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Essays on International Trade and Oligopoly / 国際貿易と寡占についての研究Kamei, Keita 23 March 2015 (has links)
京都大学 / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第18753号 / 経博第504号 / 新制||経||272(附属図書館) / 31704 / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 柴田 章久, 教授 佐々木 啓明, 教授 神事 直人 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM
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分紅制度、不完全競爭與經濟成長 / Share-based Schemes, Market Imperfections, and Economic Growth劉嘉瀅, Liu, Chia Ying Unknown Date (has links)
本論文試圖在一個內生成長的理論架構下,去探討分紅制度所扮演的角色。在第二章中,我們設立一個商品市場不完全競爭的內生成長模型。在分紅比率為外生給定的情況下,我們發現分紅比率越高,對於就業越有利,但對經濟成長的效果則是不確定。此外,我們也探討在規範分析下的最適稅率。在第三章,分紅比率經由廠商與工會協商談判決定,藉著這樣的設定,我們成功的解釋為何失業與經濟成長率之間存在正向的關係。並且,在一個分紅制度的經濟體系之下,工會化的程度與經濟成長之間並不存在一個單調的關係,而是取決於談判的方式。為了解釋廠商為何會有動機去採行分紅制度,第四章我們將效率工資引進一個採行分紅制度的成長模型中。經由分紅制度的採行,我們發現,效率工資可視為一個使經濟成長的動力。並且,我們發現,資本使用與經濟成長率之間存在一同向關係,但勞工的努力程度和經濟成長之間的關係則是不確定的。 / This dissertation is a theoretical attempt to examine the role played by share-based schemes in an endogenous economic growth model. In Chapter 2 we set up an endogenous growth model with monopolistic competition in the goods market. Given an exogenously-determined worker share, we show that while a higher revenue-sharing ratio attributable to workers will promote employment, it will have an ambiguous effect on the balanced-growth rate. In addition, we investigate the optimal tax policy response to a revenue-sharing scheme and market imperfections, which are two market distortions.
In Chapter 3, the worker’s share is determined via the negotiation between a trade union and an employer federation. By shedding light on the role of revenue sharing and the bargaining institution, we successfully provide a theoretical explanation as to why unemployment can be quite compatible with high economic growth. In addition, in a share economy, unionization does not exhibit a monotonic relationship with growth. It also depends on the presence of revenue sharing and the bargaining institution.
To explain why firms themselves could be motivated to accept revenue sharing, we introduce the efficiency wage into our analytical framework and focus on the incentive effects of revenue sharing and their consequences on economic growth in Chapter 4. Specifically, our model comprises work effort and capital utilization. By virtue of the characteristics of modeling, we show that work effort can serve as an engine of economic growth. Of interest, we find that the balanced-growth rate is procyclical in relation to capital utilization, but it may be countercyclical in relation to work effort.
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Essays on the economics of corruption / Essais sur l'économie de la corruptionWadho, Waqar ahmed 22 June 2011 (has links)
Cette thèse est composée de trois essais; dans le premier essai je traite les questions de la détermination, de la variance et des répercussions de la corruption. J’ai montré que la corruption est déterminée par la part des travailleurs non qualifiés sur la population. Si cette part est large alors il existe une corruption, si elle est faible la corruption est inexistante, et pour des niveaux intermédiaires, il existe une multiplicité d’équilibres. La corruption augmente les inégalités salariales entre travailleurs qualifiés et non qualifiés, et une perte de bien-être. Dans le deuxième essai je traite la question de lutte contre la corruption à travers l’incitation salariale. Avec une technologie de contrôle endogène, je montre que le gouvernement peut mieux accepter la corruption lorsqu’il est coûteux de contrôler. Lorsqu’il est optimal de combattre alors le gouvernement peut le faire soit à travers des salaires d’efficience ou soit par le contrôle. Néanmoins le rôle des salaires d’efficience dans la lutte contre la corruption est moindre dans les sociétés avec un niveau de malhonnêteté élevé. Le troisième essai traite la malédiction des ressources naturelles. Je montre que l'éducation et la corruption sont déterminées conjointement ; les ressources naturelles affectent l’incitation à investir en éducation et en ‘rent-seeking’ ce qui en retour affecte la croissance. En outre, la relation entre une abondance et la malédiction des ressources naturelles n’est pas monotone. Pour un niveau d’inégalité d’accès à l’éducation faible et un coût élevé de participation dans la vie politique, un niveau de croissance élevé et la trappe à la pauvreté coexistent. / This dissertation consists of three essays. The topics cover determination, variance and repercussions of corruption (essay one), corruption deterrence through wage incentives (essay two), and natural resource curse (essay three). In the first essay, I show that for a larger population of unskilled labor, there is a widespread corruption and for a smaller population there is no corruption. For the intermediate levels there are multiple equilibria. On its consequences, corruption increases wage inequality between skilled and unskilled workers, and results in output and welfare losses. In the second essay, I argue that deterring corruption through efficiency wage may become prohibitively expensive. With endogenous monitoring technology that allows capturing the dual role of auditing, as a complement with and as a substitute for wage incentives, I find that the government is better-off accepting corruption when it is costly to monitor. When it is optimal to deter bribery, the government can do it either through efficiency wages or monitoring. The role of efficiency wages decreases in societies with higher level of dishonesty. In the third essay, I build a theory explaining a resource curse. In contrast to the existing literature which generally considers low education, corruption and natural resources separately, I combine three strands of literature. Natural resources affect incentives to invest in education and rent seeking that in turn affects growth. Second, the relationship between resource-abundance and resource-curse is non-monotonic. For low inequality in access to education and high cost of political participation, high-growth and poverty-trap equilibria co-exist.
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