Thesis (PhD (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Utopie is dood. Daar is geen meer hoop dat die toekoms radikaal anders of moreel meerwaardig kan wees gemeet teen die hede nie. Om utopiese alternatiewe tot ons huidige samelewingsrangskikking te verbeel is onrealisties, en selfs gevaarlik. Daarom lewer die utopiese verbeelding vandag slegs distopieë – as ons vandag 'n andersoortige samelewing verbeel kan ons slegs dink dat dit 'n nagmerrie moet wees. Die resultaat is politieke apatie en 'n gewilligheid om onsself te versoen met die status quo. As teenvoeter vir die bogenoemde politieke apatie vra ek in hierdie proefskrif of dit vandag nog moontlik is om utopies te dink. Om hierdie vraag te beantwoord ondersoek ek eers die sogenaamde "einde" of "dood" van utopie. Utopie is vandag dood omdat die metafisiese onderbou daaran verdag geraak het, en omdat 'n utopiese gees aktief onderdruk word via 'n verskeidenheid ideologiese strategieë. Ten spyte van hierdie probleme is 'n andersoortige en postmetafisiese utopisme wel vandag moontlik, en die kontoere van hierdie nuwe utopiese rasionaliteit word nagespoor in die werk van eietydse filosowe soos Richard Rorty, Gianni Vattimo, Fredric Jameson, Slavoj Žižek en Jacques Derrida. In hulle werk herleef 'n utopiese gees wat nie meer gebonde is aan ons metafisiese filosofiese erfenis nie. Hierdie gees manifesteer ook nie (slegs) in die vorm van sketse van ideale samelewings nie, maar eerder as hermeneutiese praktyke wat die koms van sosiale alteriteit fasiliteer. Hierdie utopiese gees, in voeling met 'n postmetafisiese intellektuele klimaat, bied ek aan as 'n noodsaaklike voorwaarde vir sosiale hoop. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Utopia is dead. There is no hope today that the future will be radically different from, or ethically superior to the present. To dream up utopian alternatives to our society is unrealistic, even dangerous. It is no surprise, then, that the existing utopian imagination produces only dystopias – if we think at all of a radically different society, we can only imagine something nightmarish. The result: a political apathy and a willingness to reconcile ourselves with the status quo. To counter the abovementioned political apathy, I ask in this dissertation if it is still possible to think in a utopian fashion. In order to answer this question I start off by examining the so-called "end" or "death" of utopia. Utopia is dead today because of its questionable metaphysical foundations, and because of an active ideological repression of any utopian impulse. In spite of these problems a new and postmetaphysical utopianism is possible. The contours of this new utopianism can be extrapolated from the work of contemporary philosophers like Richard Rorty, Gianni Vattimo, Fredric Jameson, Slavoj Žižek and Jacques Derrida. In their work a utopian spirit is revived – a spirit no longer constrained by our metaphysical philosophical heritage. This spirit is manifested, not (only) in sketches of ideal societies, but rather in hermeneutic practices that facilitate the arrival of social alterity. I present this utopian spirit, in touch with a postmetaphysical intellectual climate, as a necessary condition for social hope.

