Thesis advisor: Arthur Madigan / Thesis advisor: Jorge L. Garcia / The relationship between intention, intentional action, and moral assessment is of fundamental importance to ethical theory. In large part, moral responsibility is based on an assessment of agent responsibility, which in turn is based on the connection between an agent's intentions and the actions which they cause. In the last twenty-five years, there has been a debate in contemporary action theory about the relationship between intentions and intentional action. Objecting to what he calls the "Simple View," which he characterizes as the view that all intentional actions are intended under some description, Michael Bratman, among others, argues that not all intentional actions are intended. In this dissertation, we will defend the Simple View by appealing to Aristotle's theory of action as developed in his psychological and ethical works. In the first part of the dissertation, we argue that all intentional actions are intended under some description; however, we argue that distinctions between different types of intention are essential: specifically, the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate intentions and the distinction between the intention of the end and the intention of the means. Our account centers on Aristotle's concept of prohairesis, which he identifies as the distinctly human principle of action. The term prohairesis in Aristotle's works seems to have at least three senses: 1) primarily, the deliberate intention with which a person acts, an `occurent' choice; 2) the habitual or `dispositional' choice or resolve of `decent' people; and 3) general purposes that men have which may encompass voluntary action as a whole. The first sense of the term is the primary one that properly signifies the concept. Prohairesis fits within the general framework of animal motion which Aristotle sets out in the De Anima and De Motu Animalium. For Aristotle, orexis or desire is the cause of all animal motion, including human motion. Prohairesis is a deliberate desire for the means to an end. It is a principle of action peculiar to mature human beings capable of deliberating, as it is the intention which is the result of deliberation. It marks off a narrow but important stretch of intentional action. Prohairesis is set off against other types of intention, like boulesis, which is an intention of the end, and epithumia (bodily appetite) and thumos (anger), which are non-deliberate intentions relating to non-rational appetites like lust and anger. Aristotle, in contrast to contemporary accounts of intentional action, is unusually specific in his designation of the different kinds of intention. Different orexeis differ not only with regard to specific objects but also with regard to time, planning, and detail. Aristotle traces both the causal and moral responsibility agents have for their actions to the action of these internal principles of desire. Moral assessment is linked to the operative internal principle of an act. This allows for an action to be voluntary and intentional, even if the agent does not fully understand or plan for the consequences of an action. Intention, for Aristotle, if we correctly understand it as orexis and what results from orexis, is not reducible to one mode but is irreducibly plural. Furthermore, each person's capacity for intentional action is shaped by his character, and each character has correspondingly different kinds of intention, both with respect to the objects of intention and in their relation to action. Finally, the scope of intention is not definite, and depending on the agent, can include those things which attend to the means of which he has cognizance, for instance, harmful side-effect consequences or other costs of his action. In the second part of the dissertation, we examine at length the objections to the Simple View, lodged by Bratman, Gilbert Harman, and Joshua Knobe. We give an overview of objections by Bratman, Harman, and Knobe which center on three cases and four objections. The cases are: 1) a hypothetical video game; 2) unexpected success; and 3) unintended consequences. The objections are: 1) with respect to the hypothetical video game, the Simple View ascribes an irrational intention to a gamer playing the game; 2) When agents are doubtful of the success of an action they undertake, the Simple View requires that they intend the act the perform rather than that they merely try to perform the act, which opponents argue that this is irrational and false; 3) The Simple View entails the rejection of the distinction between intention and foresight which itself entails that agents intend all the results of their actions, even when those results are merely foreseen and not intended; 4) The Simple View does not adequately explain ordinary language usage with respect to ascriptions of intention for side-effect consequences, and therefore does not reflect basic, commonly shared notions of intentional action. The first two objections center on cases where it seems irrational for an agent to intend the act he performs. In the case of the video game, the scenario is so set up that the player wins a prize for hitting either target but knows that he cannot hit both or the game will shut down. It seems irrational for him to intend to hit both if he cannot; however, in order to maximize his chance winning, it would be rational to aim at both. In the case of unexpected success, it seems that agents do not intend acts whose chances of success they doubt because intending seems to require the positive belief that one will succeed; rather, it is argued that agents merely try but do not intend the act they perform. Against these cases and objections, we argue that agents are capable of conditional and complex intentions, such that one may conditionally intend to hit whichever target is opportune, while aiming at both. Likewise, we argue that intending to act does not require the positive belief that one will succeed; only that it is possible for one to succeed. Furthermore, the distinction between trying and intending is specious. Finally, we respond to the third and fourth objections centering on the intentionality of side-effect consequences. It is argued by Bratman et al. that the Simple View entails the rejection of the distinction between intention and foresight, and that such a rejection further entails consequentialism. Likewise it is also argued that the Simple View fails to account for ordinary language ascriptions of intentionality for side-effect consequences. We agree that the Simple View entails rejecting the distinction between intention and foresight as it is currently applied, but deny that this entails consequentialism, i.e., the view that the consequences of an action are the primary basis for moral evaluation and not the agent's intentions. Likewise, we agree that the Simple View does not model ordinary language ascriptions of intention; however, this is not necessarily a defect since such ascriptions are inconsistent and imprecise. Furthermore, we argue that the Simple View might be used to more adequately explain such usage. We center our response to these objections on the Doctrine of Double Effect. We argue that the doctrine arises from a mistaken interpretation of St. Thomas Aquinas' treatment of defensive killing. We argue that Aquinas does not hold that the death of an attacker is a foreseen but not intended side-effect, as proponents of Double Effect and opponents of the Simple View hold; rather it is intended as a means to the end of self-defense. Therefore, the two effects are not the desired end and a side-effect but rather the intended end and the intended means. Furthermore, we argue that this does not entail doing evil for the sake of good because Aquinas' Aristotelian account of action specification incorporates circumstances as essential components of intentions which give an act its moral quality. Furthermore, the necessary references to an agent's intentions show how the rejection of the application of the distinction between intention and foresight does not entail consequentialism. Finally, we tackle the underlying assumptions about intention and desire which lead to the rejection of the Simple View. Opponents of the Simple View hold that intention is not a form of desire because then it would not have an essential role in the genesis of action or in rational deliberation. We, however, argue that the major objections to the Simple View are defeasible once one understands intention as a species of desire, i.e. a deliberate desire, whose scope includes consequences beyond acts performed and goals achieved. The paradoxes at the heart of the debate hinge on the ambiguity of the English word `intention' and its usage, as well as the inherent difficulty of examining psychological concepts. `Intention' has several senses unified by the purposiveness of the mental states to which the word is referred. These senses can often, but not always, be distinguished in English usage by the degree and kind of deliberation attendant to them. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

