<p>Hunger strikes are used as a method of protest to call attention to grievances or political positions and galvanize support for a cause. Historical examples from pre-Christian Europe through Guantanamo Bay have demonstrated various motives, interventions, and outcomes to this unique form of protest. Starvation causes life-threatening damage to the body, and to intervene on an unwilling subject involves invasive medical procedures. As scholars have debated how to approach this medical-ethical dilemma, a tug-of-war exists between autonomy, beneficence, and social justice with regard to the rights of prisoners of war (POWs) and detainees. International documents, legislation, and case law demonstrate vast support for and place precedence on the prisoners right to make their own autonomous, informed medical decisions, and many in the international community lean towards abstaining from intervention on hunger strikes on the basis of patient autonomy. However, there are notable arguments both for and against force-feeding that have been well documented. Despite the vast international dialogue, there is a key component that seems to have been forgotten&mdash;the environment within which the prisoner or detainee resides is immersed with coercive and manipulative activity and interrogation on a regular basis. This environment may impede the ability for the POW or detainee to make an autonomous decision and then leads to the refusal of life-saving, medical intervention on the basis of a decision that is markedly coerced or manipulated. It is therefore noted that a different lens must be used to analyze hunger strike situations for this specific population. </p>

<p> This dissertation considers the political implications of the doctrine of holiness. I proceed by demonstrating the neglect of holiness in political theology, the viability of the holiness movement as an embodied witness of the political implications of the doctrine of holiness, and a biblical trajectory in Leviticus that extends into the New Testament. I describe this scriptural holiness as vocation for all of God&rsquo;s people through personal formation and outward societal action to extend God&rsquo;s holiness. </p><p> With attention to the approaches of political theology and formation, I demonstrate that the holiness movement of the nineteenth century offers an example of holiness in practice that addresses societal problems (e.g., urban housing crisis, intemperance, and slavery). I then propose three theological issues that undermined the political vision of the holiness movement in the twentieth century. First, the scope of sin narrowed resulting in a less hopeful expectation of sanctification&rsquo;s power. Second, most of the holiness movement adopted premillennial eschatology, which altered the way it viewed social structures. Third, the holiness movement was marginalized by its theological rejection of the Third Great Awakening, which served to influence religious and civil approaches to social problems in the twentieth century (e.g., the New Deal and Social Gospel). </p><p> Three case studies (race, global missions, and temperance) demonstrate the influence these respective theological shifts had on social action. I argue that a theological interpretation of Leviticus 17-26 guides the holiness movement to embody the vocation of holiness as an alternative vision to the formation of modern politics regarding social orderings. I extend Israel Knohl&rsquo;s insight that Lev 17-26 responds to prophetic critiques of cultic practices and reconceives holiness to address social challenges. I argue that Jesus picks up this stream when he recites, &ldquo;love your neighbor as yourself,&rdquo; and that Christian embodiment of this Scriptural holiness sustains the political vocation of holiness in changing contexts (including the modern bifurcation of life into private and public spheres). I conclude that vocational holiness enables a Christian understanding of political community.</p>