Thesis (DPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this dissertation I enquire into the status, scope and limits of human knowledge, given the fact that our perceptual and cognitive faculties are the product of evolution by natural selection. I argue that the commonsense representations these faculties provide us with yield a particular, species-specific scope on the world that does not ‘correspond’ in any straightforward way to the external world. We are, however, not bound by these commonsense representations. This particular, species-specific view of the world can be transgressed. Nevertheless, our transgressing representations remain confined to the conceptual space defined by the combinatorial possibilities of the various representational tools we possess. Furthermore, the way in which we fit representations to the external world is by means of our biologically determined epistemic orientation. Based on the fact that we are endowed with a particular set of perceptual and cognitive resources and are guided by a particular epistemic orientation, I conclude that we have a particular cognitive relation to the world. Therefore, an accurate representation for us is a particular fit (our epistemic orientation) with particular means (our perceptual and cognitive resources). / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis handel oor die aard, omvang en limiete van kennis, gegewe dat ons perseptuele en kognitiewe vermoëns die resultaat van evolusie deur middel van natuurlike seleksie is. Eerstens, word daar geargumenteer dat die algemene voorstellings wat hierdie vermoëns aan ons bied ‘n partikuliere, spesie-spesifieke siening van die wêreld aan ons gee, wat nie op ‘n eenvoudige manier korrespondeer aan die werklikheid nie. Ons is egter nie gebonde aan hierdie voorstellings nie. Hierdie partikuliere, spesie-spesifieke siening van die wêreld kan oorskry word. Ons is egter wel beperk tot die konseptuele ruimte wat gedefinieër word deur die kombinatoriese moontlikhede van die voorstellingsmiddele tot ons beskikking. Verder word die manier waarop ons hierdie voorstellings aan die wêreld laat pas deur ons biologies gedetermineerde epistemiese oriëntasie bepaal. Dus, gegewe dat ons ‘n spesifieke stel perseptuele en kognitiewe vermoëns het en deur ‘n spesifieke kognitiewe epistemiese oriëntasie gelei word, staan ons in ‘n spesifieke kognitiewe verhouding tot die wêreld. ‘n Akkurate voorstelling (m.a.w. kennis vir ons) is om spesifieke vermoëns (perseptuele en kognitiewe vermoëns) op ‘n spesifieke manier (epsitemiese oriëntasie) aan die wêreld te laat pas.

Thesis (PhD)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: We live in a time of unprecedented wealth and ease, taking airplanes to exotic locales and enjoying a variety of foods from across the globe. Significant improvements in healthcare have increased life expectancy to three times that of Ancient Egypt, once considered the most advanced civilization of its time. Yet despite these advances, millions of children continue to suffer. Ninety-nine percent of the millions of child deaths before the age of five each year are preventable through low cost treatments. Poor children who live past age five usually experience a lifetime of intellectual, physical, and emotional setbacks because of their disadvantaged circumstances. What, if anything, is to be done? This dissertation argues we have strong moral obligations to help children by providing a substantive equality of opportunity so that any differences in socioeconomic or life circumstance result from individual choice, not poor moral luck. These obligations are grounded in the common morality, arise from cosmopolitan applications of beneficence, and include the provision of nutritious food, safe drinking water, adequate sanitation, shelter, certain levels of healthcare and education, and love and guidance. Although the task before us is large, it is not impossible and thus incumbent upon us to fulfill it. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Ons lewe in ‘n tyd van ongekende rykdom en gemak, waar ons vlieg na eksotiese bestemmings en ‘n verskeidenheid van kos en ontspanning van regoor die wêreld geniet. Groot verbeterings in mediese sorg het ons lewensverwagting opgestoot tot drie keer die van Antieke Egipte, wat eens op ‘n tyd beskou is as die mees gevorderde samelewing op aarde. Ten spyte van hierdie vooruitgang is daar steeds miljoene kinders wat hulself in ellendige toestande bevind. Nege-en-negentig persent van die kinders onder vyf jaar oud wat jaarliks sterf kon gered word deur laekoste mediese sorg. Arm kinders wat wel langer as ouderdom vyf leef, ervaar gewoonlik ‘n leeftyd van intellektuele, fisiese en emosionele terugslae as gevolg van hulle benadeelde omstandighede. Wat, indien enigiets, kan gedoen word? Hierdie proefskrif argumenteer dat ons ‘n sterk morele plig het om kinders te help deur substantiewe gelykheid van geleenthede te skep sodat verskille in sosio-ekonomiese of lewensomstandighede die resultaat sal wees van individuele keuses, en nie morele geluk nie. Hierdie pligte word begrond deur ons gemeenskaplike moraliteit, spruit voort uit ‘n kosmopolitaanse toepassing van goedwilligheid (‘beneficence’), en sluit die voorsiening van veilige drinkwater, voldoende sanitasie, skuiling, sekere vlakke van mediese sorg en opvoeding, en liefde en voorligting in. Alhoewel die taak wat wat voor ons staan ‘n groot een is, is dit nie onmoontlik nie en dus is dit ons plig om dit te vervul.

Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Responsibility is either linked to duties and expectations, or it is linked to the freedom of an agent. These links are questionable. It is therefore necessary to investigate the freedom and context of commission and omission. There are numerous difficulties in evaluating suicide: - The problem to distinguish between successful suicide and failed pseudo suicide. - The problem of the mind: The limited accessibility of the emotions and attitudes despite its expressibility And the unexpressibility of the experiences despite its immediate accessibility. And the problem of other minds. - The problem of the freedom of the will. Prove is given that no aspect of the mind is free - despite our illusions of freedom. - The problem of the cause, origin and extent of an act. - The problem of the relation between brain and mind. This problem is important when we consider the origin of acts and the concept of the self. The important issues when solving the difficulties pertaining to suicide are: - Agency: The self is owner of all acts and instances of mind. The self is also the subject of all physical acts and acts of the mind. - The self is an open complex system. The self is entangled in relations of differences, conflict and deferment of meaning. The important conclusions when evaluating suicide are: - The agent is the owner and the subject of his acts. The agent has illusions of freedom. The agent is inseparable from his circumstances. - Acts originate in the context of these circumstances. - Responsibility exists in the context of power in society. - The answers to the questions of Why? Are logical reconstruction and politically correct confabulations - whatever the answer is, it is shared by all participants of the context.The evaluation of suicide: - The self-murderer`s act originates from the context of the circumstances of which he is a participant. - Suicide happens within the context of a pancheiria with aspects of autocheireō and heterocheireō. - The pancheiria started before the autocheireō. - The pancheiria continues after the autocheireō. The autocheireō is but an indication of the seriousness van the larger pancheiria. The self-murderer (autocheir) and his autocheireō persist as a silhouette in our midst. - The possibility of the self-murderer`s illusion of freedom does not liberate us from the silhouette`s accusations. - Neither does se sharing of guilt give as relieve from the silhouette`s accusations. - Neither will we benefit from any rationalization. Finally we can do nothing but to utter these statements of denial and confession : - Suicide is wrong. - But we have not done it. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Verantwoordelikheid word óf aan verpligtinge en verwagtinge, óf aan die vryheid van die agent verbind. Hierdie verbindings word betwyfel. Daarom is dit nodig dat die vryheid van handeling en nie-handeling sowel as die konteks waarin die handeling en nie-handeling gebeur ondersoek word. Verskeie probleme ten opsigte van die beoordeling van die selfmoord word uitgewys: - Die probleem om die werklike geslaagde selfmoord te onderskei van die gefaalde selfmoordpoging. - Die probleme van die verstand. Naamlik die beperkte toeganklikheid van die emosies en houdings, alhoewel dit uitdrukbaar is. En die onmiddelike toeganklikheid van die ervarings wat dit te spyt nie uitdrukbaar is nie. Asook die probleem om ander verstande te ken. - Die probleem van die vryheid van die wil. Dit word aangetoon dat geen aspek van die verstand vry is nie. Dit nie teenstaande het ons steeds die illusie van vryheid. - Die probleem van die oorsaak, die oorsprong en die reikwydte van handelinge. - Die probleem van die verhouding tussen die brein en die verstand. Hierdie probleem is belangrik by die oorwegings van die oorspong van handeling en die siening van die self. Belangrike elemente by die oplossing van die beoordeling van selfmoord is: - Die agentskap: naamlik dat die self die eienaar van alle verstandsitems en handelinge is, en dat die self die subjek van alle verstandshandelinge en sigbare handelinge is. - Die self as `n oop komplekse stelsel wat in wederkerige verhoudings is van verskil, geskil en uitstel van betekenis.Gevolgtrekkings wat belangrik is by die beoordeling van selfmoord: - Die agent is eienaar en subjek van sy handelinge, het die illusie van vryheid, is deel van sy omstandighede. - Die