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La lutte internationale contre le blanchiment de capitaux et le financement du terrorisme : exemple de la France et d'Haïti / The international fight against money laundering and financing of terrorism : the example of France and HaitiStimphat, Yves-Fils 07 September 2018 (has links)
L’intérêt grandissant des États à lutter contre le phénomène de blanchiment s’est manifesté, dans un premier temps, à travers des actions unilatérales axées sur le produit du trafic des stupéfiants. La prise en charge de cette question par la communauté internationale, motivée par ailleurs par les conséquences néfastes du trafic de stupéfiants sur l’économie mondiale, a par la suite suscité la mise en commun des efforts nationaux dans ce domaine. Toutefois, s’agissant du phénomène de blanchiment lato sensu, l’approche extensive adoptée s’est accompagnée de normes tous azimuts de la part d’instances internationales et régionales créant en quelque sorte un cadre illisible et inapplicable de lutte anti-blanchiment.Au milieu de cette cacophonie normative, le Groupe d’Action Financière s’érige, depuis sa création en 1989 à l’initiative du G7/8, comme étant le haut-lieu d’interprétation et de mise en œuvre des normes internationales, notamment les conventions onusiennes et les résolutions du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies. L’efficacité des systèmes nationaux de lutte anti-blanchiment est essentiellement poursuivie sur la base de mesures préventives axées sur les risques de blanchiment de capitaux et de financement du terrorisme. / The increasing interest of countries to combat money laundering has initially been expressed through unilateral actions geared specifically to combatting drug trafficking. The takeover of the fight against money laundering by the international community, otherwise triggered by the disastrous consequences of drug trafficking and the products attained therefrom on the world economy, has imposed at a later stage the conjunction of national initiatives in this area. However, concerning the phenomenon of money laundering lato sensu, the comprehensive approach adopted has generated innumerous norms from international and regional bodies outlining an ambiguous and inapplicable framework.Amid this normative chaos, the Financial Action Task Force stands, since its creation in 1989, as the arena for setting, broadcasting, and ensuring adequate interpretation and implementation of Anti-Money Laundering (AML) international norms. The AML norms include inter alia the UN Conventions and UN Security Council’s resolutions. The effectiveness of the national systems is pursued on the basis of preventive measures in strict proportion to actual risks of money laundering and terrorist financing.
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Anti-cyberlaundering regulation and controlLeslie, Daniel A. January 2010 (has links)
<p>This paper is inspired by the ills borne out of the internet. The internet has become a modern day tool for criminals seeking to conceal the proceeds derived from their crime, hence the  / problematic notion of cyberlaundering. This paper journeys through the world of cyberlaundering by looking into the structure of the crime in great depth. It explores various possibilities, and tries to hatch out viable solutions to the dilemma.</p>
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Anti-cyberlaundering regulation and controlLeslie, Daniel A. January 2010 (has links)
<p>This paper is inspired by the ills borne out of the internet. The internet has become a modern day tool for criminals seeking to conceal the proceeds derived from their crime, hence the  / problematic notion of cyberlaundering. This paper journeys through the world of cyberlaundering by looking into the structure of the crime in great depth. It explores various possibilities, and tries to hatch out viable solutions to the dilemma.</p>
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The impact of mutual evaluation report on national anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism strategy: the case of TanzaniaGesase, Arnold January 2013 (has links)
Magister Legum - LLM
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Utilisation of the financial intelligence centre as a crime intelligence sourceMostert, Derick 11 1900 (has links)
The research was conducted as a result of the researcher‟s concern that the possibility exists that members of the different law enforcement agencies in South Africa might have a misconception about the mandate and functions of the Financial Intelligence Centre. If such a misconception in fact exists, it poses a huge challenge towards fruitful co-operation among the Centre and the different law enforcement agencies. The researcher identified certain practical problems, namely, that investigators are not aware of the types of intelligence that the Centre could provide them with, and that investigators might not be informed about the specific procedures to follow when they need to request intelligence from the Centre.
The research has shown that, in the past, the Centre has been a useful source of crime intelligence concerning a range of predicate offences including narcotics, fraud and tax related crimes. The research has further found that, although the majority of participants gained a lot of experience in law enforcement and investigations, they had limited awareness about the Financial Intelligence Centre and its functions.
This research project studied the utilisation of the Financial Intelligence Centre as a crime intelligence source. / Police Practice / M. Tech. (Forensic Investigation)
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The Suspicious Transaction Reporting Responsibilities of Attorneys in Terms of South African Anti-Money Laundering Legislative FrameworksDorey, Frank C. January 2014 (has links)
With the implementation of more and more stringent measures to prevent money laundering, criminals are resorting to the expertise of lawyers for assistance in the formulation of increasingly complex money laundering schemes. This expertise is provided both wittingly and unwittingly.
