Corporate reputation has evolved into a strategic and intangible corporate asset and accordingly directors, as custodians of corporate reputation, are tasked with building and managing corporate reputation as a source of competitive advantage. The purpose of this research is to ascertain the extent of the operationalisation of corporate reputation and the perspectives of directors as to the manner in which they perceive, value, build and manage corporate reputation. A critical review of the corporate reputation literature evidenced much ambiguity as to the definition of corporate reputation, whilst the value and competitive advantage of corporate reputation, has been empirically established. The literature within this realm fails to adequately address the operalisation of this construct and accordingly, this study attempts to address the apparent void in the academic literature by offering empirical evidence as to the manner in which directors build and manage a company’s reputation by proposing a framework to guide directors in their endeavours. In order to gauge director’s perspectives, 12 semi-structured, in-depth interviews were conducted with the directors of a multi-national company based in South Africa. The company operates in a highly regulated and competitive industry and the research findings demonstrate that corporate reputation is indeed acknowledged as a key, intangible asset. Whilst the directors did not possess clear insight into building and managing corporate reputation, several key themes emerged and the findings are consolidated into a proposed framework and a portfolio of the dimensions of corporate reputation are established. This study lays the foundation for further studies within the realm of operationalising corporate reputation, particularly as a source of competitive advantage. Copyright / Dissertation (MBA)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Gordon Institute of Business Science (GIBS) / unrestricted

High-quality early childhood education and care (ECEC) are linked to positive developmental outcomes for children. Systems have been created to define, measure and promote high-quality ECEC. National accreditation status is deemed the gold standard of a high-quality program, yet many centers are unable to achieve this without assistance. With the help of Accreditation Facilitation Projects (AFPs), many low-income centers are able to achieve accreditation. Centers collaborating with an AFP reap many benefits including financial support, ongoing training and mentoring, and guidance through the accreditation process. AFPs invest greatly in the centers they collaborate with and the longer the center takes to achieve accreditation, the more resources an AFP must expend. The purposes of this study were to understand if the educational level of center director, the total enrollment of a center, or the percentage of children receiving government subsidies could predict the time it takes for a center to complete the accreditation process while receiving assistance from an AFP, and to determine if there are differences in attitudes about program accreditation between center directors and early learning specialists who serve as accreditation mentors to the directors. Findings revealed that a) the higher educational level of program directors is associated with a quicker time to program accreditation, b) both the total enrollment of the center and the percentage of children receiving government subsidies do not predict time to accreditation, c) the number of total staff in a center is associated with a quicker time to accreditation, and d) there is no significant difference between the directors' attitudes and early learning specialists' attitudes toward accreditation and accreditation facilitation projects. AFPs looking to streamline their accreditation process and provide accountability to their stakeholders regarding their investments over time can use these findings to choose to collaborate with centers that have directors who have at least a bachelor's degree in order to shorten the time to accreditation.

David Mamet is best known as a playwright, but he also has a thriving film career, both as screenwriter and as director. He has taken very seriously each of these roles, formulating theories that, he suggests, account for the creative choices he makes. Though Mamet sometimes contradicts himself, as when he suggests that viewers should have the satisfaction of constructing their own meaning of a work, but at the same time is devoted to montage, which works by juxtaposing images that lead to a single interpretation, he clearly sees the story as a critical avenue into the spectator's unconscious, where he hopes it will resonate with a truth that speaks directly to the individual. His films House of Games, Things Change, and Homicide clearly reflect his ideas on the best ways of conveying a story on film. In House of Games, Mamet draws on Bruno Bettelheim's theories to construct a fairy tale designed to act on adult viewers in the same way that fairy tales act on the child. In Things Change, he creates a fable that explores issues of friendship and honor within the milieu of the gangster genre. And in Homicide, Mamet uses the expectations viewers bring to the theatre in anticipation of a genre film to explore themes of loyalty and identity. In Oleanna, however, Mamet relies heavily on exposition and dialogue, rather than the visual elements that separate the film from drama, which renders the film the antithesis of his long-held philosophy of film narrative. Mamet's best film work, in House of Games and Homicide, has been innovative and thought-provoking, bringing depth to the new noir and redefining the cop film. His work in Oleanna, though it may prove to be an anomaly, may suggest a surrender of his principles of filmmaking or a reformulation of them to fit some new vision.

The purpose of this study was to analyze the characteristics of teacher directed modeling evidenced in the practices of three experienced high school choral directors. Research questions were: 1. What modeling activities were exhibited in each teacher's rehearsals? 2. When viewing a 45-minute composite tape of each teacher's instructional activities representative of all rehearsals, what instructional behaviors did each choral director recognize and identify as modeling? 3. What instructional episodes on the composite tape not identified by the teachers contained elements of modeling? 4. What other episodes from the remainder of each choral director's rehearsal practice contributed to an understanding of modeling? Videotapes of three high school choral directors were recorded over the course of one semester. Excerpts from rehearsals were combined to form a 45-minute composite tape of each choral director. A text transcription was made of the composite tape. Participant directors viewed their tape and identified instructional episodes that they recognized as examples of modeling. Identifications were analyzed, and descriptive categories of modeling behaviors were established. Modeling was found to be a teacher generated or delegated act of demonstration. Demonstrations were musical or non-musical and belonging to either of three distinct categories: audible, visible, or process modeling. Subdivisions of each category were found further describing modeling in the high school choral rehearsal. In addition, types of modeling were noted in increasing cognitive complexity required on the part of students beginning with simple imitation and concluding with models as tools for musical problem solving. Research is recommended on a larger sample of participants, including junior high/middle school directors to confirm categories and levels and to develop an observation tool based on results for describing, assessing, and modifying instructional techniques of practicing and pre-service music educators.