handeling ontstaan in die konteks van hierdie omstandighede. - Verantwoordelikheid bestaan in die konteks van mag in die samelewing. - Die antwoord op Hoekom? en Waarom? is logiese herkonstruksies en politiese korrekte konfabulasie - maar wat ookal die antwoord is, dit word gedeel deur al die deelnemers aan die konteks. Die beoordeling van selfmoord: - Die selfmoordenaar se handeling ontspring uit die konteks van sy omstandighede waaraan hy `n deelnemer is. - Die selfmoord gebeur eerder binne die konteks van `n pancheiria met aspekte van autocheireō en heterocheireō. - Die pancheiria was reeds voor die autocheireō. - Die pancheiria duur voort na die autocheireō. Die autocheireō toon aan ons die erns van die oorkoepelende pancheiria. Die selfmoordenaar (autocheir) en sy autocheireō bestaan voort as silhoeët in ons midde. - Die moontlike illusie van vryheid van die selfmoordenaar kan ons nie die aanklag deur die silhoeët ontsnapping bied nie. - Net so min kan die verdeling van skuld ons van die aanklag laat ontsnap. - Enige rasionalisering van ons kant is nutteloos. Laastens kan ons net sê: - Selfmoord is verkeerd. - Ons het dit nie gedoen nie. Hierdie stellinge dien as ontkennings sowel as skuldbeleidenisse.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis takes Zygmunt Bauman’s book Modernity and the Holocaust as a point of departure in an attempt to show that genocides of the twentieth century are by-products of modernity, and not aberrations, as previously thought. Bauman’s work focuses on the distinctly modern nature of the Holocaust. Using the theory he develops in Modernity and the Holocaust, this thesis attempts to show, first and foremost, that the Holocaust is not the only example of modern genocide. By comparing and contrasting the Holocaust to another, more recent, genocide, namely the Rwandan genocide of 1994, it becomes clear that despite superficial differences between the two genocides, the Rwandan genocide is also a by-product of modernity. This conclusion has important implications, not only for the way in which we remember the Holocaust and the Rwandan genocide, but also for our understanding of evil and perpetrators of evil. Drawing on the work of Bauman and Hannah Arendt, especially with regard to the Eichmann case, chapter three investigates our traditional assumptions and expectations with regard to evil and perpetrators of evil and notes the unsettling differences between our assumptions and the modern reality. In order to truly understand the nature of perpetrators of modern genocide, it is important to look at the influence of morality on such perpetrators and the reasons why morality seems incompatible with modernity. In this regard, Haas’ book Morality after Auschwitz is of critical importance. Given the various failures and unexpected by-products of modernity, one has to wonder whether postmodernity would offer a better moral alternative to modernity. Chapter five investigates this supposition, and finds it wanting. Drawing yet again on Bauman, the notion of an ethics of responsibility is put forth as the only safeguard against modern evil. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis neem Zygmunt Bauman se boek Modernity and the Holocaust as ‘n beginpunt en probeer om te wys dat die volksmoorde van die twintigste eeu byprodukte, en nie afwykings, van moderniteit is nie. Bauman se werk fokus op die moderne eienskappe van die Holocaust. Deur gebruik te maak van die teorie wat hy in Modernity and the Holocaust ontwikkel, probeer hierdie tesis om, eerstens, te wys dat die Holocaust nie die enigste voorbeeld van ‘n moderne volksmoord is nie. Deur die Holocaust met ‘n ander, meer onlangse volksmoord, die Rwandese volksmoord van 1994, te vergelyk en te kontrasteer word dit duidelik dat ten spyte van die oppervlakkige verskille tussen die twee volksmoorde, die Rwandese volksmoord ook ‘n byproduk van moderniteit is. Hierdie gevolgtrekking het belangrike implikasies nie net vir die manier waarop ons die Holocaust en die Rwandese volksmoord onthou nie, maar ook vir die wyse waarop ons die kwaad (evil) en perpetrators of evil1 verstaan. Deur verder gebruik te maak van Bauman se werk sowel as die werk van Hannah Arendt, veral met betrekking tot die Eichmann saak, ondersoek hoofstuk drie ons tradisionele aannames en verwagtinge met betrekking tot die kwaad (evil) en perpetrators of evil en wys die onaangename verskille tussen