Thesis (MPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2008. / The merger of organisations has been extensively utilised in many industries. This has occurred globally and locally. Some mergers have become successful while others have failed to achieve their goals. The failure of mergers could be attributed to insufficient attention to certain organisational elements. When institutions merged, they become vulnerable to diversity and conflict. They also experience human variability. Organisational mergers present challenges that could be associated with humanity. This could be precipitated by various beliefs, values and norms. Conflict and diversity could be reduced by implementing certain organisational elements. This study is based on the developments of structure and culture as remedial organisational elements to reduce instability in merged institutions. These elements serve as mechanisms in dealing with the repercussions of the merger. The special focus of this study is higher education mergers. The primary objective is to gain an insight into the ramification and the impact of the merger. This includes the effectiveness of the newly designed internal processes. In accomplishing this, the study has applied a cultural and structural model to merged institutions. It has also examined various types of culture and structural literature theory extensively. From this it has discovered that these elements play a crucial role in reducing organisational conflict in mergers. It has also been found that merger consequences are less severe in organisations with similar backgrounds.

Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2012. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The quest for enhancement has been part of human culture for thousands of years. Progress in scientific developments and especially in the field of medical science has allowed for previously unthinkable advances to be employed in the endeavours to improve human functioning in its various forms. Whereas in the past, enhancement has been focused on aspects such as prolonging life, improving the immune system or cosmetic enhancements, cognitive enhancement is receiving substantial attention at the moment. Recent reports have commented on the use of stimulants such as methylphenidate, especially amongst students at tertiary institutions with the aim of enhancing cognitive abilities. This raises various concerns, ranging from safety issues and the risk of drug abuse to the moral issues relating to enhancement in the broader context. Enhancement therapies are easily justified where the required enhancement is needed to improve functioning where a specific deficit is present or where such enhancement could prevent illness. But where no illness or disorder is present, these issues cause marked ambivalence amongst medical practitioners. The legal restrictions placed on the access to stimulants require the participation of a doctor as these drugs may not be sold across the counter and a prescription is needed to acquire them. The doctor is then put in the position where a request is made for medication where illness or a disorder is not present. Medical paternalism could easily dictate that the decision does lie with the doctor because of statutory rules, but this would be at the risk of ignoring the possible rights of students to enhance. This thesis examines the concerns mentioned related to safety risks as well as the abuse potential of methylphenidate. Although there are precautions that need to be taken into account when prescribing methylphenidate, this is not sufficient to warrant a blanket refusal by medical practitioners to prescribe it to healthy students. The arguments used to debate both the promotion of enhancement therapies as well as the reasons for restricting and possibly even preventing any use thereof, are discussed. There are various reasons why enhancement may be needed in current and future society and to ignore these would raise moral issues in itself. There are various arguments used to disapprove of enhancement, but this thesis concludes that although the concerns raised should be considered on an ongoing basis, as enhancement is an ongoing process, enhancement should be allowed to continue to be explored and employed where appropriate. Finally, potential guidelines for the individual and also for tertiary institutions relating to enhancement, especially relating to cognitive enhancement with stimulants such as methylphenidate, are proposed. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die soeke na verbetering is reeds vir duisende jare deel van die menslike kultuur. Vordering in wetenskaplike ontwikkelings en veral op die gebied van die mediese wetenskap het toegelaat dat voorheen ondenkbare vooruitgang toegepas kan word in die pogings om menslike funksionering in sy verskillende vorme te verbeter. In die verlede het verbeteringstegnieke merendeels gefokus op aspekte soos verlenging van lewe, die verbetering van die immuunstelsel of kosmetiese verbeterings, maar tans geniet kognitiewe verbetering aansienlike aandag. Onlangse verslae lewer veral kommentaar oor die gebruik van stimulante soos metielfenidaat, veral onder studente by tersiêre instellings, met die doel om die verbetering van kognitiewe vermoëns teweeg te bring. Dit lei tot verskeie bekommernisse, wat wissel van veiligheidskwessies en die risiko van dwelmmisbruik tot die morele kwessies met betrekking tot verbeteringstegnieke in die breër konteks. Terapieë gemik op verbetering is maklik geregverdig waar die verbetering nodig is om funksionering te verbeter, waar 'n spesifieke tekort teenwoordig is of waar so' n verbetering 'n siekte kan voorkom. Maar waar daar geen siekte of afwyking teenwoordig is nie, veroorsaak hierdie terapieë beduidende