The object of this thesis is to investigate the application of international law in municipal law, and more specifically to focus on international human rights law. A determination of the sources of international human rights law constitutes the point of departure. Treaties are the primary source of international human rights law, followed by customary law. Recent authority indicates that the formation of customary human rights law differs from that of customary international law in general. There are, however, also international documents on human rights not falling within the scope of the traditional sources as embodied in section 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Non-binding sources of law, or soft law - most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - are shown to play an important role in the formation of both treaties and custom and directly influence state practice. Theoretical explanations expounding the application of international law in the domestic law of states are examined, assessing their suitability for effective implementation of international human rights instruments. Since the application of international law in municipal law depends on, and is regulated by rules of domestic law, the relevant rules of legal systems which may, due to historical factors or regional proximity, impact on South Africa, are examined. State practice points to two primary methods of dealing with international law obligations in domestic law, namely transformation (associated with the dualist theory) or direct application (associated with the monist theory). The specific method of incorporation adopted by a state is often closely related to that state's constitutional system. The advantages and disadvantages associated with each particular method are related to the intricacies of individual legal systems. From an internationalist perspective the often misunderstood doctrine of direct application, has the advantage of making the intended protection afforded by human rights treaties to individuals directly enforceable by domestic courts with a minimum of state intervention. The position of international law in South Africa is assessed against this background. South Africa's constitutional history under British rule followed British law requiring legislative transformation of treaty obligations, but permitting customary law to be directly incorporated into common law. The position of international law became constitutionally regulated in South Africa with the introduction of a constitutional democracy. Drafting errors and practical difficulties experienced with the 1993 Constitution, were largely ironed out by the 1996 Constitution. The post-apartheid Constitutions introduced changes and new dimensions compared to the pre-1993 position of international law, including: the consideration of international law when interpreting the constitutionally protected human rights; the involvement of the legislature in the treaty-making process; and provisions for both transformation and direct application of treaties subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Customary international law is confirmed as forming part of South African law, and courts are obliged to interpret legislation in accordance with international law. An analysis of court decisions after 1993 reveals the following broad trends: (i) The impact of international law as part of South African law is still largely overlooked. (ii) The majority of references to international law by the courts are to international human rights agreements and decisions by international tribunals under section 39 of the Bill of Rights. (iii) The distinction between international law and comparable foreign case law, as directed by section 39, is often blurred. (iv) No distinction is made between international hard and soft law when deciding on human rights matters. (v) Courts have refrained from applying international human rights obligations which form part of South African law because they are self-executing or form part of customary international law. (vi) Binding international human rights obligations are only referred to for comparative purposes. (vii) The term "treaty" is interpreted in accordance with the definition of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The intention to create legally binding obligations is therefore implicit. It has been the policy of the post-apartheid South African government to ratify or accede to the major international human rights agreements as swiftly as possible. The execution of this policy has, however, met with numerous problems. As a result, South Africa has to date not become party to the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. Many treaties to which South Africa is a party have not yet been incorporated into South African law and compulsory reports on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are overdue. Despite the post-apartheid euphoria about the creation of a human rights culture in South Africa and the formal commitment by government to give effect to international human rights instruments, much remains to be done before South Africa can be regarded as formally complying with international human rights standards. / Law / LL. D. (Law)