ons aannames en die moderne realiteit uit. Ten einde werklik die aard van perpetrators van moderne volksmoord te verstaan, is dit belangirk om na die invloed van moraliteit op hierdie perpetrators of evil te kyk, asook die redes waarom moraliteit blykbaar teenstrydig is met moderniteit. Haas se belangrike boek, Morality after Auschwitz, word hier geraadpleeg. Gegewe die verskeie tekortkominge van moderniteit, moet ons wonder of postmoderniteit nie dalk ‘n beter morele alternatief bied nie. Hoofstuk vyf ondersoek hierdie stelling en vind dat postmoderniteit ook nie voldoende is nie. Laastens word Bauman weereens geraadpleeg en sy seining van ‘n etiek van verantwoordelikheid word voorgestel as die enigste beskerming teen moderne kwaad. / Harry Crossley Foundation

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: A changing world brings about many different challenges. The same applies to business operating in society. These changes and challenges relate to business ethics in general and how it impacts on the decisions that business makes every day. The ethical challenges that business has to face have a profound effect on meta-ethical concerns. Awareness of this situation can help to direct business and the rest of society to reach positive outcomes. When looking at current cases it is evident how corporate culture and leadership play a very important role in this matter. The cases shows how the power of business is exerted in practice and it can serve a positive purpose in determining meta-ethics. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: 'n Veranderende wêreld gee tot baie verskillende uitdagings aanleiding. Dieselfde geld vir besigheid wat in die samelewing funksioneer. Dit hou verband met sake-etiek in die algemeen en watter invloed dit uitoefen op die besluite wat besigheid elke dag moet neem. Die etiese uitdagings wat besigheid elke dag in die gesig staar, het 'n diepgaande uitwerking op meta-etiese kwessies. 'n Bewustheid van hierdie situasie kan help om leiding aan besigheid en die res van die samelewing te bied ten einde positiewe resultate te bereik . As die huidige gevalle in ag geneem word, is dit klaarblyklik dat korporatiewe kultuur en leierskap ’n baie belangrike rol in hierdie verband speel. Dit toon hoe die kragtige invloed van besigheid in die praktyk gebruik word en hoe dit 'n positiewe rol kan speel om meta-etiek te bepaal.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Corporate social responsibility is a subject that is of concern to most companies that operate on a large scale today. This assignment looks at corporate social responsibility to understand how this fits into a company today. There is a short overview of the history to better understand the underlying factors and to determine the importance of corporate social responsibility. Attention is given to the argument that the current approach of companies to adhere to corporate social responsibility is because of pressure. There is also a focus on the relationship between business and society to establish how business can view its responsibilities. The example of Shell is used to show how a company under immense pressure can develop sustainable practices to ensure that they remain profitable. After the main discussion some important points are mentioned in the conclusion to clarify the business case for corporate social strategy. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Korporatiewe maatskaplike verantwoordelikheid is ‘n onderwerp wat van belang is vir meeste maatskappye wat grootskaals bedrywig is vandag. Hierdie opdrag ondersoek korporatiewe maatskaplike verantwoordelikheid om beter te verstaan hoe dit vandag in die maatskappy inpas. Daar is ‘n kort oorsig oor die geskiedenis om die onderliggende faktore beter te verstaan en om die belangrikheid van korporatiewe maatskaplike verantwoordelikheid te bepaal. Daar word ook aandag gegee aan die argument dat maatskappye verantwoordelik optree as gevolg van druk. Daar word ook gefokus op die verhouding tussen besigheid en die samelewing om te bepaal hoe besigheid sy verantwoordelikhede moet benader. Die voorbeeld van Shell word gebruik om te wys hoe ‘n maatskappy onder druk volhoubare gebruike kan ontwikkel om te verseker dat hulle winsgewend bly. Na die hoof bespreking word daar ‘n paar belangrike punte in die slotsom saamgevat om 'n besigheidsaak vir korporatiewe maatskaplike strategie uit te maak..

