To defend the objectivity and epistemic significance of science from claims that theory choice reflects scientists' values, McMullin has suggested that we clearly identify epistemic values - those such as truth which are the characteristic normative goals of science - and distinguish them from non-epistemic values. The question of the objectivity of a scientific inquiry then reduces to the question of whether it is primarily driven by epistemic values. This thesis illustrates how, using a decision-theoretic model, we can decide whether a motivation is epistemic or non-epistemic by looking at the consequences of potential actions that it attaches to. Building on this structural definition, we produce a succession of further definitions, distinguishing between epistemically and non-epistemically motivated inquiries, people, methods of persuasion and processes of interpretation. The resulting concept of epistemic value can demarcate science and non-science that is not committed to any particular method, nor to methodological anarchy. The model allows us to examine the potential behaviour of hypothetical agents. This method shows that epistemic motivation results in a desire for reliable information, while non-epistemic motivation makes information undesirable or even aversive. From this we get an empirical criterion distinguishing the two attitudes. Another useful hypothetical is to imagine a scientist who wants to assert a maximum number of truths by making a small number of statements. Under these circumstances, we find it can be rational to assert a theory with known false consequences, or a theory that is strictly meaningless but empirically adequate. Since the thesis makes use of Bayesian decision theory, the question naturally arises of how applicable it is to real people. The first part of the thesis defends the descriptive use of BDT in ordinary belief/desire explanation and shows that this does not involve any strong metaphysical presumptions about the entity being explained.

What values, if any, is moral psychology based on with regard to what humans should be like? While the value-free ideal of science requires at least the bracketing of values in regards to the conducting of research and influence on its results, this investigation takes seriously the concerns of leading social psychologists that biases may influence the subdiscipline. Textual analyses of moral psychology's literature involving content analysis of codes and cultural discourse analysis of value themes illuminate values involving moral problems and moral goods that may inherently influence research at various levels. It is proposed that values are impossible to eliminate from moral psychological research and that a simple epistemic/nonepistemic value distinction is inadequate for deciding which values are appropriate. A norm of value disclosure to replace the norm of the value-free ideal is recommended.

This study examined the motivations pre-service teachers possess as they progress though a teacher education program. Using Watt and Richardson’s (2007) Factors Influencing Teaching Choice (FIT-Choice) model as the theoretical underpinnings, the following research questions set the foundation for this study: 1) Do pre-service teachers’ motivation to pursue a teaching career change over the course of a teacher education program, and 2) Is there a relationship between pre-service teachers’ values and their satisfaction with their choice to pursue a teaching career? Quantitative results indicate significant drops in motivation from students’ Freshman/Sophomore year to students’ Graduate year. Qualitative results demonstrated a greater frequency of responses for social utility values, intrinsic motivation, positive prior teaching and learning experiences, career development aspirations, and epistemic values. / Educational Psychology

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Fundação Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / Nosso trabalho tem como objetivo central mostrar que as mudanças ocorridas no modo de produção da ciência contemporânea possuem implicações, tanto para os aspectos sociológicos da ciência quanto para os seus princípios filosóficos, que ainda apontam para uma necessidade de uma análise da relação entre ciência e sociedade. Baseamos nossa tese no trabalho desenvolvido pelo físico e epistemólogo da ciência John Michael Ziman F. R. S. (1925-2005), que defende que as mudanças ocorridas nos últimos 60 anos, relacionadas a uma nova forma de organizar, gerir e financiar a prática científica, i.e., a uma nova forma de prática científica, levaram ao surgimento de uma ciência pós-acadêmica ou pós-industrial. Sua consequência mais grave é a incorporação de um novo ethos científico, que tem como base princípios gerenciais, em detrimento do ethos mertoniano, cujo objetivo principal seria a manutenção de princípios que foram histórica e socialmente defendidos pelos cientistas em um ideal de ciência acadêmica, tais como os de objetividade, busca da verdade e autonomia, ainda que como ideais reguladores. Contudo, mostraremos que Ziman não adere à interpretação tradicional do ethos mertoniano, que o associa a uma epistemologia fundacionista. Além disso, ele