The object of this thesis is to investigate the application of international law in municipal law, and more specifically to focus on international human rights law. A determination of the sources of international human rights law constitutes the point of departure. Treaties are the primary source of international human rights law, followed by customary law. Recent authority indicates that the formation of customary human rights law differs from that of customary international law in general. There are, however, also international documents on human rights not falling within the scope of the traditional sources as embodied in section 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Non-binding sources of law, or soft law - most notably the Universal Declaration of Human Rights - are shown to play an important role in the formation of both treaties and custom and directly influence state practice. Theoretical explanations expounding the application of international law in the domestic law of states are examined, assessing their suitability for effective implementation of international human rights instruments. Since the application of international law in municipal law depends on, and is regulated by rules of domestic law, the relevant rules of legal systems which may, due to historical factors or regional proximity, impact on South Africa, are examined. State practice points to two primary methods of dealing with international law obligations in domestic law, namely transformation (associated with the dualist theory) or direct application (associated with the monist theory). The specific method of incorporation adopted by a state is often closely related to that state's constitutional system. The advantages and disadvantages associated with each particular method are related to the intricacies of individual legal systems. From an internationalist perspective the often misunderstood doctrine of direct application, has the advantage of making the intended protection afforded by human rights treaties to individuals directly enforceable by domestic courts with a minimum of state intervention. The position of international law in South Africa is assessed against this background. South Africa's constitutional history under British rule followed British law requiring legislative transformation of treaty obligations, but permitting customary law to be directly incorporated into common law. The position of international law became constitutionally regulated in South Africa with the introduction of a constitutional democracy. Drafting errors and practical difficulties experienced with the 1993 Constitution, were largely ironed out by the 1996 Constitution. The post-apartheid Constitutions introduced changes and new dimensions compared to the pre-1993 position of international law, including: the consideration of international law when interpreting the constitutionally protected human rights; the involvement of the legislature in the treaty-making process; and provisions for both transformation and direct application of treaties subject to the provisions of the Constitution. Customary international law is confirmed as forming part of South African law, and courts are obliged to interpret legislation in accordance with international law. An analysis of court decisions after 1993 reveals the following broad trends: (i) The impact of international law as part of South African law is still largely overlooked. (ii) The majority of references to international law by the courts are to international human rights agreements and decisions by international tribunals under section 39 of the Bill of Rights. (iii) The distinction between international law and comparable foreign case law, as directed by section 39, is often blurred. (iv) No distinction is made between international hard and soft law when deciding on human rights matters. (v) Courts have refrained from applying international human rights obligations which form part of South African law because they are self-executing or form part of customary international law. (vi) Binding international human rights obligations are only referred to for comparative purposes. (vii) The term "treaty" is interpreted in accordance with the definition of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The intention to create legally binding obligations is therefore implicit. It has been the policy of the post-apartheid South African government to ratify or accede to the major international human rights agreements as swiftly as possible. The execution of this policy has, however, met with numerous problems. As a result, South Africa has to date not become party to the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights. Many treaties to which South Africa is a party have not yet been incorporated into South African law and compulsory reports on the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights are overdue. Despite the post-apartheid euphoria about the creation of a human rights culture in South Africa and the formal commitment by government to give effect to international human rights instruments, much remains to be done before South Africa can be regarded as formally complying with international human rights standards. / Law / LL. D. (Law)

A partir d’idées purement théoriques sur l’enfance, fruits d’un bouleversement sociétal en occident au temps des Lumières, il a fallu des siècles pour accomplir le trajet conduisant à la reconnaissance juridique des droits de l’enfant : La Convention internationale des droits de l’enfant de 1989 marque l’aboutissement et le point de départ d’une nouvelle vision de l’enfant. Ainsi, les droits de l’enfant deviennent un enjeu politique et juridique pour tous les États qui l’ont ratifié dont la France et le Maroc. Si pour la France, la ratification de la CIDE a été le prolongement de réformes entamées au niveau interne, il s’agit pour le Maroc d’une première prise de conscience. Néanmoins, la reconnaissance des droits de l’enfant ne s’arrête pas au stade de la ratification symbolique du texte international. Les États parties doivent rendre effective les dispositions de la CIDE que ce soit au niveau de la norme ou en pratique. La mise en œuvre du texte international dont son applicabilité directe devant le juge, sa concrétisation dans le quotidien de l’enfant, l’adoption de sa philosophie et de sa nouvelle logique constitue les preuves de cette reconnaissance. En effet, c’est à ce stade là que les divergences entre les deux systèmes juridiques étudiés s’opèrent. Entre débordements et manquements, omniprésence et occasionalité, chaque contexte et chaque système juridique appréhende