Thesis (MPhil)--Stellenbosch University, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: We live in a complex world. We have questions and face problems that defy conventional reductionist approaches to finding answers and solutions. This is because we find ourselves dealing with complex systems that are dynamic, self-organizing and adaptive, while maintaining a balance between static order and chaotic change. The Earth, or Gaia, is such a system. So is the biosphere, and so is an ecosystem, an economy, a business and any living organism, including homo sapiens. By concentrating on the connections and interactions between entities, and not things in themselves, complexity research is enabling us to grasp a better understanding of the spontaneous, self-organizing dynamics of our world. Complexity studies can have an enormous impact on the conduct of economics, business and politics. This thesis describes the characteristics of complex systems, analyzes the Earth and its evolutionary story as a complex adaptive system, discusses how we can harness complexity, and how through cooperating and caring we can survive and even prosper in the world of today. A pluralistic moral 'world vision' is argued for, founded on an ethics of universal compassion for all living things, that can lead to responsible and pragmatic action. As human beings, if 'He are to uplift the poor and restore and preserve the ecology of the Earth, what will be required is a major transformation of our environmentally destructive world economy into one that can sustain progress and human flourishing. This will entail a change of mind and heart, a sense of global interdependence and universal responsibility. The challenges we face are immense. However, there are encouraging signs that worldwide people are becoming increasingly aware of what is called for. More and more people are showing their willingness to rise to the occasion. It is a time of transition. It is complex, daunting, yet exciting. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Ons leef in 'n komplekse wêreld waarin ons gekonfronteer word met vrae en probleme wat nie beantwoord of opgelos kan word deur middel van die gebruiklike reduksionistiese benaderings nie. Die rede hiervoor is dat ons te make het met komplekse sisteme wat dinamies, selforganiserend en selfaanpassend is, terwyl dit tegelykertyd 'n balans handhaaf tussen statiese orde en chaotiese verandering. Die aarde, of Gaia, is so 'n sisteem. Ook die biosfeer, 'n ekosisteem, 'n ekonomie, 'n besigheid en enige lewende organisme, insluitend homo sapiens, konstitueer komplekse sisteme. Daarom kan kompleksiteitsnavorsing, wat klem lê op die verbande en interaksies tussen entiteite, eerder as op die entiteite self, dit vir ons moontlik maak om die spontane en selforganiserende dinamiek van ons wêreld beter te begryp. Kompleksiteitstudies kan dan ook 'n enorme impak hê op die manier waarop ekonomie, besigheid en politiek beoefen word. Hierdie tesis beskryf die eienskappe van komplekse sisteme, en analiseer die Aarde en haar evolusionêre verhaal as 'n komplekse, selfaanpassende sisteem. Verder bespreek dit ook hoe kompleksiteit ontgin kan word, en hoe ons deur samewerking en sorg kan oorleef en selfs floreer in die wêreld van vandag. Op grond van 'n etiek van universele medelye met alle lewende dinge word 'n pleidooi gelewer vir 'n pluralistiese morele "wêreldvisie" wat kan lei tot verantwoordelike en pragmatiese optrede. Wat egter vereis word indien ons, as mense, armoede wilophef en die ekologie van die aarde wil herstel en handhaaf, is 'n daadwerklike transformasie van ons omgewingsvernietigende wêreldekonomie in die rigting van 'n ekonomie wat vooruitgang en menslike florering kan onderhou. So 'n transformasie sal 'n verandering van denke en ingesteldheid vereis, asook 'n sin vir globale interafhanklikheid en universele verantwoordelikheid. Dit is duidelik dat die uitdagings wat ons moet trotseer kolossaal is. Daar is egter bemoedigende tekens wêreldwyd wat aandui dat mense toenemend begin bewus raak van wat vereis word. Meer en meer mense toon hul bereidwilligheid om die situasie die hoof te bied. Dit is 'n tyd van verandering. Dit is 'n komplekse en angswekkende tyd, maar uiteindelik tog ook 'n opwindende tyd.

I provide an explanation of moral understanding. I begin by describing decisions, especially moral ones. I detail ways in which deviations from an ideal of decision-making occur. I link deviations to characteristic critical judgments, e.g. being cavalier, banal, courageous, etc. Moral judgments are among these and carry a particular personal gravity. The question I entertain in following chapters is: how do they carry this gravity? In answering the question, I try “external” accounts of moral understanding. I distinguish between the ideas of a person and a life. The idea of a life essayed is of a network of relations to others. The character of those relations, e.g. friendship, is the object of our understanding of ourselves and our lives. I argue that one’s understanding of oneself conditions the context of decision-making. I elaborate one way of making moral understanding answerable to truth using Plato’s metaphysics in the Philebus. Truth is valued and truth is essential to the independence of the moral such that seeming right and being right are distinct. However, truth is neither primary nor exhaustive of morality, because we have additional distinct resources for morally judging others. I turn instead to an “internal” account of moral understanding to answer the question regarding the personal gravity of moral criticism. Using Winch’s work on universalizability and fellowship, I argue that our conception of others must be sufficient to reflect their individuality within our moral understanding. Second, using Gaita’s work on remorse and the lucidity of self-reflection, I argue that the truth about ourselves and the wrong we do others can arrest and constrain our moral understanding and our authority. Moral understanding operates in a social milieu: argument, conversation and rationality. Arguments are grounded in meanings with primary (shared) sense, but solicit agreement in secondary sense—of what is similar, of what follows. Meaning in the secondary sense can be necessarily practical, creating practical necessities within points of view. Accounting for the consequences and understanding of disagreement is identified as pressing. An original contribution is the idea of critical authority. One’s articulation of moral meaning is controlled via the critical authority expressed using critical vocabulary. Accepting another ’s critical authority is based, in differing domains, on our relation to them, e.g. friendship, trust, fellowship. The nature of inter-personal relations are delimited by the critical authority characteristic of those relations. Critical authority explains the independent and personal force of moral criticism. To be intelligible depends on accepting some critical authorities, though I allow for the intelligible repudiation of morality in some circumstances. Wronging someone is explained as denying his critical authority, thus denying his relation to oneself, and thereby undermining his place in the moral world. The consequence of wrongdoing is the disintegration of the moral world. I defend against Nagel’s realism and Korsgaard’s constructivism. Both are committed to judging individuals but their accounts of morality undermine the intelligibility of the personal gravity of moral criticism. Developing the idea of Moral Consensus, I defend myself against the related charge of relativism.

