Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:49:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Olivia Maria Bullio Mattos.pdf: 922804 bytes, checksum: 3e7bae29d19a9a942f72caf436c16254 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010-05-19 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / In mid-2007, the world faced one of the biggest crisis capitalism ever experienced, called the subprime crisis, which originated in the US housing market. The Federal Reserve (Fed) had to act promptly, trying to rescue the markets. However, the Federal Reserve, which had always been pragmatic, found itself in great distress when the traditional tools of monetary policy were not enough to stop the liquidity crisis. The Fed had to act aggressively both as a lender of last resort and expanding the monetary base to halt the risk of a widespread "default" in the inter-bank market. Using changes in the size and composition of the Fed's Balance Sheet From July of 2007 to September of 2009, this dissertation analyses the actions taken and new tools created to fight the crisis. Initially, the dissertation presents the prevailing thesis up to the subprime crisis, which were the financial deregulation and the monetary authority's goal of price stability. The dissertation then discusses the Post- Keynesians and Minsky's take of the capitalistic economy, a more adequate view to understand the crisis and the preceding financial processes. In conclusion, the lessons learned from the subprime crisis are that we should rethink how we regulate financial institutions and products created by such institutions in pursue of profit; we should also rethink the way we do monetary policy and its objectives / Em meados de 2007, o mundo se viu a frente de uma das maiores crises financeiras já vividas pelo capitalismo, a chamada crise subprime, que teve sua origem no mercado imobiliário norte-americano. Foi necessário que o Federal Reserve (Fed) agisse e tentasse resgatar o mercado. No entanto, o Banco Central americano, que sempre foi pragmático, se viu em dificuldades quando os instrumentos tradicionais de política monetária não mais conseguiram conter a crise de iliquidez. Foi preciso então atuar agressivamente como emprestador de última instância e expandir a base monetária para conter os riscos de inadimplência generalizada no mercado interbancário. Através da análise das mudanças na composição e tamanho do Balance Sheet do Fed de julho de 2007 a setembro de 2009, esta dissertação analisa as ações e novos instrumentos criados para conter a crise. Inicialmente apresenta-se as teses dominantes até então, que eram de desregulamentação do mercado financeiro e de mandato de estabilidade de preços para a autoridade monetária. Em seguida, discute-se o entendimento de Minsky e dos pós-keynesianos da economia capitalista, uma visão mais adequada para compreender a crise e os processos financeiros precedentes. Conclui-se que as lições tiradas da crise mostram que deve-se repensar o formato de regulação das instituições financeiras e dos produtos criados por elas para busca de lucros; deve-se rever a maneira como é feita a política monetária e seus objetivos

The text deals with monetary policy normalization in USA and its influence on cross-border capital flows to emerging markets. The first chapter provides basic economic theory of capital flows. Federal Reserve's monetary policy normalization is discussed in the second chapter, including its relation to international flows of capital. The last chapter analyzes monetary policy normalization influence on capital flows to three developing countries.

The diploma thesis analyzes monetary policy in relation to the global imbalances in the world economy. The first chapter deals with historical development of the international monetary system and with effectiveness of monetary policy in the current monetary system. Chapter two defines global imbalances and focuses on their development and specifics. It also examines their connection to the monetary policy of the most important countries in the world economy. The last chapter discusses objectives of monetary policy in the modern world and suggests possible measures to reduce the global imbalances.

Main goal of the diploma thesis is to research liquidity management problems of the Federal Reserve System during banking crisis 1929 -- 1933. Monetary policy implementation based on the implicit reserve targeting was not convenient in times of sharp expansion of the demand for reserves. FED was misled by Real-bills and Riefler-Burgess doctrine and considers monetary condition to be easy. Money interest rates responded very moderately to the shortage of the banking system's liquidity. We can find origin of the first quantitative easing in 1932 when FED first bought larger quantities of the government securities. Expansionary monetary policy during the banking crisis 1929 -- 1933 was also potentially limited by the conflict among U.S. financial stability and sustainability of the gold standard.

