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Den moderna vapenutvecklingen har skapat möjligheter, som rätt exploaterat, skapar dilemman för försvararen. Som motmedel har en utvecklad version av Biddles (2006) tre principer: reducera motståndarens vapenverkan, reducera motståndarens rörlighet och säkerställa egen rörlighet, prövats ur ett försvarsperspektiv gentemot specialoperationer. Resultatet visar att principerna har god passning på taktisk nivå. Studien fokuserar på inverkan av de immateriella faktorerna, i motsats till numerisk och teknologisk spets. Arbetet tydliggör att förmågan att använda, organisera och leda sina militära förband är en viktig framgångsfaktor. Arbetet visar att tillämpningen av immateriella faktorer kan förklara, variationen, varför försvaret i vissa fall segrar och i andra fall lider nederlag. Arbetet ger ny kunskap till forskningen om försvar mot specialoperationer likväl som den kan vara ett embryo till en intresseväckande debatt om defensiva markoperationer. / Modern weapon development has created opportunities, which, properly exploited, create dilemmas for the defender. As a countermeasure, a developed version of Biddle's (2006) three principles: avoid the opponent's weapon effect, delay the opponent's mobility, and, create their own mobility, has been tested from a defense perspective against attacking special operations. The result shows that the principles have good fit even at the tactical level. The study focuses on the influence of intangible factors, as opposed to numerical and technological cutting-edge. The work makes it clear that the ability to use, organize and lead their military units is an important factor, for success. The work shows that the application of intangible factors can explain, the variety, why in some cases defense triumphs and in other cases suffers defeat. The work provides new knowledge to research on defense against special operations as well as it can be an embryo of an interesting debate about defensive ground operations.

What is the motive of the Russian invasion of Ukraine? Is Kreml seaking security or power? The topic will be discussed from the perspective of offensive and defensive realism, which is based on John Mearsheimer, Stephen Walt and Kenneth Waltz thoughts and ideas. The thesis has also studied the war in Georgia and Syria in an attempt to find similarities with today's war in Ukraine. The thesis is structured as a comparative case study with a theory testing element with an main focus of explaining the invasion from offensive and defensive realism. The thesis can conclude that the motive behind the invasion could be explained by both theories with a clear predominance of a desire for power.

Examining Israel's measures against the nuclear weapons programs of Iraq, Syria, and Iran was the aim of this study. The research question is: Based on Walt's defensive realism and the balance of threat theory, why did Israel act/is acting against the Iraqi, Syrian and Iranian nuclear weapons programs?. Walt's defensive realism and the balance of threat theory, which is based on four separate threat components, are used to discuss and provide an answer to the main question of the research. Comparative case study was used as a method, and materials including speeches from government officials, databases of scientific research, and yearly assessments were used. The researcher came to the conclusion that Iraq 1981, Syria 2007 and Iran in 2009–2021 are considered to be threats to the state of Israel because they have supported anti-Israel militias and engaged in armed conflicts with Israel. The researcher used a comparative case study to draw this conclusion. With ballistic missiles that may reach Tel Aviv, the Tehran regime has frequently sponsored anti-Israel Shia-Sunni militias in the Middle East. In order to stop totalitarian governments in the area from compromising Israel's security, it was concluded that Israeli aggressive policy and assaults on the nuclear programs in Iraq, Syria, and Iran were important and rational.