published_or_final_version / abstract / toc / Educational Psychology / Master / Master of Social Sciences

published_or_final_version / Psychology / Master / Master of Philosophy

SPEECH ETHICS IN THE HEBREW PSALTER Samuel Onchonga Asuma, Ph.D. The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 2012 Chairperson: Duane A. Garrett This dissertation examines the use of speech terminology in the Hebrew Psalter in order to find out why the terminology is used frequently and what it teaches about speech ethics. Also, it seeks to determine the Psalter's contribution to the study of Old Testament ethics in general. Chapter 1 discusses the problem, purpose, thesis, and the methodology of the study. Chapter 2 briefly looks at the history of the study of Old Testament ethics during the modern era beginning from the nineteenth century to the present, paying special attention to how it developed into an independent discipline and the key issues that have dominated scholarly discussion along with the underlying philosophical ideas that inform that discussion. Chapter 3 examines the occurrence of speech terminology outside the Hebrew Psalter, using select passages from the Pentateuch, prophetic and wisdom literature in order to determine what these passages teach about the proper use of speech. Chapter 4 discusses briefly whether or not the Psalter contains ethical instruction. In answering the question, it takes into consideration the approaches taken by pre-critical interpreters and form and canonical critics. Chapter 5 examines the use of speech terminology in the Hebrew Psalter with the aim of finding out why it is used frequently and what the Psalter teaches about speech ethics. Chapter 6 summarizes the findings of the study and proposes an answer to the question as to why the Psalter has more references to the use of speech than any other book in the Old Testament. It suggests the contribution the Psalter makes to the study of Old Testament ethics. Finally, proposals are made regarding areas for further research. This work contends that speech terminology features prominently in the Psalter not only because the Psalter places strong emphasis on truthful speech but also because speech is used by the wicked as a weapon of oppression. The powerful members of society devise evil schemes and put them into effect using false accusation, false testimony, false oaths, slander, and humiliation against the weak. Since the weak do not have any human being or institution to protect them, they appeal for justice from God as the righteous king and judge. / This dissertation is under embargo until 2014-12-14.

In this report I argue that a popular account of the nature of ethical thought and talk -- non-cognitivism -- cannot make sense of our attempts to explain why some things are right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust. After introducing the process by which we attempt to explain these sorts of ethical features (a process I call ethical explanation), I consider how we might test whether non-cognitivism can account for this process. We can test whether non-cognitivism can account for ethical explanation, I argue, by testing whether non-cognitivism can account for the meanings of ethical explanatory sentences, the sentences we use to express explanatory thoughts in ethics. After considering how non-cognitivism might account for ethical explanatory sentences (and so the thoughts these sentences express), I develop a series of problem cases on which, I argue, no plausible non-cognitivist account of these meanings of these sentences is possible. Because non-cognitivism cannot account for the meanings of ethical explanatory sentences, I conclude, non-cognitivism cannot account for ethical explanation. / text

No description available.

No description available.