The use of financial incentives mechanisms (FIMs) in Australian government large nonresidential building projects is seen as a way to improve project motivation and outcomes and reinforce long-term commitment between participants. Yet very little empirical research has been conducted into how FIMs should be applied in the context of construction projects and what determines their impact on motivation. The primary aim of this research was to identify the motivation drivers impacting on the achievement of FIM goals. This allowed for the formulation of recommendations to improve Australian government building procurement strategies, creating the potential for better project outcomes. The research involved four major case studies of large construction projects. Analysis of motivation drivers on each project was based on interviews with senior project participants, secondary documentation and site visits. Once the motivation drivers were identified, they were ranked by the weighted number of motivation indicators impacted, to give an indication of their relative importance. The results provide Australian government clients with key areas for policy direction. The findings indicate that the following motivation drivers (in order of impact) were more important than FIM design in achieving FIM goals: equitable contract risk allocation and management scope for future project opportunities with the client harmonious project relationships early contractor involvement in design stages value-driven tender selection processes. A consequence of ignoring these key procurement initiatives can be a less than ideal FIM goal performance, despite the nature of FIM design, including the strength of the reward on offer. FIMs have the potential to be a valuable addition to any project procurement strategy. Yet, the main message of this thesis is: If clients rely solely on financial incentives as the driver of motivation it will likely result in failure.

The constitution stipulates that it is required to establish public health institutions. Among all the public health institutions, public hospital, such as municipal hospital or hospital under Department of Health, Executive Yuan, is mostly closely associated with public health. However, comparing the salaries with other healthcare personnel working in the private sector, it is difficult to attract the top physicians into public hospitals. In order to keep the salaries in public and private sectors in balance, or at least minimize the gap, Department of Health Administration initiated the financial incentive program. There are four municipal hospitals in Kaohsiung City: Kaohsiung Municipal United Hospital, Kaohsiung Kai-Suan Psychiatric Hospital, Kaohsiung Municipal Min-Sheng Hospital and Kaohsiung Municipal Chinese Medical Hospital. Since these four hospitals make distinct profits, the amount of financial incentives the staff received are different. Municipal Hospital pays financial incentives in accordance with the laws and rules passed by the direct authority which is Department of Health, Kaohsiung City Government. In this article, we analyze Kaohsiung Municipal Hospital financial incentive program to discuss the content, defect, suggestions and opinions of the staff, real financial incentive fraud cases, applicable law analysis, and whether or not the program conforms to our current concept of administrative law. This article is divided into seven chapters: prologue, introduction of Kaohsiung Municipal Hospital financial incentive program, real fraud cases, analysis on financial incentive program survey, elaborate on the applicable laws, the financial incentive program and the administrative law concept, conclusion and suggestions. It is hoped to bring up some concrete ideas for improvement, to clarify the applicable laws, to reflect the actual opinions and suggestions of the staff toward financial incentive program, and eventually to perfect the program so it is legitimate under both constitution and laws.

