Universiẗat, Diss., 1997 u.d.T.: Hostettler, Stephan: Das Konzept des Economic Value Added (EVA)--St. Gallen.

This study examines the emergence of risk governance arrangements in US bank holding companies (BHCs) and tests for their impact upon performance and risk profiles. Following the financial crisis, regulators introduced several new risk governance processes, including the adoption of Risk Appetite arrangements and the establishment of Risk Committees, both board level features. In this study, a research gap is unearthed with respect to risk governance practices and their impact upon BHC performance and risk measures. The motivation of this research is to validate the adoption of these board-level practices in an evidence-based framework. The empirical research method relies on the collection of a unique data set. The sample covers a significant dollar-weighted portion of the US banking system. Multivariate analysis facilitates the testing of risk governance mechanisms to outcome variables, while controlling for firm-specific and standard corporate governance variables. The practical implication of this study with respect to Risk Appetite is clear. BHCs that practice Risk Appetite arrangements exhibit improved performance and lower realised loan losses. In contrast, while some limited evidence is presented that the marketplace may reward BHCs for certain composition aspects of the Risk Committee, the overall results suggest that the requirement for a Risk Committee has little impact to BHC’s operating performance and risk measures. In terms of academic contribution, this study examines two major risk governance mechanisms within a common framework, presenting evidence of a significant and positive impact of the board level articulation of Risk Appetite arrangements to a suite of BHC performance measures and a negative association to loan losses. As the first known empirical research study of Risk Appetite, it confirms that this board level mechanism should be included as an explanatory variable in bank or risk governance related empirical research studies. These findings provide industry practitioners (including BHC chief executive officers and board members) convincing arguments for the immediate adoption of Risk Appetite arrangements. US Regulators, who introduced Risk Appetite requirements in 2014 for larger BHCs, are presented with validation by this study for wider adoption of this risk governance mechanism, even if such practices are voluntarily adopted by BHCs. As signs begin to emerge in the United States of the possible relaxation of the regulatory requirements of certain aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act, this study contributes to this debate in a timely fashion by testing the veracity of two key supervisory-driven risk governance practices aimed at the boardroom in an evidence-based evaluation.

With a rapid centralisation of fiscal sovereignty now being aired as a possibility following on from the financial and economic crisis, this thesis considers how legitimising discourses are shaping the efforts to reform EU fiscal governance. Norman Fairclough’s ‘moderately constructivist’ three-dimensional framework for CDA is drawn upon. This approach is also combined with insights drawn from the new institutionalist literature base (particularly from its historical and discursive strands of thought), with an additional emphasis being placed on broader understandings of structural forms of power as developed through the writings of Susan Strange. It is found that the emerging debate over EU fiscal governance reform is dominated by a limiting neoliberal legitimising discourse. This research also makes a contribution to our understanding of the ideational and institutional roots of the current impasse in European Integration. Finally, it is concluded that the efforts to reform the EU’s fiscal governance arrangements are likely to bring about, at best, incremental change along a path-dependent line.

Topic of this thesis is the Data Governance implementation in the large companies. These companies struggle during governing and managing data to get useful insights for the decision making. Data Governance is new approach to managing the companies which helps to solve the data management pain points and helps organizations to work with data effectively and without any problems. Data Governance helps to transform data into asset. This thesis is divided into theoretical and practical part. In the theoretical part are discussed reasons for emerging Data Governance, analysis of approaches to Data Governance by world leading methodologies and possible focus of the Data Governance projects as well as its benefits. Important part of this theoretical part is Data Governance components definition. Implementation of the Data Governance is discussed in the practical part. The goal of the practical part is to describe required artifacts which should exist during the implementation. Described artifacts use the best practice from the existing literature. These deliverables will help to better structure, govern and successfully implement the Data Governance. Delivering these artifacts bring the value for the company. Each project deliverable has definitions of the importance for the project team and the company. Most important benefit of the practical part is aspiration to eliminate pain points during the Data Governance implementation as appropriate project team, cooperation definition, buy-in and deliverables.

The main purpose of the master thesis is to determine the role of corporate governance in solving the economic and financial crises. This is done through explanations of events that led to the current form of Corporate Governance in developed countries. Corporate Governance is defined as the set of rules governing the relationship between owners and managers. The thesis present the basic model of the relationship management, which allows to evaluate the form of Corporate Governance in selected countries. At the same time clarifies the causes of economic crises since the 90s of the 20th century to the present from the perspective of Corporate Governance.

