No description available.

The purpose of this study was to examine factors that band directors may be able to use in enhancing enrollment in band programs. The categories of predictor variables were school leadership, level of support, student characteristics, band leadership, and band leader characteristics. There was one criterion variable, band enrollment. Stepwise multiple regression was used to determine which predictor variables explained a portion of the criterion variable, band enrollment. A sample of 400 active band directors was drawn from the membership of the American School Band Directors Association. A table of random numbers was used to select the sample. Data were collected from responses to a questionnaire that was mailed to all persons in the sample. Usable responses were received from 250 males and 65 females. Results of a stepwise multiple regression indicated that five variables accounted for 86.7% of the variance in band enrollment. These five variables in the order of the amount of variance accounted for are (1) the total number of students in the band director's school, (2) the relationship between the band director and constituents (principal component one), (3) revenue per band student, (4) proportion of students on free or reduced-price lunch in the band director's school, and (5) race of the band director. One of the main implications of this study appears to be broadly associated with the kinds of relationships a band director develops with the members of the band community. Even though the band director cannot do anything about the size of the student body, the challenge is for band directors to use strategies that enhance their relationships with the band community. / Ed. D.

The dissertation empirically examines the efficacy of internal control mechanisms by analyzing 94 forced turnovers of chief executive officers (CEOs). It seeks to answer two primary questions: One, do governance-related characteristics influence the promptness with which poorly-performing CEOs are removed from office; and two, are removals of CEOs followed by changes in internal control mechanisms? The results suggest that poorly performing managers are removed more quickly in firms that have a larger percentage of independent outside directors on their board, that have higher equity ownership by the non-CEO directors and lower equity ownership by the CEO, and that separate the positions of CEO and chairperson. The results also suggest that the removal of the CEO provides both the opportunity and the incentive to alter internal governance systems. There is significant turnover of board members and the new boards generally have a higher fraction of independent outside directors and are more likely to separate the positions of CEO and chairperson. In addition, the sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm performance increases significantly following turnover. These post-turnover improvements in monitoring and incentive schemes are more significant in those firms that require a crisis in the product and/or capital market before they remove their CEOs. However, there is no evidence of short-term improvement in operating performance following changes in CEOs and governance systems. Overall, the results suggest that board and ownership characteristics do influence the effectiveness of internal monitoring systems and that CEO turnover is associated with broad changes in monitoring and incentive systems. / Ph. D.

The first essay shows that academic directors significantly increase firms' innovation. Following an academic director's death and relative to a non-academic director's death, the average firm reduces the number of citation-weighted patent applications by 30.7%. The number of patent applications also increases when an academic director becomes less busy after another company she holds directorship is acquired. Consistent with an advising channel, academic directors in STEM disciplines are particularly pro-innovation. In line with monitoring channels, firms with academic directors tend to dismiss CEOs who do not innovate and restrict real earnings management that waste financial resources. The relation between academic directors and innovation is not driven by PhD CEOs or non-academic PhD directors. Academic directors are associated with higher firm value at firms where innovation is more important but not at other firms. Overall, our results highlight the vital advising and monitoring roles academic directors play in corporate innovation. The second essay finds that pre-existing professional ties with a firm's board significantly increase a CEO candidate's probability of being hired by the firm. Considering all CEOs hired this year as potential candidates, a board-connection corresponds to a 152% increase in the probability the candidate is selected as CEO. Consistent with the hypothesis that boards select connected candidates to increase shareholder value, we find significantly greater firm performance improvement after CEO turnovers for firms hiring connected CEOs than those hiring unconnected CEOs. Further, the performance increases are significant only among firms with severe information asymmetry, large CEO termination risk, and high coordination costs. We also find that connected CEOs make better acquisitions than unconnected CEOs. These results suggest connected hiring increases firm performance because it reduces information asymmetry, CEO termination risk, and CEO-board coordination costs. Inconsistent with boards rendering favors to friends, connected CEOs are not awarded a larger pay package when they assume office. Overall, our results suggest that it pays for a firm to hire a CEO with pre-existing ties to the board. / Doctor of Philosophy / We see professors seating on corporate boards all the time. Why do firms hire them? Do they make firms innovate more because they have strong research orientation? The first essay finds that these directors enhance corporate innovation. They improve innovation with their STEM expertise. Because STEM disciplines are particularly relevant to production technology, they are able to advise the CEO about innovation. We also find that these directors make firms innovate more by linking CEO termination decisions to innovation and by preventing companies from wasting resources that could otherwise be used for innovation. Lastly, these directors improve firm value at firms where innovation is important. The board makes CEO recruiting decisions. We are interested in knowing (1) whether candidates are more likely to be hired if they already had a connection with the board; (2) whether these candidates outperform candidates without any connections. The second essay finds that having an acquaintance on the board helps a CEO candidate land the CEO position. We also find that these CEOs outperform CEOs without any connections. This is because there is little information gap between the connected CEO and the board. Also, the pre-existing connections allow the two parties to have better coordination.

