An investigation into whether Plato was committed to separate Forms in the Phaedo. Two accounts of separation are distinguished: Gail Fine's modal account where separation is a capacity to exist independendently from sensible particulars, and Daniel D. Devereux' non-modal account where separation is equivalent with non-immanence. I analyse multiple key passages of the Phaedo using these accounts of separation, to see whether any passage commits Plato to separation understood in either modal or non-modal terms. I argue and conclude that there is no evidence of Plato being committed to separation in the Phaedo, understanding separation in either modal or non-modal terms.

We give congruences modulo powers of p in {3, 5, 7} for the Fourier coefficients of certain modular functions in level p with poles only at 0, answering a question posed by Andersen and Jenkins and continuing work done by the Jenkins, the author, and Moss. The congruences involve a modulus that depends on the base p expansion of the modular form's order of vanishing at infinity.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.