Background: Recently, health plans have initiated pay-for-performance (P4P) programs to incentivize pharmacies to focus on medication-related quality measures. Little research exists as to what attributes help a pharmacy to perform well in a P4P program. Objectives: This study aimed to: (1) propose a conceptual framework evolved from theories pertaining to economic, psychology, and organizational behavior disciplines that may contribute to a pharmacy's performance in a financial incentive program; (2) develop theoretically-derived questionnaires designed to elicit from pharmacists and pharmacy management pharmacy characteristics and pharmacy personnel factors thought to be associated with achieving quality measures specified for a pharmacy P4P program; (3) psychometrically assess these two newly developed questionnaires designed to collect information from community pharmacies eligible to participate in a pharmacy P4P program; (4) assess the magnitude of the relationship between pharmacy-related and construct redundancy of latent variables identified in objective 3; and (5) examine pharmacy factors' association with community pharmacies achieving quality measures in a pharmacy P4P program. Methods: Two survey instruments were created from a theoretically-derived conceptual framework to measure pertinent pharmacy characteristics and pharmacy personnel factors using a multi-step, mixed-methods process. Questionnaire development entailed semi-structured interviews, item generation, expert content validation, and cognitive debriefings. Developed questionnaires were evaluated in a non-experimental, cross-sectional survey of pharmacists and pharmacy management. Pharmacy personnel surveyed for this study were affiliated with pharmacies in Inland Empire Health Plan's (IEHP's) community pharmacy network. Using items measured in each questionnaire, specified groups of items were hypothesized to have a certain underlying latent variable. Latent variables hypothesized for items measured in the pharmacist questionnaire included: (1)"adherence management -services," (2)"adherence management-counseling," (3) "asthma management," (4) "pharmacist-prescriber relationship," (5) "chronic disease management," (6) "non-dispensing ability," and (7) "workload impact". For items measured in the pharmacy management questionnaire, eight latent variables were hypothesized: (1) "program understanding," (2) "program financial salience," (3) "program involvement," (4) "organization's adaptability," (5) "organization's innovativeness," (6) "organization's proactiveness," (7) "organization's risk-taking." and (8) "organization's focal emphasis." For hypothesized latent variables with four or more items, the value thresholds of three assessment indexes were employed as criteria to evaluate each measurement model's goodness-of-fit. Indexes included: (1) 2 test statistic (i.e.,>0.05), (2) root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) (i.e., 0.05), and (3) comparative fit index (CFI) (i.e.,>0.95). The statistical significance of item factor loadings was assessed for latent variables with (1) four or more items deemed to have adequate model fit per index criteria and (2) only three items, for which goodness-of-fit may not be assessed. Structural modeling was used to explore associations between (1) pairs of latent variables with adequate model fit and/or statistically significant factor loadings; and (2) latent variables with medication-related quality measures. The strength of associations among latent variable pairs was measured with correlation coefficients. Latent variable pairs with significant correlations greater than 0.50 were evaluated for construct redundancy, for which a change in CFI was used as the comparison criteria to determine whether the latent variables are better represented as one (i.e., (CFI<-0.01) or two constructs (i.e., (CFI ≥ -0.01). Mediation-related quality measures specified as dependent variables in structural models included: diabetes medication adherence, hypertension medication adherence, hypercholesterolemia medication adherence, absence of controller therapy in patients with asthma, use of high-risk medications in elderly, and generic dispensing rate. Results: The empirically derived conceptual framework outlined four major domains proposed for consideration when evaluating pharmacy P4P programs: (1) incentive; (2) pharmacy; (3) other influencing factors; and (4) P4P program measures. From this framework, two questionnaires were developed with the aim of measuring pharmacists' and pharmacy management's pharmacy attitudes and perspectives of a community pharmacy P4P program. The pharmacist survey instrument consisted of five sections: (i) community pharmacy P4P program; (ii) pharmacy services; (iii) pharmacist workload; (iv) pharmacy practice site; and (v) pharmacist's background. The pharmacy management questionnaire consisted of four sections: (i) pharmacy P4P program; (ii) pharmacy organization's characteristics; (iii) pharmacy practice site; and (iv) respondent's background information. Among the 604 pharmacies invited to participate, pharmacists from 114 unique pharmacies (19%) and pharmacy management from 100 unique pharmacies (17%) participated in the survey. This study identified psychometrically validated measurement models for latent constructs with items measured in the pharmacist ("adherence management-counseling," "asthma management," "workload impact" ) and pharmacy management ("program involvement," "organization's innovativeness," "organization's proactiveness," "organization's risk-taking" ) questionnaires). With the exception of "program involvement," the latent constructs measured in the pharmacy management questionnaire were identified to be significantly correlated (𝛹>0.50, p<0.001) and more parsimoniously represented as one factor rather than two (∆CFI<-0.01). No significant associations were identified in exploratory analyses of validated measurement models from the pharmacist questionnaire with targeted medication-related quality measures in IEHP's community pharmacy P4P program. Conclusion: This study collected data for two questionnaires evaluating (1) pharmaceutical care services conceptualized to be associated with targeting medication-related quality measures and (2) pharmacy management's attitudes toward a pharmacy P4P program. Furthermore, psychometric assessment of each questionnaire supplied initial validity evidence for three constructs for the pharmacist questionnaire ("adherence management-counseling," "asthma management," and "workload impact" ) and four constructs for the pharmacy management questionnaire ("program involvement," "organization's innovativeness," "organization's proactiveness," and "organization's risk-taking" ). Subsequent validation of these latent constructs in larger sample sizes is required. Continued study of pharmacy factors and their association with medication-related quality measures is needed to improve our understanding of pharmacies' performance in financial incentive programs. As pharmacy organizations are increasingly integrated into more financial incentive programs aimed at targeting process- and outcomes-related quality measures, it is essential to be able to measure pharmacy and management factors in order to determine which factor(s) impact pharmacy performance.

