I explore the epistemic justification of self-beliefs regarding personality traits within the internalism-externalism debate. Historically, the question of epistemic justification of self-beliefs has been discussed only with respect to our beliefs about our current mental states while the epistemic justification of our self-beliefs about our personality traits was assumed not to be any different from the justification of our beliefs about the external world. However, I use empirical psychology to highlight a few unique characteristics of our self-beliefs about personality traits that make the typical application of internalist or externalist standards less straightforward. These characteristics have to do with the biases and the self-verification that accompany our self-beliefs about our personality traits. I argue that externalism, in general, and virtue reliabilism, in particular, are more suitable to the context of our self-beliefs about our personality traits than other theories of justification. However, I contend that within the virtue reliabilism framework, a self-belief-forming process can become more competent if it generates self-belief from the instances where individuals manifest the trait in question while having the motivation and opportunity to do otherwise. I show how this condition makes the self-belief-forming process more competent and, therefore, makes the produced self-beliefs more epistemically justified. / Thesis / Master of Philosophy (MA)

This thesis is about the relationship between a belief being justified and it being true. It defends a version of the view that the fundamental point of having a justified belief is to have a true one. The particular version of that view it defends is the claim that belief is subject to a truth norm – i.e. a norm or standard that says that one should believe something if and only if it’s true. It claims that belief being subject to such a truth norm can explain which beliefs count as justified and which do not. After introducing the idea of a truth norm (Ch. 1), the argument of my thesis involves two main stages. Part One of the thesis (Chs. 2-3) contains the first stage, in which I argue that my way of arguing for a truth norm, on the basis of its explanatory role in epistemology, is much more likely to be successful than a more popular way of arguing for a truth norm, on the basis of its explanatory role in the philosophy of mind. Part Two (Chs. 4-7) contains the second stage, in which I argue that the truth norm can indeed explain justification in the way I’ve outlined. I do this by answering four criticisms that have been made of the claim that belief is subject to a truth norm. These criticisms claim that a truth norm should be rejected because, in turn, a truth norm cannot guide belief formation (Ch. 4), because a truth norm prescribes believing all the truths (Ch. 5), because a truth norm never prescribes suspending judgement (Ch. 6), and because a truth norm in some cases prescribes making problematic trade-offs of having one false belief for the sake of having many true beliefs (Ch. 7). I argue that all of these criticisms fail. But it is through answering these criticisms that we can see the contours of a defensible explanation of justification in terms of the truth norm.

Bayesian epistemology provides a promising framework for a theory of epistemic rationality. But the way in which this framework has been built upon thus far yields an unfortunately mechanical picture of rationality, on which rational agents are mere data crunchers who receive evidential input and spit out numeric credal output. This picture is rightly criticized, most prominently by Bas van Fraassen, for being too narrow and restrictive and thus failing to account for certain features which rationality plausibly has, such as a degree of permissiveness, and for certain unconventional rational phenomena, such as conversions. Unfortunately, van Fraassen’s apt criticism of mechanistic rationality overshoots its mark in seeking to topple the entire Bayesian framework. Bayesian epistemology suffers a guilt by association with the robotic picture. This dissertation aims to restore Bayesianism from the mechanistic but often implicit assumptions which corrode it, and to rebuild, from the Bayesian foundation, an alternative picture of rationality as a property of sentient agents who are capable of understanding and mentally engaging with the objects of their credences. Along the way I account for some basic Bayesian objects such as credence and evidential input. I also accord a central role to the ability of representational experiences, largely sidelined in many Bayesian discussions, to give rise to surprising evidence. On these building blocks I develop theory of rationality, Expansive Bayesianism, which evades the criticisms launched at the robotic picture and shows that Bayesianism itself is a fruitful and powerful framework for a theory of rationality.