ambivalensie onder mediese praktisyns. Die wetlike beperkings wat geplaas is op die beskikbaarheid van stimulante vereis die betrokkenheid van 'n dokter aangesien hierdie middels nie oor die toonbank verkoop mag word nie en 'n voorskrif nodig is om dit te bekom. Die dokter word dan in die posisie geplaas waar daar 'n versoek is vir medikasie waar siekte of 'n versteuring nie teenwoordig is nie. Mediese paternalisme kan maklik dikteer dat die besluit suiwer as gevolg van statutêre reëls wel alleen by die dokter lê, maar die risiko bestaan dan dat die regte van studente om hulself te verbeter ignoreer word. Hierdie tesis ondersoek die potensiële probleme met betrekking tot die veiligheidsrisiko's sowel as die misbruikpotensiaal van metielfenidaat. Alhoewel daar voorsorgmaatreëls in ag geneem moet word wanneer die voorskryf van metielfenidaat oorweeg word, is dit nie voldoende om 'n totale weiering deur geneeshere om dit voor te skryf aan gesonde studente te regverdig nie. Die argumente wat gebruik word om sowel die bevordering van die verbeteringsterapieë as die redes vir die beperking en moontlik selfs die voorkoming van enige gebruik daarvan te debatteer, word bespreek. Daar is verskeie redes waarom verbetering in die huidige en toekomstige samelewing nodig is en om dit te ignoreer sou op sigself morele beswarte opper. Daar is wel verskeie argumente wat gebruik kan word om verbetering af te keur, maar hierdie tesis wys daarop dat hoewel die kommer wat geopper word in ag geneem moet word op 'n deurlopende basis, aangesien verbeteringstegnieke ‘n voortdurende proses is, bevordering van hierdie terapieë toegelaat moet word en waar toepaslik in diens geneem moet word. Ten slotte word moontlike riglyne vir die individu en ook vir tersiêre instellings met betrekking tot verbetering, veral met betrekking tot kognitiewe verbetering met stimulante soos metielfenidaat, voorgestel.

Thesis (MA (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2005. / It seems to be a priori impossible to formulate any general theory or model that encompasses all of the properties of complexity. So, one must make do with partial solutions. A possible approach we propose is to take inspiration from quantum theory, since there seems to be a strong analogy between complex systems and quantum systems. Although we do not propose any literal application of quantum mechanical formalism to complexity, we suggest that the language of quantum mechanics is already so well developed - and for a much wider spectrum of problems than most theories - that it can serve as a model for complexity theory. There are many problems common to both complex systems and quantum systems and we suggest that it might be useful to test the applicability of aspects of the “language” of quantum mechanics to a general complex system. What we suggest here is an interdisciplinary talk led between the natural sciences and philosophy, which we believe is the only way in which to deal with complexity “as such”.

Thesis (MPhil (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This study finds its roots in the ancient quarrel, as mentioned by Plato 400 BC, between poets (artists) and philosophers on the nature of our ethical existence. The ancient philosophers participating in the ancient quarrel, such as Plato, had a metaphysical understanding of our existence and they believed that we should communicate about our ethical existence through a style which acknowledges the transcendental nature of our human existence. The styles and language used by the philosophers of the ancient quarrel were therefore often very abstract, and mostly concerned with the rationality of human reasoning. The ancient poets participating in this quarrel, however, did not share the metaphysical worldview of their philosophical rivals. They denied the transcendental nature of our existence, and argued that our ethical existence should be portrayed and communicated through a style which acknowledges the fact that we are humans with a concrete existence. The poets of the ancient quarrel also promoted a style which acknowledges humans as beings with both rational and emotional faculties. It is for this reason that we find today in literature concerned with moral matters, both the abstract style of moral philosophy which is concerned with the rational aspects of our existence, and the concrete style of fictional literature which is concerned with the emotive aspects of our existence. The quarrel on how to communicate about the nature of our ethical existence is, however, an ongoing debate which is still prevalent in our modern times. This study turns to the modern argument of Martha Nussbaum on how to communicate about the nature of our ethical existence. Nussbaum argues that the abstract style of philosophical texts on morality acknowledges the abstract and rational aspects of our human nature and existence, but that it often fails to fully acknowledge the fact that we are concrete human beings for whom emotions play an integral part in our ethical existence. She therefore believes that moral philosophy should be presented in combination with fictional literature in order to give a true and complete picture of our ethical existence. This study thus enters into a critical dialogue with Nussbaum on her proposal to combine fictional literature with moral philosophy. Accordingly, this study focuses on three specific aspects of our ethical existence, which Nussbaum argues, are acknowledged through fictional literature such as novels, but not through the typical style of abstract moral philosophy. They are; 1) that human values are plural and often incommensurable; 2) that the particulars of situations play an important role in ethical deliberation; and 3) that human emotions and the imagination form a big part of