Freedom of religion or belief is indisputable in Human rights discourse, more discussed is exactly what it is that is included in the concept of freedom of religion or belief (in Swedish: religionsfrihet). This thesis focuses on the freedom of religion or belief in a European context, in particular on the European court of human rights and article 9 in the European convention for human rights. Some criticism has been directed against the Court to the effect that its practice and verdicts don't answer to the pronounced desire to develop a pluralistic and inclusive form of freedom of religion or belief. My aim is to examine, analyse and test three different theories, which all try to develop alternatives to the expression freedom of religion or belief, in relation to six verdicts from article 9 in Europe convention. My basic purpose is to try to find new ways of talking about freedom of religion or belief that might lead to a more inclusive, pluralistic and equal interpretation of that concept. The three theories wich I use are elaborated by Richard Amesbury (associate professor at Claremont school of Theology); Hugo Strandberg (TD at Åbo Akademi) and Eberhard Herrmann (professor in philosophy of religion at Uppsala University); and Martha Nussbaum (professor of law and ethics at the University of Chicago). The six cases from the European court are: X v. Federal Republic of Germany, X v. United Kingdom, Chappell v. United Kingdom, Dahlab v. Switzerland, Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, Dogru v. France. The results of this thesis suggest that the use of alternative expression to the Swedish term religionsfrihet might to a great extent lead to a more inclusive, pluralistic and equal form of freedom of religion or belief – for example in such areas as: individuality, minorities and frames of reference in society as such.

In this thesis it is argued that while the concept of freedom of religion or belief itself is opaque and difficult to define, the right to religious freedom must contain certain basic factors – most importantly the right to individual (religious) autonomy. The individual autonomy approach is seen here as providing the necessary rationale for the protection of freedom of religion or belief. This rationale is not cemented in stone in the practice of the Convention and this has caused the Court to lose its focus on individual freedom. It is a dangerous tendency. It allows the focus to be placed on the role of the State and leaves freedom of religion or belief to be heavily affected by politics and fluctuating social attitudes. In this regard, this thesis looks for the meaning and scope of individual and collective religious autonomy and how it is and ought to be represented in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. It is the aim of the author to contribute to a clearer and more principled understanding of Article 9 of the ECHR. The right to individual autonomy is thought to be able to provide the necessary focus for the European Court of Human Rights in creating a more robust framework for the protection of freedom of religion or belief different from current Court practice which shows inconsistency in its reasoning and theoretical chaos. This lack of clarity has also contributed to freedom of religion or belief being a relatively weak right. It is explored here as to how the principle of autonomy (as developed in this thesis) relates to other principles provided by the Court, namely the principle of State neutrality, pluralism and the effective protection of rights, but also the margin of appreciation and the autonomy of religious communities. The individual autonomy centred theoretical framework in the first part of the thesis will be engaged to analyse the conflict in the triangle of state-individual-community explored in the second part.

Cette thèse propose une lecture juridique, politique et sociale de l’application de la loi anti-blasphème de 1965 dans le plus grand pays musulman du monde, l’Indonésie. Plusieurs controverses sont apparues ces dernières années concernant la nature de la loi sur le blasphème dans la vie religieuse de la société démocratique indonésienne ; cette loi correspond-elle à la prévention des abus en matière de religion et/ou de blasphème, comme il est mentionné explicitement dans son titre, ou bien concernerait-elle plutôt la restriction de la liberté de religion et d’expression en matière religieuse ? En avril 2010, après le procès contrôlant la constitutionnalité de cette loi, une décision de la Cour constitutionnelle indonésienne a établi que la loi examinée ne correspondait pas à cette seconde lecture. Si cette loi a bien pour objectif de restreindre la liberté de religion ou d’expression en matière religieuse, selon la Cour, cela ne signifie pas que cette forme de restriction est inconstitutionnelle dès lors que la Constitution de 1945 en vigueur s’accompagne d’une restriction légale au respect ou à la sauvegarde des valeurs religieuses en particulier, à côté de la moralité, de la sécurité et de l’ordre public. Toutefois, les débats et les tensions au sein de la société concernant l’application de cette loi perdurent sans relâche. Les défenseurs des droits de l’homme maintiennent que l’existence d’une telle loi anti-blasphème est contraire à l’esprit de la démocratie. En revanche, les défenseurs de la censure religieuse s’obstinent à affirmer que cette loi est nécessaire pour éviter les conflits religieux. À travers une analyse de