The purpose of this research was to consider whether the South African anti-money laundering legislation places suspicious transaction reporting obligations, which are in line with and meet international directives, conventions and best practice frameworks, on attorneys. The study entails a consideration of the suspicious transaction reporting obligations of lawyers introduced by the Financial Action Task Force, the European Union, the United Kingdom and South Africa and provides an understanding of the concept of money laundering, the money laundering process and the areas in which lawyers are vulnerable to money laundering.
The research found that the suspicious transaction reporting responsibilities of attorneys in terms of South African anti-money laundering legislation are not in line with international frameworks and best practice. / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2014. / tm2015 / Auditing / MPhil / Unrestricted
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The reporting responsibilities of accountants in terms of South African anti-money laundering legislationCullen, Catherine 03 May 2012 (has links)
Criminals make use of accountants to assist them, knowingly or unknowingly, with complex money laundering schemes. The nature of the accounting profession places accountants in an ideal position to identify possibly money laundering activities. The purpose of this research is to consider whether the reporting obligations of South African accountants in terms of section 29 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, No 38 of 2001, as amended, corresponds sufficiently with the services they provide so as to constitute an effective anti-money laundering measure. In order to evaluate the relevance of section 29, the reporting requirements of accountants practising in South Africa are compared with those of the European Union and the United Kingdom, as well as the requirements of the Financial Action Task Force. The research study will also analyse the money laundering process and the nature of the accounting profession and consider some of the methods used to perpetrate money laundering applicable to accountants. The research found that accountants in South Africa have a duty to report suspicious transactions only when they are party to such transactions or when they are going either to receive the proceeds of crime or be used for money laundering purposes. Accordingly, in view of the fact that accountants are more likely to be in a position to observe money laundering than to be party to such a transaction, the requirements of section 29 of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, No 38 of 2001, as amended, are not effective when applied to accountants. Copyright / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Accounting / unrestricted
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Utilisation of the financial intelligence centre as a crime intelligence sourceMostert, Derick 11 1900 (has links)
The research was conducted as a result of the researcher‟s concern that the possibility exists that members of the different law enforcement agencies in South Africa might have a misconception about the mandate and functions of the Financial Intelligence Centre. If such a misconception in fact exists, it poses a huge challenge towards fruitful co-operation among the Centre and the different law enforcement agencies. The researcher identified certain practical problems, namely, that investigators are not aware of the types of intelligence that the Centre could provide them with, and that investigators might not be informed about the specific procedures to follow when they need to request intelligence from the Centre.
The research has shown that, in the past, the Centre has been a useful source of crime intelligence concerning a range of predicate offences including narcotics, fraud and tax related crimes. The research has further found that, although the majority of participants gained a lot of experience in law enforcement and investigations, they had limited awareness about the Financial Intelligence Centre and its functions.
This research project studied the utilisation of the Financial Intelligence Centre as a crime intelligence source. / Police Practice / M. Tech. (Forensic Investigation)
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The South African anti-money laundering regulatory framework relevant to politically exposed personsAhlers, Christelle January 2013 (has links)
Politically exposed persons have become a specific risk factor in money laundering. The Financial Action Task Force has formulated clear and specific requirements for dealing with these individuals. Internationally, various jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the European Union have adopted effective legislation encompassing the 2003 Financial Action Task Force Recommendations. In South Africa the requirement to apply appropriate, risk based procedures to politically exposed persons has been limited to banks.
The aim of this research study was to identify whether the South African anti-money laundering regulatory framework, adequately addresses managing the risks of politically exposed persons. The regulatory frameworks of the United Kingdom and the European Union, as well as the requirements of the Financial Action Task Force, were used to determine whether best practice is followed in South Africa with regard to politically exposed persons. The process of how money is laundered has been examined as well as the methods that corrupt politically exposed persons use in order to launder money.
The study has shown that politically exposed persons are not regulated in South Africa in accordance with the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations issued in 2003, while the South African Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Framework does not adequately address the risk posed by corrupt, politically exposed persons. Both international best practice and the recommendations of the World Bank were considered in terms of the way in which to address the risks posed by these persons effectively. / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Auditing / unrestricted
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Praní špinavých peněz a jeho prevence / Money laundering and its preventionChýlová, Jana January 2010 (has links)
The work includes a theoretical definition, ways and methods of money laundering, Czech and International anti money laundering (AML) law. The second part is devoted to the fight against money laundering. It describes the main AML organizations. And as an example is given the program of one banking institution.
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