While the virtues of social capital in democracies are widely recognized, previous studies have repeatedly shown that social capital is in short supply in heterogeneous communities with ethnic minorities. Against the view that levels of social capital are culturally predetermined, I argue that it is possible to generate social capital by carefully formulating political institutions. Drawing from theories of institutional management of ethnic conflict and theories of institutional learning, I construct an integrated theory of social capital which hypothesizes that citizens learn to trust one another based on their experiences with political institutions during an extended period of democratic rule. To test this integrated model of social capital, I use a probit analysis to examine how democratic longevity in different institutional settings (e.g., majoritarian vs. consensus) influences social capital. To overcome the endogeneity problem that exists between social capital and democratic longevity, I adopt an instrumental variables approach, drawing on theories in international relations. My analysis of World Values Survey data yields three main conclusions concerning the institutional arrangements that foster social capital. First, I find that democratic longevity fosters higher levels of trust in countries with consensus institutions containing powersharing arrangements through cabinets, executive-legislative balances, party systems, and electoral systemspresumably because cooperation among different groups enhances social capital. Second, a longer period of democratic rule in highly federal institutions undermines trust, as the devolution of powers through territorial units is thought to fragment the political system and society. Finally, consistent with the theoretical expectations, I find that these two conclusions hold only among ethnic minorities. Among ethnic majorities, the effect of democratic longevity disappears once we purge the endogenous component (i.e., the effect of social capital on democratic longevity), using an instrumental variables approach. Case studies of the Baltic States, the Canadian province of Quebec, and Malaysia corroborated the findings from the statistical analyses. By uncovering a mechanism through which social capital can be generated in multiethnic states, this study makes an important contribution to the literature.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of North Texas, Aug., 2007. / Title from title page display. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 226-236).

Democracies worldwide are facing a third wave of autocratization, in which a new model tactic has emerged to end democracies. During previous waves coup d’état have been the main reason why democracies breakdown. However, they do still occur during the third wave of autocratization, but previous research has focused on theoretically develop the reasons for why coups occur through focusing on the military and specific regions. In addition, various definitions exist regarding coup d’état, and as a result, its definition has become fragmented, which has had real-life implications. The Capitol Insurrection that occurred in the United States on January 6th, 2021, introduced an unprecedented attack on one of the world’s most prominent and noticeable democracies, intending to overturn the 2020 Presidential Election. The Capitol Insurrection has been defined as a domestic terrorist attack and, thus, not an attempted takeover. Therefore, this thesis aims to analyze the concept of coup d´état to develop the understanding of takeover attempts in democracies. In addition, it aspires to theoretically develop the concept of takeovers in democracies through applying a multiple-case design consisting of three cases that have been defined as coups and three cases that follow the new tactic used in the third wave of autocratization. The thesis summarizes the previous definitions and explanations regarding takeovers and applies that to analyze how and what characterized the six cases. In addition, the findings of the six cases are compared to the previous definitions to analyze what speaks for and against a broadened definition of a takeover. The analysis of this thesis finds and argues for that there is a need to redefine the model tactic during the third wave of autocratization to a type of takeover performed by the chief executive and political elites, in other words, performed by the government for government.

This dissertation begins from a desire to explain situations in which left-wing parties appear to adopt policies that are more typically associated with right-wing thinking. A standard explanation for such behaviour is that relatively weak left-wing parties are drawn to adopt those policies as a way of getting elected — commonly expressed as convergence on the median voter. The puzzle, however, is that this explanation often seems to fall foul of the empirical reality that left-wing parties adopt these policies when they are relatively strong, not weak. The explanation for this advanced here is that parties, seeking to improve outcomes for their constituencies both now and in the future, often operate in political environments which lead them to assign a high probability that today’s policy choices will not survive the predations of government by opposing parties tomorrow. Where this is the case, there is incentive to pursue policies that are less efficient, but which have inbuilt political defence mechanisms: with the main such mechanism focused upon here being the power of organised public sector labour. The effect of partisanship is, therefore, conditioned by expectations about the future political power of parties. Where left-wing parties expect to be weak, they will tend to adopt the highly statist, bureaucratised, nationalised policies that are traditionally associated with the Left as these will tend to embody large amounts of organised labour that will be a counter to future right-wing governments. Where left-wing parties expect to be strong, the costs associated with such policies come to outweigh the benefits, with the result that they do not need to pursue such ‘left-wing’ policies. These ideas are developed heoretically within an institutionalist framework, yielding a synthesis between the historical and rational choice institutionalisms. Empirically, the theoretical framework is applied to the development of welfare states and to the issue of privatisation of state-owned enterprises.