Recent scholarship on Hegel has employed the Wittgensteinian concept of a "form of life" in order to explain how sociality shapes and determines the reflective practices of self-conscious individuals. However, few of these scholars have considered how the non-reflective aspects of inhabiting a form of life- especially the abilities to form habits and to have feelings- contribute to the reflective aspects. In this thesis I argue that this oversight leads to serious exegetical and philosophical problems for making sense of Hegel's theory of ethical life. Not only does Hegel regard habit and feeling as playing a necessary role in the justification of our reflective practices, but he is right to do so, since, were he not to consider these factors, he could not account for how any of our moral claims could be justified.

In this thesis I scavenge the history of philosophy for answers to the question ‘How are claims to knowledge justified?’. I argue that Plato’s psychological doctrine of knowledge marks the starting point of a philosophical inquiry motivated by the possibility to discover foundations of knowledge through investigating the nature of mind. At the core of this inquiry lies the hypothesis that if the psychological mechanisms that govern the capacity for knowledge acquisition is fully understood, then answers will follow about why judgements are true or false. The prospective result of the inquiry is a theory of universal epistemic justification which demarcates epistemically warranted beliefs from unwarranted beliefs. I suggest that there is a historically persistent case of cognitive dissonance within the epistemological enterprise — a tension between two of its central theses — which is caused by the persistence of the of the hitherto unsuccessful but ongoing quest for universal epistemic justification, and its inciting promises. The contradicting theses are those of certain justification (that one is justified in believing that p only if p is entailed by evidence) and proportional justification (that one is proportionally justified in believing that p to the extent that evidence makes p credible). I discuss the consequences of giving up one of the respective theses. I conclude that the thesis of certain justification cannot be given up unless an adequate theory of proportional justification is proposed, and that the legacy of searching for universal epistemic justification will continue unless epistemologists are able to construct one.

No description available.

No description available.

<p>The instrumental conception of epistemic rationality is the view according to which beliefs, or doxastic states generally, are epistemically rational insofar as they promote the achievement of an epistemic goal, and they are epistemically irrational to the extent that they fail to promote such a goal. The thesis that I defend here is that the instrumental conception is not satisfactory as a general account of epistemic rationality.</p> <p>I proceed by examining a number of reasons one might offer for accepting the instrumental account, and I find them wanting. I also consider various ways of formulating the epistemic goal, attempting to determine the best one, in order to show the instrumental conception in its best light. I consider and reject the attempt to ground the instrumental conception on the proper function of our cognitive systems. Finally, I consider three arguments against the instrumental conception of epistemic rationality, and some objections to them. I conclude that, even shown in its most favourable light, the instrumental conception cannot give us a satisfactory general account of epistemic rationality.</p> / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Ce mémoire se concentre sur le problème de la régression épistémique. Il s’agit d’un problème très important puisqu’il remet en question la possibilité de la justification. Nous nous intéresserons aux détails de ce problème, ainsi qu’aux réponses qui lui sont offertes. Traditionnellement, deux réponses sont concurrentes : le fondationnalisme et le cohérentisme. La première propose d’arrêter la régression à un fondement, alors que la seconde propose de s’intéresser à la cohérence partagée par les croyances. Toutefois, le but de notre mémoire est de présenter et de défendre une troisième solution : l’infinitisme. Introduite dans les années 1990 par Peter Klein, l’infinitisme est une des plus récentes théories de la justification et, malgré son intérêt, elle est encore très peu défendue. Cette théorie propose de résoudre le problème de la régression en basant la justification des croyances sur des séries infinies et non répétitives de raisons. Cette idée est intéressante, car l’infinitisme renverse le problème d’origine, puisque les régressions infinies sont généralement perçues comme étant un problème pour la connaissance et la source du scepticisme. Notre objectif est de montrer que l’infinitisme est la meilleure solution possible au problème de la régression. Pour ce faire, nous faisons la synthèse des principaux arguments pour l’infinitisme. Cela nous permettra de distinguer trois types d’infinitisme pour ensuite retenir un de ces types, une forme impure d’infinitisme, comme étant le meilleur. Finalement, nous confronterons l’infinitisme à ces critiques pour montrer qu’il s’agit d’une théorie de la justification qui est réellement viable. / This dissertation focuses on the problem of epistemic regression which questions the possibility of justification. For this reason we’ll take interest in the details of epistemic regression and in the solutions that different critics offer to solve the problem. Generally, two positions oppose each other : foundationalism and coherentism. The first one proposes to stop the regression at a foundation, as the second one takes concern about the coherence shared amongst the beliefs. However the purpose of this dissertation is to present and defend a third position : infinitism. Introduced in the 1990’s by Peter Klein, infinitism is one of the most recent theories of justification. Although it is quite appealing, Klein’s theory is not very popular and few people defend this position. Infinitism offers to solve the problem of regression by basing the justification of the beliefs on series of infinite and non repetitive reasons. Consequently, infinitism reverses the initial problem because infinite regression is often perceived as an issue for knowledge and a source for scepticism. Our goal is to demonstrate that infinitism is the best way to solve the problem of epistemic regression. Therefore, we’ll synthesize the arguments in favor of infinitism and that will mark out three types of infinitism from which we’ll retain one, an impure form of infinitism, as best suited to answer the problem of regression. Finally we’ll respond to the main oppositions to infinitism in order to demonstrate that it is in fact a viable theory of justification.

