Habilitationsschrift--Universität Bern, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. xvii-lxxii) and index.

No description available.

Thesis (M.S.) -- Central Connecticut State University, 2009. / Thesis advisor: Jennifer Hedlund. "... in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Criminal Justice." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 45-48). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Canada and the United States are similar in many respects, and both protect individual rights at a constitutional level. However, the Supreme Court of Canada and the United States Supreme Court have developed alternative conceptions of the constitutional protection of freedom of expression and equality. This thesis describes these differences and attempts to explain the reasons for their development. Under the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme Court merely requires that governmental actors refrain from overt discrimination on the basis of an objectionable ground. Thus, the Court has created numerous doctrines to limit equality to this definition, including color-blindness, intentional discrimination, and multiple levels of review. Each of these concepts has contributed to the application of formal equality by restricting governmental attempts, such as affirmative action, to alleviate social inequality. In addition, the Court's application of content neutrality to freedom of expression cases has restricted attempts to promote equality through legislation restricting hate speech and pornography. By contrast, the Supreme Court of Canada has interpreted the protection of equality in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to respond to the actual social consequences of legislation. Rather than limiting the Charter to intentional discrimination, the Court will consider governmental actions which have the effect of creating or encouraging inequality. Similarly, governmental restrictions on hate speech and pornography have been upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada as necessary for the protection of equality. For the Supreme Court of Canada, equality has a social reality. These differences suggest an alternative role of government in the rights sphere in Canada and the United States. The United States Supreme Court has developed a rights interpretation which excludes much significant governmental action, whether positive or negative. The Court has incorporated the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment and, in doing so, has expanded individual rights at the expense of state power in the promotion of equality. The lack of such a development in Canada has resulted in a more substantial role for social legislation, while still protecting against governmental overreaching through the Charter.

Thesis (LL. M.)--University of Toronto, 2004. / Adviser: Jennifer Nedelsky.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 203-210). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2005. / Title from first page of PDF file. Document formatted into pages; contains ix, 104 p.; also includes graphics (some col.). Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-87). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center

Thesis--Tübingen Universität, 2004/2005.

Giving effect to the constitutional right to equality and the peculiar nature thereof in a heterogeneous society such as South Africa has proved to be a perplexing task. This is apparent when analyzing case law on the subject which demonstrates that our courts are regularly confronted with complex equality claims, and as a consequence, naturally have to make difficult decisions which in turn contribute toward our emerging and developing equality jurisprudence and ultimately the achievement of the constitutional standard of equality. This treatise considers substantive equality as a species of equality in the workplace and the defence of affirmative-action justification in terms of section 6 of the Employment Equity Act. In doing so, it outlines the seemingly peculiar application of affirmative action in a society that was once divided along racial and gender lines, a society that has once experienced one of the most severe forms of racial discrimination in the form of apartheid and its associated laws, policies and practices. This oppressive political regime had the effect of entrenching a deep legacy of racism, deprivation, exclusion and discrimination into the social fabric of society, which in turn had a disproportionate impact on the majority of people or categories of people relative to an elite minority. The legacy of this oppressive political system remains alarmingly evident today. The treatise reveals the challenges and difficulties a society faces in attempting to break with past patterns of disadvantage and its efforts to build a society that is non-racist, non-sexist, socially just and inclusive. The Constitution with its transformative vision should be considered the genesis of this credible and abiding process of redress. It is this exercise of redress coupled with the Constitution’s transformative mandate that raises difficult issues of restoration and reparation for past injustice, and the most appropriate and accommodating manner to do so. In addition to the Constitution, Parliament has enacted national legislation as a transformative agent in the workplace. The EEA as a legislative instrument was designed to give effect to the constitutional right to equality in the workplace. It emphatically prohibits unfair discrimination, but also obliges designated employers to implement affirmative-action measures. For such measures not to be unfairly discriminatory, they must be consistent with the purpose of the EEA. A plain reading of the EEA reveals that it does not provide sufficient guidelines for valid affirmative action. However, the EEA provides an interpretive injunction in that it must be interpreted in light of the Constitution and international law. In this regard the Constitutional Court in Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 1 in interpreting the Constitution, developed a test to assess whether a restitutionary measure such as affirmative action is in fact and in law a valid measure. To date this test is generally not followed, despite the authority of the judgment. In this regard, the courts have developed sound, but sometimes inconsistent principles and standards to test for the validity of affirmative action and to adjudge whether such measures are compliant with the Act. The test has also recently been reaffirmed in the recent judgment of South African Police Service v Solidarity obo Barnard.2 It is anticipated that affirmative-action case law will henceforth develop along the same lines. In this we appreciate judicial guidance and supervision in interpreting and pronouncing upon the legitimacy and validity of affirmative-action measures.

Ronald Dworkin has achieved prominence in the field of jurisprudence through his book, Taking Rights Seriously, (hereafter TRS) his many articles in the "New York Review of Books," and other publications that pursue a coherent philosophy for liberals. In response to criticism of his earlier work, Dworkin has expanded and clarified his liberal position on equality rights. This thesis will address how Dworkin's later writings attempt to fill in gaps that occur in Dworkin's first arguments for a hierarchical, principled picture of the law. It will be argued here that Dworkin's views require an unusual perspective on the concept of an individual, and this renders his rights-based political morality seriously deficient. The nature of Dworkin's theory is first indicated by an attack on the "ruling theory of law" which he characterizes as positivistic when asked what the law is, and utilitarian when required to decide what the law should be. His central criticism charges that legal arguments are incomplete without principles which refer to or are implications of rights. Dworkin's liberal political morality is founded on rights to equal respect and concern. The elaboration of what these rights mean is sustained throughout Dworkin's publications. He maintains that his liberal rights-thesis is the theoretical articulation of the constitutional right to equality. Applying Dworkin's rights-theory to the Regents of the University of California v. Bakke2 case illuminates many of the more abstract aspects of his views. This thesis will argue against Dworkin by focusing on the too-narrow conception of individuals implied by his theory of rights. The ideal Dworkin employs of a right to 'equality of resources' justifies an aggressive redistributional scheme, unchecked by a fuller conception of what is an individual. Dworkin is only able to hold his ideal of a right to 'equality of resources' together with his notion of individual rights by accepting a diminished concept of the individual. This argument suggests that a fuller conception of an individual recognizes the connection between merit and entitlement. Dworkin's scepticism regarding the feasibility of merit being protected by individual rights is undercut by introducing a distinction between merit and success. Leaving key aspects of an individual, such as merit and its related features, out of official deliberation about rights, conceptually inhibits the extent of individualizability in a rights theory. If we wish to maintain such features, and value their protection and cultivation by a political order, adopting Dworkin's rights-thesis and its consequences is impossible. / Arts, Faculty of / Philosophy, Department of / Graduate