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Euthanasia has been subject of controversy since antiquity, but 3000 years later it still seems to be highly debated among contemporary ethicists and philosophers. The main purpose of this essay is to investigate under which circumstances euthanasia could be morally permissible, by highlighting and discussing the most debated objections against it. The first objection brings up the problem of how we can be sure that a wish to die is confident and final. This objection is followed by a discussion about the risks of administering euthanasia incorrectly. The second objection concerns whether voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide really is necessary. Here, the main question is whether people about to die would be harmed rather than helped if they had euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide available as an alternative. The third section discusses the doctrine of double effect. Here, the main purpose is to investigate where DDE stands in relation to cases of euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Furthermore, the final two objections concern the parallel between killing and letting die, and second of all the slippery-slope argument in connection with euthanasia. The essay concludes with a discussion about the ways in which practicing euthanasia can be harmful, as well as a more detailed debate about the sustainability of the objections mentioned above.

<p>In this modern period, societal and religious groups are strongly divided regarding the acceptability of abortion. Despite so many attempts by various groups to find a middle ground, the debate on abortion still remains largely polarized, at its most dramatic point with the extreme conservatives claiming abortion to be the moral equivalent of murder and the extreme liberals see it as devoid of moral import. And this polarization is due to the legal battle that continues to shadow moral discussions. An acceptance of an ethical nuance will here play as a concession on the deeply contested question of whether abortion should be a legally protected option for a woman, and to an extent blame for the continued crudeness which can be laid at the doorstep of a moral theory itself. Apparently, the ethical literature on abortion has focused almost exclusively on the tiniest moral assessment on whether and when abortion is morally permissible. This question is a crucial one indeed and its answer is desperately sought in this thesis by exposing the position of the Catholic Church.</p>

In this modern period, societal and religious groups are strongly divided regarding the acceptability of abortion. Despite so many attempts by various groups to find a middle ground, the debate on abortion still remains largely polarized, at its most dramatic point with the extreme conservatives claiming abortion to be the moral equivalent of murder and the extreme liberals see it as devoid of moral import. And this polarization is due to the legal battle that continues to shadow moral discussions. An acceptance of an ethical nuance will here play as a concession on the deeply contested question of whether abortion should be a legally protected option for a woman, and to an extent blame for the continued crudeness which can be laid at the doorstep of a moral theory itself. Apparently, the ethical literature on abortion has focused almost exclusively on the tiniest moral assessment on whether and when abortion is morally permissible. This question is a crucial one indeed and its answer is desperately sought in this thesis by exposing the position of the Catholic Church.