our ethical existence. The fundamental aim of this study is thus to answer the question whether the style of fictional literature actually acknowledges the three above mentioned aspects of our ethical existence. The novel which is used to determine this is Alan Paton’s Cry the Beloved Country. Nussbaum classifies the three above mentioned aspects of our ethical existence as 1) The Non- Commensurability and Plurality of Values; 2) Priority of the Particular; and 3) Ethical Value of the Emotions and Imagination. These three aspects are, however, derived from Aristotle’s ethics and they form, as Nussbaum has argued, the bases of the Aristotelian ethical position – a position from which practical knowledge can be obtained. The aim of this study is therefore not only to determine whether certain fictional literature acknowledges the three fundamental aspects of the Aristotelian ethical position, but it also aims to answer the question whether the Aristotelian ethical position (and therefore practical wisdom) can be obtained through the reading of fictional literature such as novels. The study concludes that some fictional literature, such as the novel Cry, the Beloved Country, does in fact adequately portray the three fundamental features of the Aristotelian ethical position, and that Nussbaum’s proposal should receive serious consideration, since the inclusion of some fictional literature into moral philosophy my lead to deeper ethical understanding from which practical wisdom can be obtained. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie studie vind sy oorsprong in die eeue oue stryd, soos al reeds geïdentifiseer deur Plato 400 vC, tussen digters (kunstenaars) en filosowe oor die aard van ons etiese bestaan. Die antieke filosowe wat deelgeneem het aan hierdie eeue oue vete, soos byvoorbeeld Plato, het ‘n metafisiese verstaan van ons bestaan gehad, en het daarom geglo dat ons oor ons etiese bestaan moet kommunikeer deur middel van style wat erkenning gee aan die transendentale aard van ons menslike bestaan. Die style en taal wat deur die filosowe van hierdie eeue oue vete gebruik is, was dus dikwels baie abstrak en uiters bemoeid met die mens se rasionele denkvermoëns. Die antieke digters wat deelgeneem het aan hierdie vete het egter nie, soos die filosowe, ‘n metafisiese wêreldbeskouing van ons bestaan gehad nie. Hulle het die transendente aard van ons bestaan ontken, en het daarom daarop aangedring dat ons etiese bestaan voorgestel en oor gekommunikeer moet word deur style wat erkenning gee aan die feit dat ons mense is met ‘n konkrete bestaan. Hulle het egter ook aangedring op ‘n styl wat erkenning gee dat mense beide rasionele en emosionele wesens is. Dit is weens hierdie rede dat ons vandag, in literatuur aangaande morele kwessies, die abstrakte en meer rasioneel geöriënteerde styl van morele filosofie, sowel as die konkrete en meer emosioneel geöriënteerde styl van fiktiewe literatuur aantref. Daar is egter vandag steeds nie klaarheid oor hoe daar oor ons etiese bestaan gekommunikeer moet word nie, en onenigheid is dus steeds te bespeur in huidige debatte oor hierdie tema. Hierdie studie ondersoek ‘n moderne argument, soos voortgestaan deur Martha Nussbaum, oor die wyse waarop daar oor die aard van ons etiese bestaan gekommunikeer moet word. Nussbaum neem die standpunt in dat die abstrakte styl van morele filosofiese tekste erkenning gee aan die abstrakte en rasionele aard van ons menslike aard en bestaan, maar dat dit nie altyd daarin slaag om erkenning te gee dat ons mense is met ‘n konkrete etiese bestaan waarin emosies (eerder as net rasionele denke) ook ‘n baie belangrike rol speel nie. Hierdie studie neem dus die vorm aan van ‘n kritiese dialoog met Nussbaum aangaande haar voorstel om fiktiewe literatuur te kombineer met morele filosofie. Gevolglik fokus hierdie studie op drie spesifieke aspekte van ons etiese bestaan, wat Nussbaum glo wel deur fiktiewe literatuur aangespreek word maar nie altyd deur tekste van morele filosofie nie. Hierdie drie aspekte is 1) dat menslike waardes uiteenlopend en dikwels onversoenbaar is; 2) dat die partikuliere elemente van situasies ’n belangrike rol speel in etiese besluitneming; en 3) dat ons menslike emosies en verbeelding ’n groot deel uitmaak van ons etiese bestaan. Die fundamentele doel van hierdie studie is dus om te bepaal of die styl van fiktiewe literatuur wel erkenning gee aan die drie bogenoemde aspekte van ons etiese bestaan. Die fiktiewe werk wat gebruik is om dit te bepaal, is Alan Paton se Cry, the Beloved Country. Nussbaum klassifiseer die drie bogenoemde aspekte van ons etiese bestaan as 1) Onversoenbaarheid and Pluraliteit van Waardes; 2) Prioriteit van die Partikuliere; en 3) Etiese Waarde van die Emosies en Verbeelding. Hierdie klassifikasie vind egter sy oorsprong in die etiek van Aristoteles, en vorm dus volgens Nussbaum die basis van die Aristoteliaanse etiese posisie – ‘n posisie van waaruit praktiese wysheid geput kan word. Die doel van hierdie studie is dus nie net om te bepaal of fiktiewe literatuur erkenning gee aan die drie fundamentele aspekte van die Aristoteliaanse etiese posisie nie, maar die doel is ook om te bepaal of die Aristoteliaanse etiese posisie (en dus praktiese wysheid) bekom kan word deur die lees van fiktiewe literatuur. Die studie kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat sekere fiktiewe literatuur, soos die werk Cry, the Beloved Country, inderdaad wel bevredigende erkenning gee aan die drie eienskappe van ons etiese bestaan, soos veronderstel deur die Aristoteliaanse etiese posisie, en dat Nussbaum se voorstel ernstige aandag behoort te geniet, aangesien die insluiting van sekere fiktiewe literatuur in morele filosofie ‘n dieper etiese verstaan teweeg kan bring, waaruit praktiese wysheid geput kan word.

