Orientador: Héctor Luis Saint-Pierre / Co-orientador: Diego Lopes da Silva / Banca: Érica Cristina Alexandre Winand / Banca: Samuel Alves Soares / O Programa de Pós-Graduação em Relações Internacionais é instituído em parceria com a Unesp/Unicamp/PUC-SP, em projeto subsidiado pela CAPES, intitulado "Programa San Tiago Dantas" / Resumo: Procuramos compreender o processo de constituição do binômio Desenvolvimento e Defesa no Brasil, questionando a centralidade adquirida pela indústria de defesa (ID) nesta construção. Embora reconhecendo que a associação entre estratégia de desenvolvimento e política de defesa não seja necessariamente inédita no Brasil, defendemos que nos moldes aqui observados, trata-se de fenômeno fruto de uma correlação específica de forças estabelecida nos governos petistas. Apresentamos três fatores a ser considerados em nossa análise. Primeiro, o respaldo fornecido por uma política econômica desenvolvimentista, com maior atuação do Estado no mercado que beneficiou a indústria de defesa. Segundo, a orientação da ID por uma política externa que almejava maior autonomia internacional lastreada em capacidade dissuasória. Por fim, tratamos da legitimidade da ID. A convergência dos interesses dos diferentes atores sociais envolvidos na política industrial de defesa brasileira justificava os vultuosos investimentos demandados. A convergência dos três fatores dava as bases para a conformação do binômio Desenvolvimento e Defesa em torno da ID. / Abstract: The purpose of this work is to understand the process of constitution of the binomial Development and Defense in Brazil, questioning the centrality acquired by the defense industry in this construction. While recognizing that the association between development strategy and defense policy is not necessarily unprecedented in Brazil, we argue that in the ways observed here, this phenomenon is the result of a specific force correlation stablished during the Worker's Party's governments. We present here three factors that, in our understanding, should be considered for the analysis in question. The first concerns the support provided by a development-oriented economic policy, with greater State action in the market. In this scenario, the defense industry benefited from its insertion in a broader development policy. Secondly, by being encompassed in a broader foreign policy strategy that sought greater autonomy in the international scenario backed by greater deterrent capabilities, the defense industry had its development boosted. Finally, we address the matter of legitimacy. The convergence of the interests of the different social actors involved in the Brazilian defense industrial policy gave the sector the justifications necessary for the large investments demanded. By converging, the three factors provided the basis for the conformation of the Development and Defense binomial around ID. / Resumen: El objetivo de este trabajo es comprender el proceso de constitución del binomio Desarrollo y Defensa en Brasil, cuestionando el porqué de la centralidad adquirida por la industria de defensa (ID) en esta construcción. Aunque reconociendo que la asociación entre estrategia de desarrollo y política de defensa no es necesariamente inédita en Brasil, defendemos que en los moldes aquí observados este fenómeno es fruto de una correlación específica de fuerzas establecida en los gobiernos petistas. Se presentan aquí tres factores que, en nuestro entendimiento, deben ser considerados para el análisis en cuestión. El primero se refiere al respaldo proporcionado por una política económica de cuño desarrollista, con mayor actuación del Estado en el mercado. En ese escenario, la industria de defensa se beneficiaba en la medida en que se veía englobada una política de desarrollo más amplia. En segundo lugar, el encuadramiento de la ID en una estrategia de política exterior que anhelaba una mayor autonomía en el escenario internacional respaldado en mayores capacidades disuasorias daba un mayor impulso al sector. Por último, tratamos de la legitimidad de que gozaba la ID. La convergencia de los intereses de los diferentes actores sociales involucrados en la política industrial de defensa brasileña dada al sector las justificaciones necesarias para las enormes inversiones demandadas. Al converger, los tres factores daban las bases para la conformación del binomio Desarrollo y Defensa en to... (Resumen completo clicar acceso eletrônico abajo) / Mestre