reformula, seguindo as novas filosofia e sociologia da ciência, os ideais epistêmicos preconizados pelas tendências positivistas e neopositivistas, em especial a noção da objetividade. Para Ziman, a ciência ainda produz conhecimento confiável, pois possui um mecanismo cooperativo de produção, que tem como base a crítica entre os pares. / The major objective of this work is to demonstrate that the changes occurred in the last sixty years in the way science is organized, managed and funded, i.e., in the mode of knowledge production, have consequences both to the sociological and to the philosophical principles of science. Those changes raise the necessity to analyse sience and society relationship. Our thesis is mainly based on the work of the physicist and epistemologist John Michael Ziman F. R. S. (1925-2005), who argued that the collectivization of science led to a new mode of knowledge production called post-academic or post industrial science. One of its major consequences is related to the changes on the scientific ethos. In a post academic science a new ethos of science, based on managerial values, is deflating the mertonian ethos, which main goal would be the maintenance of principles historically and socially shared by scientists, in an ideal of academic science, such as objectivity, search for truth and autonomy (even tough as regulatory principles). Furthermore we will show that Ziman does not incorporate the traditional interpretation of the mertonian ethos, which associates it to a fundacionist epistemology. Besides that, he reinterprets it - by following the new trends in philosophy and in sociology of science the epistemic ideals preconised by the positivists and neo-positivists, specially the notion of objectivity. In Zimans point of view, we can still trust science, because it has a social mechanism of knowledge production that is based on the cooperation and organized scepticism.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Fundação Carlos Chagas Filho de Amparo a Pesquisa do Estado do Rio de Janeiro / Nosso trabalho tem como objetivo central mostrar que as mudanças ocorridas no modo de produção da ciência contemporânea possuem implicações, tanto para os aspectos sociológicos da ciência quanto para os seus princípios filosóficos, que ainda apontam para uma necessidade de uma análise da relação entre ciência e sociedade. Baseamos nossa tese no trabalho desenvolvido pelo físico e epistemólogo da ciência John Michael Ziman F. R. S. (1925-2005), que defende que as mudanças ocorridas nos últimos 60 anos, relacionadas a uma nova forma de organizar, gerir e financiar a prática científica, i.e., a uma nova forma de prática científica, levaram ao surgimento de uma ciência pós-acadêmica ou pós-industrial. Sua consequência mais grave é a incorporação de um novo ethos científico, que tem como base princípios gerenciais, em detrimento do ethos mertoniano, cujo objetivo principal seria a manutenção de princípios que foram histórica e socialmente defendidos pelos cientistas em um ideal de ciência acadêmica, tais como os de objetividade, busca da verdade e autonomia, ainda que como ideais reguladores. Contudo, mostraremos que Ziman não adere à interpretação tradicional do ethos mertoniano, que o associa a uma epistemologia fundacionista. Além disso, ele reformula, seguindo as novas filosofia e sociologia da ciência, os ideais epistêmicos preconizados pelas tendências positivistas e neopositivistas, em especial a noção da objetividade. Para Ziman, a ciência ainda produz conhecimento confiável, pois possui um mecanismo cooperativo de produção, que tem como base a crítica entre os pares. / The major objective of this work is to demonstrate that the changes occurred in the last sixty years in the way science is organized, managed and funded, i.e., in the mode of knowledge production, have consequences both to the sociological and to the philosophical principles of science. Those changes raise the necessity to analyse sience and society relationship. Our thesis is mainly based on the work of the physicist and epistemologist John Michael Ziman F. R. S. (1925-2005), who argued that the collectivization of science led to a new mode of knowledge production called post-academic or post industrial science. One of its major consequences is related to the changes on the scientific ethos. In a post academic science a new ethos of science, based on managerial values, is deflating the mertonian ethos, which main goal would be the maintenance of principles historically and socially shared by scientists, in an ideal of academic science, such as objectivity, search for truth and autonomy (even tough as regulatory principles). Furthermore we will show that Ziman does not incorporate the traditional interpretation of the mertonian ethos, which associates it to a fundacionist epistemology. Besides that, he reinterprets it - by following the new trends in philosophy and in sociology of science the epistemic ideals preconised by the positivists and neo-positivists, specially the notion of objectivity. In Zimans point of view, we can still trust science, because it has a social mechanism of knowledge production that is based on the cooperation and organized scepticism.