Thesis (MA (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis entails a critical analysis of the concept of compliance. The latter can briefly be defined as rules and policies developed with regard to employee behaviour with the goal of controlling and monitoring unethical behaviour. This thesis presents a critical explication of compliance based on various levels of analysis. Firstly, this will be done by discussing the context of the historical development of compliance, stemming from and starting with the bureaucratization of the economy and the practical implementation thereof in business. The historical overview entails a discussion of the development of management models. This provides the context for explicating the problem that these management models are geared towards the restriction of the autonomous individual for the purpose of control. This is achieved through the removal of the individual agent’s responsibility over his/her work. The latter, however, elicits resistance from the employee which I discuss in terms of the implicit contract (between the employer and the employee). Initially, this problem of resistance was addressed by mechanization, but with the global shift towards a servicedriven economy such methods were no longer applicable. Moreover, this shift brought about the development and implementation of post-Fordist models of management, focused on human capital. It is then within this management model that compliance was developed as the most commonly used method of control. According to my argument then, compliance was initially implemented as a method of instilling ethical behaviour in business; however its practical application failed in achieving such promises. I argue that the reason for the failure of compliance pertains to the very definition thereof which does not make allowance for the individual moral agent. This is demonstrated by explicating the manner in which compliance is implemented, with specific reference to culture lag. This refers to the exponential growth of information and communication technology in which ethical measures to address the problems causes by the latter, could not develop with parallel speed. Compliance finds culture lag especially difficult to address, since the creativity of the individual moral agent that is cardinal to resolving the problem of culture lag, is not made allowance for in the structures of compliance. This is exacerbated by the importance given in the structures of compliance to controlling tacit knowledge, since the latter is increasingly considered as a form of capital within the service-driven economy. In the final instance, I argue that compliance stands directly opposed to the principles of ethics and as such fails to address the problem of unethical behaviour. A possible solution to this is considered when looking at ideas with reference to trust, self-respect and responsibility. The latter, in turn, yields a possible solution to the original problem, namely that the individual moral agent is not acknowledged in the structures of compliance, and in some cases even totally discarded. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis behels ‘n kritiese analise van die konsep van ‘compliance.’ Compliance kan in Afrikaans vertaal word as ‘inskiklikheid’ – maar word in ‘n besigheidskonteks gebruik om te verwys na die implementering van ‘n stel reëls, of ‘n spesifieke beleid, wat daarop gemik is om onetiese gedrag van werknemers te monitor en te beheer. Hierdie tesis bied ‘n kritiese ondersoek van ‘inskiklikheid,’ gegrond op verskillende vlakke van analise, wat insluit die historiese ontwikkeling van ‘inskiklikheid’, die burokratisering van die ekonomie, en die praktiese implikasies daarvan vir besigheid. In die historiese oorsig val die klem op die ontwikkeling van bestuursmodelle. Dit verleen ‘n konteks aan die probleem dat al die betrokke bestuursmodelle daarop gemik was om die outonomie van die individu te beperk, en daardeur beter beheer oor sy/haar aksies te verkry. Dit is gedoen deur die individu in die werksopset van sy/haar verantwoordelikheid te ontneem. Dit het egter die teenreaksie van weerstand by werknemers ontlok, wat bespreek word in die konteks van die implisiete kontrak (tussen werkgewer en werknemer). Hierdie probleem van weerstand, is aanvanklik deur toenemende meganisasie aangespreek. Maar in die konteks van die globale oorgang na 'n meer diens-gedrewe ekonomie, was meganisasie nie meer 'n volhoubare oplossing nie. Verder, binne 'n diens-gedrewe ekonomie word idees van menslike kapitaal op prys gestel, soos in die bestuursmodel wat hierdie fase kenmerk, naamlik ‘post-Fordism’. Dit is binne hierdie konteks dat inskiklikheid ontwikkel het as die algemeenste manier waarop beheer oor werkers uitgeoefen word. Volgens my argument is inskiklikheid aanvanklik ge-implementeer as ‘n metode om etiese gedrag binne ‘n besigheidskonteks te handhaaf. Inskiklikheid het egter nie aan hierdie verwagting voldoen nie. Die rede hiervoor is dat inskiklikheid teenstrydig is met die konsep van die individuele morele agent. Dit word duidelik as die wyse