The continued existence of the Russian defence and arms industry, known as the Oboronnyi Promyshennyi Kompleks (OPK), was called into question following the disintegration of the Soviet Empire in 1991. Industry experts cited the lack of a domestic market, endemic corruption, and excess capacity within the industry as factors underpinning its predicted demise. The most telling factor was the sudden removal of considerable government subsidies and high defence industry wages that had traditionally buttressed the industry's economic viability and encouraged the cream of Russia's workers into the sector. It was a crippling blow. However, the industry's export customers in China, India and Iran during those early years became the OPK's saving grace. Their orders introduced hard currency back into the industry and went a long way to preventing the forecasted OPK collapse. Although pessimistic predictions continued to plague the OPK throughout the 1990s, the valuable export dollars provided the OPK the breathing space it needed to claw back its competitive advantage as an arms producer. That revival has been further underpinned by a new political commitment, various research and development initiatives, and the restoration of defence industry as a tool of Russian foreign policy. In order to gauge the future prospects for the OPK, it is necessary to examine the domestic and external drivers that have either underwritten its success to date or are still required to ensure its long term endurance. Domestically, continued success demands a closer collaboration between the OPK and the Russian armed forces. It also requires serious efforts to curb endemic corruption, further consolidation of the defence industry and continued development of the Russian domestic market for arms. Externally, the strength of the state arms exporter, Rosoboronexport, global market diversification and joint military ventures with strategic partner countries are essential ingredients for long term OPK success. Cultivating and maintaining the economic and political momentum vital for the OPK's progress will be a daunting undertaking for Russia. However, Russia's accomplishments in these key areas since 2000 suggest that continued success is a genuine prospect and that the OPK could potentially grow to be the proverbial 'phoenix from the ashes'. China and India constitute approximately eighty percent of the total Russian arms transfer market. Trading and cooperation with these two countries has provided Moscow with the finances to sustain its defence industry through continued orders and valuable finance for research and development programmes for military hardware. However, post 2015, the Chinese market will be nearing total saturation and the Indian market will have contracted somewhat, as the indigenous defence industries of these nations can be expected to usurp the demand for Russian equipment. This scenario, together with a more active foreign policy under Putin has seen Russia launch aggressive marketing campaigns into the Middle East, South East Asia and Latin America. The strategy has already begun to pay dividends with large contracts being signed by Algeria, Indonesia, and Venezuela. The Russians hope that large sales to these countries will trigger further sales within the respective regions. The realised or potential contracts for arms from Libya, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Mexico, and Brazil suggest that this strategy is producing the desired result. The short term future of the Russian OPK looks promising. The rising domestic defence order is beginning to challenge the export market as the OPK's most important customer. Meanwhile, exports will be safeguarded by continued foreign demand for niche Russian defence products such as cruise missiles and air defence systems as well as cost effective and user friendly Russian aircraft, ships, submarines and land systems. Flexible financing options offered by Rosoboronexport will stimulate demand in new markets such as Algeria and Indonesia and sustain the economic viability of the OPK for at least the next decade.

The continued existence of the Russian defence and arms industry, known as the Oboronnyi Promyshennyi Kompleks (OPK), was called into question following the disintegration of the Soviet Empire in 1991. Industry experts cited the lack of a domestic market, endemic corruption, and excess capacity within the industry as factors underpinning its predicted demise. The most telling factor was the sudden removal of considerable government subsidies and high defence industry wages that had traditionally buttressed the industry's economic viability and encouraged the cream of Russia's workers into the sector. It was a crippling blow. However, the industry's export customers in China, India and Iran during those early years became the OPK's saving grace. Their orders introduced hard currency back into the industry and went a long way to preventing the forecasted OPK collapse. Although pessimistic predictions continued to plague the OPK throughout the 1990s, the valuable export dollars provided the OPK the breathing space it needed to claw back its competitive advantage as an arms producer. That revival has been further underpinned by a new political commitment, various research and development initiatives, and the restoration of defence industry as a tool of Russian foreign policy. In order to gauge the future prospects for the OPK, it is necessary to examine the domestic and external drivers that have either underwritten its success to date or are still required to ensure its long term endurance. Domestically, continued success demands a closer collaboration between the OPK and the Russian armed forces. It also requires serious efforts to curb endemic corruption, further consolidation of the defence industry and continued development of the Russian domestic market for arms. Externally, the strength of the state arms exporter, Rosoboronexport, global market diversification and joint military ventures with strategic partner countries are essential ingredients for long term OPK success. Cultivating and maintaining the economic and political momentum vital for the OPK's progress will be a daunting undertaking for Russia. However, Russia's accomplishments in these key areas since 2000 suggest that continued success is a genuine prospect and that the OPK could potentially grow to be the proverbial 'phoenix from the ashes'. China and India constitute approximately eighty percent of the total Russian arms transfer market. Trading and cooperation with these two countries has provided Moscow with the finances to sustain its defence industry through continued orders and valuable finance for research and development programmes for military hardware. However, post 2015, the Chinese market will be nearing total saturation and the Indian market will have contracted somewhat, as the indigenous defence industries of these nations can be expected to usurp the demand for Russian equipment. This scenario, together with a more active foreign policy under Putin has seen Russia launch aggressive marketing campaigns into the Middle East, South East Asia and Latin America. The strategy has already begun to pay dividends with large contracts being signed by Algeria, Indonesia, and Venezuela. The Russians hope that large sales to these countries will trigger further sales within the respective regions. The realised or potential contracts for arms from Libya, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Mexico, and Brazil suggest that this strategy is producing the desired result. The short term future of the Russian OPK looks promising. The rising domestic defence order is beginning to challenge the export market as the OPK's most important customer. Meanwhile, exports will be safeguarded by continued foreign demand for niche Russian defence products such as cruise missiles and air defence systems as well as cost effective and user friendly Russian aircraft, ships, submarines and land systems. Flexible financing options offered by Rosoboronexport will stimulate demand in new markets such as Algeria and Indonesia and sustain the economic viability of the OPK for at least the next decade.