Based upon the findings reported in this study, the following conclusions may be drawn. 1. It can be concluded that the personnel officials' sex did not significantly affect their attitudes toward secretarial workers. Male and female personnel officials responded in a similar manner to the 30 office situations described on the Situational Attitude Scale for Secretarial Occupations. These same attitudes were affected, however, by the sex of the secretarial worker described. The scores on the instrument that referred to secretaries as female (Form B) were significantly higher than those scores on the form that referred to secretaries as male (Form A) for both male and female personnel officials. Therefore, because of these higher sex"."role attitudes toward females, it can be concluded that both the male and female personnel officials view the appropriate sex-role of the secretary as female. The sex-role attitudes of both the male and female personnel officials are biased in favor of females. Thus, this study supports related literature that contends that a majority of both sexes believe that secretarial work is more congruent with the female sex role (Hesselbart, 1977: Fox, 1975; Levinson, 1975). 2. In view of their higher sex-role attitude scores on both forms of the instrument, the male personnel officials seemed to have a more positive sex-role attitude than female personnel officials toward both male and female secretarial workers. Likewise, the female personnel officials have a less positive sex-role attitude toward both their own sex and the opposite sex in secretarial positions. Contrary to the related literature (Shepard and Hess, 1975; Entwistle and Greenberger, 1972; Iglitzen, 1972; Spence and Helmreick, 1972), females were not "found to be more liberal at every age level than males." 3. The variables of: (1) location of the ASPA chapter, (2) age of the personnel official, (3) educational level of the personnel official, and (4) self-rating of the personnel official, were not closely related to the attitude scores. The question is raised as to whether these variables are important in predicting sex-role attitudes, as is suggested in the related literature. / Ed. D.

The purpose of this dissertation is to introduce and empirically test a new theoretical perspective for assessing board effectiveness. Although the ability-motivation models provide a fruitful foundation in developing the characteristics that influence directors' job effectiveness, there are limitations this these models. First, the directors' ability and motivation dimensions are not clear, as existing conceptualizations are fungible and provide little clarity for theoretical and empirical research. Second, the ability-motivation models overlook several characteristics that are known to influence job performance but do not fit within the current dimensions. Finally, the current studies implicitly assume that all directors on the board have the same opportunity to monitor and advise in every domain. Therefore, I integrate the corporate governance literature on board effectiveness and the social psychology literature on job performance and propose that boards' effectiveness is a function of individual directors' capacity, engagement, and opportunity. This dissertation offers several contributions. First, I propose a theoretical model that illuminates and extends the core dimensions (i.e., capacity, engagement, and opportunity) of directors' effectiveness. The core dimensions of the model in my dissertation provide a much-needed conceptual clarity and coherence to the constructs that influence directors' effectiveness, which supports the development of stronger theory of directors' effectiveness. Second, by exploring the role of opportunity, I challenge one major assumption of the corporate governance field that all directors on the board have the same responsibility to monitor and advise in all domains. Third, the dissertation begins to shed light to the 'black box' of boards of directors by exploring how boards might enable directors to exert their full potential regarding their board functions. / Doctor of Philosophy / Board of directors are considered by practitioners as one of the most important corporate governance mechanisms to monitor and advise the CEO and other executives of the firm. Nonetheless, boards often fail in fulfilling these roles. This is exemplified by the constant news regarding organization misconduct and strategic failures. Therefore, the question of when and how directors can effectively perform their board's duties remain answered. In my dissertation I propose that directors must have high levels of capacity, engagement, and opportunity at the same time in order to monitor and advise effectively. Specifically, I emphasize the importance of appropriately matching directors to a position in which they can leverage their capacity and engagement. Boards are pressured to constantly evaluate their capabilities; thus, boards might use the insights of this study to appropriately evaluate and adjust the responsibilities of their directors. Furthermore, investors might use our proposed model to externally evaluate if the boards of the firms in which they are investing are structured in a way that they can mitigate misconduct which could greatly impact their investment outcome. Finally, policy makers can rely on these criteria (capacity-engagement-opportunity) to create board regulations to improve monitoring effectiveness.