waarop dit ge-implementeer word, ondersoek word, spesifiek aan die hand van die voorbeeld van die ‘kultuurgaping’ [‘culture lag’]. Laasgenoemde verwys na die gaping tussen nuwe tegnologie en etiese respos wat ontstaan as gevolge van die eksponensiële groei in kommunikasie- en informasietegnologie en die oënskynlike onvermoë van besighede om dit in hul etiese beleid aan te spreek. Bydraend tot die probleem is dat die kreatiwiteit van die individuele morele agent wat voortdurend benodig benodig word om hierdie gaping te oorkom, nie in die strukture van inskiklikheid erken word nie. Dit is veral belangrik, inaggenome die toenemende belangrikheid wat in die strukture van inskiklikheid verleen word aan die beheer van implisiete kennis [‘tacit knowledge’], omdat dit in binne die diensgedrewe eknomie toenemend as kapitaal beskou kan word. In die laaste instansie argumenteer ek dat ‘inskiklikheid’ direk teenstrydig is met die beginsels van etiek, en misluk dit as ’n metode om die probleem van ‘culture lag’ sowel as ander kwessies op te los. ’n Mootlike oplossing word ondersoek waneer idees rondom vertroue, self-respek en verantwoordelikheid verken word. Met verwysing na laasgenoemde is dit moontlik om die oospronklike rede vir weerstand aan te spreek, naamlik dat die individuele morele agent deur ‘inskiklikheid’ oor die hoof gesien word, en dit selfs in sekere opsigte heeltemal agterweë gelaat word.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2001. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Suicide is a truly philosophical problem. Judging whether life is or not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy. In Africa, suicide is not uncommon as evidenced by the Botswana experience. Suicide acts are the forefront of the daily existence even today. Suicide is felt in different areas of Botswana and while the study draws heavily on Africa especially Botswana, reference is also made to countries outside Africa. Hence, suicide in this thesis is not addressed in a restrictive manner. But its manifestation in essence is assessed in a general mode. This implies that the escalation of suicide is viewed from the sociological, psychological and philosophical implications. Although it is not easy to accept and live with suicide, people are beginning to accommodate it as an inevitable concept. However, the family and friends of a person who has committed suicide still feels ashamed, humiliated and sometimes guilty. The aim of this assignment is to analyse and evaluate the moral argument for and against suicide and to focus on the moral implications of committing suicide. While agreeing that individuals' autonomy are personal, the writer tries to suggest a way out of this self-destruction (suicide) which is just a means to an end and not an end in itself. The writer in the concluding chapter tries to explore the pros and cons of suicide, and comes up with the conclusion that the right to live should be given attention than the right to die, at least to preserve its generations which all creatures strive for. Areas of focus: • The concept of Suicide • The nature and incidence of Suicide. • Arguments in favour of Suicide • Arguments against Suicide • The Suicide I Euthanasia Debate / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Selfmoord is 'n ware filosofiese probleem. Om te oordeel of 'n lewe die moeite werd is om gelewe te word, vereis 'n antwoord op 'n fundamentele vraag van filosofie. In Afrika is selfmoord nie ongewoon nie, soos gesien in die geval van Botswana. Selfmoord kom baie algemeen daar voor. Selfmoord word aangetref in verskeie areas in Botswana, en, alhoewel die studie fokus op Afrika - en spesifiek Botswana, word daar ook verwys na lande buite Afrika. Maar die manifestasie daarvan word in essensie en in die algemeen aangespreek. Dit beteken dat die toename in selfmoord in terme van die verskynsel se sosiologiese, sielkundige en filosofiese implikasies aangespreek word. Alhoewel dit nie maklik is on selfmoord te aanvaar en mee saam te leef nie, begin mense dit aanvaar as 'n onvermydelike verskynsel. Maar die familie van 'n persoon wat selfmoord gepleeg het voel steeds skaam, verneder en soms skuldig. Die doel van hierdie werkstuk is om die argumente vir en teen selfmoord te analiseer, te evalueer, en om te fokus op die morele implikasies van selfmoord. Alhoewel die outeur saamstem dat individue outonoom is, word sterk teen die morele aanvaarbaarheid van selfmoord geargumenteer. In die gevolgtrekking ondersoek die outeur die voordele en nadele van selfmoord en eindig met die bevinding dat die reg tot lewe meer aandag behoort te kry as die sg. reg om te sterf. Areas waarop gefokus word: • Die konsep "selfmoord" as sodanig • Die aard van selfmoord en (hoe algemeen dit voorkom.) • Argumente ten gunste van selfmoord • Argumente teen selfmoord • Die selfmoord -genadedood debat

