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<p>Emission permit markets are being actively implemented as a regulatory method to control various types of pollution in the United States because of the potential efficiency improvements they offer. In Canada, regulators have been more cautious, frequently citing concern that proposed Canadian markets are expected to be thin and/or dominated by a single firm. In these circumstances, such a firm could manipulate prices to reduce its own emission control costs while increasing the total cost of pollution control across the market. Such activity might also cause emission permit markets to be viewed as unviable on efficiency and equity grounds. This thesis investigates the potential problems such markets might experience if one firm (or a group of firms) has the ability to manipulate market prices to their advantage. Given the lack of empirical data, experimental economic methods are used in an attempt to determine whether it is reasonable to assume violations of the basic competitive market assumptions should be expected to seriously undermine the efficiency benefits emission permit markets offer in a controlled setting.</p> <p>The experiments reported here show that in double auction markets with one dominant firm and a number of fringe firms, strategic manipulation occurs repeatedly in the laboratory. The dominant firm uses emission permits in a socially inefficient manner in order to reduce its costs, increase its profits and exclude rivals in downstream product markets. Far from finding increased market efficiency and decreased cost of pollution control, this study confirms that implementing permit markets when there are firms with market power may decrease efficiency. The resultant loss in gains from trade could also reduce the political viability of emission trading programs.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

A favourable environment is without any doubt a necessary condition of human existence. Its state is negatively affected by various human activities. The state is thus forced to intervene and ensure its protection, using various means. The aim of my thesis is to describe and analyse the financial and legal tools used in environmental protection and suggest possible improvements. The thesis consists of two chapters. Chapter one, containing seven subchapters, mainly explores the general characteristics of financial and legal tools used in the field of environmental protection. Subchapter one defines the term of financial and legal tools of the environmental protection. Subchapter two examines the influencing of financial and legal tools. Subchapter three describes the externalities and their relation to environmental protection. The fourth subchapter outlines the functions of financial and legal tools of environmental protection. The fifth subchapter deals with their categorization. Subchapter six outlines the advantages and disadvantages of financial and legal tools. Subchapter seven presents the financial and legal tools used by the European Union. Chapter two focuses on individual types of financial and legal tools and their current legislation. This chapter is divided into four subchapters. The...

<div>This dissertation consists of three chapters about the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). All chapters contributes to the scarce but recently great developing literature on installation and firm-level studies in the EU ETS. The first chapter evaluates the policy effectiveness and efficiency by theoretical modelling and</div><div>empirical assessment of firms’ emission abatement activities. The second chapter overviews the global emission trading market, documents the institutional background</div><div>of emission trading, and analyzes firms’ emission trading patterns in light of the broader empirical literature. The last chapter studies productivity and firms’ emission</div><div>permit trading behaviors by considering a complete set of options. In the first chapter, I investigate how firms reduce emissions under continuous adjustment of the policy by using the implementation of the three phases of EU ETS</div><div>as a cost shock. I develop a model of emission abatement with heterogeneous firms by introducing two channels: Reallocation and Investment which incur variable and</div><div>fixed abatement costs respectively. More productive firms are cleaner as they put more effort on Investment. However, the policy effect is ambiguous driven by the magnitude</div><div>and correlation of the proposed abatement technology parameters, which highlights the importance of the current abatement technology for firms’ responses to climate</div><div>policy. I then empirically test the model by using a novel dataset that matches firms’ financial, production and emission data. In addition to providing the elasticity of</div><div>emission intensity, the elasticity of Reallocation and Investment, the model enabled me to estimate the firm’s abatement technology parameters and decompose the emissions into the proposed two channels. The results indicate that firms have a higher efficiency on abatement in utilizing of inputs than green technology investment. The emission change is primarily driven by the channel of Reallocation and is concentrated in non-metallic</div><div>mineral companies. The green innovation is limited under the policy with a small emission intensity decrease even though there is large emission reductions. The second chapter reviews the global rise of emission trading, documents the institutional background of emission trading, and summarizes firms’ emission trading patterns. To the best of my knowledge, this study is one of the first to empirically analyze the trading behaviors of all ETS firms covering all three phases in the EU ETS. I use two micro-level datasets to investigate the permit trading behaviors of all types of trading in the market, including international offset permits. Some explanations of the identified trading patterns are provided in this paper. Additionally, this study also discusses the patterns in light of the broader empirical literature. The last chapter contributes to the literature on the firms’ permit trading behaviors. The development of the EU ETS has complicated firms’ decisions around carbon trading and offered firms more options to offset emissions. We provide a first look at the determinants behind firms’ participation in the EU ETS as well as their trading behaviors by considering a complete portfolio of permit trade markets</div><div>in the EU ETS. Based on a comprehensive permit transaction dataset linked with individual level firm’s characteristics, we quantitatively analyze firms’ participation</div><div>decisions and trading patterns. We focus on the impact of firms’ productivity, endowment position, and endowment value on market choice and trading amount. Our</div><div>results suggest that productive firms are more likely to participate in permits trading and to purchase the permits in the secondary and international markets. Conditional</div><div>on firms’ market choice, the permit trading amount is also correlated with a firm’s productivity and endowment value. In addition, firms in power and energy sector are</div><div>more likely to participate in permit trading than other manufacturing firms. Overall, the empirical results indicate that less productive firms have disadvantages competing</div><div>in the permit trade market.</div>