Cette thèse porte sur le déclin de la participation électorale dans les dix démocraties post­communistes qui ont intégré l’Union européenne en 2004 et 2007. Ces pays ont connu la plus forte baisse de participation électorale observée en régimes démocratiques depuis la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. Afin de comprendre ce phénomène, la thèse adopte une approche qui est à la fois systématique, théorisée, quantitative et comparative. Elle est structurée autour d’un nouveau schéma directeur conceptuel pour l’étude de la participation électorale au niveau agrégé. Ce cadre théorique distingue quatre types de facteurs qui affectent la participation en fonction de la nature et la temporalité de leurs effets. Le rôle de chaque type dans le déclin post­communiste est théorisé et considéré l’un après l’autre. Les sections empiriques emploient des méthodes quantitatives et une comparaison à l’intérieur des dix pays mais également avec d’autres démocraties établies ou nouvelles. Elles analysent plusieurs bases de données originales, dont la principale contient pratiquement toutes les élections législatives intervenues dans le monde démocratique entre 1939 et 2010. Les résultats remettent en cause l’idée selon laquelle le déclin participatif est principalement dû à un désenchantement démocratique. Ils montrent qu’au moins six autres facteurs causaux y contribuent. Ils tiennent aux contextes de démocratisation, aux changements institutionnels et aux évolutions dans la composition des électorats. La magnitude exceptionnelle du phénomène étudié est, ainsi, le produit d’une multiplicité des causes. / This dissertation studies the puzzling decline of voter turnout in ten post­communist democracies that joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007. These countries experienced the most spectacular erosion of electoral participation in democratic regimes since World War Two. To solve this puzzle, my dissertation follows a systematic, theory­based, quantitative and comparative approach. It is structured by a newly­conceived master conceptual scheme for the study of aggregated voter turnout. This theoretical framework distinguishes between four types of turnout drivers based on the nature and temporality of their effects. The role of each type in the post­communist decline is theorised and considered in turn. The empirical sections employ several types of quantitative methods and intra­ but also inter­regional comparisons with established and other new democracies. They draw on several original datasets, the most important of which comprises the quasi­totality of democratic legislative elections held around the globe between 1939 and 2010. The results question the conventional wisdom that the post­communist turnout decline is mostly due to citizens’ dissatisfaction. Instead, they show that it is driven by no less than six other causes that relate to democratisation, institutional change and shifts in the composition of the electorate. It is the multiplicity of causal factors that explains the unparalleled startling magnitude by which voting rates decreased in the ten countries at hand. Besides solving the central puzzle, this dissertation yields a number of new middle­range theories and insights that pertain to electoral participation in both new and established democracies.

In recent decades the European Union has moved from a multilateral treaty to a distinctive social, political, and economic order among European states. During the same period political philosophers have increasingly turned their attention to questions of justice beyond the state. But their discussions have largely focused on global justice, and have paid relatively little attention to the distinctive moral and political questions raised by the emergence of a new type of order among European states. This thesis fills this lacuna, by developing a conception of ‘social democratic’ or ‘egalitarian’ social justice for the specific institutional arrangements of the EU. In Chapters one through three, I delineate a general conception of ‘pluralist egalitarianism’, the view that we have a variety of grounds for endorsing equality-inclined economic institutions domestically. Direct egalitarian arguments stress the internal requirements of institutional fairness to which basic economic institutions are subject. Indirect egalitarian arguments favour egalitarian economic outcomes based on concerns of social equality. I further differentiate between a transnationalist and an internationalist position. Direct transnationalist arguments stress the EU’s similarity to domestic institutions and derive egalitarian economic requirements for the EU as a whole. Indirect transnationalists argue that EU citizens stand in a distinctive kind of relationship such that the value of social equality has purchase amongst them, and social equality requires a limitation on economic inequalities at the EU level. By contrast, internationalists insist on the continuing importance of national self-determination. However, they endorse more substantive economic institutions at the EU level to protect existing social democratic welfare state arrangements. In chapter four to seven, I assess the extent to which each of these arguments can support a more egalitarian organisation of basic economic institutions at the EU level. Finally, I offer one practical proposal that would help the EU to realise the social democratic vision I have defended. This is the idea of an EU social minimum. I explain how such a social minimum would be conceived and implemented, and I demonstrate why transnationalists and internationalists should endorse such a policy.