Thesis (MA (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This thesis is a philosophical exposition of violence informed by two theoretical positions which confront complexity as a phenomenon. These positions are complexity theory and deconstruction. Both develop systemsbased understandings of complex phenomena in which relations of difference are constitutive of the meaning of those phenomena. There has been no focused investigation of the implications of complexity for the conceptualisation of violence thus far. In response to this theoretical gap, this thesis begins by distinguishing complexity theory as a general, trans-disciplinary field of study from critical complexity theory. The latter is used to develop a critique and criticism of epistemological foundationalism, emphasising the limits to knowledge and the normative and ethical dimension of knowledge and understanding. The epistemological break implied by this critique reiterates the epistemological shift permeating the work of, among others, Friedrich Nietzsche and Jacques Derrida. In this context, critical complexity theory begins to articulate the idea of violence on two levels: first, as an empirical, ethical problem in the system; and, secondly, as asymmetry and antagonism. Violence in this second sense is implicated in the dynamic relations of difference through which structure and meaning are generated in complex organisation. The sensitivity to difference and violence shared by critical complexity theory and deconstruction allows for the parallel reading of these philosophical perspectives; and for the supplementation and opening of critical complexity theory by deconstruction within the architecture of this thesis. This supplementation seeks to preserve the singularity of each perspective, while exploring the potential of their points of affinity and tension in the production of a coherent philosophical analysis of violence. Deconstruction offers a more developed understanding of violence and a wealth of related motifs: différance, framing, law, singularity, aesthetics and others. These motifs necessitate the inclusion of other philosophical voices, notably, that of Nietzsche, Arendt, Kant, Levinas, and Benjamin. In conversation with these authors, this thesis links violence to meaning, to its possibility, to its production and to the process by which meaning comes to change. Given these links, violence is conceptualised in relation to the notion of difference on three distinct levels. The first is the difference between elements in a complex system of meaning; the second is the notion of difference between systems or texts around which boundaries or frames can be drawn; and the third is the notion of difference between meaning and the absence of meaning. This discussion examines the relationship between this violence implicated in the constitution of meaning and the more colloquial understanding of violence as atrocity, as rape, murder and other socially, politically and ethically problematic expressions thereof. It is to empirical violence, following Derrida and Levinas, that we are called to respond and to intervene in the suffering of the other. The ethical and political necessity of response anchors this discussion of violence. And, it is towards the possibility of an adequate response – the possibility of an ethics sensitive to its own violence and a politics that is directed at the eradication of empirical violence – which this discussion navigates. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Hierdie tesis is ’n filosofiese uiteensetting van geweld wat deur twee denkwyses ingelig word wat kompleksiteit as fenomeen konfronteer. Hierdie denkwyses is kompleksiteitsteorie en dekonstruksie. Altwee ontwikkel sisteemgebaseerde verduidelikings van komplekse fenomene waar verhoudings van verskille die betekenis van hierdie fenomene beslaan. Daar is tot dusver nog geen gefokusde ondersoek na die implikasies van kompleksiteit vir die konsepsualisering van geweld nie. As antwoord op hierdie teoretiese leemte, begin hierdie tesis deur kompleksiteitsteorie as ’n algemene, trans-dissiplinêre studierigting van kritiese kompleksiteitsteorie te onderskei. Laasgenoemde word gebruik om kritiese denke van epistemologiese grondslae te ontwikkel, en beklemtoon die perke op kennis en die normatiewe en etiese aspek van kennis en verstaan. Die epistemologiese verwydering wat deur hierdie kritiek geïmpliseer word, herhaal die epistemologiese verskuiwing wat die werk van onder andere Friedrich Nietzsche en Jacques Derrida, deurdring. In hierdie konteks begin kritiese kompleksiteitsteorie om die konsep van geweld op twee vlakke te verwoord: eerstens as ’n empiriese, etiese probleem in die stelsel en tweedens as asimmetrie en antagonisme. Geweld in die tweede opsig word in die dinamiese verhoudings van verskil geïmpliseer, waar struktuur en betekenis in komplekse organisasie gegenereer word. Die sensitiwiteit vir verskil en geweld wat deur kritiese kompleksiteitsteorie en dekonstruksie gedeel word neem parallelle lesings van hierdie filosofiese perspektiewe in ag; sowel as die aanvulling en oopmaak van kritiese kompleksiteitsteorie deur dekonstruksie binne die struktuur van hierdie tesis. Hierdie aanvulling wil die enkelvoudigheid van elke perspektief bewaar, terwyl dit die potensiaal van hul punte van verwantskap en