This thesis focuses on Sophocles&rsquo / Antigone in the context of Hegel&rsquo / s reference to it in describing the ancient Greek ethical life in the chapter on &ldquo / Spirit&rdquo / of the Phenomenology of Spirit. While evaluating the ancient Greek ethical life as a moment on the way to Spirit&rsquo / s self-knowledge which dissolves through its own dialectics, Hegel describes the inherent contradictions of ancient Greek ethical life which cause its dissolution through Antigone. Antigone&rsquo / s act of mourning has a central position in the context of the supersession of these contradictions. The aim of this thesis is to understand the ancient Greek ethical life as Hegel describes it and to specify Antigone&rsquo / s position in this description.

Recently, a number of scholars have sought to reveal the extent to which the concept of religion and the discipline of religious studies depend upon a distinction between humans and other animals for their conceptual and disciplinary integrity. This dissertation is an attempt to deepen this insight by (re)turning to one of the central figures in the history of thinking about religion, G.W.F. Hegel, whose Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion represent one of the first forays into the academic study of religion. By employing the non-human animal as a limit-case, this project attempts to probe Hegel’s concept of religion for a place where it might be possible to think “religion” anew. This “place” can be found in Hegel’s concept of habit or Gewohnheit, since habit unsettles the distinction between nature and spirit, leaving open a way to rethink “religion” as being rooted in the animal or quasi-natural. Chapter 1 considers Alexandre Kojève’s worry that, at the proverbial “end of history,” the human being will become “reanimalized.” We argue that the (im)possibility of such a reanimalization lies in Hegel’s concept of habit or Gewohnheit, that “mechanism,” which aids the natural or feeling-soul in its “transition” to spirit or, more specifically, consciousness. In chapter 2, we consider the relationship between nature and spirit further, exploring the relationship between thought and feeling as thematized in Hegel’s philosophy of religion. Hegel argues (in contrast to the likes of Schleiermacher) that religion cannot have its essence in feeling, because feeling is a form of thought. In chapter 3, we take a closer look at how habit aids in the “transition” or passing-over from nature to spirit, highlighting habit as skill. Habit is a means for the purification of the natural drives and for replacing these drives with those of another, spiritual nature. However, we will find that the transition from nature to spirit cannot be accomplished through habit alone; it depends upon an encounter with the infinite or death, wherein the subject realizes her own in/finitude. In chapter 4, we consider how spirit expresses itself through the human body and, most importantly, through language and (the language of) sacrifice. While the death of the animal is the becoming of spirit, spirit depends upon the death of the animal even after it makes its first appearance in language since speech or language is dependent upon the animal voice. In the final chapter, we discover that religion too is predicated on the death or sacrifice of the animal. Moreover, it is through religion that human beings raise themselves above the animals and learn how to recognize themselves as essentially spiritual beings. Religion brings about this realization, this conversion from nature to spirit, through the cultus – a form of religious practice akin to a habit as skill. In the cultus, the human subject undergoes a conversion and becomes aware of herself as a spiritual rather than a natural being. When performed continuously, this cultus becomes the basis of the ethical as well as the philosophical life.