Thesis (MPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2009. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Are violent and non-violent mass atrocities morally different? According to the United Nations, they are. But why? The answer to this question is important as it in part determines our obligations to people living in other countries. This thesis seeks to determine if violent and non-violent mass atrocities are morally different and, if not, whether the latter should be included under the United Nations’ doctrine of the responsibility to protect. In order to do this, the thesis first examines the conditions under which sovereignty exists in order to understand when intervention can occur. It also analyzes just war theory to discern when military intervention to halt nonviolent mass atrocities is justified. Having established these two concepts, the thesis then presents three arguments for why non-violent mass atrocities are morally indistinguishable from violent ones and should also be included under the doctrine of the responsibility to protect. A discussion of the feasibility of implementing this extension and the long-term effects of these types of interventions follows. Finally, the thesis contains three case studies in order to apply the arguments presented earlier. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Is daar ‘n morele verskil tussen gewelddadige en nie-gewelddadige gruweldade? Volgens die Verenigde Nasies is daar so ‘n verskil, maar hoekom? Die antwoord tot hierdie vraag is deels belangrik omdat dit ons verantwoordelikhede tot mense in ander lande bepaal. In hierdie tesis word daar gepoog om te bepaal of daar so ‘n verskil tussen gewelddadige en nie-gewelddadige gruweldade is, en, indien nie, of nie-gewelddadige gruweldade ook moet tel onder die Verenige Nasies se verantwoordelikheid om te beskerm. Die tesis poog eerstens om die kondisies vir soewereiniteit te bepaal ten einde te probeer verstaan wanneer ‘n intervensie moreel regverdigbaar is. Dit analiseer ook die teorie van geregverdigde oorlogvoering ten einde te bepaal wanneer militêre inmenging om nie-gewelddadige gruweldade stop te sit geregverdig is. Na hierdie twee konsepte ondersoek is word daar drie argumente verskaf om aan te toon dat nie-gewelddadige gruweldade nie moreel onderskeibaar is van gewelddadige gruweldade nie, en dus dat nie-gewelddadige gruweldade onder die verantwoordelikheid om te beskerm behoort te tel. Dit word gevolg deur ‘n bespreking van die praktiese haalbaarheid van die implementering van so ‘n uitbreiding van die verantwoordelikheid om te beskerm, asook ‘n bespreking van die langtermyn effekte van hierdie tipes intervensies. Die tesis eindig met drie gevallestudies ten einde die argumente wat reeds gemaak is toe te pas.

Thesis (MA (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / A brief introduction to the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics is based on the Other/other. He argues that we are in an asymmetrical relationship with our neighbour that pre-destines us with ethical responsibility even before consciousness or choice. In the face-to-face encounter an infinity and alterity about our neighbour is revealed, which is irreducible to my ontological grasp and thereby compels me to respond to him. It is also through this relation that our humanity is released as our solipsistic all-for-myself becomes a being-for-the-other. Furthermore, the I is irreplaceable, thereby making each of us ethically responsible for our neighbour to the point of responsibility for his material misery. This paper introduces this stance with the aim to underscore it. A brief discussion on the priority of ethics before ontology in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas The incessant theme of Levinas’ writing over 25 years has been “Ethics as First Philosophy,” which is synonymous with “The Subject’s Ethical Responsibility for his Neighbour.” This paper is a short discussion of this theme of the origin of ethics. Levinas’ arguments on pre-original time, the Infinite, language and human corporeality by which he establishes a subjectivity that is not fundamentally determined by intentionality and self-sameness, but by the proximity of our neighbour, will be considered. For Levinas it is this relation to the Other that answers the question of the meaning of being and is also the first word of words. First Philosophy is accordingly to be found in the face-to-face which is a subordination of knowledge to a mode of meaning beyond totality.