spanning in die produksie van ’n koherente filosofiese analise van geweld verken. Dekonstruksie bied ’n meer ontwikkelde verstaan van geweld en ’n rykdom van verwante motiewe: différance, beraming, wet, enkelvoudigheid, estetika en ander. Hierdie motiewe noodsaak die insluiting van ander filosofiese stemme, soos Nietzsche, Arendt, Kant, Levinas en Benjamin. Hierdie tesis tree in gesprek met hierdie skrywers en skakel geweld aan betekenis, aan die moontlikheid, aan die produksie en aan die proses waardeur betekenis na verandering lei. Gegewe hierdie skakels, word geweld in verhouding tot die begrip van verskil op drie spesifieke vlakke gekonsepsualiseer. Die eerste is die verskil tussen elemente in ’n komplekse stelstel van betekenis; die tweede is die begrip van verskil tussen stelsels of tekste waar grense of rame om getrek kan word; en die derde is die begrip van verskil tussen betekenis en die afwesigheid van betekenis. Hierdie bespreking stel ondersoek in na die verhouding tussen hierdie geweld wat in die samestelling van betekenis geïmpliseer word en die meer alledaagse verstaan van geweld as wreedardigheid, as verkragting, moord en ander maatskaplike, politiese en etiese problematiese uitdrukkings daarvan. Ons word geroep om op empiriese geweld, in navolging van Derrida en Levinas, te reageer en in te gryp om die lyding van ander te keer. Die etiese en politiese noodsaaklikheid van reaksie dien as grondslag vir hierdie bespreking van geweld. Uiteindelik beweeg hierdie bespreking nader aan die moontlikheid van ’n voldoende reaksie – die moontlikheid van ’n etiek wat sensitief vir sy eie geweld is en ’n politiek wat op die uitwis van empiriese geweld gerig is.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: What does it mean that the violence of aggression could justify the violence of resistance? What does such justification accomplish, and when, and how? What underlies the conditions and limitations of justified violence, as, for example, these have been formulated in western doctrines of "just war"? Most critically, how could one think about the possibility of a resistance to evil that would be effective without itself instituting further violence? The theoretical ground of this investigation is found in a close reading of the work of Emmanuel Levinas, specifically the section of his Otheruiise than Being, or Beyond Essence in which human consciousness is shown to be, from the first, called to justice in responsibility for others. For Levinas, to be a subject is to be always already for-the-other as a substitute or hostage. This is both a persecution and the "glory" of human being. Thus Levinas introduces an enigmatic "good violence" prior to any distinction between aggressive and just violences. The idea of an originary good violence opens up a reconsideration of the evil of aggression and the joyfulness of resistance. This in turn shows the instability or equivocation of just violence: even if it is inspired by goodness - by one's responsibility for the useless suffering of others - it is never finally good enough, and always at risk of slipping into injustice. The responsibility of a "just warrior" is thus not cancelled by the justness of the cause. The justness of the cause indeed demands ever greater responsibility, even for and before one's enemy. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Wat sou dit kon beteken dat die geweld van aggressie die geweld van verset regverdig? Wat word bewerkstellig deur sodanige regverdiging, en wanneer, en . hoe? Waarop berus die voorwaardes en beperkinge van geregverdigde geweld, soos dit byvoorbeeld geformuleer is in Westerse leerstellings oor "regverdige oorlog"? Nog belangriker: hoe kan 'n mens dink oor die moontlikheid van verset teen die bose wat effektief is, maar sonder om self verdere geweld daar te stel? Die teoretiese grondslag van hierdie ondersoek is 'n nougesette bestudering van die werk van Emmanuel Levinas, meer spesifiek die afdeling van sy Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, waarin hy argumenteer dat die menslike bewussyn van meet af aan tot geregtigheid opgeroep word in verantwoordelikheid vir andere. Om 'n subjek te wees is vir Levinas om altyd alreeds vir-dié-ander te wees as 'n plaasvervanger of gyselaar. Dit is sowel 'n vervolging as die "heerlikheid" van menswees. Levinas argumenteer dus ten gunste van 'n "goeie geweld" voorafgaande aan enige onderskeidinge tussen aggressiewe en geregverdigde geweld. Die idee van 'n oorspronklike goeie geweld maak 'n herdenking van die boosheid van agressie en die vreugdevolheid van verset moontlik. Op sy beurt toon dit die onstabiliteit of dubbelsinnigheid van geregverdigde geweld: selfs al word dit geïnspireer deur goedheid - deur 'n mens se verantwoordelikheid vir die nuttelose lyding van ander - is dit nooit goed genoeg nie en loop dit altyd die gevaar om om te slaan in onreg. Die verantwoordelikheid van 'n "regverdige vegter" word daarom nie uitgekanselleer deur die regverdigheid van sy saak nie. Die regverdigheid van die saak eis trouens nog groter verantwoordelikheid, selfs vir en vóór jou vyand.

