<p>The study analyzes Russian foreign policy discourse on NATO during and after the Georgian war as constructed in on-line news articles from the state-run RIA Novosti news agency. The thesis adopts constructivist and discourse analytical approach. Namely, it is based on the interplay between the three main theoretical pillars: language as constitutive part of social reality; media as a type of discourse; and the constructivist understanding of the foreign policy discourse as being embedded in the domestic social and cultural dimensions.  <em></em></p><p>The research has shown that the discourse on NATO constructed in the news articles of Ria Novosti to a great extent reflected the official Russian government’s discourse.  The overall unfavorable representation of the organization was evident throughout the analyzed material. This ‘negative-other representation’ served to establish political frontiers between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ of the discourse. In the context of the Georgian war, the questions of the future power balance as well as effective transatlantic security mechanism gained particular prominence. The geopolitics of the regional security was represented as bipolar, comprising NATO (or ‘the West’ in its broad sense) on the one hand and Russia as the legitimate leader in most of the post-Soviet space, on the other. Such representation tended to possess distinctive features of the Cold War discourse.</p><p> </p>

This study seeks to examine the how populism impacts foreign policy discourse. The study applies role theory to the empirical case of the Brazil-China bilateral relationship in order to observe changes within role conceptions or role prescriptions before and after the election of populist leader Jair Bolsonaro. The research question put forward is   As a result of the election of populist president Jair Bolsonaro, in the case of the bilateral relationship between Brazil and China, has 1)    the role conception of Brazil’s own role changed, and if so, how? 2)    the role prescription of Chinas role changed, if so, how?    3 hypotheses are developed, based on the chosen definitions of populism, and tested on the material. The chosen materials for the study are speeches and tweets by incumbent presidents or other high-ranking officials. The data has been collected from Brazil’s ministry of foreign affairs website, or the official government website of Brazil. The chosen methodology is a qualitative text analysis. The study finds support for two out of the three hypotheses. These relate to anti-pluralism and anti-elitism as central aspects of populist discourse. The study does not find bad manners to be a key aspect of populist foreign policy discourse. The analysis reveals that the role conception has changed in some ways whilst the role prescription has remained strikingly similar.

Situated within a global context of political unease over Russia’s involvement in Ukraine, this thesis challenges views of Russian foreign policy as enigmatic and unpredictable. It examines the relationship between identity politics, conceptions of security, and the foreign policy preferences of the Russian political elite. It shows how particular aspects of Russian identity that are dominant in different international contexts work to structure policy preferences. This contributes to the pursuit of apparently contradictory objectives across these settings, and to inconsistencies between the rhetoric and reality of Russian security policy. Previous studies have looked into the impact of Russian identity on its policy preferences, but most have taken a limited, instrumentalist view of identity as a tool that is mobilised by political elites to further their existing policy preferences. By contrast, this thesis argues that conscious elite mobilisation of identity provides only part of the picture. Visions of Russian identity (and consequently of its international role) are constrained by institutional factors. These include the linked historical development of the Russian military, economy and education/research sectors. Following a discursive understanding of institutions, they also include the limited number of ways in which identity has previously been represented. These factors produce subconscious constraints on the imagining of Russian identity. This limited conceptualisation of Russian identity has become even more specific in the Putin era, due to the political elite’s frequent repetition of one, highly restrictive, narrative of a ‘usable’ history, presented as the factual background to policy discussion. This narrative foregrounds favoured events, associating them with preferred identity themes. Resultant ‘truths’ of Russian identity then provide a framework for foreign policy. Particular elements of this framework dominate Russia’s relationships with different multinational bodies, impacting on the type of policy cooperation pursued. In relations with the EU, focus on Russia’s equal contribution to European civilisation brings normative incompatibilities between the parties to the fore and acts as a barrier to compromise. With contrasting visions of their identities in their shared region, of what security there should look like, and of how it should be achieved, Russia-EU cooperation has been most effective when undertaken in a specific, sectoral manner. Anticipating the ‘West’s’ relative decline in global influence, Russia has gradually downgraded EU relations whilst pursuing a ‘multivector’ foreign policy that emphasises alternative partners. Capitalising on its identity as one of the BRICS rising powers, Russia has been able to pursue a joint challenge to the contemporary structure of the international order, facilitated by members’ shared convictions of the inequities of the existing system, and of their subordinate positions within it. Here, Russia’s identity as a cultural bridge has been emphasised, giving it a unique possibility to negotiate between the old and the new global powers. Most recently, Russia has built upon its identity as a continent-straddling regional leader, and a supposedly natural representative of Eurasia. In developing the Eurasian Union, Russia seeks to use its privileged regional role to ensure continued global relevance during an anticipated, and desired, transition to global multipolarity. This is a new reading of Russian ‘great power’, in which Russia’s multiple international roles are combined to give it the greatest possible level of influence in determining new global structures.