Boards of directors of corporations have been criticized for failing to effectively perform their roles of ratifying and monitoring managerial decisions, retaining and terminating top management, and evaluating and rewarding executive performance. critics have suggested that increasing the proportion of outside directors on the board increases independence and improves board effectiveness. Research has provided evidence that the composition of the board affects firm performance, the likelihood of chief executive turnover, and the monitoring of important decisions such as the adoption of poison pills and acquisitions. In this study, the effect of the composition of the board on the relationship between executive compensation and firm performance is investigated. The effect of board composition on the types of performance measures, accounting and stock return, used in the pay-performance relationship is also examined. Data were gathered from publicly available sources, including Forbes compensation surveys, firms’ proxy statements, and COMPUSTAT and CRSP tapes. These data were then statistically analyzed using a regression model with indicator variables for outsider-dominated boards. The types of performance measures, accounting and stock return, were then compared to test whether their usage in the pay-performance relationship differs between outsider-dominated and insider-dominated boards. The results of this study indicate that the association between compensation and stock return measures of performance is stronger when the board is composed of a majority of outside directors. There is no evidence, however, of a stronger association between compensation and accounting measures of performance for outsider-dominated boards. The results also reveal that outsider-dominated boards use both accounting and stock return measures of performance in the pay-performance relationship whereas insiders focus on accounting measures. These results imply that outside directors act in the interests of shareholders by linking compensation to stock return measures as well as accounting measures of performance. These findings are consistent with the conclusions of other board composition studies that outside directors play an important role in the corporate governance process. / Ph. D.

This study investigated the knowledge of special education directors or division designees in school divisions across the Commonwealth of Virginia. One-hundred-twenty-nine Virginia special education directors or division designees were sent an on-line assessment describing 22 hypothetical scenarios representing current legal issues in the area of special education law as prescribed by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEA) and No Child Left Behind (NCLB). The instrument used in this study was adapted from the Power (2007) study with a revision of response choices to provide more definitive results. A demographic questionnaire was adapted to determine individual and school division characteristics pertinent to the study. A total of 87 division special education administrators responded, a 67% response rate. After initial analysis, 84 assessments were usable. The statistical package JMP-Software for Univariate and Multivariate Statistics (2005) was used to tabulate the responses and to examine the relationships between demographic variables and respondents' knowledge of special education law. Descriptive statistics were applied to identify deficiencies in the respondents' knowledge base. Results of this study yielded a mean total score of 80.3% on the online assessment. Respondents scored below the mean in the areas of free and appropriate education, related services, student discipline, and liability for reimbursement to parents. There was no statistically significant relationship between knowledge of special education law and any of the following demographic characteristics: size of the school division, previous special education teacher experience, number of years as a special education director, highest degree attained, percent of time devoted to special education responsibilities, and attendance at special education law workshops. Respondents who belonged to professional organizations scored significantly higher on the assessment than those who did not. The assessment also compared methods of remaining current with special education law and the respondents' knowledge of the law. The following methods yielded a statistically significant relationship with knowledge of special education law: reading professional organization bulletins, attending professional development seminars, and using "other" means. The results of this study will be used to recommend professional development on the interpretation and implementation of special education law at the school-division and college/university levels. / Ph. D.

Yes / This paper investigates the relation between insider trading and the likelihood of insolvency with a specific focus on the directors’ sale and purchase transactions preceding insolvency.We use a unique data set on directors’ dealings in 474 non-financial UK firms, of which 117 filed for insolvency, over the period 2000–2010.We show that the directors of insolvent firms increase their purchase transactions significantly as the insolvency approaches. The results also reveal a significant relation between three different measures of insider trading activity and the likelihood of insolvency, which is observed to be positive only during the last six-month trading period. The relation is negative for the earlier trading periods. While the earlier purchase transactions appear to be motivated by superior information held by insiders, the purchase trades closer to the insolvency date are possibly initiated by directors’ motives to influence the market’s perception of the firm in an attempt to avert or delay insolvency.

No / This article observes separately and jointly the impact of international financial reporting standards (IFRS) and/or board of directors’ independence on accounting conservatism in FTSE 100 nonfinancial firms between 2002 and 2007. Using Givoly and Hayn’s (2000) accrual-based measure of accounting conservatism, we found a reduction in conservatism after the mandatory adoption of IFRS, and, also, that board of directors’ independence improved accounting conservatism. Moreover, IFRS and board of directors’ independence had a complementary impact on accounting conservatism since the role of independent directors was not observable prior to the mandatory adoption of IFRS. Our results suggest that, after the mandatory adoption of IFRS, independent directors are likely to put significantly more pressure on the management to practice more accounting conservatism.