Undersökningen syftar till att ge en bild av vilka förutsättningar och möjligheter det finns för uppförande av en försorteringsanläggning där plasten i avfallet kan sorteras ut. Detta sker genom att undersöka ekonomiska besparingar genom minskat behov av utsläppsrätter, identifiera lämplig utsorteringsteknik, utreda hur avsättningen för utsorterad plast kan se ut genom att identifiera potentiella mottagare samt kostnader för avsättning och transport. Undersökningen tyder på att NIR-teknik är den mest lämpliga för en försorteringsanläggning. Med Svensk Plaståtervinning som mottagare beräknas en framtida försorteringsanläggning kunna minska mängden plast som går till förbränning med 48%. Detta motsvarar en kostnadsbesparing i utsläppsrätter på 7 670 000 kr per år med dagens utsläppsrättspriser och 9 850 000 kronor per år med estimerade värden för framtidens utsläppsrättspriser. En medförd årlig transportkostnad av den utsorterade plasten till mottagare beräknas uppgå på 632 000 kronor per år. Det finns idag ett flertal potentiella mottagare av den utsorterade plasten men ett pris för denna hantering är svårt att få och kräver vidare utredning och diskussion. Ett ungefärligt europeiskt marknadspris för hantering av utsorterad förpackningsplast är givet till cirka 250 €/ton.

This thesis extends the standard shirking model of efficiency wages to a continuum of effort levels. The generalisation completely overturns previous intuitions. In particular, the characteristic feature of the earlier theory that monitoring and pay are substitute instruments for motivating workers, no longer exists. This is remarkable, since such a negative correlation has been used as the primary empirical test for the existence of efficiency wages. With a continuum of effort levels, the efficiency wage model can also more conveniently be compared with conventional linear incentive wages. The most frequently recurring objection against the efficiency wage model is that unemployed workers should offer to pay entrance fees. This criticism is responded to in a model with finitely many periods. It is shown that the per period worker rents associated with efficiency wages strongly diminishes with the number of periods. It is further argued that both bonds and entrance fees are inferior means of extracting the remaining worker rents compared to investments in firm specific human capital. Finally, the above refinements of the efficiency wage theory are translated to fit in the arena of environmental economics and government policy. The corresponding results establish a rationale for a government to subsidise polluting firms and explain why a command and control policy is preferable to market-based incentive schemes. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 1999

No description available.

This thesis deals with instruments of economic regulation related to environment protection in the field of energetics. It surveys selected instruments in the form of ecological taxes and Emission Trading System. It clarifies the origin and development of these instruments and their integration into the legislation of the Czech Republic. The major aim of the thesis is to analyze the impact of ecological taxes and trading with emission permits on management decisions of a company.The analysis and calculations have been carried out in a real enterprise. I have tried to prove how the System of Emission Trading impacts on the management decision and strategic goals of a company due to further development of the EU System of Emission Trading, its changes as well as changes in production of a company.

Thesis Abstract: Chapter I: Regional burden sharing of GHG mitigation policies – A Canadian perspective. The distribution of the burden of cost arising from the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is a contentious issue in policy discussions; more so among regional jurisdictions in the federalist countries with decentralized authorities over environmental regulations. In this setting, often the policy discussions are focused on the distribution of regional emission reduction targets that, in turn, entails negotiations over the distribution of the scarcity rents and the regional transfers of wealth. The allocation of regional emission entitlements is thus a key factor that could hinder the political feasibility of a national GHG mitigation policy. In this paper, we build a multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Canadian economy to assess the implications of different burden sharing rules governing the national GHG abatement policy with a cap-and-trade system of emission permits. In addition to assessing the impacts of traditional regional emissions allocation rules that involve intra-regional transfers of wealth, we consider a particular emission allocation that avoids such transfers, which may be a more palatable option given the context of likely fierce negotiations over the issue. Our results indicate to differing outcomes depending on the allocation policy in use. The CGE framework is also able to shed light on the transmission mechanisms that drive the results underlying the policy options. Chapter II: Endogenous technological change and emission allowances. Given the imminent threat of global warming due to GHG emissions, a number of emission mitigation policies have been proposed in the literature. However, they generally suffer from the classical equity-efficiency trade-off. High costs from equity concerns often render environmental policies politically unattractive and thus hard to implement. Recent advancement in the climate policy modeling literature that incorporates endogenous technological change (ETC) into the framework can potentially bring new insights into this debate. Using an inter-temporal, multi-sector CGE approach with ETC incorporated into the framework, this paper builds a model that focuses on the equity-efficiency debate for the policymakers. Canada is chosen as the country of investigation for this purpose. The paper provides a new welfare ranking of four permit allocation policies that address the equity-efficiency trade-off. In a second-best setting with pre-existing distortions, output-based allocation (OBA) of emission permits is compared to three other policy options: (i) an emissions trading system with grandfathered allocation (GFA), (ii) an auction permit trading system where permit revenue is recycled to lower payroll taxes (RPT), and (iii) a hybrid of OBA and R&D subsidy (O-R&D). We find that adapting OBA, as well as O-R&D, is welfare improving over GFA. The implicit output subsidy, entailed in the OBA policy, mitigates against the rising cost effect in the GFA policy. This is reinforced through added investment incentive in R&D when ETC in incorporated into the framework. With O-R&D, since the R&D subsidy corrects for market imperfections in the knowledge accumulation process, the effect is further bolstered, culminating into mitigation of uneven distributional outcome for energy-intensive industries as a whole. Contrary to previous results, we also find that, in terms of the welfare metric, OBA unequivocally improves the distributional outcome across sectors as compared to the RPT policy. Inclusion of ETC also unequivocally generates a higher welfare ranking for all permit policy schemes. Chapter III: Emission permit banking and induced technological change. This paper attempts to undertake an exploratory research by integrating two themes in the emission mitigation policy literature, which include: the inter-temporal emission permit banking and borrowing and the role of induced technological change in emission mitigation. Using a simple optimal control approach, we construct a unified framework that evaluates the optimal path of emissions and the optimal trajectory of permit price when both inter-temporal banking and borrowing of permits and the effects of induced technological change (ITC) are present. We find that ITC leads to a declining emission trajectory over time. The effect of ITC on the optimal permit price path, however, is ambiguous and critically depends on the extent of marginal cost saving that emanates from emission-saving technological innovation.