Thesis (MA (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2003. / Trophy hunting remains a highly contentious issue within environmental spheres of debate. Whether it is morally justifiable for humans to kill other living creatures for recreation, even if by doing so generates revenue in aid of their conservation, is a contested issue that will not easily rest and on which there is as yet no clear ground for consensus between opposing viewpoints. Within environmental philosophy, the topic of the morality of sport hunting has been extensively discussed, with the focus shifting constantly between various moral and ethical theories; while in an African context, big game trophy hunting continues to be a vital source of income for wildlife conservation and rural communities amidst the contested meaning of its role and place. The phrase "the hunting debate" refers to the ongoing discourses that surround the contested meaning and morality of recreational hunting, while the groups involved in the debate are polarised along the lines of preservationist and conservationist viewpoints. The lack of consensual ground between opposing viewpoints and the strength of the conviction of held beliefs and values result in a stalemate. In this thesis an attempt is made to map this stalemate by identifying the role players relevant to an African context, and the groups who stand in opposition to one another, namely those within the anti-hunting and pro-hunting communities. Points of contention are highlighted, and the various moral theories inherent in the debate are identified, with the crux of the stalemate being shown to be essentially between deontological moral assumptions regarding the wrongness of hunting, and utilitarian approaches that attempt to justify it morally according to an aggregation of benefits. The meaning of hunting for the Ethical Hunter is also clarified, as is the meaning of the hunting experience as a philosophical and historical symbolic construction. The political nature of the debate is also explored against the backdrop of a postmodern description of culture and communities, as is the way in which certain symbols are employed as ideological tools within the debate, and how they serve to influence public opinion regarding the morality of hunting. The hunting experience is discussed in detail as a historical construct, and certain hunting narratives are briefly identified in this regard, as are the symbolisms of indigenous hunter-gatherer hunting practices. This is in order to identify similarities or differences in meaning of the hunting experience, and so doing reach a position to say what hunting with integrity may mean. Integrity as a Virtue is promoted as the founding conceptual criterion around which discussions of trophy hunting may be based, and trophy hunting of the Big Five species in Africa is contextually explored with this notion in mind. While trophy hunting of the Big Five offers tangible and much needed instrumental benefits, it does not stand up well to a critique of "the hunting experience" as a historical construct and as a commodified package, as The Hunting Experience in this sense is seen to lack authenticity in terms of an idealised and primitivist notion of the meaning of Ethical Hunting. The paradox of Big Five trophy hunting is that it is very hard to justify, as it is seen to reinforce dualistic assumptions of nature, and objectify animals as a commodity; notwithstanding the moral uncertainty surrounding the act it can, however, be seen to offer benefits that are pragmatic and tangible, for ecosystems as well as humans. However, with the exception of strictly utilitarian approaches, the findings of this thesis suggest that instrumental economic benefits are not enough to justify trophy hunting of the Big Five in Africa from a moral philosophical perspective, although in keeping with the aims of the study no attempt is made to posit one moral position over another as to the morality of trophy hunting. In conclusion, it is suggested that trophy hunting be de-emphasised as an inevitable and singularly viable wildlife management tool, and instead be understood in terms of a short-term strategic compromise, as doing so allows more room for the growth of ideas that may offer an acceptable alternative. Based upon the findings of this study, it is acknowledged that such a compromise is essentially and theoretically also a compromise of integrity, which may nevertheless within certain contexts be necessary in the short-term.