The doctoral thesis tries to reflect the collaboration of Catholic priest with the State Security Service (ŠtB). This is done in two steps. The first part illustrates the historical background based on research of archive materials and testimony of living priests - agents. Results of historical research tell us that it is not possible to assess the collaboration across the board just on the registration of agents in secret police register. Core of historical part is a typology of collaboration. It serves as a base for input to the second ethical part of doctoral thesis. The main goal of ethical part is to find objective criterions for answerable and ethical way out from moral dilemmas. Core of this part is theory about ethical compromise with two normative principles - principle of small evil and principle of double effect. The analysis of small evil didn't get a satisfy way out from the situation of blackmail: in the concrete situation it didn't tell us, which evil is smaller and which is bigger. The principle of double effect showed us, that the collaboration in blackmail situation is without proportionate cause, in other words, is counterproductive to their value in universal perspective. The priests hadn't any guaranty, that after consent with collaboration in blackmail, the damage on their side but...

nÃo hà / Durante fenÃmenos transitÃrios podem ocorrer pressÃes muito baixas nos trechos mais elevados de uma tubulaÃÃo, correndo o acÃmulo de ar que à arrastado pela Ãgua ocasionando sÃrios danos à tubulaÃÃo. A presenÃa de uma grande quantidade de ar na tubulaÃÃo de um sistema de aduÃÃo de Ãgua por recalque à a causa direta de reduÃÃo da seÃÃo e como conseqÃÃncia tem-se a reduÃÃo da capacidade de transporte, comprometendo seriamente o rendimento deste sistema. Os dispositivos mais modernos para o alÃvio do golpe de arÃete trabalham com ar, dentre eles, os mais utilizados na prÃtica sÃo as ventosas automÃticas, foco deste trabalho. A condiÃÃo de contorno destas ventosas à bem complexa, resultando em uma equaÃÃo nÃo linear, alÃm do fato de a Ãrea do orifÃcio da ventosa variar linearmente com o tempo. Para resolver esta nÃo linearidade aplicou-se o mÃtodo da aproximaÃÃo parabÃlica nos intervalos onde ocorre escoamento do ar em regime subsÃnico. Neste trabalho foram feitas simulaÃÃes do transiente hidrÃulico para verificar a eficiÃncia das ventosas automÃticas de duplo efeito com abertura e fechamento nÃo instantÃneos como um mecanismo de alÃvio do golpe de arÃete. As simulaÃÃes foram feitas utilizando o software UFC6 produzido no LaboratÃrio de HidrÃulica Computacional (LAHC) da Universidade Federal do CearÃ. As vÃlvulas ventosas representam uma soluÃÃo hidrÃulica satisfatÃria, pois, sÃo equipamentos de fÃcil instalaÃÃo e manutenÃÃo, alÃm do fato de serem bem mais compensadores do ponto de vista econÃmico. Os resultados obtidos mostraram a eficiÃncia deste mecanismo como alÃvio do golpe de arÃete. / During time dependent phenomena in pipelines, very low pressures may occur, mostly in points of dow elevations. In these cases, air accumulated in these points is carried out by the water flow and may damage the pipeline. This also causes reduction of the flow area and consequently, reduction of the flow itself. The most modern Waterhammer protection devices and among them, we find the air entry valves, which is the object of this work. The boundary conditions for these devices is very complex and results in a non-linear equations. Besides, we have to consider that the air flow cross-section area of the valves orifice varies linearly with time. In order to solve this non-linearity it was used the method of parabolic approximation for solving the equation in each interval of subsonic air flow. In the present work, several Waterhammer pipeline simulations were performed in order to verify the performance of the double effect automatic air valves, with non-instantaneous closing. The UFC6 computer software were used to accomplish these simulations. Air valves are a satisfactory hydraulic solution for the Waterhammer problem since they are cheaper than other devices and easy to install and mountain.

The dissertation is an examination of obligation, which I argue is a mode of rational necessity that is proper to human agency. I begin from G. E. M. Anscombe’s celebrated attack against modern moral philosophy, and then sketch a positive theory of obligation as it figures in morality and in law, drawing upon the work of Aquinas and Aristotle. The first chapter explicates this idea of “practical necessity” and the second chapter shows that Aristotelian ethics, because it is not a theological law conception of ethics, has no place for a peculiarly moral conception of obligation. The third chapter examines Aquinas’s conception of moral law and argues that Aquinas vindicates Anscombe’s negative critique of the “moral ought.” The fourth chapter shows that the application of exceptionless moral norms (i.e. moral absolutes), which is one kind of obligation, requires attention to aspects of social practices. Attention to social practices allows the resolution of controverted problems about specifying intentions and applying the principle of double effect in a way that makes exceptionless moral norms workable. The fifth and final chapter defends the conception of intentional action assumed in the fourth chapter, and demonstrates that the scholastic ‘sub specie boni’ thesis is an integral part of action explanation, as well as Anscombe’s notion of “practical knowledge”. The upshot of the dissertation is an integrated investigation into how the ideas of good and necessity figure in ethics, law, and human action. / text