À partir d'une analyse de la science contemporaine comme état de pluralité scientifique, nous nous intéressons à la situation épistémologique particulière qu'est la mise en œuvre de cet état de pluralité, c'est-à-dire à la pluralité scientifique en action, sous la forme de projet de relations entre disciplines scientifiques distinctes. Nous définissons la relation disciplinaire comme une relation d'interaction volontaire entre différents chercheurs issus de disciplines et/ou de spécialités différentes, autour d'un problème commun, pour lequel leurs compétences épistémiques spécifiques sont requises. Dans ce but, nous associons une réflexion théorique à une d'un terrain propice : le LabEx IMU (Laboratoire d'Excellence de l'Intelligence des Mondes Urbains) et les projets scientifiques qui émergent en son sein, à partir de disciplines aussi distinctes que les sciences informatiques, l'archéologie, la biologie, sociologie, philosophie, etc. L'étude de pluralité scientifique en action veut également dire : telle que la pluralité scientifique est pratiquée. Notre objectif est de mobiliser les ressources philosophiques ( philosophie des sciences générale, pragmatisme, épistémologie sociale, philosophie empirique) pour rendre compte de la dimension proprement épistémique de ces projets, c'est-à-dire leur objectif de connaissance. Dans ce but, nous analysons le contexte de spécialisation disciplinaire dans lequel des situations d'interactions émergent, en considérant que bien que cette spécialisation soit le plus souvent justifiée épistémique, d'autres dynamiques scientifiques apparaissent comme nécessaires. Nous défendons la thèse suivante : ces interactions sont des réponses à la nécessaire tension à l'unité dans la science, tout en étant devant être considérées sur un plan épistémologique comme des tentatives de mise en ordre non théoriques, qui anticiperaient ce que la science qui devrait être. Pour préciser ce que sont les projets de relation disciplinaire, nous nous intéressons à la condition de la science qui les rend possible (division du travail scientifique ; communauté scientifique), ainsi qu'aux moyens d'instruire philosophiquement de telles situations, en mobilisant la notion d'enquête chez Peirce et Dewey, notamment dans le lien qu'elle permet entre sens commun et enquête scientifique. À l'encontre de plusieurs approches de l'interdisciplinarité, qui cherchent à définir un niveau d'interaction satisfaisant, nous proposons de rendre compte de la multiplicité des interactions épistémiques au sein de la science et de développer des moyens d'analyse susceptible de représenter ces situations. Dans ce but, nous revalorisons la place des disciplines, afin de justifier le fait que ces projets sont principalement la poursuite d'une science normale par d'autres moyens. Nous analysons également en quoi ces projets doivent être considérées comme une bonne manière de faire de la science, fondés en premier lieu par leur excellence épistémique. D'autres valorisation deviennent alors possibles : comme commensurabilité aux phénomènes, comme confrontation à des problèmes pratiques et comme maximisation de la culture et des valeurs scientifiques. En confrontant ces analyses à notre terrain d'étude, nous développons des catégories analytiques susceptibles de représenter les situations d'interactions, en proposant une typologie des relations disciplinaires ainsi qu'une étude plus globale des projets de relations disciplinaires en eux-mêmes. Nous terminons notre étude par l'analyse de différents projets du LabEx IMU, en leur appliquant les catégories de représentation précédemment développées. / From an analysis of contemporary science as a state of scientific plurality, we study the particular epistemologic situation of the implementation of this state of plurality, that is to say the scientific plurality in action, as it takes form into projects of relationships between distinct scientific disciplines. We define disciplinary relationship as a volunteer relation of interaction between different searchers from different scientific disciplines/specialites around a common issue, for which their specific epistmemic competences are required. In this goal, we associate a theoric reflexion with a fieldwork : the study of the Labex IMU - (Laboratoire d'Excellence de l'Intelligence des Mondes Urbains ; Excellence Laboratory of the Intelligence of Urban Worlds) within which scientific projects emerge, from disciplines as different as computer science, archeology, biology, sociology, philosophy and so on. Thus, the study of the scientific plurality in action means : as the plurality is practised. Our objective is to use philosophical ressources (general philosophy of science, pragmatism, social epistemology, empirical philosophy) to describe the epistemic dimension of these projects, that is to say their objective of knowledge. With this objective in mind, we analyse the origin of this state of diversity through the problem of disicplinary specialization, by showing that, even if these specialization is most of the time justified, other dynamics appears necessary. We defend the following these : these interactions are answers to the necessary tension toward the unity of science, and they must be considered from an epistemologic point of view as non-theoric set in order attempts which would anticipate the science that must be. To specify what are the projects of disciplinary relationships, we study at firt the scientific condition that makes it possible (scientific work division ; scientific community), and the means to analyse philosophically such situations, by engaging the notion of inquiry of Peirce and Dewey, in particular the link that it allows between common sens and scientific inquiry. On opposition to several interdisciplinarity approaches, which seek to define a satisfactory level of interaction, we propose to investigate the multiplicity of epistemic interactions in science and to develop analytical means to represent such situations. Thus, we accord more status to disciplines, in order to justify the fact that these projects are a mere continuation of normal science by other means. We analyse also how these projects must considered as good science, founded in epistemic excellence at first place. Other valorisations becomes possibles : as commensurability to phenomenons, as a confrontation to pratical issues and as a maximisation of scientific culture and values By confronting these analysis to our fieldwork, we develop analytical categories capable to represent the situations of interactions, by proposing a typology of disciplinary relationships and a more globla study of the projects of disciplinary relationships in their own. We finish our study by the analysis of several projects of the LabEx IMU, by apling to them the representational categories previously developped.