German-Russian relations have remained strong since the Cold War, despite continuing in traditions of multilateralism and integrated into the Western order. Despite recent tensions and deterioration since the Ukraine Crisis, German-Russian relations are a subject of intense debate between the political parties CDU/CSU and SPD that governed Germany in a coalition from 2014-2017. This thesis utilises a social constructivist method to focus on social factors and party-political legacies relevant in the evolving relationship. It then analyses the evolving discourse of the parties about Russia in the years 2014-2017, focusing on the different ways the discourse uses and connects with the factors and legacies. Although a parallel movement is discerned between the foreign policy positions of the CDU/CSU and SPD, the parties' positions do not converge but remain in conflict about the future of European security, cooperation with Russia and the desired foreign policy role of Germany. Throughout, the analysis suggests that contemporary theories about German-Russian relations and about Germany's foreign policy role should look at the internal debates and factors to get a more complete picture of German foreign policy. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

The study analyzes Russian foreign policy discourse on NATO during and after the Georgian war as constructed in on-line news articles from the state-run RIA Novosti news agency. The thesis adopts constructivist and discourse analytical approach. Namely, it is based on the interplay between the three main theoretical pillars: language as constitutive part of social reality; media as a type of discourse; and the constructivist understanding of the foreign policy discourse as being embedded in the domestic social and cultural dimensions.  The research has shown that the discourse on NATO constructed in the news articles of Ria Novosti to a great extent reflected the official Russian government’s discourse.  The overall unfavorable representation of the organization was evident throughout the analyzed material. This ‘negative-other representation’ served to establish political frontiers between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ of the discourse. In the context of the Georgian war, the questions of the future power balance as well as effective transatlantic security mechanism gained particular prominence. The geopolitics of the regional security was represented as bipolar, comprising NATO (or ‘the West’ in its broad sense) on the one hand and Russia as the legitimate leader in most of the post-Soviet space, on the other. Such representation tended to possess distinctive features of the Cold War discourse.

This thesis aims to determine if there is a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism in the Swedish Government’s Statements of Foreign Policy between 2002 and 2018. Discourse analysis have been used to analyze eight statements, based on a constructivist framework and the theoretical concept of Swedish exceptionalism. Swedish exceptionalism is the idea of Sweden having a self-image of being superior to others, mainly based on the country’s understanding of itself as being a “moral superpower”.   The research question formulated was: Are the Swedish Government’s Statements of Foreign Policy, between 2002 and 2018, articulated through a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism?   To determine if there was a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism in the Statements of Foreign Policy, seven key representations of the concept were established. Those were   Sweden:   1.     being military non-aligned 2.     having an active foreign policy 3.     being pioneering or “leading the way” 4.     bringing security, stability, and peace 5.     being a champion of human rights and democracy 6.     acting as mediator and/or a bridge builder 7.     showing solidarity with “less fortune states” (developing, vulnerable and/or small)   The results of the empirical study were that all key representations were present in all of the statements analyzed, which lead to the conclusion is that the Statements of Foreign Policy between 2002 and 2018 were articulated through a discourse of Swedish exceptionalism.

The Sultanate of Oman is often described by the international media as a peaceful exception in the turbulent Middle East. Most authors studying Oman’s history and politics agree that discretion, consultation, peaceful neighborhood relations and independence from the greater powers operating in the region have been the constant elements of the country’s contemporary foreign policy. Moreover, it is widely argued that Oman’s foreign policy approach derives from the country’s national identity, including its Ibadi tradition and the cosmopolitan character of the Omani maritime history. Despite the extensive use of terms like a “non-aligned” or “neutral” foreign policy deriving from a “tolerant” or “peaceful” identity, both by academics and journalists to describe the country’s behavior, a careful reflection on the appropriate application of these concepts to the Omani case is still missing. The aim of my research is to deconstruct essentialist understandings of Oman's identity and foreign policy, by looking at how discursive alignments and identity contents varied to support the government's quests for legitimacy, recognition, and status. By adopting a Discourse Historical Approach (DHA), the work compares the National Day speeches and the UN GA speeches under the entire reign of Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Bu Saidi (1970 – 2020), to look at how discourse changed based on the time, issue, and audience of reference. More broadly, this research seeks to provide an underexplored perspective on Oman’s foreign policy, at the same time contributing both to the theoretical debate on small states’ alignments and to the discussion on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states’ foreign policies and identities.