Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2004. Graduate Programme in Ethnomusicology and Musicology. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 338-347). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ99155

Thesis (M.M.) Florida State University, 2006. / Advisor: Ladislav Kubik, Florida State University, College of Music. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed 8-21-2007). Document formatted into pages; contains 54 pages. Includes biographical sketch.

Thesis (M.M.) Florida State University, 2007. / Advisor: Charles E. Brewer, Florida State University, College of Music. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed 8-22-2007). Document formatted into pages; contains 100 pages. Includes biographical sketch. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis--Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. v-vi).

System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Accompanied by 2 recitals, recorded Nov. 18, 2004, and Nov. 19, 2008. Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-62).

This thesis examines the relationship between folk psychology and scientific psychology, and argues that the conceptual taxonomy provided by the former is unsuitable for fine-grained cognitive scientific research. I avoid traditional eliminativism by reserving a role for folk psychology as a socio-normative discourse, where folk psychological concepts primarily refer to behaviour rather than to mental states, and also exert a regulative influence on behaviour. In the first half of this thesis I develop a positive account of folk psychology as a broad discourse that includes mental state attributions, behavioural predictions, narrative competency, and regulative mechanisms. In the second half I argue that the conceptual taxonomy provided by this discourse has led to theoretical confusions in both philosophy and cognitive science, and I propose a systematic methodology for developing a novel ‘cognitive ontology’ that is better suited for contemporary scientific research. What is folk psychology? In chapter 1 I survey the history of the term folk psychology and demonstrate that the term only really came into general usage following the work of Fodor and Churchland in the 1970s and 80s. I also argue that it is a mistake, stemming from this era, to identify folk psychology exclusively with propositional attitude psychology, which is just one particular way in which the folk might understand one another. If folk psychology is not just propositional attitude psychology, what else might it be? In chapter 2 I consider what I call the ‘universality assumption’, i.e. the assumption that folk psychological intuitions are shared across all cultures and languages. If this assumption were justified then it might provide partial support for the claim that folk psychology presents an accurate account of human cognition. However, there is significant evidence of variation in folk psychological intuitions, suggesting that folk psychology might be at least partially biased by cultural and linguistic influences. If folk psychology is not the same in every culture, how come it is so successful at predicting behaviour? In chapter 3 I look at various ways in which folk psychological discourse can play a regulative or normative role by exerting an influence on our behaviour. This role helps to explain how folk psychology can be predictively successful even if it fails to accurately describe the fine-grained details of human cognition, as via regulative mechanisms it is able to become a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy. How well does folk psychology match up with our scientific understanding of cognition? In chapter 4 I present evidence of cases where folk psychological concepts have served to mislead or confuse theoretical debates in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I consider several case studies, including the false belief task in social cognition, the taxonomisation of sensory modalities, the extended cognition debate, and the recently emerging ‘Bayesian brain’ hypothesis. If folk psychological concepts do not refer to entities in our scientific theories, then what do they refer to? In chapter 5 I examine the status of folk psychological kinds as natural kinds, and argue that even under a very liberal account folk psychological kinds probably do not constitute viable scientific kinds. However, due to the regulative mechanisms described in chapter 3, they do constitute what Hacking has described as ‘human’ or ‘interactive’ kinds, which exhibit complex looping effects. What kinds of concepts should cognitive science use, if not folk psychological concepts? Finally, in chapter 6 I look at recent developments in ‘cognitive ontology’ revision and argue that we should adopt a systematic methodology for constructing novel concepts that better reflect our current best understanding of cognitive systems. In closing I consider the relationship between these novel concepts and the ontology presented by folk psychological discourse.

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M.A. / This study aims to examine the structure and style of Setswana folktales. Secondly it wishes to test the applicability of synchronic approach in general and (in particular) Propp-Dundes' approaches in the evaluation of Setswana folktales. We intend to interview as many informants as possible both in urban and (in) rural areas. Folktales will be recorded, transcribed in their original language and then literally be translated into the target language. However where literal translation fails to reflect the intended meaning free translation will be pursued.

This thesis examines historical developments in Scottish dance over the past two hundred years and considers how they combined to shape the current traditional dance and music culture in Scotland. This work examines the effects of increasing regulation and standardisation during the twentieth century through an assessment of the experiences, viewpoints and opinions of present-day practitioners. The business practice and increasing professionalisation of nineteenth-century dancing masters active in the North-East of Scotland, and that of A. Cosmo Mitchell in particular, is considered in relation to the formation of the regulatory societies. The introduction of standardisation is examined through a comparison of nineteenth- and twentiethcentury published sources for the 'Highland Fling'. Tensions and contrasts in traditional dance and music are assessed by a consideration of the approach taken by influential traditional music education establishments such as Fèisean nan Gàidheal and by examining the relationship between Highland dancing and Highland piping. Reactions to regulation such as the (re)introduction of percussive step dance to Scotland and the growth in popularity of informal, 'called' ceilidh dancing are evaluated. The relationship between traditional dance and music in Scotland today is considered in the light of recurring themes such as professionalisation, regulation, authority, reactions to the status quo and the revival of an approach to or concept of dance rather than the revival of an historically verifiable style.

No description available.