I develop a connection between Hegel's account of Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit) and his ontology, arguing that Ethical Life draws out some of the more intuitive and subtle sides of Hegel's ontology on the one hand, and some of its more ambitious and challenging aspects on the other. Ethical Life, for Hegel, signifies our lived, normative, concrete social reality; my central claim is that Hegel uses this account to illustrate (and support) some of his key ontological convictions. I begin by showing how Ethical Life figures centrally in Hegel's attempt to ontologically prioritize intelligibility. Chapter One is devoted to Hegel's case for this ontological priority: essentially, the argument is that we ought to accept (and implicitly already do accept) the adequacy of thought to being, and that this adequacy entails that the object in its fully experienceable multilayered depth is its fundamentally "real" form. I then argue, in Chapter Two, that Ethical Life develops an account of the Self-World relation better able to accommodate a world of such intelligible objects: Ethical Life premises itself on "Self-World mutual-constitution," where Self and World each are what they are in virtue of the greater relation between them. This integrated relationship, this greater whole, becomes the ground on and out of which such intelligible objects can emerge, develop, and sustain themselves. The dissertation's second half further defines key strands of Hegel's ontology, such as the demand that a philosophically viable ontological model be a wholly self-contained and self-explanatory, self-supporting and self-determining, intelligibility- and process-oriented totalistic whole. This demand comes out, for example, in Hegel's critique of Kant, which is the topic of Chapter Three. There, I argue that Hegel charges Kant with an ontological conservatism, with retaining "pure" forms of subjectivity and objectivity, the possibility of which had been made questionable by the transcendental turn. Hegel instead suggests that we drop such problematic notions as Things-in-themselves or Pure Concepts of the Understanding, opting instead to simply recast the experienced world as conceptually determined appearances per se. The conceptual self-determination of appearances, meanwhile, is something Hegel will associate with his notion of Reason, and in Chapters Four and Five, I consider the relation of Ethical Life to this notion of Reason. Hegel characterizes Ethical Life as "actual Reason," and I argue in Chapter Four that the currently prevalent, non-metaphysical readings of Hegel's social thought (what I call the rational justifiability reading) are incomplete to the extent that they fail to adequately integrate into their account the fact that Reason, for Hegel, is (among other things) an ontologically operative principle. Hegel identifies Reason with the experienced world's conceptual self-determination, or with the intelligible framework which structures, animates, and stabilizes the experienced world. This identification is essential to Hegel, in that it methodologically opens up the possibility of developing an account that not only can be intellectually identified with the experienced world, but can be directly, experientially recognized in (or as) the experienced world. In Chapter Five, I argue that Ethical Life plays a key role here by offering an account --even an illustration-- of Reason in its operation as the experienced world's conceptual self-determination. Custom and Fate, two concepts encountered in Ethical Life, portray an uncomprehending intuition of the experienced world's conceptual self-determination in the moment of its concrete operation; the "internal" experience of this process described in Ethical Life also displays how intelligible principles can immanently sustain and determine the experienced world. Ethical Life, I ultimately argue, brings Hegel's ontology down to earth, so to speak. Through Ethical Life, we come to see that a number of Hegel's less-familiar and more seemingly foreboding claims can be associated with recognizable phenomena, or even identified with the experienced world. Yet, simultaneously, recognizing this connection helps us appreciate the ambition of Hegel's challenge to us to reconsider our presuppositions: we experience reality to be richly complex yet intelligibly ordered --Hegel's ontology asks us now to take seriously the implications of the possibility of our experience's being a veritable revelation of reality. / Philosophy

Recent scholarship on Hegel has employed the Wittgensteinian concept of a "form of life" in order to explain how sociality shapes and determines the reflective practices of self-conscious individuals. However, few of these scholars have considered how the non-reflective aspects of inhabiting a form of life- especially the abilities to form habits and to have feelings- contribute to the reflective aspects. In this thesis I argue that this oversight leads to serious exegetical and philosophical problems for making sense of Hegel's theory of ethical life. Not only does Hegel regard habit and feeling as playing a necessary role in the justification of our reflective practices, but he is right to do so, since, were he not to consider these factors, he could not account for how any of our moral claims could be justified.

The present work aims to analyse the dynamics between the concepts atstake within the transition from morality to ethical life in Hegel’s “Philosophy of Objective Spirit”. Our hermeneutical and conceptual resource consists in the complementary readings of the dialectical movements of “morality” in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and in his Phenomenology of Spirit. First of all, we will examine the concepts of abstract good and conscience (das Gewissen) that appear in the Philosophy of Right. Secondly, we will examine the meaning of such concepts (the moral worldview and conscience or acting moral consciousness) in the Phenomenology of Spirit as complementary concepts. Finally, we offer a formulation and analysis of the meaning of the overall transition from morality to ethical life, starting from the dialectic articulation of both concepts, and the emergence of ethical freedom as an overcoming of moral freedom. / El presente trabajo tiene como objetivo hacer un análisis de la dinámicaentre los conceptos en juego en el tránsito de la moralidad a la eticidad en la filosofía del espíritu objetivo de Hegel. El recurso hermenéutico y conceptual al que apelamos es la complementación entre las lecturas de los movimientos dialécticos de la “Moralidad” en la Filosofía del derecho y de la “Moralidad” en el capítulo sobre el espíritu en la Fenomenología del espíritu. En primer lugar, desarrollaremos los conceptos de conciencia moral del deber (el bien abstracto) y la buena conciencia (das Gewissen) en la Filosofía del derecho. En segundo lugar, abordaremos, como complemento conceptual, el sentido de tales conceptos (la visión moral del mundo y la buena conciencia o conciencia moral actuante) en la Fenomenología del espíritu. Finalmente, ofreceremos, a partir de la articulación dialéctica de tales conceptos, la formulación y el análisis de lo que significa el tránsito de la moralidad a la eticidad y el surgimiento de la libertad ética como superación de la libertad moral.