Thesis Abstract: Chapter I: Regional burden sharing of GHG mitigation policies – A Canadian perspective. The distribution of the burden of cost arising from the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is a contentious issue in policy discussions; more so among regional jurisdictions in the federalist countries with decentralized authorities over environmental regulations. In this setting, often the policy discussions are focused on the distribution of regional emission reduction targets that, in turn, entails negotiations over the distribution of the scarcity rents and the regional transfers of wealth. The allocation of regional emission entitlements is thus a key factor that could hinder the political feasibility of a national GHG mitigation policy. In this paper, we build a multi-region computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of the Canadian economy to assess the implications of different burden sharing rules governing the national GHG abatement policy with a cap-and-trade system of emission permits. In addition to assessing the impacts of traditional regional emissions allocation rules that involve intra-regional transfers of wealth, we consider a particular emission allocation that avoids such transfers, which may be a more palatable option given the context of likely fierce negotiations over the issue. Our results indicate to differing outcomes depending on the allocation policy in use. The CGE framework is also able to shed light on the transmission mechanisms that drive the results underlying the policy options. Chapter II: Endogenous technological change and emission allowances. Given the imminent threat of global warming due to GHG emissions, a number of emission mitigation policies have been proposed in the literature. However, they generally suffer from the classical equity-efficiency trade-off. High costs from equity concerns often render environmental policies politically unattractive and thus hard to implement. Recent advancement in the climate policy modeling literature that incorporates endogenous technological change (ETC) into the framework can potentially bring new insights into this debate. Using an inter-temporal, multi-sector CGE approach with ETC incorporated into the framework, this paper builds a model that focuses on the equity-efficiency debate for the policymakers. Canada is chosen as the country of investigation for this purpose. The paper provides a new welfare ranking of four permit allocation policies that address the equity-efficiency trade-off. In a second-best setting with pre-existing distortions, output-based allocation (OBA) of emission permits is compared to three other policy options: (i) an emissions trading system with grandfathered allocation (GFA), (ii) an auction permit trading system where permit revenue is recycled to lower payroll taxes (RPT), and (iii) a hybrid of OBA and R&D subsidy (O-R&D). We find that adapting OBA, as well as O-R&D, is welfare improving over GFA. The implicit output subsidy, entailed in the OBA policy, mitigates against the rising cost effect in the GFA policy. This is reinforced through added investment incentive in R&D when ETC in incorporated into the framework. With O-R&D, since the R&D subsidy corrects for market imperfections in the knowledge accumulation process, the effect is further bolstered, culminating into mitigation of uneven distributional outcome for energy-intensive industries as a whole. Contrary to previous results, we also find that, in terms of the welfare metric, OBA unequivocally improves the distributional outcome across sectors as compared to the RPT policy. Inclusion of ETC also unequivocally generates a higher welfare ranking for all permit policy schemes. Chapter III: Emission permit banking and induced technological change. This paper attempts to undertake an exploratory research by integrating two themes in the emission mitigation policy literature, which include: the inter-temporal emission permit banking and borrowing and the role of induced technological change in emission mitigation. Using a simple optimal control approach, we construct a unified framework that evaluates the optimal path of emissions and the optimal trajectory of permit price when both inter-temporal banking and borrowing of permits and the effects of induced technological change (ITC) are present. We find that ITC leads to a declining emission trajectory over time. The effect of ITC on the optimal permit price path, however, is ambiguous and critically depends on the extent of marginal cost saving that emanates from emission-saving technological innovation.