<p>Despite of the financial crisis managers are receiving large financial short-term incentives in form of bonuses. This has been criticized in the media and by governments, shareholders and numerous of studies have been made about financial incentives and whether they work or not and the results vary. What do the companies themselves say about this? Why do they use short-term incentives?</p><p>The purpose of this thesis was to find out why companies choose to have short-term incentive plans which usually consist of an annual bonus. Moreover how the incentive plans are designed and what companies expects from them.</p><p>A qualitative method is used in this thesis; five interviews were made in order to collect empirical material. The companies that participated in the study were Q-Med, Boliden, Johnson & Johnson, Nordea, and Siemens. The personnel who were interviewed were Human Resources (HR) directors or Financial Directors or had compensations and benefits as their main responsibility. All companies who participated in the interviews are public companies, although not all of them are listed at the Swedish Stock Exchange, Siemens and Johnson & Johnson are listed at the New York and Frankfurt Stock Exchange.</p><p>The conclusion of this study is that companies use short-term incentives as a motivator for the management and to structure goals and set a common aim for the companies’ divisions. They also consider themselves to need them in order to attract and keep good managers. The incentive programme is structured with the aim to increase the company’s profit by motivating employees but also to rate and evaluate the manager. When the incentive programme is well designed and fulfils its purpose it will benefit the shareholders, who owns the company, as profits will increase.</p>

Objective: For this dissertation, I investigated the characteristics of homeless, unaccompanied youth to determine which subgroups of students pursued and obtained financial stipends as an incentive for satisfactory educational outcomes- grades C and above. Method: The study was based on data obtained from a community-based, non-profit, drop-in center that serves homeless, unaccompanied youth enrolled in school. From each participant (n=965), demographic variables (including the student's age, grade, gender, race, and ethnicity) and life experience variables (including the student's reason for homelessness, current living situation, teen parenting status, and program enrollment status- either a new or returning student to the program) were obtained. These variables were used to determine the relationship between the student's characteristics and the outcome measurements: percent of the potential monthly stipends earned and the length of enrollment in the program. Results: The results demonstrated significant mean differences within the student's age, grade, and program enrollment status for both the percent of stipends earned and the length of program enrollment. A student's teenage parenting status also indicated a significant difference for the percent of stipend earned. Three student characteristics were significant predictors for the percent of stipends earned, and five characteristics were significant predictors for the length of program enrollment. Conclusions: Specific subgroups within the unaccompanied, homeless population pursue and obtain financial stipend incentives for educational outcomes at different rates. These results add to the literature needed to better align educational services and programs to the various subgroups within the homeless youth population.

Despite of the financial crisis managers are receiving large financial short-term incentives in form of bonuses. This has been criticized in the media and by governments, shareholders and numerous of studies have been made about financial incentives and whether they work or not and the results vary. What do the companies themselves say about this? Why do they use short-term incentives? The purpose of this thesis was to find out why companies choose to have short-term incentive plans which usually consist of an annual bonus. Moreover how the incentive plans are designed and what companies expects from them. A qualitative method is used in this thesis; five interviews were made in order to collect empirical material. The companies that participated in the study were Q-Med, Boliden, Johnson &amp; Johnson, Nordea, and Siemens. The personnel who were interviewed were Human Resources (HR) directors or Financial Directors or had compensations and benefits as their main responsibility. All companies who participated in the interviews are public companies, although not all of them are listed at the Swedish Stock Exchange, Siemens and Johnson &amp; Johnson are listed at the New York and Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The conclusion of this study is that companies use short-term incentives as a motivator for the management and to structure goals and set a common aim for the companies’ divisions. They also consider themselves to need them in order to attract and keep good managers. The incentive programme is structured with the aim to increase the company’s profit by motivating employees but also to rate and evaluate the manager. When the incentive programme is well designed and fulfils its purpose it will benefit the shareholders, who owns the company, as profits will increase.