No mesmo ano de 1844 as duas grandes leituras sobre a relação entre a economia política e a filosofia de Hegel foram estabelecidas pela primeira vez. De um lado Rosenkranz apontava para as questões envolvidas naquilo que a Filosofia do direito (1821) abarcava sob o nome de sociedade civil. De outro, Marx apontava para a importância da noção de noção de trabalho, especialmente na Fenomenologia do espírito (1807). Sem se alinhar definitivamente com nenhuma destas duas tradições, esta pesquisa se propõe a analisar esta influência tanto no campo mais restrito da sociedade civil, quanto no tema do trabalho, buscando articular estes dois campos a partir do processo de abstração que se impõe como base do trabalho, se desdobra na sociedade civil (multiplicação de carências, abstração do trabalho, valor, colonização) e aponta para o espírito absoluto (estado e história mundial). Veremos que este processo de abstração (que se impõe também como base da linguagem) é a condição negativa do advento do espírito, precisamente por fazer do mundo (o ser, a exterioridade) propriedade do espírito. / In the same year of 1844, the two major readings of the relationship between political economy and Hegelian philosophy were established for the first time. On one side, Rosenkranz pointed the questions concerning what the Philosophy of Right (1821) designated as civil society. On the other, Marx pointed to the importance of the notion of labor, specially in the Phenomenology of the Spirit (1807). Without definitely align with either of these two traditions, this research proposes itself to analyse this influence both in the more restricted field of civil society and in the theme of labor, searching to articulate this two fields from the abstraction process that imposes itself as the groundwork of labor, unfolds itself in the civil society (multiplication of needs, abstraction of labor, value, colonization) and points to the absolute spirit (state and world history). We shall see that this process of abstraction (which also imposes itself as groundwork of language) is the negative condition for the coming of the spirit, precisely for transforming the world (the being, the exteriority) property of the spirit

Submitted by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-22T14:51:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-phellipe-marran.pdf: 786585 bytes, checksum: 9aec77621aee01c10d389862c31b74af (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Andrea Hayashi (deachan@gmail.com) on 2016-06-22T14:54:41Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-phellipe-marran.pdf: 786585 bytes, checksum: 9aec77621aee01c10d389862c31b74af (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-22T14:54:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao-phellipe-marran.pdf: 786585 bytes, checksum: 9aec77621aee01c10d389862c31b74af (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-06-20 / O objeto desta pesquisa consiste no estudo da concepção de “substância enquanto sujeito” à qual é fundamental para a compreensão do processo de formação do inconsciente político do indivíduo moderno, sob o prisma do idealismo alemão. Mais especificamente, tal estudo busca desenvolver-se a partir de uma articulação entre as obras Fenomenologia do Espírito, Enciclopédia das ciências filosóficas e Ciência da Lógica de Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. Propõe-se uma apresentação das interpretações dos conceitos presentes nas obras de alguns estudiosos de Hegel, para elucidar os vínculos entre a reflexão da política e a da própria Sittlichkeit. Para tanto, será do interesse deste estudo expor a leitura que Hegel faz da tensão política da liberdade presente na obra de Immanuel Kant, levando em conta as implicações que tal tensão política acaba por apresentar em três momentos específicos: o primeiro deles é o momento da fundação do Estado; o segundo momento é o da manutenção do Estado; e o terceiro é o da revolução. Ao desenvolver o estudo propomo-nos a realizar investigação da articulação sistêmica entre antropologia e fenomenologia, na medida em que ela permite apreender as determinações recíprocas (negações determinadas) entre educação (Erziehung) e formação (Bildung); articulação e determinações talvez permitam delinear a figura do sujeito à luz das mediações internas à transição entre o que Hegel chamou de “sensação do direito” e “sentimento do direito”. / The purpose of this research is the study of designing "the substance as a subject " is crucial to the understanding of the formation process of the political unconscious of the modern individual from the German idealism’s perspective. More specifically, this study seeks to develop from an articulation between Phenomenology of the Spirit, Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences and Science of Logic, by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. We propose a presentation of the concepts’ interpretations in the works of some scholars of Hegel , to elucidate the links between politics’ reflection and the Sittlichkeit itself . To this end, this study will be of interest to expose the reading that Hegel does of the political tension of freedom in Immanuel Kant’s work , considering the implications that such political tension puts forward three specific moments: the first of them is the moment of foundation of the State; the second moment is the maintenance of the State; and the third is the revolution. In developing the study we propose to do the investigation of the systemic links between anthropology and phenomenology, as it allows to learn the reciprocal determinations (denials determinations) between education (Erziehung) and self-cultivation (Bildung); articulation and determinations may allow to delineate the figure of the subject in the light of the internal intercession between what Hegel called "Law’ Sense" and "Law’s consciousness" mediations.

