Orientador: Maria Eunice Quilici Gonzalez / Banca: Mariana Carmem Broens / Banca: Alfredo Pereira Júnior / Banca: Ítala M. L. D'Ottaviano / Banca: Elias Humberto Alves / Resumo: Dois são os objetivos desta tese: o primeiro é discutir os pressupostos epistemológicos subjacentes à concepção internalista da mente que enfatiza a mediação representacional entre o sujeito do conhecimento e o mundo. O segundo consiste em propor e debater a hipótese epistemológica (H), de acordo com a qual há percepção direta das invariâncias no comportamento sócio-cultural. Inicialmente, discute-se o método de análise e síntese cartesiano, questionando sua adequação para o estudo da percepção-ação. Especial ênfase é dada às críticas de Ryle ao método cartesiano de análise que possibilita a geração de erros categoriais em sua aplicação no estudo do conhecimento perceptual. Uma alternativa à perspectiva representacionista da percepção é apresentada por meio da Teoria da Percepção Direta (TPD), proposta por Gibson, aplicando-a também à análise do comportamento sócio-cultural. Algumas dificuldades são encontradas na execução de tal intento; entre elas está a questão da autonomia dos indivíduos. Uma possível solução a este problema é elaborada, ressaltando os aspectos das variâncias relacionais dos indivíduos com o meio ambiente, encontradas juntamente com as invariantes estruturais e transformacionais. As invariantes como as variantes constituem as especificidades da interação entre indivíduo e meio ambiente delineando a personalidade individual. / Abstract: This thesis has two aims: the first is to discuss epistemological presuppositions underlying the internalist conception of mind that emphasizes the representational mediation between a knowing subject and the world. The second consists in proposing and debating the Epistemological Hypothesis (H), according to which there is a Direct Perception of Invariances in Social-Cultural Behavior. At first the methodology of Cartesian analysis and synthesis is discussed, questioning its adequacy to the study of action-perception. Special attention is giving to Ryle’s criticism of the Cartesian method of analysis that allows the generation of categorical mistakes, applied to the study of perceptual knowledge. An alternative to representational perception is shown to be the Theory of Direct Perception (TPD), proposed by Gibson, which will be applied to the analysis of socialcultural behavior. Some difficulties are discovered during this project; among them is the problem of personal autonomy. A possible solution for that problem is to emphasize the relational variances between individuals and their environment, these variances occur together with the structural and transformational invariances. The invariants as well as variants form the specifics of the interaction between individual and environment, and thereby shape the personal autonomy. / Doutor

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:32:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2006-12-04Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T20:03:13Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 morais_sr_dr_mar.pdf: 1039071 bytes, checksum: ffdf99fb1c29e213a06ddde5c95dbbe7 (MD5) / Dois são os objetivos desta tese: o primeiro é discutir os pressupostos epistemológicos subjacentes à concepção internalista da mente que enfatiza a mediação representacional entre o sujeito do conhecimento e o mundo. O segundo consiste em propor e debater a hipótese epistemológica (H), de acordo com a qual há percepção direta das invariâncias no comportamento sócio-cultural. Inicialmente, discute-se o método de análise e síntese cartesiano, questionando sua adequação para o estudo da percepção-ação. Especial ênfase é dada às críticas de Ryle ao método cartesiano de análise que possibilita a geração de erros categoriais em sua aplicação no estudo do conhecimento perceptual. Uma alternativa à perspectiva representacionista da percepção é apresentada por meio da Teoria da Percepção Direta (TPD), proposta por Gibson, aplicando-a também à análise do comportamento sócio-cultural. Algumas dificuldades são encontradas na execução de tal intento; entre elas está a questão da autonomia dos indivíduos. Uma possível solução a este problema é elaborada, ressaltando os aspectos das variâncias relacionais dos indivíduos com o meio ambiente, encontradas juntamente com as invariantes estruturais e transformacionais. As invariantes como as variantes constituem as especificidades da interação entre indivíduo e meio ambiente delineando a personalidade individual. / This thesis has two aims: the first is to discuss epistemological presuppositions underlying the internalist conception of mind that emphasizes the representational mediation between a knowing subject and the world. The second consists in proposing and debating the Epistemological Hypothesis (H), according to which there is a Direct Perception of Invariances in Social-Cultural Behavior. At first the methodology of Cartesian analysis and synthesis is discussed, questioning its adequacy to the study of action-perception. Special attention is giving to Ryle s criticism of the Cartesian method of analysis that allows the generation of categorical mistakes, applied to the study of perceptual knowledge. An alternative to representational perception is shown to be the Theory of Direct Perception (TPD), proposed by Gibson, which will be applied to the analysis of socialcultural behavior. Some difficulties are discovered during this project; among them is the problem of personal autonomy. A possible solution for that problem is to emphasize the relational variances between individuals and their environment, these variances occur together with the structural and transformational invariances. The invariants as well as variants form the specifics of the interaction between individual and environment, and thereby shape the personal autonomy.

This study investigates “dark ecology” – an ecological theory formulated by Timothy Morton, based on an object-oriented ontology and claimed to offer a new perspective on how humans can and should coexist with other “objects” in the world in a better, less hostile way. Dark ecology is a critique of both an anthropocentric and a biocentric worldview, aiming to erase the dichotomy between human/nature and subject/object.  This essay performs an internal critique of dark ecology, analyzing and interpreting Morton’s books Dark Ecology (2016) and Being Ecological (2018) through the lens of two central concepts – “responsibility” and “agency” in order to extract the premises of importance to the theory. These premises are then presented in Aristotelian syllogisms, based on which the validity of dark ecology is evaluated. The aim of the essay is to find an answer to the question as to whether dark ecology is logically coherent and consistent – and thus can really be seen as a fruitful perspective on how humankind should act in relation to the environment or not. The result from this investigation is that dark ecology is an invalid theory since it suffers from both incoherence and inconsistency. Based on this, it is concluded that dark ecology fails to achieve what it is presented to do. The answer to the research question of this essay, “Is dark ecology a theory that, if applied, leads to a change in humans’ relationship with the biosphere for the better?” is therefore “no”.