Many utilities implement the financial incentive plans in promoting their Demand-Side Management (DSM) programs. The plans are intended to reduce the customer investment cost for a high efficiency equipment option, so that to make the investment more attractive. Despite its potential to increase customer participation, the financial incentives could cause a considerable increase in program cost to the utility. An analysis of financial incentive impact on the utility DSM program is conducted in this thesis. The analysis uses the combination of the customer participation modeling and the cost-benefit analysis of a DSM program. A modeling of customer participation by a discrete choice model is presented. The model uses the logistic probability functions. The benefit and cost of DSM programs are explored to develop the analysis methodology. Two typical energy conservation options of DSM programs are taken for case studies to demonstrate the analysis. The analysis is also conducted to see the effect of financial incentives on the performance of DSM programs in a fluctuating marginal energy cost. The result of this research shows that the financial incentive could induce the customer participation, thus provide an increase of benefit and costs. However, this research also reveals that, in certain circumstances, the financial incentive may result in a decrease of net benefit due to significant increase of cost. These imply that utilities must carefully evaluate the financial incentive plan in their DSM programs, before the programs are implemented. / Master of Science

Por um longo período o modelo de assistência em odontologia adotado no país se voltava apenas para um grupo etário da população as crianças e ainda se caracterizava pelo não conservadorismo, com um alto número de extrações, já que não existia uma estrutura que possibilitasse o acesso a outros níveis de atenção. Fato este reverberado pela ausência de políticas específicas de saúde bucal na esfera federal, até que em 2004 surge a Política Nacional de Saúde Bucal - Programa Brasil Sorridente. As diretrizes da política propõem a ampliação do acesso a todas as faixas etárias e o atendimento integral em todos os níveis, incentivando estados e municípios a criarem os Centros de Especialidades Odontológicos (CEO), que funcionariam como unidades de referência de média complexidade para as equipes de saúde bucal, oferecendo procedimentos mais complexos e conclusivos complementares aos realizados na atenção básica. O presente estudo analisa essa política de incentivo financeiro federal procurando identificar os elementos que possam ter contribuído ou dificultado a implantação dos CEO nos municípios do Estado do Rio de Janeiro no período de outubro de 2004 até dezembro de 2008. A análise foi baseada em documentos oficiais e entrevistas com atores relevantes para a compreensão das disputas deste processo. / For a long period the assistance model in dentistry adopted at the country only was turned for an age group of the population the children and it was still characterized by the non conservatism, with a high extractions numbers, since there isnt a structure that made possible the access to the other levels. This fact is reverberated by the absence of specific oral health policies in the federal sphere until that in 2004 the Oral Health National Policy appears - the Smiling Brazil Program. The politics guidelines propose the extended access for all age groups and the integral assistance at all the levels, motivating states and local governments to create Specialties Dentistry Centers (CEO) that they would work about references units of secondary complexity for the teams of oral health, offering more complex and conclusive procedures complementary to the accomplished in the basic attention. This work analyses that financial incentive federal policy trying to identify the elements that might have contributed or hindered the CEOs implementation in the municipalities of the Rio de Janeiro state in the period of October 2004 to December 2008. The analysis was based on official documents and interview with important actors for understanding of the process disputes.

Por um longo período o modelo de assistência em odontologia adotado no país se voltava apenas para um grupo etário da população as crianças e ainda se caracterizava pelo não conservadorismo, com um alto número de extrações, já que não existia uma estrutura que possibilitasse o acesso a outros níveis de atenção. Fato este reverberado pela ausência de políticas específicas de saúde bucal na esfera federal, até que em 2004 surge a Política Nacional de Saúde Bucal - Programa Brasil Sorridente. As diretrizes da política propõem a ampliação do acesso a todas as faixas etárias e o atendimento integral em todos os níveis, incentivando estados e municípios a criarem os Centros de Especialidades Odontológicos (CEO), que funcionariam como unidades de referência de média complexidade para as equipes de saúde bucal, oferecendo procedimentos mais complexos e conclusivos complementares aos realizados na atenção básica. O presente estudo analisa essa política de incentivo financeiro federal procurando identificar os elementos que possam ter contribuído ou dificultado a implantação dos CEO nos municípios do Estado do Rio de Janeiro no período de outubro de 2004 até dezembro de 2008. A análise foi baseada em documentos oficiais e entrevistas com atores relevantes para a compreensão das disputas deste processo. / For a long period the assistance model in dentistry adopted at the country only was turned for an age group of the population the children and it was still characterized by the non conservatism, with a high extractions numbers, since there isnt a structure that made possible the access to the other levels. This fact is reverberated by the absence of specific oral health policies in the federal sphere until that in 2004 the Oral Health National Policy appears - the Smiling Brazil Program. The politics guidelines propose the extended access for all age groups and the integral assistance at all the levels, motivating states and local governments to create Specialties Dentistry Centers (CEO) that they would work about references units of secondary complexity for the teams of oral health, offering more complex and conclusive procedures complementary to the accomplished in the basic attention. This work analyses that financial incentive federal policy trying to identify the elements that might have contributed or hindered the CEOs implementation in the municipalities of the Rio de Janeiro state in the period of October 2004 to December 2008. The analysis was based on official documents and interview with important actors for understanding of the process disputes.