Democratic Ethical Life and the Struggle for Recognition: AReconstruction of Hegel’s Inluence on Deliberative Democracy”. Hegel’s politicalphilosophy represents a signiicant contribution to the understanding of moderndemocracy and social dynamics. As regards modern democracy, the concept ofdemocratic ethical life presented by Wellmer allows for the integration of equalsubjective rights and citizen participation in a deliberative culture that illsdemocracy with citizen vitality without going against individual liberties. As forsocial dynamics, they can be explained by the need for reciprocal recognition asthe key to the constitution of subjectivity, which explains the moral motivation inthe struggles of social groups. Both concepts are closely interwoven because thestruggle for recognition allows for an explanation of the dynamics of democraticethical life. Thus, democratic ethical life and the struggle for recognition, asinterwoven concepts, offer two key notions for the solution of some of the obstacleswith which contemporary political philosophy must deal. / La ilosofía política de Hegel ofrece una signiicativa contribución parala explicación de la democracia moderna y de la dinámica social. En el primercaso, el concepto de eticidad democrática, que Wellmer postula, permite integrarderechos subjetivos iguales y la participación ciudadana en una cultura deliberativaque dota a la democracia de vitalidad ciudadana sin violentar libertadesindividuales. En el segundo caso, la dinámica social puede ser explicada a partirde la necesidad de reconocimiento recíproco como clave de la constitución de lasubjetividad, que explica la motivación moral de las luchas de los grupos sociales.Ambos conceptos se encuentran internamente ligados ya que la lucha porel reconocimiento permite explicar la dinámica de una eticidad democrática. Deesta forma, eticidad democrática y lucha por el reconocimiento, en tanto conceptosinternamente ligados, ofrecen dos claves conceptuales para la solución dealgunos de los bloqueos que debe enfrentar la ilosofía política contemporánea.

No mesmo ano de 1844 as duas grandes leituras sobre a relação entre a economia política e a filosofia de Hegel foram estabelecidas pela primeira vez. De um lado Rosenkranz apontava para as questões envolvidas naquilo que a Filosofia do direito (1821) abarcava sob o nome de sociedade civil. De outro, Marx apontava para a importância da noção de noção de trabalho, especialmente na Fenomenologia do espírito (1807). Sem se alinhar definitivamente com nenhuma destas duas tradições, esta pesquisa se propõe a analisar esta influência tanto no campo mais restrito da sociedade civil, quanto no tema do trabalho, buscando articular estes dois campos a partir do processo de abstração que se impõe como base do trabalho, se desdobra na sociedade civil (multiplicação de carências, abstração do trabalho, valor, colonização) e aponta para o espírito absoluto (estado e história mundial). Veremos que este processo de abstração (que se impõe também como base da linguagem) é a condição negativa do advento do espírito, precisamente por fazer do mundo (o ser, a exterioridade) propriedade do espírito. / In the same year of 1844, the two major readings of the relationship between political economy and Hegelian philosophy were established for the first time. On one side, Rosenkranz pointed the questions concerning what the Philosophy of Right (1821) designated as civil society. On the other, Marx pointed to the importance of the notion of labor, specially in the Phenomenology of the Spirit (1807). Without definitely align with either of these two traditions, this research proposes itself to analyse this influence both in the more restricted field of civil society and in the theme of labor, searching to articulate this two fields from the abstraction process that imposes itself as the groundwork of labor, unfolds itself in the civil society (multiplication of needs, abstraction of labor, value, colonization) and points to the absolute spirit (state and world history). We shall see that this process of abstraction (which also imposes itself as groundwork of language) is the negative condition for the coming of the spirit, precisely for transforming the world (the being, the exteriority) property of the spirit

The following thesis can be read as a socio-historical case study of the emergence of risk discourses within the Scottish Criminal Justice System, particularly in relation to offenders who are defined by their dangerousness. It focuses on the emergence of the Risk Management Authority (RMA) which was set up under recommendation of the MacLean Committee in 2000. The thesis examines the broader social and cultural forces from which the Risk Management Authority emerged by drawing on Hegel’s notion of ‘Ethical Life’ (Sittlichkeit) as a means of framing institutional change. By way of a re-interpretation of Hegel, through the lens of critical theory, it seeks to historicise and make problematic the concepts and assumptions surrounding our understanding of modernity. Through the concepts of reflexivity, legitimacy and indeterminacy it offers a critique of the existing sociology of risk, which places risk at the centre of debates on modernity, contingency and the self-understanding of society. This critique offers a conceptualisation of penal institutions as not just administering punishment, but as instrumental in the constitution of human subjectivity.