la question des droits de l’enfant, notamment son effectivité en dépend de son histoire, de son processus socioculturel, de son système politique et également de sa situation socioéconomique. De cette manière, la CIDE devient un outil parmi d’autre et non pas un objectif en soi. Au final ce sont les droits de l’enfant qu’on veut réaliser et non pas le compromis des États signataires de la Convention. / From purely theoretical ideas on the childhood, the fruits of a societal upheaval in west in the time of the Lights, were needed centuries to carry out the route leading to the legal recognition of children rights: the International Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 marks the outcome and the starting point of a new vision of the child. So, children rights became a political and legal stake for all the States which ratified it among which France and Morocco. If for France, the ratification of the CIDE was the continuation of reforms begun at the internal level, it is a question for Morocco of a first awarenessNevertheless, the recognition of children rights does not stop at the stage of the symbolic ratification of the international text. Involved states have to make effective the capacitieS of the CIDE whether it is at the level of the standard or in practice. The implementation of the international text among which its direct applicability in front of the judge, its realization in the everyday life of the child, the adoption of its philosophy and its new logic establishes the proofs of this gratitude. Indeed, it is at this stage that the differences between both studied legal systems take place.Between overflowing and breaches, omnipresence and occasionality, every context and every legal system dreads the question of children rights, in particular its effectiveness depends on its history, sociocultural process, political system and also its socioeconomic situation. In this way, the CIDE becomes a tool among of the other one and not the objective in itself. In the end it is the children rights which we want to realize and not the compromise agreed by the states who signed up the convention.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-03-15T19:33:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cristiano Afonso Natividade.pdf: 670397 bytes, checksum: 73e350081a414e05166cad42dc04031f (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-08-18 / Fundo Mackenzie de Pesquisa / The autonomy of will has been the target of criticism or exaltation throughout the history what is still today one of the most important and controverted principles. Its validity is incontestable for both the contract and the free initiative, but the risk of giving value to that principle without restrictions has already been dangerous and prejudicial. This work seeks the real and current situation of the mentioned principle and above all tries to match it with the constitutional rules in order to learn how they were decisive for the autonomy of will conjuncture and also to know the relation of these rules with the autonomy of will at present time. Furthermore, this work shows some situations to exemplify where the Constitutional Principles act straightly in the civil relations molding the autonomy of will. / A Autonomia da Vontade tem sido alvo de críticas e exaltações ao longo da história,sendo ainda hoje um dos princípios mais importantes e mais controversos. A sua validade é incontestável, tanto para o contrato quanto para a livre iniciativa, mas os riscos de se valorizar esse princípio sem restrições já se mostrou perigoso e por diversas vezes danoso. Este trabalho tende a procurar a real situação atual do princípio citado, mas sobretudo tende a relacioná-lo com os Princípios Constitucionais, de forma a verificar como estes princípios foram determinantes para a atual conjuntura da Autonomia da Vontade, bem como qual é a relação destes princípios com a Autonomia da Vontade na atualidade.

A tension arises whenever the South African private law fails to meet constitutional right norms. To remedy a deficiency, two law-making options are available. The first is for the judiciary to develop or change private law principles and rules in order to provide protection for the implicated constitutional norm. The second is for the judiciary to enforce an obligation upon Parliament to enact legislation to amend or replace existing private law rights and obligations so as to safeguard the norm against interference from a private individual or entity. The former is the more conventional option, but, in recent years, the law reports record an increasing reliance on the legislative duty to protect constitutional right norms in private legal relationships. The thesis investigates the extent to which the latter phenomenon - which will be described as a 'pivot towards legislative remedies' - exists, and the circumstances in which the courts pivot towards legislative remedies rather than developing private law of their own accord. The thesis finds that legislative schemes that give effect to constitutional rights are likely to contain an array of benefits that are absent from or reduced in the judicial law-making process. The judicial pivot towards legislative remedies is thus a strategy to enhance the process through which conflicting rights are resolved, as it allows for the constitutional rebuilding of private law in a way that the judiciary is unable to do on its own. Importantly, however, theories of judicial deference do not explain the pivot. On the contrary, the courts have exercised a strict level of control over the legislative law-making pathway. Through either statutory interpretation or the review of legislation, the courts require legislation to contain the essentials of the judicial law-making framework. From this perspective, the judicial law-making process produces the floor of the rebuilding project and the legislative law-making process enhances that framework.