Les gérants de portefeuille pour compte de tiers sont souvent jugés par leur performance relative à celle d'un portefeuille benchmark. A ce titre, ils sont amenés très fréquemment à utiliser des modèles internes de "risk management" pour contrôler le risque de sous-performer le benchmark. Par ailleurs, ils sont de plus en plus nombreux à adopter une politique de rémunération incitative, en percevant une commission de sur-performance par rapport au benchmark. En effet, cette composante variable de leur rémunération leur permet d'augmenter leur revenu en cas de sur-performance sans contrepartie en cas de sous-performance. Or de telles pratiques ont fait récemment l'objet de nombreuses polémiques : la période récente de crise financière mondiale a fait apparaître certaines carences de plusieurs acteurs financiers en terme de contrôle de risque ainsi que des niveaux de prise de risque et de rémunération jugés excessifs. Cependant, l'étude des implications de ces pratiques reste un thème encore relativement peu exploré dans le cadre de la théorie classique des choix dynamiques de portefeuille en temps continu. Cette thèse analyse, dans ce cadre théorique, les implications de ces pratiques de "benchmarking" sur le comportement d'investissement de l'asset manager. La première partie étudie les propriétés de la stratégie dynamique optimale pour l'asset manager concerné par l'écart entre la rentabilité de son portefeuille et celle d'un benchmark fixe ou stochastique (sur ou sous-performance). Nous considérons plusieurs types d'asset managers, caractérisés par différentes fonctions d'utilité et qui sont soumis à différentes contraintes de risque de sous-performance. Nous montrons en particulier quel est le lien entre les problèmes d'investissement avec prise en compte de l'aversion à la sous-performance et avec contrainte explicite de "risk management". Dans la seconde partie, on s'intéresse à l'asset manager bénéficiant d'une rémunération incitative (frais de gestion variables, bonus de sur-performance ou commission sur encours additionnelle). On étudie, selon la forme de ses incitations financières et son degré d'aversion à la sous-performance, comment sa stratégie d'investissement s'écarte de celle de l'investisseur (ou celle de l'asset manager sans rémunération incitative). Nous montrons que le changement de comportement de l'asset manager peut se traduire soit par une réduction du risque pris par rapport à la stratégie sans incitation financière soit au contraire par une augmentation de celui-ci. Finalement, nous montrons en quoi la présence de contraintes de risque de sous-performance, imposées au gérant ou traduisant son aversion à la sous-performance, peut être bénéfique à l'investisseur donnant mandat de gestion financière. / It is common practice to judge third-party asset managers by looking at their financial performance relative to a benchmark portfolio. For this reason, they often choose to rely on internal risk-management models to control the downside risk of their portfolio relative to the benchmark. Moreover, an increasing number are adopting an incentive-based scheme, by charging an over-performance commission relative to the benchmark. Indeed, including this variable component in their global remuneration allows them to increase their revenue in case of over-performance without any penalty in the event of underperforming the benchmark. However, such practices have recently been at the heart of several polemics: the recent global financial crisis has uncovered some shortcomings in terms of internal risk control as well as excessive risk-taking and compensation levels of several financial players. Nevertheless, it appears that analyzing the impact of these practices remains a relatively new issue in continuous time-dynamic asset allocation theory. This thesis analyses in this theoretical framework the implications of these "benchmarking" practices on the asset manager's investment behavior. The first part examines the properties of the optimal dynamic strategy for the asset manager who is concerned by the difference of return between their portfolio and a fix or stochastic benchmark (over- or under-performance). Several asset manager types are considered, defined by different utility functions and different downside-risk constraints. In particular, the link between investment problems with aversion to under-performance and risk management constraints is shown. In the second part, the case of the asset manager who benefits from an incentive compensation scheme (variable asset management fees, over-performance bonuses or additional commission on asset under management), is investigated. We study how, depending on the choice of financial inventive structure and loss aversion level, the asset manager's strategy differs from that of the investor (or the strategy of the asset manager receiving no incentive remuneration). This study shows that the change in investment behavior of the asset manager can lead to both a reduction in the risk taken relative to the strategy without financial incentives or conversely an increase thereof. Finally we show that the existence of downside risk constraints, imposed on the asset manager or corresponding to their aversion for under-performance, can be beneficial to the investor mandating financial management.