ABSTRACT BENEFITS OR HARMS OF NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND by Judy Block The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 reauthorizes and extensively amends the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and establishes control over the majority of federal programs and spending that affect public education. Embedded in the Act are various requirements that states and schools must adhere to as a condition of receiving federal education funds as well as harsh sanctions for failing to meet the requirements. No Child Left Behind notably shifts federal education policy by expanding its role into the areas of standards and assessment, accountability, curricula, discipline and administration, and providership. The Act also exacerbates tensions and blurs the line between competing ideologies of the role and nature of public education. NCLB's dominant reliance on proven research methods and statistical data, and its provisions regarding student assessment, failing schools, and parental choice open the schoolhouse door to commercial marketteers, further transforming public education into a consumer good, classrooms into marketplaces, and students and teachers into immaterial byproducts. No Child Left Behind's requirements often have more than one result, with some results doing more harm than the Act's stated good. The principle of double effect (PDE) provides a lens to evaluate instances where there are two effects of a single act; that is,PDE can explain the permissibility of an action that causes an undesired or harmful effect secondary to promoting some good end. By using philosophical analysis generally, and the principle of double effect specifically, this dissertation examines No Child Left Behind’s implementation requirements, specific programs, and their effects to determine the Act's benefits or harms. The dissertation proceeds with a review of NCLB's historical context and key features, an introduction to the principle of double effect, and a discussion of democratic and market ideologies and their relationship with education. This dissertation recognizes the various populations affected by the Act, but focuses specifically on students with disabilities and the relationship of the principle of double effect to the implications of NCLB. Chapter Four extends the principle of double effect to NCLB's implementation requirements and specific programs to identify their consequences or effects. The dissertation concludes with a synthesis of the questions and problems presented by NCLB and the implications for students, teachers, public education, and our communities.

Bakgrund: Dödshjälp är ett debatterat ämne som berör sjuksköterskans arbetsuppgifter. Flera länder och stater har legaliserat dödshjälp. Dödshjälp kan ses som ett sätt att respektera patientens önskemål, att lindra lidande och bevara värdighet. Det kan även ställas mot vårdpersonalens egen autonomi eller ICN:s etiska kod som menar att sjukvårdens uppgift är att lindra och bota sjukdom och inte skada patienten. Vårdpersonal beskriver svårigheter i att hantera situationer där dessa komponenter på olika sätt ställs emot varandra. Syfte: Syftet var att belysa sjuksköterskans erfarenheter upplevelser och faktorer som kan påverka upplevelser av att arbeta med personer som önskar eller kommer att genomgå dödshjälp. Metod: En litteraturöversikt i enlighet med Friberg genomfördes. Resultatet byggde på tio originalartiklar som togs fram genom systematisk sökning. Analysen genomfördes genom tematisering och färgkodning.   Resultat: Arbetet med dödshjälp upplevdes olika beroende på vilken typ av dödshjälp som genomfördes, patientens och anhörigas upplevelser, deltagandet i beslutsfattandet, etiska koder och lagar som gällde samt sjuksköterskornas egna värderingar och erfarenheter. Detta ledde till både positiva och negativa upplevelser för sjuksköterskan. Dessa upplevelser kunde också hanteras genom formellt eller informellt stöd, vilket i sin tur bidrog till sjuksköterskans upplevelser. Diskussion: Resultatet diskuteras utefter Travelbees teori om den mellanmänskliga relationen och hur vårdandet utan roller kan bidra till en bättre vård, men även påverka sjuksköterskans upplevelser av vården. Dessutom diskuteras om hur sjuksköterskans egna värderingar och erfarenheter påverkar upplevelserna i vården. / Background: Euthanasia is a debated subject that concerns nurses’ duties. Several countries and states have legalized euthanasia. Euthanasia can be seen as a way of respecting patients wishes, relieving suffering and preserving dignity. However, it can also be considered against healthcare personnels own autonomy or ICN ethical code, which means that the health care task is to alleviate and cure and not harm the patient. Healthcare professionals describe difficulties in dealing with situations where these components differ in a variety of ways. Aim: The aim of the study was to highlight nurses’ experiences and factors that may affect experiences of working with people who want or will undergo euthanasia.  Method: A literature review according to Friberg was conducted. The result is based on ten original articles that were obtained through systematic search. The analysis was conducted by thematization and color-coding. Results: Workning with assistens in death was experienced differently depending on the type of euthanasia that was carried out, the experiences of patients and relatives, participation in decision making, ethical codes and laws, as well as nurses’ own values and experiences. This led to both positive and negative experiences for the nurse. These experiences could also be managed through formal or informal support, which in turn contributed to nurses’ experiences. Discussion: The discussion is based on Travelbees theory of interpersonal relationships and how care without rolls can contribute to better care, but also affect nurses’ experiences of care. In addition, there is discussion about how nurses own values ​​and understandings affect experiences in health care.