behavioural dimensions. The pattern of correlations obtained from the self—report inventories was highly similar to that obtained with male samples, further suggesting that the same construct is being measured in both sexes. The implications of these findings in terms of the construct of psychopathy and explanations of women’s criminality are discussed as well as future research and practical implications. / Arts, Faculty of / Psychology, Department of / Graduate

This thesis examines the role of psychopathy in violent female offending, and explores DSM-IV personality disorders that may also be a factor. Past research on female offenders and psychopathy suggest that this is a valid construct when looking at female offenders. This study was driven by two questions: which personality disorders are most common in adult female offenders who are psychopathic, and are adult female offenders who are psychopathic more likely to have been convicted of a violent offense than those who are not psychopathic, but have at least one personality disorder. The results indicate that Cluster B personality disorders were the most common, and Cluster C the least common. The results also showed that those women who were psychopathic were no more likely to have been convicted of a violent crime than those who had at least one personality disorder, but were not psychopathic. Treatment implications and the direction of future research are discussed.

In a preregistered study, we investigated whether two different procedures increased people’s recognition and motivation to self-regulate personal bias and also recognition and motivation to combat systemic bias. Non-Black undergraduates (N = 467) were randomly assigned to either a IAT procedure (i.e., took a racial IAT, received fixed feedback indicating racial bias, and received an explanation for why people may hold implicit biases), a discrimination experiences procedure (i.e., read about Black people’s discrimination experiences across various institutional contexts), or a control procedure (i.e., rated their preferences for common consumer products). Then, participants completed measures assessing recognition of and motivation to combat personal and systemic bias. Among average IMS participants, results indicated that the IAT procedure significantly increased recognition of personal racial bias, compared to the control procedure. The discrimination experiences procedure significantly increased motivation to combat systemic bias, support for policies aimed at addressing inequality, and motivation to self-regulate personal bias, compared to both the control and IAT procedures. We also found that the IAT heightened negative self-directed affect especially among higher IMS participants, which in turn was associated with increased acknowledgement of and motivation to combat not only personal but also systemic bias. Finally, among all participants, the discrimination experiences procedure heightened negative other-directed affect, which in turn was associated with increased recognition of and motivation to combat systemic bias. Although additional research is needed, these initial results may suggest that personal bias interventions influence personal bias outcomes but do not similarly influence systemic bias outcomes. In contrast, systemic bias interventions may be more likely to influence awareness of and motivation to combat both personal and systemic bias. These results pave the way for future investigation into the nature of crossover effects between personal and systemic bias procedures.

<p>Theorists conceptualize gratitude as incorporating either an <i>interpersonal perspective</i> in which an individual feels or gives thanks to another person as the source of a provided benefit, or an <i>impersonal perspective</i> in which one’s feelings of gratitude are not necessarily directed to other human beings as the beneficial source, but rather feelings of gratitude are attributed to a nonhuman source (e.g., nature, fate, luck, God, the cosmos). This latter perspective maintains that not only do people feel gratitude for valued benefits provided by another person (i.e., interpersonal source), but people can also experience gratitude for valued benefits that do not emerge or originate from others (i.e., impersonal source). Theorists also posit that over time, people can take any particular benefit for granted (i.e., habituate), failing to experience feelings of gratitude because they presume that the availability of a benefit/source is stable and certain, and unlikely to be lost. By comparison, evidence suggests that perceiving uncertainty or the potential loss of a benefit/source inspires a greater sense of gratitude. Reflecting on the pragmatic uncertainty of finite benefits/resources that are frequently taken for granted should lead to enhanced feelings of gratefulness. </p> <p>Although the majority of empirical work examining feelings and functions of gratitude is structured around an interpersonal source perspective in which people receive one-time benefits, investigations focused on gratitude for impersonal sources of benefits remain scant and understudied. The present research follows from McCullough’s (2001) and Watkins’ (2014) call to increase empirical research examining gratitude in contexts in which the source does not involve a human benefactor. The current work including a pilot test and four studies (N = 1459) offers such an examination. The findings from this initial set of studies demonstrated some evidence that those with pro-environmental attitudes exhibited increased gratitude for water when provided with specific information about water’s value (vs an unrelated topic) (Study 1). I also found that people with more pro-environmental attitudes value water more when water is presented as a relatively more uncertain resource (Study 2). The effect of certainty on gratitude was replicated in Study 3, showing that those in a low certainty condition were more grateful for water than those in a high certainty condition. Moreover, gratitude for water predicted the intent to perform water conservation behaviors and interest in water conservation volunteering (Study 3). I also found some evidence that habituation mediated the effect between the perceived certainty of a benefit and lower gratitude, suggesting that people experience less gratitude for benefits they take for granted, in part, because they think less about them (Study 4). However, this affect only appeared consistently among more liberal, pro-environmental people. The current research contributes to and expands gratitude theory and research by providing some initial evidence that feelings of gratitude can serve broader adaptive purposes than is currently theorized. Thus, gratitude not only helps people identify and bond with social benefactors, but it also may serve as a generalized psychological system that prompts people to recognize and positively respond to most any form of benefit/source. </p>

<p>Person-thing orientation (PTO) describes how interests in people (person orientation; PO) and things (thing orientation; TO) motivate behavior. These orientations have been shown to be predictive of important outcomes, but little is known about <i>how</i> these orientations work as motivational systems for behavior. The current paper explored whether different levels of PO and TO among participants affect individual categorizations of stimuli as “person-like” or “thing-like.” Participants (<i>N</i> = 170) were asked to rate how person-like and thing-like they perceived 100 individual stimulus items to be, and their PO and TO scores were measured. I hypothesized that TO would predict higher ratings of stimuli as thing-like, especially when PO levels were lower, and that PO would predict higher ratings of stimuli as person-like, especially when TO levels were lower. I predicted that this pattern of results would be stronger among stimuli categorized as ambiguous than among stimuli categorized as an unambiguous person or thing. The findings did not support the main hypotheses. Instead, the person category stimuli showed the hypothesized pattern of results. Among these stimuli, PO predicted person ratings and TO predicted thing ratings (but in the negative direction). The results and implications of these findings were discussed.</p>