This research identifies the conditions that contribute to the rise of durable state rivals that persist over time and do not attempt to overthrow the state. I use a case study of Hezbollah in Lebanon and find that a weak state, foreign state sponsorship, and local support contribute to the rise of durable state rivals. The same conditions that enable the rise of a durable state rival make it more difficult for a durable state rival to overthrow the state. Durable state rivals exist within state borders, possess a high level of social control over a community within the state, and challenge the authority and legitimacy of the state, but they do not attempt to overthrow the state.

Submitted by Pedro Brandão Solti (pedrosolti@gmail.com) on 2016-04-29T00:08:03Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Foreign Support, Internal Political Disputes and Mass Killings_Biblioteca.pdf: 491661 bytes, checksum: 6003dbc9dfce9fc1a8d17e087e25c9e4 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by GILSON ROCHA MIRANDA (gilson.miranda@fgv.br) on 2016-05-25T14:48:40Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Foreign Support, Internal Political Disputes and Mass Killings_Biblioteca.pdf: 491661 bytes, checksum: 6003dbc9dfce9fc1a8d17e087e25c9e4 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2016-06-13T12:41:27Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Foreign Support, Internal Political Disputes and Mass Killings_Biblioteca.pdf: 491661 bytes, checksum: 6003dbc9dfce9fc1a8d17e087e25c9e4 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-13T12:42:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Foreign Support, Internal Political Disputes and Mass Killings_Biblioteca.pdf: 491661 bytes, checksum: 6003dbc9dfce9fc1a8d17e087e25c9e4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-28 / This paper studies the incentives underlying the relations between foreign countries and rival domestic groups. It models the interaction in a infinitely-repeated game between these three players. The domestic groups bargain for a split of the domestic surplus and may engage in violent dispute for power and in unilateral mass killing processes. The foreign country may choose to support one of these groups in exchange for monetary transfers. The paper characterizes the parametric set in which strategies leading to no violent disputes nor mass killings are Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibra in the presence of foreign support, but not in its absence.

Abstract: What explains the use of violence in extra-institutional political campaigns? Domestic groups challenge host states using both nonviolent and violent tactics. While Gandhi’s struggle for India’s independence is perhaps the most famous example of nonviolence, many of today’s bloody civil wars also started out as nonviolent movements. In a world eager to support the self-determination of marginalized groups, both nonviolent and violent groups receive support from foreign actors. Despite this, theories on the use of violence by these groups remain untested empirically.  This paper uses panel data to quantitatively investigate the proposition that external support of extra-institutional political movements causes an increase in the use of violence. A logistic regression model finds no statistically significant relationship between the provision of external support and an increased use of violence in primarily nonviolent campaigns. An additional test on a sample of violent non-state groups finds that battle-related deaths increased when external support was provided in the previous year, a result significant at 99% confidence.

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