son contenu juridique et de sa mise en application, nous considérons que la loi anti-blasphème de 1965 a visé en premier lieu à entraver le déploiement des courants de croyance spirituelle locale ou des courants mystiques javanais qui, dans une certaine mesure, sont considérés par les musulmans en particulier comme une menace pour les religions existantes et pour la désintégration du pays. Dans un second temps, nous verrons que l’existence de ladite loi est davantage destinée à restreindre le nombre des religions reconnues par l’État d’une part, et à réprimer les courants religieux « dissidents » ou « hétérodoxes » d’autre part. Si les actes jugés comme blasphématoires, parmi lesquels figure la diffusion d’interprétation religieuse « déviantes » de l’orthodoxie, sont des infractions sanctionnées, ce n’est pas la loi anti-blasphème de 1965 qui sert de référence, mais l’article 156a du Code pénal qui trouve son origine dans ladite loi. Ainsi, la loi anti-blasphème de 1965 est plutôt utilisée pour restreindre la liberté de religion et de conviction au sens large, alors que l’article 156a du Code pénal est chargé de limiter la liberté d’expression en matière religieuse. En Indonésie comme ailleurs, le renforcement de l’application de la loi anti-blasphème va de pair avec l’émergence des groupes religieux radicaux qui veulent voir triompher leur conception totalitaire d’une liberté d’expression bridée par le respect de la foi religieuse. Ces derniers utilisent de cette loi non seulement à des fins religieuses, mais également à des fins politiques, notamment celle déstabiliser un régime « laïque » ou bien d’étendre leur influence. L’objectif de cette thèse est non seulement d’analyser la nature de la loi anti-blasphème de 1965, mais aussi de proposer une perspective alternative pour aborder les conflits juridiques en Indonésie concernant les deux droits fondamentaux, à savoir le droit à la liberté de religion et le droit d’expression. La thèse vise alors la prévention des conflits juridiques en la matière et ainsi qu’à trouver un équilibre entre les libertés concernées. / This thesis proposes a legal, political and social reading of the application of the blasphemy law in the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia. Several controversies have emerged in recent years regarding the nature of the blasphemy law in the religious life of the Indonesian democratic society. For instance, disagreement remains with regards to the intent of this law, i.e., whether it really aims at preventing misuse of religion and/or acts of blasphemy, as explicitly mentioned in its title, or whether it intends to restrict the freedom of religion and religious expression. In April 2010, after the examination of the constitutionality of this law, the Indonesian Constitutional Court ruled out the second possibility. The court further argues that even if the law has an unintended effect of restricting the freedom of religion or religious expression, it is not against the constitution since the 1945 Constitution is accompanied by a legal restriction to respect or preserve religious values in particular, as well as morality, security and public order. However, the debates and tensions within society regarding the implementation of this law continue unabated. On the one hand, human rights defenders persist in saying that the existing anti-blasphemy law is contrary to the spirit of democracy. On the other, defenders of religious censorship persist in resisting that this law is necessary to avoid religious conflicts. Through an analysis of legal content and its implementation, I argue that the blasphemy law of 1965 initially aims to hinder the development of the local spiritual belief stream or Javanese mystical groups, which to some extent are considered by Muslims in particular as a threat to existing religions and a source of disintegration of the country. Further, I maintain that the existence of the above-mentioned law has the tendency to restrict the number of religions officially acknowledged by the State and to repress “dissident” or “heterodox” religious movements. If acts considered blasphemous, including the "deviant" religious interpretation of orthodoxy, are punishable offenses, it is not the anti-blasphemy law of 1965 that serves as a reference, but the article 156a of the Penal Code, which has its origin in that blasphemy law does. As a consequence, the blasphemy law of the 1965 is rather used to restrict the freedom of religion and belief in the broad sense, while article 156a of the Penal Code is applied to limit the freedom of religious expression. In Indonesia, as elsewhere, the strengthening of the application of the blasphemy law goes hand in hand with the emergence of radical religious groups intend to promote their totalitarian concept of freedom of expression restrained by respect for the religious faith. The latter make use of this law not only for religious reasons, but also for political reasons, including destabilizing a secular regime or extending their influence. The thesis does not only aim to analyze the nature of the blasphemy law of 1965, but also to propose an alternative perspective in understanding and solving the problem of the legal conflicts in Indonesia pertaining to the two fundamental rights, namely the right to freedom of religion and expression. The thesis also seeks to find a balance between two freedoms and to propose preventive measures that can be adopted in the aforementioned legal conflicts.