Thesis (MA)--Stellenbosch University, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In contrast with the moral philosophy that morality is dependent on society preached by Durkheim and his disciples Bauman argues that the origin of morality cannot be found within social structures. According to Bauman certain social mechanisms hinder morality rather than promote it. He discusses two social structures to argue this point: socialization (within the modem condition) and sociality (within the postmodern condition). Within both structures, the Other is of functional value, and responsibility for this Other is denied. Within the structure of socialization responsibility is denied because of adiaphorization within the organization (certain actions are declared morally neutral), and also because ethical codes are adhered to. Within sociality responsibility never even arises and we find the postmodern version of adiaphorization. According to Bauman, morality originates with the personal responsibility for the Other. His argument is based on Levinas's version of who this Other is and what responsibility entails. According to Levinas, responsibility is non-reciprocal and asymmetrical. However, this relationship changes the moment that the third (or society) enters. At this moment we operate according to certain conditions and standards. Instead of placing the origin of morality in society, Bauman thus argues for a 'personal' morality. This leads to the problem that he does not provide enough space for morality within society. Without refuting his emphasis on a 'personal' morality, I focus on an alternative origin. If we agree that morality originates within the personal imagination, it does not only include Levinas's pre-ontological theory, but enlarges the idea of what morality encompasses to also leave space for morality within the the social sphere. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Bauman se morele filosofie het (anders as dié van Durkheim en sy navolgers) ten grondslag dat die oorsprong van moraliteit nie binne sosiale strukture gevind kan word nie. Hy argumenteer dat sosiale meganismes binne sekere sosiale strukture juis moraliteit ondermyn. Die sosiale strukture waarna hy hier verwys is socialization (binne die moderne kondisie) en sociality (binne die postmoderne kondisie). Binne beide 'strukure' het die Ander funksionele waarde en word verantwoordelikheid vir hierdie Ander ontduik. Binne socialization word verantwoordelikheid vir die Ander ontduik deur middel van adiaforisasie in die organisasie (deurdat sekere aksies moreel neutraal verklaar word) en ook deur die navolg van bepaalde etiese kodes. Binne sociality kom verantwoordelikheid glad nie eers ter sprake nie en ontstaan die postmoderne weergawe van adiaforisasie. Moraliteit is volgens Bauman veel eerder in die persoonlike verantwoordelikheid vir die Ander gesetel. Hy bou veral voort op Levinas se beskouing van wie hierdie Ander is en wat hierdie verantwoordelikheid behels. Dié verantwoordelikheid is, naamlik onvoorwaardelik en asimmetries. Hierdie verhouding verander egter sodra die derde (die sosiale) op die toneel verskyn - dan het ons te make met standaarde en voorwaardes. My probleem met Bauman se beskouing is daarin geleë dat dit nie ruimte vir moraliteit binne die gemeenskap laat nie. Sonder om sy klem op 'n 'persoonlike' moraliteit af te skiet, fokus ek op 'n alternatiewe oorsprong vir moraliteit. Indien ons toegee dat moraliteit ontstaan binne die mens se verbeelding, verbreed dit die verstaan van wat moraliteit behels. Sodoende word Levinas se pre-ontologiese teorie ingesluit, maar word daar ook plek gelaat vir moraliteit binne die sosiale sfeer.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2011. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this mini-thesis I explore Hannah Arendt’s engagement with the problem of foundation in relation to the work of Derrida and complexity theory. In Arendt the problem of foundation takes shape as the attempt to develop a thinking of foundation that does not repress political freedom. The American Revolution is an important point of reference in Arendt’s attempt to develop such a notion of authority. According to Arendt the American republic could, however, not entirely succeed in realizing this conception of authority. I draw on Derrida and complexity theory in order to show that the shortcomings Arendt points to are structural to institutions as such. Following Derrida and complexity theory, I further that the recognition of this structural limitation is an indispensable step in the attempt to think political authority as something stable, but which nevertheless keeps open the possibility of political change. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie skripsie ondersoek ek Hannah Arendt se ommegang met die probleem van begronding deur dit in verband te bring met die werk van Jacques Derrida en kompleksiteitsteorie. Die probleem van begronding neem vir Arendt vorm aan in die poging om politieke gesag op so wyse te bedink dat dit nie politieke vryheid onderdruk nie. Die Amerikaanse rewolusie vorm ’n sentrale verwysingspunt in Arendt so poging om gesag op hierdie manier te bedink. Dit slaag volgens haar egter nie heeltemal daarin om hierdie alternatiewe vorm van gesag te verwesenlik nie. Ek steun op Derrida en kompleksiteitsteorie om te wys dat die tekortkominge waarop Arendt wys in ’n sekere sin struktureel is tot enige instelling. Ek argumenteer voorts in navolging van Derrida en kompleksiteitsteorie dat ’n erkenning van hierdie strukturele beperking ’n belangrike moment is in die poging om politieke gesag te bedink as iets wat stabiel kan wees, maar terselftertyd ruimte laat vir politieke verandering.