This thesis addresses numerous key points on the application of the margin of appreciation principle in relation to Article 9 (2) of the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ('Convention').1 In general terms, the margin of appreciation doctrine means that the State is allowed a certain measure of discretion, subject to European supervision, when it takes legislative, administrative, or judicial action in the area of a Convention right.2 The margin of appreciation is given to Contracting States to allow variation amongst them in terms of interpretation of the rights guaranteed.

This thesis argues that the current Canadian approach to freedom of religion is inconsistent with Canada’s approach to multiculturalism. It begins by placing Canada’s multiculturalism legislation into the broader intellectual context of the leading political theories on the governance of diverse populations. It then examines the Canadian case law regarding freedom of religion, arguing that the prevailing rights-based approach produces consequences inconsistent with Canada’s legislated commitments to multiculturalism. It posits that the individualism of rights-based analysis, the pressure to frame religion in pre-defined ways, and the tendency of courts to speak in the language of tolerance are all troublesome. Further, it argues that when disputes are framed in terms of rights, meaningful dialogue is less likely and compromises are difficult to achieve. It then proposes an alternative, “difference-based” approach to disputes involving religion, which provides a framework more consistent with Canada’s multicultural ideals.

No description available.

Twentieth-century analytic philosophy ushered in a renewed interest in an ethical theory known as the Divine Command Theory of ethics (DC). Consequent to the work of G.E. Moore, philosophers have been involved in metaethics, or how we may ground ethical terms such as “good” and “right”. The traditional DC response is to argue that God is the source of good, and best serves that role in that He is an “ideal observer” of all states of affairs. The question is how is God’s will relevant to determining the moral status of actions? At this point one may distinguish between what God wills and what God in fact commands. However, the contemporary debate is to determine whether it is God’s commands or God’s will that is primary in determining moral obligation. The most vivid portrait of this distinction is found in the binding of Isaac. There we note that God commands Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, but it is not at all clear that God wills the actual death of Isaac. Thus, in this work I will present and defend a coherent DC view of ethics, whereby our moral obligations are derived from the commands of God. In chapter II I will provide a brief history of philosophers who have endorsed DC. In chapter III I will argue that the best ground for objective moral values is best defined by DC. Chapter IV will be devoted to my particular argument for DC. I will take up the task of defending the traditional command view of DC. Chapters V and VI will be devoted to developing plausible responses to major objections to DC. In chapter V I will attempt a resolution of the famous Euthyphro dilemma, and in chapter VI I will argue that endorsing a DC view of ethics in no way negates the autonomy of the moral agent.

This essay begins with the assumption that a liberal political morality is grounded upon two core ideals one, that the freedom to shape one's own life in accordance with one's reasonable beliefs about the good is constitutive of the ideal human life; and two, that the state ought to be in the business of securing this life-shaping freedom for its citizens. I argue that the endorsement of these ideals has perfectionist implications for a political morality. My central claim is that if the liberal state is committed to securing its citizens' life-shaping freedom, then it must actively and intentionally promote a definitive ideal of human flourishing. Accordingly, a liberal political morality is perfectionist insofar as it promotes an ideal of human flourishing; it is liberal insofar as that ideal is a distinctively liberal one. My argument proceeds in four stages. In Chapter II, I argue that a liberal political morality cannot remain neutral in the way that many liberals claim it must be. The consequence of this is that a liberal morality must be grounded upon a non-neutral moral ideal. In Chapter III, I argue that this non-neutral ideal must take citizens' positive liberty or what I am calling their life-shaping capabilities €”seriously if it is to achieve its end of securing its citizens' life-shaping freedom. In Chapter IV, I present a theoretical framework intended to support the perfectionist element of my account. To do this, I propose a capabilities approach to well-being, which enables us to determine which capabilities are necessary for life-shaping freedom. In Chapter V, I address the inevitable worry that the state's enforcement of perfectionist political principles is likely to unjustifiably infringe upon its citizens'€™ freedom. To alleviate this concern, I argue that any paternalistic interference justified by a capabilities approach actually enhances citizens' long-term freedom by preventing them from permanently forfeiting the necessary conditions of their freedom. Once this obstacle has been overcome, we will be free to embrace the perfectionist implications of our commitment to life-shaping freedom.

<p>This paper investigates the impact of Economic Freedom on FDI inflows to developing countries and the Middle East in particular. Four forms of Economic Freedom were tested as variables determining FDI inflow. These four variables were Freedom from Corruption, Government Size, Trade Freedom and Investment Freedom. Cross-sectional data for twelve Middle Eastern countries and forty-three other developing countries were gathered for 1995 and 2006. It was revealed that only Trade Freedom and Invest-ment Freedom were significant in both Middle East and other regions. Apart from one case, the general positive sign of the significant variables confirms our hypothesis re-garding the positive effects of these Economic Freedoms on FDI inflows. Based on these findings it can be recommended to improve the investment environment and re-duce the barriers to trade in order to attract more FDI.</p>

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2000. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [151]-168). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.S.) in Spatial Information Science and Engineering--University of Maine, 2001. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 160-166).

Thesis (M.A.)--West Virginia University, 2002. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains iii, 100 p. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 98-100).

Thesis (M.A.)--Čhulālongkō̜n Mahāwitthayālai, 1964. / In Thai with English abstract. Typescript. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. 255-266).