This paper compares economical and political independence to a success rate of monetary policy of national banks, on a case of Fed and the Czech National Bank. Based on my definition of independence and accountability based on literature, I show that price stability defined as a main goal is the key factor. If the goal consists of more indicators, there is space for political pressure and the success rate decreases. Some rate of independence is necessary in order to achieve a healthy economy, however, total independence cannot be the target. Accountability then works towards independence as a system of achieving legitimacy, not as a substitute. Public inflation aversion is also considered as an important factor for achieving price stability.

Objective of this paper is to assess efficacy and feasibility of measures undertaken by the Federal Reserve system during the financial crisis that erupted in the year 2007. Firstly, origin of central banking in USA is described, then structure and mandate of Fed. Discussion of causes of the financial crisis follows. This work sheds light on policies of Fed after the beginning of the crisis and analyzes their efficiency and suitability. The biggest focus is on quantitative easing and on its effects on long-term interest rates.

The Great Depression elucidated the shortcomings of the banking system and its control by Wall Street. The creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913 was insufficient to correct flaws in the banking system until the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935. A.P. Giannini, the American-Italian founder of the Bank of America and Mormon Marriner S. Eccles, chairman of Federal Reserve Board (1935-1949), from California and Utah respectively, successfully worked to restrain the power of the eastern banking establishment. The Banking Act of 1935 was the capstone of their cooperation, a bill that placed open market operations in the hands of the Federal Reserve, thus diminishing the power of the New York Reserve. The creation of the Federal Housing Act, as orchestrated by Eccles, became a source of enormous revenue for Giannini. Giannini's wide use of branch banking and mass advertising was his contribution to American banking. Eccles's promotion of compensatory spending and eventual placement of monetary control in the hands of the Federal Reserve Board with Banking Act of 1935 and the Accord of 1951 and Giannini's branch banking diminished the likelihood of another sustained depression. As the Bank of America grew, and as Eccles became more aggressive in his fight for control of monetary policy, Secretary of State Henry Morgenthau, Jr., became a common enemy to both bankers. Morgenthau caused the Securities and Exchange Commission to launch an investigation of the Bank of America. Later, when Eccles and Giannini were no longer friends, the Board of Governors filed suit under the Clayton Act against Transamerica, a Giannini bank holding company. By 1945, Giannini's bank was the largest in the world. When John W. Snyder replaced Morgenthau, the "freeze" against Giannini's expansion stopped. Eccles was demoted by Truman but served on the Board of Governors until the Accord of 1951 making the Reserve no longer responsible for supporting the pegged interest rates of government bonds.

No description available.

The diploma thesis investigates causes and progression of the financial crisis beginning in 2007 in the United States and leading in the economic recession. Theoretical part of the thesis describes business cycles and their explanations in accordance with the Austrian theory of the business cycle and other theories. Analytical part of the thesis explores the period before the crisis and significant events relevant to it. The main subject of the thesis are institutions and regulatory measures that have major importance for the U.S. real estate market -- including monetary and intervenionist policy of Fed, Community Reinvestment Act, government sponsored enterprises and three major rating agencies. The goal of the work is to provide a comprehensive view of the financial crisis and analyse main factors that influenced its creation -- credit expansion, mortgage market, Fed's monetary policy, bank behavior, etc. This thesis tries to demonstrate an inaccuracy of state inteventions and their impacts on the economy and market system.

The main goal of this thesis is comparison of FEDs monetary policy in times of Great Depression and financial crisis 2007 -- 2009. Both of them began when the speculative bubble burst (in the first case it was in stock market, in the second one it occurred in real estate market). The effect of speculative bubbles bursting had very negative impact on global economic system. The FEDs monetary reaction to the both crises was very different. It differentiates in many aspects -- in times of Great Depression FED acted passive -- did not provide large open market purchases, did not lowered the interest rate quick enough to avoid the money stock fall-down. In current crisis, FED did not repeat mistakes made during Great Depression. In response to the market pressure, FED created several unconventional tools to support liquidity of depository institutions, primary dealers and commercial paper market. Via these new-invented programs, FED did not allow the money stock to fall and as the financial strains eased, they slowly disappeared. Besides these liquidity programs, FED supported economy with fast interest rate lowering and providing quantitative easing. Steps taken by FED helped to stabilize financial markets.