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As financial intermediaries, banks are "special" because they play an important role in transferring funds from surplus spending units to deficit spending units and serve as a channel of monetary policy. Therefore, the safety and soundness of banks is essential to the financial stability and economic development. This study investigates how bank governance mechanisms, namely, executive compensation and board of directors, affect bank safety. Given the unique nature that bank assets are opaque, bank governance is expected to be different from corporate governance of industrial firms. This study also investigates how the opaqueness nature of bank assets affects the compensation design of bank executives. Chapter 1 investigates the association between asset opacity and CEO pay-performance sensitivity of bank holding companies (BHCs). Contrary to the monitoring cost hypothesis according to which when information asymmetry is high firms rely more heavily on equity-based compensation, I find that when the share of opaque assets in total assets increases, pay-performance sensitivity in BHCs declines. This finding supports the view that when the share of opaque assets increases, managers can pursue risky projects to a greater extent in the interests of shareholders but at the expenses of bondholders, and, hence, the optimal compensation structure in BHCs with larger share of opaque assets has a lower pay-performance sensitivity to restrain managerial risk-taking incentives, reducing the conflicts of interests between shareholders and bondholders. The negative effect of asset opacity on pay-performance sensitivity is robust after accounting for the endogeneity of asset opacity and using various compensation measures. In addition, I find that higher pay-performance sensitivity generally leads to a greater share of opaque assets in total assets. The results of this study suggest that asset opacity is an important determinant of compensation structure in the banking industry. BHCs should use caution when using stocks and options to promote prudent risk taking under bank asset opacity conditions because opaque bank assets make risk-shifting behaviors induced by equity-based compensation difficult to monitor, threatening the bank stability. Regulators should also account for this opacity effect. Chapter 2 investigates the relationship between insolvency risk and executive compensation for BHCs over the 1992-2008 period. I employ CEO compensation sensitivity to risk (vega) and pay-share inequality between the CEO and other executives as measures of compensation and employ a simultaneous equation model to account for the endogeneity problem between vega and risk. Five main results are obtained. First, CEO compensations in BHCs have risen in response to deregulation to resemble those of the industrial firms. Second, higher vegas lead to greater bank instability. Third, the association between bank stability and managerial compensation is bi-directional; higher vegas induce greater risk and vice versa. Fourth, BHCs in the next to the largest-size group increase CEO vegas the most and have the strongest potential to create instability in the financial industry, such as the one witnessed in 2007-2009. Fifth, increased pay-share inequality has effects opposite to those of the increase in vega; greater pay-share inequality is associated with greater bank stability. Implications of executive compensation effects on instability for depositors, deposit insurers and regulators are drawn. Chapter 3 investigates the association between the structure of board of directors and risk taking of bank holding companies. I use the number of directors on the risk committee and the frequency of its meetings to measure the strength of risk management exercised by bank boards. Several interesting findings are obtained. First, banks with stronger risk committees, namely risk committees with a greater number of directors and more frequent meetings, are associated with more diversified loan portfolios, greater amounts of safer loans, less mortgage-backed securities, and lower market risk. These results continue to hold even after controlling for the possible endogeneity problem using the dynamic panel GMM estimator. Overall, these results suggest that stronger risk management by bank boards has a positive and significant impact on banks' safety and soundness. Second, the percentage of banks having a risk committee has been increasing steadily since 1999, suggesting bank boards have gradually taken a greater role in risk management and their fiduciary duties have expanded beyond shareholders to include depositors. However, less than half of bank boards have a risk committee before 2007, suggesting weak risk management at the top level and the possibility that bank boards may have failed to control the excessive risk-taking in the banking industry leading to the recent financial crisis. Finally, the percentage of banks with a risk committee is still less than 60% after the crisis, suggesting that depositors and bank supervisors could enhance the stability of banks by further improving the effectiveness of internal risk control at bank boards. / Business Administration/Finance

This dissertation examines the impact of board of director characteristics and policies on nonprofit performance. Using data collected through a survey of nonprofit colleges and universities, I provide evidence that specific board member characteristics and board monitoring policies are vital in shaping both the financial and nonfinancial success of nonprofit institutions of higher education. Related to board characteristics, results indicate that bigger boards with more major donors are consistently associated with better performing organizations, confirming my board contribution hypothesis. These results are in addition to noteworthy relationships between nonprofit success and the number of meetings held by an organization as well as the impact of recruiting board members who serve on other nonprofit boards. In terms of board monitoring, findings confirm regulatory and advisory recommendations that the use of a conflict of interest policy, disclosure of business relationships, nominating and compensation committees are important aspects of board development in addition to longer board terms. These relationships confirm all three monitoring hypotheses, suggesting that board disclosures, organization, and independence all have an important impact on success when it is measured as organizational efficiency, one of the most studied and relied upon measures of performance in the nonprofit sector. This work makes important, initial forays into the relationships between board of director qualities and nonprofit performance. Although limited by the relatively small sample of colleges and universities, given the lack of public data available related to nonprofit boards, this study is unique in the ability to analyze nonprofit boards with both financial and nonfinancial performance measures. / Business Administration/Accounting