This thesis seeks to explain how democracies emerge out of the ashes of civil wars. This paper envisions transitions to democracy after a civil war largely as a function of the peace process. Democracy is thought of as a medium through which solutions to the problems and issues over which the civil war was fought can be solved without violence. Transitions to democracy are more likely if there is a large bargaining space and the problems of credible commitments to democratization can be solved. Democratization is more likely if four conditions exist in a state after the civil war: a negotiated settlement, credible commitments via international enforcement, demobilization, and a cooperative international environment. The hypotheses derived are tested through an event history analysis for two different standards of democracy. The results suggest that factors indicative of all four theoretical concepts contribute to the likelihood of democratization after a civil war.

This thesis shows that citizens whose policy concerns are higher on political elites' agendas are more likely to be satisfied with democracy and to vote in elections. It develops a theoretical framework to explain the influence of the previously neglected variable priority congruence on democratic satisfaction and turnout and provides empirical evidence for it. The thesis thereby makes significant contributions to our knowledge about the ingredients of democratic legitimacy. Previous research shows that political representation, as measured by proximity between citizens' and elites' policy positions, is linked to democratic satisfaction. In this thesis, it is argued that congruence in priorities has a similar effect because citizens are likely to perceive elites who emphasise their concerns as responsive to societal needs and public opinion. The empirical analyses suggest that democratic satisfaction is indeed influenced by priority congruence, yet less so amongst more politically sophisticated individuals as well as in younger democracies and countries with lower levels of democracy and governance. These differences are probably due to variation in citizens' expectations towards elite behaviour and the democratic system. Elite attention to citizens' concerns moreover influences their decision to turn out in elections. If voters' issue priorities are salient in the campaign, they are likely to perceive the election to be more important. Moreover, they will find it easier to evaluate parties and make their vote choice. These mechanisms are shown to be less relevant amongst partisans, since party attachment mobilises voters and facilitates their vote choice. Again, previous policy-based explanations of turnout focus on positions, largely ignoring priorities. The hypotheses are tested through statistical analysis of data from voter and candidate surveys as well as media content analyses. The data come from all 27 European Union countries in 2009, whereby several hypotheses are only tested in Germany due to data availability.

The European Union is often criticized for having a democratic deficit, and most often cited are the shortcomings in citizen inputs. The complex institutional structure, in particular the dual channel of representation (supranational and intergovernmental), contributes to these concerns. This thesis thus examines what impacts the linkage between citizens and their elected representatives in the direct channel of representation. I refer to this linkage as the "electoral connection" and outline three related input criteria: Competent Citizens: Citizens can competently assign policy responsibility and hold their representatives to account; Meaningful Choices: Citizens have meaningful choices at election time; and Substantive Representation: Elected officials are representative of their constituents. The theoretical framework of the electoral connection is based in substantive representation, and focuses on the mandate conception of representation but also includes a discussion of accountability. I utilize European Election Studies (EES) voter, media, and candidate studies from 2009, EES voter and candidate studies from 1994, and a novel expert survey on EU responsibility (2010). The analyses of responsibility attributions and vote choice are conducted using multilevel modelling to assess individual- and contextual-level determinants. I test the effect that information and political attitudes, specifically extreme attitudes have on the first two criteria of the direct electoral connection. The role of information is tested at the individual level through political sophistication, and at the contextual level through the politicization of the EU issue. The first criterion is tested by comparing citizen and expert attributions of responsibility. For the second criterion, two chapters which examine perceived party positions and issue-cross pressure assess how this impacts the electoral connection. The final empirical chapter is a descriptive analysis of congruence on policy priorities and preference for governmental responsibility to assess substantive representation. If there is some understanding of responsibility, and citizens have selected parties that align with their preferred policy positions, then we should expect government to be representative of its constituents. One contribution is defining an expanded definition of the electoral connection. In addition I show that political sophistication and issue politicization have a positive impact on the electoral connection, while attitude extremity generally has a negative impact. Furthermore, the European Parliament is quite representative of its constituents. Concerns about democratic deficit and lack of representation in the European Union are overstated.