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree, U.S. Army War College. / Title from title screen (viewed May 22, 2008). Bernard F. Griffard, project adviser. "21 March 2008"--P. [iii]. "ADA479009"--URL. Includes bibliographical references (p. 19-23). Also issued in paper format.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Western Hemisphere))--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): Giraldo, Jeanne K. "June 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on 13 July 2009. Author(s) subject terms: United States, Venezuela, Russia, Vladimir Putin, Dmitry Medvedev, Hugo Chávez, perception, Constructivism, oil, arms sales, petroleum, energy, International Relations Theory, Strategic, Realism, Liberalism, Siloviki, PDVSA, GAZPROM, democracy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 97-126). Also available in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--George Washington University, 1992. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 236-248).

This dissertation focuses on the local defence-related industry as a beneficiary under the Department of Defence’s defence industrial participation (DIP) programme, managed by Armscor. Attention is given to the main construct of the development theory and how the DIP process in South Africa compares with the international reciprocal trade phenomena commonly referred to as ‘countertrade’. The author does an in-depth analysis of the Government’s policy regarding the defence-related industry (DRI) that forms part of the local defence industrial base (DIB), as well as the DIP policy, procedures and practices and their subsequent bearing on the local defence industry. The study is further substantiated with a comprehensive review of the consequences and outcomes resulting from the largest defence package deal (SDP), signed in December 1999, between the Department of Defence and several major foreign original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and subsequently benchmarked against academic discourse on the subjects of international countertrade and development theories.

Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The fundamental motivation for emerging arms suppliers to produce arms was the desire to overcome their position of dependence in the system of arms production and transfers. However, their predicament as late entrants into the system castigated them to fail in this endeavour. This failure is based on three criteria, which also assist in the identification of emerging suppliers. Firstly, the weaponry they produce is far below the sophistication characterised by higher levels of technological advancement. Secondly, they can only produce one or two advanced weapon systems. Finally, they rely on the leading suppliers for certain sophisticated components of weapon systems which they cannot produce themselves and as a result, become so dependent that they, with an exception of a few, are unable to go beyond the simple reproduction or retrofitting of existing weapon systems. The capability to produce arms was restrictedly extended to certain states in the post-war era, and even those states that obtained such a capability were confmed to producing small arms and platforms for naval vessels. Those states that went beyond these capabilities did so with the assistance of other states or specialists, the initial intention being to meet domestic requirements, and ultimately to dispose surplus Second World War equipment in the re-transfer market. The emerging supplier states' intention to develop indigenous arms industries was driven by the political urge to reduce their reliance on the leading suppliers and to nationalise the arms production process for import substitution in order to meet domestic security needs. Since the emerging suppliers began the process of defence industrialisation from the importation of complete weapon systems to import substitution, and ultimately to the promotion of exports, they mainly relied on technology imported from the leading suppliers. On the one hand, the leading suppliers attempted to hinder the efforts of emerging suppliers to promote arms exports so as to protect their oligopolistic share of the arms market through tightening the controls and regulations on technological supplies. On the other, the emerging suppliers were impelled to promote their arms exports in order to overcome the saturation of their domestic markets, to utilise effectively their arms production capacities, and to positively affect their balance of payments through the procreation of foreign exchange returns. This study reached the following conclusions and inferences: 1. The arms trade has evolved to be characterised by the transfer of military technology, which did not feature in the arms transactions of the previous periods. 2. The gap between the leading and emerging suppliers is widening with regard to the sophistication of technological capabilities, and accordingly the stratification within the arms production and transfer system is sustainable and reinforced, thus making it hard for the lower tiers to progress beyond their current status. 3. The emerging suppliers' share of and contribution into the arms market is constricted, and as such they specialise in specific (often uncomplicated) weapon systems that constitute niches in the global market. 4. The unfolding arms production and transfer system is characterised by a fiercely competitive atmosphere, and consequently, only those states that can subsidise or integrate their efforts are enabled to sustain an advanced arms production faculty. 5. As the emerging suppliers begin to introduce more and more of their wares into the market, the costs of research and development begin to soar in the same manner as those of the leading suppliers, thus urging them to become more export-oriented. 6. Participants in the system will be compelled to relinquish their comparative technological superiority in order to survive, thus narrowing the gap between the capabilities possessed by both the leading and the emerging suppliers. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die onderliggende motivering van opkomende wapenverskaffers om wapens te produseer word toegeskryf aan 'n behoefte om hulle relatiewe afhanklikheid in die stelsel van wapenproduksie en - handel te oorkom. Boonop het die laat toetrede tot die stelsel hierdie opkomende verskaffers se kanse tot sukses verder belemmer. Die rede vir die onsuksesvolle toetrede word gebasseer op drie kriteria (wat ook dien as identifiserende eienskappe van opkomende wapenverskaffers). Eerstens, die wapens wat opkomende verskaffers lewer skiet tekort aan die vereiste gesofistikeerde standaarde van die gevestigde wapenprodusente. Tweedens, hulle kan slegs een of twee gevorderde wapenstelsels produseer. Derdens, sekere komponente van wapenstelsels word verkry by die gevestigde verskaffers, wat lei tot afhanklikheid tot so 'n mate dat die opkomende verskaffer se vermoëns beperk word tot eenvoudige reprodusering of herinstallasies van bestaande stelsels. Trouens, in die post-oorlog tydperk is die vermoë om wapens te produseer doelbewus beperk tot sekere state wat 'n afgebakende reeks van handwapens en uitrusting vir vloot vaartuie kon vervaardig. State wat verby hierdie vermoë beweeg het, het dit gedoen met behulp van ander state of spesaliste, oorspronklik met die oog op die huishoudelike behoefte maar ook om ontslae te raak van surplusse uit die Tweede Wêreldoorlog. 'n Politieke begeerte om in hulle eie sekuriteitsbehoeftes te voorsien deur middel van invoersubstitusie, het die opkomende verskaffers genoop om ontslae te raak van die afhanklikheid op gevestigde verskaffers en om die wapenproduseringsproses te nasionaliseer. Hulle het hoofsaaklik gesteun op ingevoerde tegnologie om die verdedigingsbedryf te industrialiseer. Die proses het so verloop: volledige wapenstelsels is ingevoer, daarna het invoersubstitusie plaasgevind, en daarna 'n bevordering van uitvoere. Gevestigde verskaffers het endersyds probeer om (deur middel van strenger kontrole en regulasies of tegnologiese ware) die opkomende verskaffers te verhoed om hulle oligopolistiese houvas op die mark te belemmer en andersyds moes opkomende verskaffers noodgedwonge hulle uitvoere bevorder om te voorkom dat die plaaslike mark versadig word. Die laasgenoemde aspek het ook die betalingsbalans van opkomende verskaffers positief beinvloed as gevolg van die inkomste uit buitelandse valuta. Hierdie studie kom tot die volgende aanames en gevolgtrekkings: 1. Wapenhandel het só ontwikkel dat die oordrag van militêre tegnologie die hoofkenmerk geword het in die stelsel - 'n ongekende kenmerk tot dusver in die ontwikkelingsgang van internasionale wapenhandel. 2. Die gaping van tegnologiese vermoëns tussen opkomende en gevestigde wapenverskaffers word groter en daarmee saam word die stratifikasie in wapenproduksie en -lewering volhoubaar en versterk, wat lei tot 'n beperking op die vermoë van opkomende verskaffers om vooruitgang te maak. 3. Opkomende verskaffers se aandeel in en bydrae tot wapenmarkte bly beperk en spesialiseer daarom op spesifieke (meestalongekompliseerde) wapenstelsels wat gemik is op sekere nisse in die wêreldmark. 4. Die ontluikende wapenproduksie en -handelsisteem is uiters kompeterend, met die gevolg dat slegs state wat hulle pogings kan subsidieer of integreer in staat is om gevorderde fasiliteite te onderhou. 5. Met die toenemende aanbod vanaf opkomende verskaffers, styg die kostes van navorsing en ontwikkeling vir beide die opkomende en die gevestigde verskaffer wat weer beide dwing om hulle uitvoere te beklemtoon. 6. Deelnemers in die stelsel sal gedwing word om hulle vergelykende tegnologiese voorsprong prys te gee om te oorleef in die stelsel, waarna die gaping tussen die vermoëns van opkomende en gevestigde verskaffers verminder sal word.

It is the purpose of this thesis to give the reader a picture of the labor shortage hampering the Defense Production Program, to describe the structure and development of the corporate plan for the National Defense Training Programs conducted by the Federal Security Agency for Texas, to evaluate the effectiveness of this plan, and, in conclusion, to point out such developments as might possibly effect our general educational systems.

Thesis (M.S. in Management)--Naval Postgraduate School, December 1990. / Thesis Advisor(s): Gates, William. Second Reader: Doyle, Richard. "December 1990." Description based on title screen as viewed on April 2, 2010. DTIC Identifier(s): NATO, Defense Planning, Industrial Production, Economics, Burden Sharing, Defense Industries, Sharing, Costs, Military Forces (Foreign), Military Forces (United States), Military Equipment, Mathematical Models, Military Reserves, Industrial Capacity. Author(s) subject terms: Burden-sharing, NATO. Includes bibliographical references (p. 75-80). Also available in print.