Ce mémoire se concentre sur le problème de la régression épistémique. Il s’agit d’un problème très important puisqu’il remet en question la possibilité de la justification. Nous nous intéresserons aux détails de ce problème, ainsi qu’aux réponses qui lui sont offertes. Traditionnellement, deux réponses sont concurrentes : le fondationnalisme et le cohérentisme. La première propose d’arrêter la régression à un fondement, alors que la seconde propose de s’intéresser à la cohérence partagée par les croyances. Toutefois, le but de notre mémoire est de présenter et de défendre une troisième solution : l’infinitisme. Introduite dans les années 1990 par Peter Klein, l’infinitisme est une des plus récentes théories de la justification et, malgré son intérêt, elle est encore très peu défendue. Cette théorie propose de résoudre le problème de la régression en basant la justification des croyances sur des séries infinies et non répétitives de raisons. Cette idée est intéressante, car l’infinitisme renverse le problème d’origine, puisque les régressions infinies sont généralement perçues comme étant un problème pour la connaissance et la source du scepticisme. Notre objectif est de montrer que l’infinitisme est la meilleure solution possible au problème de la régression. Pour ce faire, nous faisons la synthèse des principaux arguments pour l’infinitisme. Cela nous permettra de distinguer trois types d’infinitisme pour ensuite retenir un de ces types, une forme impure d’infinitisme, comme étant le meilleur. Finalement, nous confronterons l’infinitisme à ces critiques pour montrer qu’il s’agit d’une théorie de la justification qui est réellement viable. / This dissertation focuses on the problem of epistemic regression which questions the possibility of justification. For this reason we’ll take interest in the details of epistemic regression and in the solutions that different critics offer to solve the problem. Generally, two positions oppose each other : foundationalism and coherentism. The first one proposes to stop the regression at a foundation, as the second one takes concern about the coherence shared amongst the beliefs. However the purpose of this dissertation is to present and defend a third position : infinitism. Introduced in the 1990’s by Peter Klein, infinitism is one of the most recent theories of justification. Although it is quite appealing, Klein’s theory is not very popular and few people defend this position. Infinitism offers to solve the problem of regression by basing the justification of the beliefs on series of infinite and non repetitive reasons. Consequently, infinitism reverses the initial problem because infinite regression is often perceived as an issue for knowledge and a source for scepticism. Our goal is to demonstrate that infinitism is the best way to solve the problem of epistemic regression. Therefore, we’ll synthesize the arguments in favor of infinitism and that will mark out three types of infinitism from which we’ll retain one, an impure form of infinitism, as best suited to answer the problem of regression. Finally we’ll respond to the main oppositions to infinitism in order to demonstrate that it is in fact a viable theory of justification.