with Fr. Timothy Radcliffe / Higgins Hall 300

with Fr. Timothy Radcliffe / Higgins Hall 300

Corporate governance issues have become increasingly important to financial managers and shareholders. Firms that are plagued by poor performance, incompetent managers, or excess agency costs have become the subject of a dramatic increase in shareholder activism. Dissident shareholders, who are unable to launch costly takeover bids or proxy contests, have initiated a process of governance reform through the use of shareholder sponsored proposals. Shareholder proposals are a direct attempt to reverse operating or voting policies, such as a proposal to repeal a classified board. Managers announce shareholder proposals in a proxy statement and typically include a vote recommendation against the proposal. In the first essay, I find an unfavorable stock price reaction to the announcement of a shareholder proposal. In some cases, however, management supports the proposal and negotiates an agreement with the proposing shareholder. Stock prices react favorably to a settlement announcement. If managers are willing to negotiate with shareholders, they are perceived to be acting in the best interest of shareholders. If managers are unwilling, shareholders believe a severe agency problem exists. In the second essay, the effect that ownership structure has on voting outcomes of shareholder proposals is examined. I find a direct relationship between the percentage of votes cast in favor of the proposal and levels of institutional ownership. There is an inverse relationship between the percentage of votes and managerial ownership and firm size. Large firms with powerful owner-managers present the greatest obstacle to the success of shareholder proposals. The repeal of shareholder rights plans is one of the most frequently used shareholder proposals. By adopting the rights plan, managers increase the probability of defeating a takeover, but increase their power in negotiating with a potential acquiring firm. In the third essay, I find that firms who combine a rights plan with high debt levels construct a powerful defense against a hostile takeover. Shareholders target these high debt firms and design proposals to repeal the rights plan.

Case studies from India have shown that the legal regime governing water pollution control in India has miserably failed. Sectoral approach to water management is quite evident. On the other hand Sweden has shown a remarkable change with regard to environment management. The poor management of a resource makes the resource further poor. Thus effective management of the resources becomes crucial. Good governance has been vital in conservation of a resource. But the issue is what constitutes good governance with respect to water? Law has always played a steering role in governance aspect. But despite having pollution control laws the effective governance of water pollution has not been attainable in India. Are the pollution control laws fundamentally wrong or some other factors prevail which is beyond the reach of law to control the pollution problem. The thesis which is a comparative study of legal framework and their implementation in India and Sweden attempts to explore how control of water pollution has been effectively governed in Sweden and what needs to been done in India.

Governments around the world, including Canada, continue to look for new ways to structure themselves and deliver services to accommodate the growing challenges of governing in an increasingly complex global environment. One strategy is to hive off functions to arms-length entities. This continues to be a popular option for service delivery, consuming significant amounts of public resources with little understood about the implications on accountability, performance, transparency and cost. Distributing public governance by moving functions further out from the institutional centre of government has tended to make the public sector less visible. In Canada, there has been negligible critical analysis about the trend and its impacts, in particular, at the provincial level. This study addresses that gap by analyzing the use of arms-length entities over time in two provinces, British Columbia and Ontario. It empirically determines trends in agencification, explores the rationale for creation and use of arms-length entities, and contributes to a better understanding of the implications, impacts and challenges that continue to arise in distributing public governance. The study uses a mixed methods approach relying on a quantitative analysis of jurisdictional data to describe changes in the agency landscape in British Columbia and Ontario over a 65 -year period from 1951 to 2016. The qualitative strategy uses 32 interviews of current and past government and agency executives to provide insights into the rationale for agency creation, relationships between government and its arms-length entities, the impacts on public sector governance, and the future of agencification. Document and literature reviews were conducted to support the analysis of both the quantitative and qualitative data. Results show there has been a continued and statistically significant increase in the overall number of arms-length entities in both jurisdictions over time. Creation, though, ebbs and flows, and is not necessarily a reflection of political ideology or economic climate. However, political influence has not been eliminated with the establishment of governance frameworks for arms-length entities. Recognizing this, agencies have become more adept at reading political signals and building relationships with government that earn them trust and autonomy. The key findings of this study suggest that: 1. The governance structures in Canada continue, increasingly, to illustrate a broad range of arms-length entities to deliver a breadth of services and functions, with little consistency in the rationale and structure for their creation. 2. New governance controls and mechanisms are being implemented to address issues of performance, accountability and political brand as the shape of the public sector continues to evolve. 3. The independence of arms-length agencies is more myth than reality. Ultimately governments are accountable for their delegation of authority and this reality has and will continue to influence the relationship between government and its arms-length entities. 4. Individual personalities matter. Despite governance frameworks and mechanisms intended to prescribe the accountability relationship between government and arms-length entities, individuals on both sides of the relationship can have a significant impact on agency performance and viability. All indications suggest that governments will continue to use arms-length agencies to deliver a variety of services using various organizational forms and inconsistent governance frameworks. In addition to agency creation, the reshaping of agencies through merger, re-categorization, mandate shifts, renaming, etc., will continue, as will the changing landscape of distributed public governance. The ability to design a governance framework that addresses the ongoing reshaping of government structure will need to evolve in order to address challenges with coordination, fragmentation, service delivery and accountability. To this end, governments have been rationalizing their governance systems, increasing their ability to control arms-length entities through a variety of mechanisms, including the creation of new “super agencies”. As the use of agencies continues, the governance environment becomes more complex with a greater number of actors, changes in government capacity and resourcing, and global, multi-level government systems in meeting public needs. Governance rationalization supports the need for increased focus on why and how governments re-shape themselves and how this impacts accountability and performance, providing new opportunities for further research as the shape of the public sector continues to evolve. / Graduate